UN accountability for violations of human rights. by Verdirame, Guglielmo
UN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS
G UGLIELM O V ERD I RAME
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR TH E PhD DEGREE IN L a w  
AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
UMI Number: U156099
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U156099
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
lH £ S £ S
r .
9513 .
1
Library
British L ib ra ry  of Political 
and Econom ic S c ien ce
Abstract
This thesis examines compliance with international human rights law in United Nations 
(UN) operations. It focuses on the provision o f  emergency humanitarian assistance, and 
on the assumption o f administrative powers by the UN both de jure (international 
administrations o f territory) and de facto (refugee camps). It is argued that in these 
operations the UN has the functional capacity to have a direct impact on individuals and 
on the enjoyment o f their fundamental rights. In part using case studies (the provision o f 
humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, the UN administrations in Kosovo and East 
Timor, and refugee camps in Kenya), it is shown that acts in violation o f human rights 
have indeed been committed in the course o f these operations. Although the UN is not 
itself a party to human rights treaties, various arguments are made to justify the 
applicability o f international human rights law to the UN, and to its specialised 
programmes and agencies. Mechanisms — political, administrative, judicial and semi-judicial 
- for ensuring the accountability o f the UN for violations o f human rights are examined. 
However, existing mechanisms are largely inadequate. They neither offer remedies to the 
victims o f  the violations, nor impose sanctions on the perpetrators; their ability to modify 
future institutional conduct is also limited.
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Introduction
Until no t so long ago the accountability o f the United Nations (UN) for violations o f 
hum an rights would have probably been labelled as an “academic question”, where the 
w ord  “academic” has the rather disparaging meaning o f ‘scholarly to the point o f 
being unaware o f  the outside world’.1 Nowadays, however, it is evident that 
international institutions, and the UN in particular, have developed the functional 
capacity to have a direct impact on individuals. Indeed, there are various situations in 
which states have relinquished functions and responsibilities, and even effective power 
and control over a territory, to UN bodies and agencies. In examining the UN’s 
obligations in the sphere o f human rights and its accountability for their violation, this 
thesis focuses on the provision o f humanitarian assistance, and on the assumption o f 
administrative control by the UN over a territory and a population both de jure (for 
instance, in the international administrations in Bosnia and in Kosovo) and de facto (as 
is the case in refugee camps).
T he topic for this thesis was conceived in the course o f research on refugee rights 
which I conducted in East Africa in 1997, while employed as a research officer at the 
Refugee Studies Programme, University o f  Oxford. A disquieting finding o f  this 
research was that some o f the most glaring abuses o f the rights o f refugees were in 
practice the result o f  actions, omissions and policies o f humanitarian agencies, and 
especially o f the Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). During one o f my first visits to a refugee camp, in Kenya in 1997,1 found 
evidence o f the imposition o f collective punishment on the entire population o f the 
camp on two separate occasions. Refugees, whose survival depended almost entirely 
on food aid, were subjected to the punitive suspension o f food distribution after 
protest had taken place in the camp against some UNHCR policies and practices. It 
soon became clear that, in part through the establishment - alongside other parallel 
institutional arrangements - o f an extra-judicial and administrative system separate 
from that o f the state, UNHCR exercised effective control in this and other refugee 
camps.2
1 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.).
2 In the course of subsequent fieldwork in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Liberia, I could 
verify that what had happened in Kakuma was not an isolated incident and that human rights violations 
in refugee camps are endemic.
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The example o f  collective punishment in refugee camps illustrates one o f  the main 
propositions in this thesis, i.e. that the UN has developed the capacity to have a direct 
impact on individuals and to violate their fundamental rights in the course o f its 
operations. The other side o f my argument is that, despite the applicability o f  human 
rights obligations to the UN, the international legal framework regulating UN 
operations and UN accountability is inadequate failing to take into account the wide 
powers that are in practice exercised by the UN in these circumstances.
O ne difficulty with defining the topic for this thesis was that UN operations have 
grown in quantity and quality to such an extent as to make a cohesive all- 
encompassing approach to their study almost impossible. Factual and legal differences 
between different UN operations and interventions are significant. There are at least 
five categories o f  operations in which human rights violations can occur, or have 
indeed been reported to occur:
(a) The activities o f  international financial institutions. The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have been accused o f imposing projects and policies that 
violate human rights or that are detrimental to the environment. The impact o f these 
organisations on individuals, albeit considerable, is, however, usually mediated rather 
than direct; it is normally the consequence o f  the political pressure they exercise on 
the state, often in conjunction with bilateral donors.
(b) Security Council action. The Security Council has been accused o f violating human 
rights, and humanitarian law, mainly as a result o f the use o f its Chapter VII powers. 
Examples include sanctions (Iraq), the implementation o f a military enforcement 
action (Iraq), the imposition o f an arms embargo that prevents people facing genocide 
from defending themselves (Bosnia), and the failure to intervene to prevent a genocide 
(Rwanda or Cambodia). The acts and omissions in question are imputable to the 
Security Council whose members would bear ultimate political (and, if applicable, 
legal) responsibility.
(c) Peacekeeping operations. This category overlaps to some extent with (b). 
Peacekeeping operations vary significantly in terms o f  mandate, size, and command
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structure. As a result, the risk, or actual occurrence o f  violations o f humanitarian law 
and human rights can change remarkably from one operation to the other.
(d) Humanitarian assistance. The provision o f  emergency humanitarian assistance has 
become one o f the main areas o f multilateral action. Within the UN, at least four o f 
the main agencies are primarily or significantly devoted to it — UNHCR, the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the 
W orld Food Programme (WFP). In many an emergency, UN agencies are the primary 
providers o f  essential services, such as water, food, sanitation, health, and education. 
The power they exercise in these circumstances is enormous, as is their direct impact 
on the lives o f  the millions o f  people who depend on this assistance.
(e) Administration o f  territory. International administration o f territory has attained 
prominence in the media in recent years as a result o f the establishment o f UN 
administrations in Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. International 
administrations are not, however, an entirely new phenomenon, and are presumably 
going to be increasingly resorted to in the future as a means o f post-conflict 
intervention. In other situations, UN agencies assume administrative powers in a de 
facto manner. With millions o f  refugees living in them the world over, UNHCR- 
administered refugee camps are the main example o f de facto administration, and one 
o f the best kept “secrets” o f international governance.
In this thesis, I focus on the last two categories o f operations - the provision o f  
emergency humanitarian assistance, and the administration o f  territory by the UN - 
mainly because o f  the marginal attention that these operations have so far received 
from legal scholars. Humanitarian assistance has been examined from various 
viewpoints, but so far the contribution o f lawyers has for the m ost part dealt with 
questions such as the existence o f a right to humanitarian assistance, whilst the 
question o f  compliance with human rights law by the international institutions 
providing this assistance - or indeed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - has 
been neglected. There is also a gap between the social sciences literature in this area, 
which has drawn attention to the socio-economic impact o f international actors, and 
the legal literature, which has remained for the most part oblivious to these 
denunciations. As far as the administration o f territory is concerned, only a few
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authors have dealt with de jure administrations, while the de facto exercise o f 
governmental authority has been almost entirely ignored. This thesis also contains 
numerous references to peacekeeping operations, which bear important similarities 
with the operations I am examining. I did not devote a separate chapter to 
peacekeeping, however, because it has already been the object o f extensive scholarly 
work. Moreover, the pervasive role o f troops-contributing states in the conduct o f 
peacekeeping operations distinguishes them from humanitarian operations and from 
the administration o f territory.
There are also important inherent differences between the categories o f  operations on 
which I have chosen to concentrate, and the other categories — the activities o f 
international financial institutions and Security Council action. Firstly, it is in the 
provision o f  humanitarian assistance and in the administration o f territory that the 
direct impact upon individuals o f the institutional activities o f the UN is m ost evident. 
Secondly, violations o f human rights in the course o f  these operations are normally 
the direct result o f actions and decisions o f  UN personnel, rather than o f decisions o f 
representatives o f states (as is the case with the Security Council). They are an 
expression, albeit a pathological one, o f the bureaucracy o f the Organisation. Finally, 
the institutions in category (a) — the World Bank and the IMF — are specialised 
agencies o f the UN, and have a different legal status.
This thesis first examines the origins o f the international legal regime that regulates 
international institutions and humanitarian multilateralism (Chapter I). A genealogical 
analysis o f norms is fruitful as part o f  a critical approach to the concrete functioning 
o f a legal regime. Some o f the basic norms regulating international institutions were 
crystallised at a time when international institutions were facing an upward struggle for 
self-affirmation in an entirely state-centric world. Humanitarian struggles have often 
been conducted unilaterally, and the process o f canvassing support and organising a 
multilateral effort has been fraught with difficulties, as the history o f the centennial 
campaign to end the slave trade demonstrates.
Chapter II examines one o f the key legal issues, the applicability o f international 
human rights law to the UN (with some references to humanitarian law). The rules on 
international institutional responsibility are also dealt with in this chapter. Although
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the examples are for the most part drawn from the operations examined in Chapter 
III and IV, the legal arguments developed in this chapter are susceptible o f application 
to other international institutions and to the full spectrum o f institutional activities.
Chapter III looks into the provision o f  humanitarian assistance by the UN. I t 
discusses the general international legal framework applicable to the provision o f such 
assistance, and examines a case-study — the provision o f multilateral assistance in 
Afghanistan — that illustrates some o f the legal difficulties and dilemmas in this type o f 
operation. It is submitted that the provision o f  humanitarian assistance by the UN in 
Afghanistan in 1996-2000 violated the principle o f  non-discrimination.
Chapter IV examines the assumption o f  administrative powers by the UN. It discusses 
the practice o f  the UN in de jure administrations, with a brief reference to the 
experience o f the League o f Nations. The Chapter then analyses the exercise o f de facto 
governmental authority by UNHCR in refugee camps, using refugee camps in Kenya 
as the main case-study.
Finally, Chapter V  discusses existing mechanisms for accountability. Their 
effectiveness is assessed both in the light o f existing practice and on the basis o f their 
hypothetical application to some o f the situations examined in the previous Chapters. 
In discussing the effectiveness o f  existing mechanisms, some proposals for change 
and improvement are put forward. Most, but not all, o f  these suggestions are made 
not so much from a law-as-it-should-be (lexferenda or droit desiderable) perspective, but 
rather as a way o f  reviving ‘juristic conceptions’, as well as existing legal principles and 
categories to make sure that they can effectively address the realities o f  these situations 
rather than ‘obscure them’.3 In the conclusion, I outline some o f the challenges that lie 
ahead.
3 Lighthouses of Crete and Samos (France v. Greece), Judgment, (1937) PCIJ Series A/B, No. 71 at 127 
(diss. op. o f Judge Hudson).
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CHAPTER I
Origins and Development of the International Legal Regime 
Regulating International Organisations and Humanitarianism
I.l. In troduction
The origins o f  both multilateralism and m odem  humanitarianism lie in the XIX 
century. The two became quickly intertwined with states relying on various forms o f 
inter-state co-operation and on the establishment o f international institutions for the 
pursuit o f common goals, among which humanitarian ones were prominent - e.g. the 
provision o f emergency humanitarian assistance, socio-economic development the 
relief o f  poverty, and, after the Second World War and particularly in the last two 
decades, the promotion o f the rule o f law and o f respect for human rights.
The campaign for the end o f the slave trade was the first attempt to establish an 
internationally recognised humanitarian standard. The legality o f the British maritime 
policy to end the trade was questioned at the time with arguments that evoke current 
debates on the limits o f humanitarianism and, in particular, on the legality o f  the use 
o f force for humanitarian purposes. Britain, the superpower o f  the time, soon realised 
that unilateral action was not sufficient and began to promote a multilateral effort to 
end the trade. A t the end o f the XIX century, sufficient consensus among states 
finally emerged to establish a Public International Union for the suppression o f the 
slave trade. O ther humanitarian movements commenced in the second half o f the 
XIX century, m ost notably the movement to “humanise” the conduct o f warfare 
spearheaded by the International Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC). In spite o f its 
non-governmental status, the principles developed by the ICRC to operationalise its 
humanitarian mandate became almost archetypical for multilateral humanitarianism in 
general.
The creation o f the League o f Nations represented a ‘paradigm shift5 in international 
relations. Undertaking a wide variety o f activities, the League became the first truly 
global international institution. The League promoted standard-setting in various 
areas; it was the first international institution to administer territory (the Saarland);
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and it embarked upon various humanitarian programmes, from the struggle against 
slavery and the slave trade to relief and settlement programmes for refugees.1 In many 
respects, the UN continued in the footsteps o f its predecessor and multilateralism 
grew steadily after World War II, despite the cold war slowing down progress for 
many years.
The foundations o f the international legal regime applying to international 
organisations were largely laid down in the period before the Second World War. The 
main concern at the time was to secure the presence o f these fledgling actors in an 
international arena completely dominated by states. It was believed necessary that 
international institutions be immune from national jurisdictions, and that 
accountability for their activities be essentially an internal matter so that they could be 
placed, as far as possible, beyond the reach o f  states. Later, and in a manner 
consistent with this approach, international organisations were shielded from being 
sued by states in the World Court, despite being able to avail themselves o f the 
advisory jurisdiction o f the Court. The view that international organisations are 
potential victims o f  states is still dominant today, but jars with developments in the 
last decades, m ost notably with the quantitative and qualitative expansion o f 
international institutions.
Since the end o f  the Second World War, international institutions, both within the 
“United Nations (UN) family” and without it, have proliferated. They have 
undertaken tasks, and have carried out operations in different fields and on a much 
larger scale than ever before. Despite this expansion certain key aspects o f the legal 
regime governing the activities o f  international organisations have remained static. As 
a result, the legal regulation o f the activities o f  international institutions lags behind 
reality in many ways, and does no t offer solutions to some serious problems raised by 
their activities.
Institutional expansion has thus often been dysfunctional. An examination o f  the 
practice o f various organisations in the UN family the powers and functions shows 
that the powers that they actually exercise often go beyond the terms o f  their original 
mandates. Their actual modus operand! has come about as a result o f policy statements,
1 C. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe (1995).
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internal guidelines, but also ‘unwritten’ codes and practices: together these often 
constitute an informal statute which regulates the ways in which organisations operate 
on the ground.
1.2. T h e  Struggle to E n d  the  Slave T rade  an d  th e  O rig ins o f 
In terna tiona l H um anitarian ism
(a) The initial phase
The Vienna Congress o f 1815 is commonly heralded as the starting point o f the 
process o f  organisation o f the international community o f states.2 Although no stable 
international institution was established, the principle o f regular consultations among 
European powers was laid down. The purported aim o f these consultations was to 
avoid the frequent recourse to war that had characterised European history before 
then.
The Vienna Congress also saw the adoption o f  a declaration that condemned the 
slave trade, one o f  the first examples o f a pronouncem ent by representatives o f states 
on a humanitarian matter.3 The declaration was adopted largely because o f British 
pressure. That the abolition o f the slave trade had reached such a high position on 
the British national agenda as to induce British leaders to raise it in Vienna was due to 
the strength o f the abolitionist movement in Britain. Normally inspired and 
dominated by religious organisations, but also comprising private individuals and 
secular associations that had been influenced by the ideas o f the Enlightenment, the 
abolitionists had developed a network o f support across Britain that became a very 
effective way for promoting momentous social change at first in Britain and then on 
an international scale. With their assiduous campaigning since the 1780s they obtained 
a landmark victory with the adoption in 1807 o f  the Slave Trade Abolition Act.4 The
2 D. Armstrong, The Rise of International Organisation. A  Short History (1982); C. Archer International 
Organisations (2nd ed., 1992) at 6-7.
3 Declaration o f the Eight Courts Relative to the Abolition o f the Slave Trade, 8 February 1815, in N. 
G. Grewe (ed.) Fontes Historiae Juris Gentium (1992), Vol. 3 /1 , at 376 and in Martens, NR, T, II, 432. 
Also: Declaration o f Eight European Courts on the Abolition o f the Slave Trade, 8 February 1815.
4 The first European country to abolish the slave trade officially was Denmark in 1802, even though 
slavery was still lawfully practised in some o f her colonies for another decade (Daget, The Abolition 
of the Slave Trade’, in J. F. Ade Ajayi (ed.), General History of Africa. Africa in the X IX  Century Until the 
1880s (1989) 64). Britain had been among the most important slave-trading nations in the 18th century 
after the Peace Treaty o f  Utrecht in 1713 had secured her monopoly o f the trade to Latin America.
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abolitionist movement constituted one o f  the first examples o f a civil society 
movement propounding a humanitarian cause.5 It found in Britain a naturally fertile 
soil owing to the strong economy and sizeable middle class, and to the traditional 
respect for free speech. However, even the progressive array o f legal scholars, 
politicians and socialites involved in the abolitionist movement cannot always be 
viewed as advocates o f human equality as we would intend it today. Indeed, ‘the 
emancipationists wished to free the slave within the minimum decency which 
humanity required, but they insisted on European guardianship... As a result, the 
primary goal was the creation o f  societies that, in the words o f French premier 
Georges Clemenceau, “complied with certain principles o f government” to be 
determined by Europeans’.6 Humanists - or humanitarians as we would say today - 
accepted the premise o f European guardianship as a ‘sacred trust o f civilisation’.
The declaration adopted in Vienna was later incorporated in the Final Act o f  the 
Congress and, as such, became part o f  the treaty that formed the basis for the 
European order following the Napoleonic wars.7 However, the wording o f the 
declaration was carefully calibrated in order to avoid the introduction o f  an obligation 
to abolish the slave trade. It may be seen as an early example o f  ‘legal soft law’. The 
European powers simply declared that:
considering the universal abolition o f the Slave Trade as a measure particularly 
worthy o f their attention, conformable to the spirit o f the times, and to the 
generous principles o f their august Sovereigns, they are animated with the 
sincere desire o f  concurring in the m ost prom pt and effectual execution o f
5 D. B. Davis, The Problem ofSlavery in the Age of Revolution: 1770-1823 (1975) at 68.
It is, however, important not to romanticise ‘civil society’ as a force that pushes change from the 
grassroots level and defies established power. As Gramsci illustrated — A. Gramsci, Quademi dal Carcere 
(Giulio Einaudi, 2nd ed., 1975) at 40-41, 1222-1224, 1235-1237, 1249-1250, 1603, 2010-2011 - civil 
society movements in the West are historically an expression o f the elite and are normally respectful o f  
the underlying balance o f power in a society. In the case o f the British anti-slavery movement, for 
example, the religious ideals o f Protestant reformists played a crucial role. The British elite was 
prepared to embrace the abolition o f the slave trade as part o f a ‘package’ o f religious reforms that 
aimed at rescuing Britain from evil. In fact, it has been argued that the association with die Jacobins 
and with Thomas Paine in the 1790s was counterproductive for the abolitionist movement See at 
Kaufmann, Pape, ‘Explaining Cosdy International Moral Action: Britain’s Sixty-year Campaign Against 
the Adantic Slave Trade’, 53 Int. Org. (1999) 631 at 662.
6 Siba N’zatioula Grovogui Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans. Race and Self- Determination Under 
International Law (1996) 79.
7 Art 118, No. 15 o f the Final Act o f the Congress o f Vienna, 9 June 1815, 64 CTS (1815) 492. The 
Final Act was signed by Great Britain, Austria, France, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Sweden- 
Norway.
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this measure, by all the means at their disposal, and o f acting in the 
employment o f these means, with all the zeal and perseverance which is due 
to so great and noble a cause.
The declaration added that how ever honourable their [the Sovereigns’] views, they 
cannot be attained without due regard to the interests, the habits, and even the 
prejudices o f their subject’. Hence, Britain’s hopes to reach a legally binding 
international commitment to end the slave trade, and to establish a common 
international maritime policy for the suppression o f this practice were crushed.8
In the years that followed the Congress o f Vienna, Britain pursued mainly 
unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to canvass enough international support in favour o f  a 
common international maritime policy against the slave-trade. At the heart o f the 
British policy lay the right to visit, search and seize vessels suspected o f  transporting 
slaves.9 The other European powers, wary o f British naval supremacy, feared that the 
international legal acceptance o f the right o f seizure would consolidate the policing 
role o f the British Navy.
Another strategy adopted by Britain in this period was to include a provision on the 
abolition o f the slave trade in treaties that it concluded with other countries for 
different purposes, for example in commercial agreements. By doing so, it often 
managed to establish the right o f  search and seizure bilaterally.10 For instance, the 
Hammerton Treaty o f 2 O ctober 1845 between Britain and the Sultan o f Muscat 
allowed the Royal Navy to search, seize and confiscate vessels belonging to the 
subjects o f the Sultan suspected o f transporting slaves.11 Abolitionist clauses were also 
included in some o f  the agreements that Britain concluded with African chiefdoms at
8 The inclusion o f an abolitionist clause in a treaty which Britain concluded with France the year 
before the Congress had seemed to indicate that obtaining such a legal commitment from the other 
European counterparts could be possible (Additional Articles to the Definitive Treaty o f Peace and 
Amity between Austria, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Sweden and France, 30 May 1814, 63 
CTS (1814-15) 193).
9 After failing to achieve this in Vienna, Britain tried again at the Congress o f Verona in 1822 but her 
initiative foundered on this occasion, too. Davis, supra note 5 at 35.
10 R  Howell, The Royal Naty and the Slave Trade (1987) at 9. For a complete list o f the treaties that 
contained a clause on the abolition o f the slave trade signed by Britain until 1850. See also R. 
Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Latv (3rd ed., 1879) at 420-421.
11 Art 3, Agreement between Great Britain and Muscat for the Termination o f the Export of Slaves, 2 
October 1845, 99 CTS (1845-46) 27. In the preamble it was stated that the Sultan was agreeing to the
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the time o f her colonial expansion in the continent.12 Throughout the XIX century 
Britain also made recognition o f the states that had gained independence in Latin 
America conditional upon their total renunciation o f the slave trade.
However important, these bilateral agreements were not per se sufficient to create a 
generally binding international standard against the slave trade, so long as the main 
European powers did no t become parties to them. Convincing the European powers 
proved much harder. Throughout the XIX century, Britain continued to stop foreign 
vessels on the Atlantic ocean, particularly in front o f the West African coast, generally 
incurring the protest o f the states concerned. In the 1840s, the British Navy, officially 
authorised by Parliament, searched Portuguese and Brazilian ships unilaterally. In the 
case o f Brazil, the British intervention was particularly aggressive, and involved the 
burning o f ships o f slave traders in Brazilian territorial waters and harbours. This 
nearly led to a war with Brazil, averted when Brazil finally caved in and accepted to 
ratify a treaty giving British ships a right o f  search and visit.13
The British position was not always consistent. The British were alert to national 
security issues, and were naturally more prepared to coerce comparatively less 
powerful states like Portugal, Brazil or Cuba, than the United States o f America (US) 
or France. Indeed, in official dealings with US and French officials, Britain for the 
m ost part maintained that she did no t claim a right to search and seize vessels 
belonging to countries with which she had no t entered into any agreement conferring 
mutual rights o f search and visit.14 At times, however, Britain did argue that her 
warships were entitled to examine the papers o f foreign vessels and, if necessary, to
end o f the slave trade ‘in deference to the wishes o f Her Majesty and o f the British nation, and in 
furtherance o f the dictates o f humanity’.
12 See for instance: Engagement between Great Britain and King Fanatoro and the Chiefs o f Cape 
Mount (West Africa), 2 January 1846, 99 CTS (1845-46) 272; Treaties between Great Britain and the 
Chiefs o f Sano and Moricaryah, Malaghea, Fouricane and Benira (West Africa), 20, 23 and 28 May 
1845, 98 CTS (1845) 205. These agreements normally contained provisions on free trade and access o f  
British goods to local markets, as well as other provisions constituting the seeds o f the colonial system 
o f ‘indirect rule’ (M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Continental Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism (1996) 
at 17).
13 Kaufimann and Pape, supra note 4 at 659.
14 See, for instance, letter from the Earl o f Aberdeen to Mr Everett, 20 December 1841, XXX British 
and Foreign State Papers (1841-42) 1178. A discrepancy between stated practice and actual practice 
characterised both British and US policy in this area. In fact, the US, where the slave trade — but not 
slavery - had been banned in 1793, was clearly aware o f the fact that vessels under the American flag 
were engaging in the trade but did not take active steps to suppress it. Britain, on the other hand, 
stated that it was not searching vessels under foreign flags, unless there was a treaty authorising the 
British fleet to do so. It nonetheless continued to police the seas, especially o ff the West African coast.
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board the ship.15 O ther countries, like the US for instance, categorically denied that 
the British fleet had such a right, and, perhaps no t so surprisingly, Britain herself 
vehemently denied the existence o f  such a right when Haiti, having banned the slave 
trade, began to stop and search foreign vessels.16
In the still numerous cases in which the British Navy sought and seized vessels o f 
countries with which there was no specific agreement authorising this practice, Britain 
was formally contravening principles o f international law that she had declared to 
recognise. In these cases, she would usually deny that she had searched or seized such 
vessels — thereby implicitly ‘confirming’ the legal validity o f the principle that there 
was no general right to stop and search — but would also refer to principles o f 
‘humanity and universal morality’ at a time in which the natural law tradition was still 
very strong.17
(b) Judicial attitudes
The attitude o f  courts was cautious when they dealt with cases o f foreign ships seized 
on the high seas by the Royal Navy for trading in slaves. In the he Louis case, the 
High Court o f Admiralty reversed the decision o f the vice-admiralty court that had 
condemned a French ship for engaging in the slave trade.18 In his judgment, Sir 
William Scott explained that there was no right o f search in time o f peace and that 
the slave trade could no t be equated to piracy and, as such, treated as a crime jure 
gentium. Unlike the pirates, slave-traders did not, in his view, engage in the ‘act o f 
freebooters, enemies o f  the human race, renouncing every country, and ravaging 
every country in its coasts and vessels indiscriminately, and thereby creating an 
universal terror and alarm’.19 Slave-traders were ‘persons confining their transactions 
(reprehensible as they may be) to particular countries, without exciting the slightest 
apprehension in others’.20 The different treatment that international law reserved to 
pirates and slave-traders is revealing. Pirates were seen as disruptive o f  public order 
since they interfered with the safety o f  navigation and with commerce; on the other
15 Letter o f  Viscount Palmerston to Mr Stevenson, 27 August 1841, XXX British and Foreign State 
Papers (1841-42) 1152.
16Letter o f Mr Stevenson to Viscount Palmerston, 27 February 1841, XXX British and Foreign State 
Papers (1841-42) 1137.
17 See for instance Noyes ‘Christianity and Late XIX Century British Theories o f International Law’ in 
M. W. Janis, The Influence of Religion on the Development of International haw (1991).
18 he houis, (1817) in Parry (ed.) British International haw Cases (1965) Vol. Ill at 691.
19 Id. at 705.
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hand, slave-traders, who certainly caused much greater suffering, were not considered 
hostes humani generis.
The Court rejected the argument that the right o f  visit and search derived from the 
need to enforce Britain’s own navigation laws by checking the nationality o f a ship to 
ensure that she was not disguising her ‘true’ flag. Considerable weight was given to 
the fact that a significant number o f countries were still practising slavery and that 
Britain could not impose its will on them.21 The High Court o f  Admiralty upheld this 
precedent in other decisions.22
There were, however, also signs o f  a change in judicial attitudes. The 1822 case United 
States v. The L a Jeune Eugenie23 concerned a French vessel which was carrying slaves and 
had been seized by an American warship on the coast o f  Africa. The French consul 
protested that the American courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The Circuit 
Court stated that the preliminary jurisdictional matter concerned the international 
legal status o f the prohibition o f  slave trade. It was held that ‘at the present m om ent 
the traffic is vindicated by no nation, and is admitted by almost all commercial 
nations as incurably unjust and inhuman’;24 as a result ‘in all cases, where it is not 
protected by a foreign government, [the courts will have] to deal with it as an offence 
carrying with it the penalty o f confiscation’.25 The fact that France no t only had 
abolished the slave trade in law but had also ceased to tolerate its practice by her 
citizens was decisive. The court still deemed it necessary to distinguish this case from 
other cases in which the slave trade is carried out with the consent o f a state. It 
explained,
The independence o f  nations guarantees to each the right o f guarding its own
honour, and the morals and interests o f  its own subjects. N o one has a right
20 Ibid.
21 ‘To press forward to a great principle by breaking through every other great principle that stands in 
the way o f its establishment; to force the way to the liberation o f Africa by trampling on the 
independence o f other states in Europe; in short, to procure an eminent good by means that are 
unlawful is as little consonant to private morality as to public justice’ (Le Louis, supra note 18, at 703).
22 For instance in San Juan Nepomuceno, Yambi, (1824) 1 Hag. Adm. 265, in Parry (ed.), supra note 18 at 
711 and in Buron v. Denman, ibid. (Vol. VI) 385.
23 United States v. La The Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, (2) Mason’s Reports 409. The case is also in 
Dickinson A  Selection of Cases and Other Readings on the Law of Nations (1925) 13.
24 Id. (La Jeune Eugenie) at 847.
25 Ibid.
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to sit in judgement generally upon the actions of another... No nation has 
ever yet pretended to be the custos morum o f the whole world; and though 
abstractedly a particular regulation may violate the law of nations, it may 
sometimes, in the case of nations, be a wrong without a remedy— 26
In a later case, in 1841, concerning fugitive slaves from a Spanish colony, the Supreme 
Court of the United States declared that the slave trade as an ‘atrocious violation of 
human rights’, and held that the US was not under an obligation to return them to 
the Spanish authorities.27
(c) The progressive adoption of treaty standards
On the international plane, the most significant outcome of British efforts was the 
adoption of a multilateral treaty on the slave trade in 1841. Five European powers 
were party to it - Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia.28 This treaty 
established mutual rights of search and visits to be exercised by warships of the 
contracting parties when there were ‘reasonable grounds’ for suspecting that a 
merchant vessel belonging to any of the parties to the treaty was engaged in the slave 
trade (Art. 2). Although this treaty instituted a form o f international co-operation for 
policing the High Seas, it did not go as far as establishing universal jurisdiction for the 
suppression of the slave trade. Proceedings for the confiscation o f the vessels could 
be started only before ‘the competent Tribunal of the Country to which she 
belongs’.29 At that time only piracy thus met the definition of a crime jure gentium, for 
which universal jurisdiction existed. Whereas slave traders were often referred to as 
‘pirates’ in public statements, their treatment under the international law remained 
substantially different.
26 Ibid.
27 The United States v. The Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518.
28 Treaty of London for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, 20 December 1841 (Martens, T. 
XII, 170; 92 CTS (1841-32) 437). On 24 February 1848, Belgium acceded to this treaty, but France 
never ratified it. Fischer, ‘The Suppression of Slavery in International Law’, 3 International Law Quarterly 
(1950) 28.
29 Art. 10, Treaty of London, id.. The principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state for 
offences committed on the High Seas was still invoked by France in the Lotus case, Judgment, (1927) 
PCIJ Reports Series A, No. 10). The Court held that there was no principle of customary international 
law ‘in regard to collision cases to the effect that criminal proceedings are exclusively within the 
jurisdiction o f the State whose flag is flown...’ See also Fischer, supra note 28 at 45.
The 1890 Brussels Conference recognised the right to stop vessels under 500 tons in 
the open sea suspected o f trading in slaves, and to examine their papers.30 Mutual 
rights o f search and visit were established, but their exercise vis-a-vis vessels 
belonging to non-state parties was expressly excluded. This provision, which was 
legally superfluous merely confirming a general rule o f  treaty law {pacta tertiis nec nocent 
nec prosunt), implicitly recognised that the enforcement o f  the ban on the slave trade 
could no t yet be considered part o f customary international law.31 The Brussels 
Conference also established an International Maritime Bureau in Zanzibar to gather 
information and documentation from all the powers involved in the suppression o f 
the trade.32 Albeit its powers were limited compared to contemporary international 
organisations, the Bureau represented one o f  the first concerted efforts to establish a 
multilateral institution for humanitarian purposes. The twinning o f multilateralism and 
humanitarianism was inaugurated, and it would grow enormously in the following 
century.
The right to stop and board a ship on high seas suspected o f  being involved in the 
slave trade acquired customary status in the following decades, although, as is often 
the case with customary law, it is difficult to identify the precise m om ent in time 
when this happened. By the beginning o f the XX century m ost commentators in 
international law argued that this right could be exercised only on the basis o f a treaty 
provision.33
While before the First World War the attempts to introduce a ban had been limited 
to the slave trade, after the War slavery per se became illegal with the adoption o f the 
Slavery Convention in 1926.34 The Final Act o f  the Berlin Conference had expressly 
referred to the existence o f slavery (Arts. 42), but had fallen short o f  prohibiting it. 
The idea that international law could go as far as limiting the sovereignty o f states and
30 Art. 42, General Act o f the Brussels Conference on the African Slave Trade, 2 July 1890, Martens 
NRG II, XVII, 345; 173 CTS (1890). Oppenheim, International Law Vol. I (1st ed., 1905) at 321. All
European States, the US, Persia, Turkey, Zanzibar and the Congo Free State signed and ratified the
General Act. Trebilcock, ‘Slaver/ in 8 EngchpaecUa ofPubHc International Law (1985) 482. Fischer, supra 
note 28 at 49.
31 Art. 45, General Act o f the Brussels Conference.
32 Chapter V (Arts. 74-80, General Act o f the Brussels Conference, supra note 30.
33 See L. Oppenheim, supra note 30 at 347 and J. Westlake International Law, Vol. I (1904) at 166-167. 
Sir Robert Phillimore however argued that the slave trade was a legal as well as a natural crime*. 
Phillimore, supra note 10 at 410.
34 Slavery Convention (1926) 60 LNTS 253.
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impose obligations on the treatment o f individuals took some time to be accepted, 
and, when it finally was, freedom from slavery became the first human right protected 
under international law. The right o f  search, visit and seizure o f  ships engaged in the 
slave-trade also became part o f customary international law in the period during the 
two wars. Any remaining doubt that this was so was dispelled with the adoption o f 
the Geneva Convention on the High Seas in 1958 — which included a provision to 
this effect and was expressly declaratory o f customary international law existing at the 
time.35
(d) The campaign to end the slave trade and the origins o f humanitarianism
O ne can only speculate on the course that international law would have taken, had 
British diplomacy been successful in its efforts to create international norms that 
established the right o f visit, search and seizure o f  any vessel engaged in the slave 
trade. The fact that it proved very difficult even for Britain, the world’s leading super­
power in the XEX century, to overcome international resistance to the suppression o f  
the slave trade testifies to the enduring strength o f  the principles o f the freedom o f 
the high seas, and o f  national sovereignty.
Interesting parallels can be drawn between the contemporary debate on 
humanitarianism and the legal, moral and political debates around the end o f the slave 
trade. The opposing interpretations o f the anti-slavery movement which have 
emerged among historians are still relevant to the current debate on the value o f  
humanitarianism and humanitarian interventions.36 According to one historical 
interpretation o f this phenomenon, which we could term ‘realist’ or ‘sceptical’, there 
were no true humanitarian concerns behind the end to the slave trade: Britain and the 
abolitionists were moved exclusively by their own economic interest and, in a 
machiavellian way, they sought to create a ‘humanitarian discourse’ to justify their 
actions.37 Realism also characterises Foucault’s analysis o f another great reform which 
took place in the late XVIII and early XIX centuries and which is also often 
connected to the rise o f  the ‘humanitarian conscience’, the reform o f the penal 
system that led to the prohibition o f  torture and to the affirmation o f detention as
35 Art. 22, Convention on the High Seas (1958) 450 UNTS 11. It was later confirmed by Art. 110, 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea (1982) UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122.
36 T. Bender (ed.) The Anti-slavery Debate. Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation 
(1992).
37 E. Williams Capitalism and Slaveryiy^Wt).
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the standard form o f punishment. Indeed, Foucault argued that, in spite o f its avowed 
humanitarian ethos, the aim o f this reform was no t ‘to punish less, but to punish 
better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with 
more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish into the social body’.38
According to a different way o f viewing the campaign to end the slave trade, the 
abolitionists movement represented a mom ent o f real growth in humanitarian 
sensibility, a strengthening o f ‘our feeling o f responsibility for the stranger’s 
suffering’39 that was pivotal in the rise o f a new, and better, humanitarian conscience.
W hether the real motivation for suppressing the slave trade was altruistic or whether 
it was the result o f self-interested economic calculations, the claim that the end o f the 
slave trade represented a triumph for social justice is no t invalidated. An explanation 
that is more likely to be historically accurate views domestic political factors as 
decisive in determining the British military campaign to end the slave trade. 
Throughout the first half o f the XIX century the Protestant Dissenters, who were 
staunch abolitionists, held the key to the precarious balance o f  power between the 
two main parties in Britain, the Tories and the Whigs.40 Because o f their leverage, 
which thus depended on the working o f coalition politics in Britain at a particular 
time, the Dissenters could succeed in putting British naval action to stop the trade 
high on the political agenda in spite o f the huge economic costs o f the abolition in 
Britain and in her colonies first, and o f the military campaign to stop the trade later.
An important lesson that can be learnt from this excursus on the origins o f m odem 
humanitarianism is that since its beginning there has been a connection between 
hegemony and humanitarianism. Britain monopolised the great humanitarian 
campaign to end the slave trade in the XIX century. Today the broader discourse on 
humanitarianism, and especially the litmus test question o f the legality o f  humanitarian 
intervention, is still the prerogative o f northern states, the ‘givers’ in the aid 
relationship and at the same time those with political and military might.41 Many
38 M. Foucault Discipline and Vanish: The Birth of the Prison (1977) at 82.
39 Haskell, ‘Capitalism and the Origin o f Humanitarian Sensibility’ in Bender, supra note 36 at 128.
40 Kaufmann and Pape, supra note 4.
41 C. N. Murphy International Organisation and Industrial Change (1994) at 48. Murphy uses Gramscian 
theory to explain the creation and evolution o f international organisation. In particular, he observes, 
‘Gramsci’s concept o f a unified social order as a historical bloc linked by both coercive institutions of
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realists would see in this a confirmation o f the fact that humanitarianism is nothing 
but a smoke screen for new and perhaps more sophisticated forms o f hegemony. 
Moreover, the fact that a humanitarian label often implies immunity from criticism 
surely encourages the mis-representation o f  hegemonic projects in humanitarian 
terms. It is also im portant for activists to be aware o f  the hegemonic side o f 
humanitarianism, no t only because they might become the unwitting executioners o f 
a hegemonic strategy, but also because, learning from the experience o f the 
Dissenters in Britain, they could exploit national political divisions to further a 
humanitarian agenda.
W hether the abolitionist movement really sealed the birth o f a new humanitarian 
sensibility or not, its historical importance for the later developments o f international 
human rights and humanitarian law and international organisations can hardly be 
underestimated. Two Public International Unions concerning slave trade were 
founded: the Union for the Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, originally envisaged in the 
General Act o f the Brussels Conference in 1890, finally came to existence in 1912 and 
was endowed with two international offices, one in Zanzibar and the other one in 
Brussels attached to the Belgian Foreign Ministry, as it was common at the time for 
international organisations to operate directly from the office o f a ministry o f  one o f 
its founding members. The Union for the Suppression o f the White Slave Traffic, on 
the other hand, came to existence in May 1904.42 These two Unions became ‘the first 
major global international organisation with a mandate to end abuses o f  human rights 
around the world’.43
In the wake o f the anti-slave trade movement, other humanitarian campaigns were 
launched in the second half o f  the XIX century. King Leopold’s crimes in Congo 
became a cause celeb at the turn o f the century and a movement o f journalists, 
intellectuals and activists managed to put the brutal occupation o f Congo on the 
world’s agenda.44 O n another front, the founding o f  the ICRC in 1863 signalled the 
growth o f humanitarianism in another direction, that is the attempt to “humanise”
the state proper and consensual institutions o f civil society can help us remember that the world 
organisations, as co-operative institutions o f international civil society, have only been effective when 
they have worked alongside a coherent system o f coercive power at the international level, a stable 
military order’ (p. 10).
42 L. Oppenheim International Law (2nd ed., 1912) at 622.
43 Murphy, supra note 41 at 105.
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the conduct o f  warfare. Capturing and promoting this humanitarian spirit - ‘the spirit 
o f  Solferino’ — to the point o f almost becoming its embodiment, the ICRC played a 
pivotal role in the development o f humanitarian law. The campaign to end the slave- 
trade had demonstrated what a private movement could achieve in terms o f changing 
state practice and international law. The ICRC took this a step further by directly 
spearheading the adoption o f  treaties and becoming actively involved in the 
international law-making process.45 International law did no t limit itself to regulating 
the conduct o f war from the standpoint o f the state. A t the Hague Conferences 1899- 
1907, rules on the conduct o f warfare to protect the wounded, the sick and 
shipwrecked members o f the naval forces were introduced.46 ‘Geneva law’ took this 
further and extended the protection o f  the ‘victims’ o f armed conflict, including 
civilian populations.47
1.3. T h e  P ublic  In terna tional U nions
Public International Unions also trace their origins to the second half o f the XIX 
century. Unions established in that period include International Telegraph Union 
(1865), the Universal Postal Union (1874) and the International Railway Congress 
Association (1884). By 1914 there were many Unions dealing with such different 
matters as communication, infrastructure, trade, intellectual property, labour, 
agriculture, public order, relief, health, education, and even inter-state conflicts.48 
These Unions, which ‘would have been inconceivable before the first decades o f the 
Industrial Revolution’, were the predecessors o f  m odem  international organisations, 
but their organisational and institutional structure was embryonic compared to 
international organisations nowadays.
The body o f  treaty law that emerged from the establishment o f the Public 
International Unions was often referred to by the commentators o f  the time as
44 The history o f that movement is recounted in A  Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (1999).
45 The first humanitarian law treaty to be adopted as a result o f an ICRC initiative was the Convention 
for the Amelioration o f the Condition o f die Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864) 129 CTS 361.
46 The Hague Conferences also dealt with disarmament and with the peaceful settlement of disputes.
47 Greenwood, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) 1 at 19.
48 This sub-division is the one adopted by Murphy, id. at 47-48.
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‘international administrative law’.49 The rise o f the Unions was normally explained as a 
result o f  the development and expansion o f national public administrations since ‘the 
vast majority o f  the interests which are the objects o f  public administration have 
evolved and have by now become group interests in the community o f civilised states 
and, as such, [have become] international interests’.50 It was also pointed out that 
commercial interests o f states were best served by creating these forms o f 
international administration.51
The constituent instrument o f the Unions was a treaty which originated from a 
diplomatic conference convened after a public initiative or, in some cases, after the 
private initiative o f capitalists or pressure groups.52 Membership o f the Unions was 
open to all states, with the obvious exception o f those Unions that operated in a 
geographically defined area. Unions generally had permanent organs, normally a 
Commission, performing executive functions, and a ‘legislative’ body, the Congress or 
Conference.
Unanimity was usually a requirement for decisions.53 An important distinction in the 
Unions’ law, or international administrative law, was between the convention and the 
regkment, the former indicating the fundamental law, always treaty-based, that 
regulated the Unions, the latter referring to the resolutions o f the organs o f  the 
Unions.54 Using today’s preferred terminology, the convention corresponds to the 
binding constituent instrument o f an organisation, and the regkments to the non­
binding resolutions or decisions o f  the organs.
49 Borsi, ‘Carattere ed oggetto del diritto amministrativo intemazionale’, 12 Riv. It. Dir. Int. (1912) 368; 
N. L. Hill International Administration (1931); Reinsch, ‘International Administrative Law and National 
Sovereignty’, 3 AJIL  (1909) 1; P. S. Reinsch, Public International Unions: Their Work and Organisation. A  
Study in International Administrative Taw (1911). Schucking *L’ organisation intemationale’, 15 RGDIP 
(1908) 15.
50 Ullman’s Volkerrecht cited in Schucking, ibid. at 15 (note 1).
51 Hill, supra note 49 at 14-16.
52 Reinsch (1909), supra note 49 at 20.
53 Hill supra note 49 at 6. Reinsch adds the Sugar Commission, the Agricultural Institute and the 
Superior Council o f Health to the list o f Unions that allowed non-unanimous decisions in some cases 
(ibid. at 29).
54 Reinsch explains that ‘changes in the convention necessitate diplomatic action, and require, 
therefore, greater formality as well as more extensive deliberation. The presence of diplomatic 
representatives is always necessary when a convention is to be changed. Changes in the reglement may 
be made by technical delegates’, (ibid., p. 30).
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A t the outset, the Unions worked very closely with the governments o f the country in 
which their headquarters were situated. In some cases, the offices o f the Union were 
based at a ministry. Even the Unions that had separate offices - like the Telegraphic 
Union, the Postal Union, or the Labour Office, predecessor o f  the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) - operated closely with the host government, under 
whose supervision and direction they had been placed. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the nature o f the Unions as independent entities and the need to 
recognise them as international legal persons was quickly recognised. The 
Commission appointed by the Director o f  the International Agricultural Institute in 
1914 to investigate ‘the questions concerning the legal status’55 o f the Institute 
concluded that state parties to the 1905 Convention that had created the Institute had 
obliged themselves to give domestic legal recognition to the Institute. Such obligation 
was no t explicitly provided under that Convention, but - according to the 
Commission - it was implied under it. According to this interpretation, the 1905 
Convention established ‘54 different legal entities, all identical, except for their 
different nationality’.56 This conclusion was not shared by Fusinato, a member o f  the 
Perm anent Court o f Arbitration. In his view, the only possible construction was to 
recognise that the Institute ‘must be considered as a real international legal entity, 
composed o f the state parties to the 1905 Convention, and recognised as such in the 
territory o f  those states’.57 He also added that the law applicable to the Institute 
should be that deriving from the ‘personal statute o f the Institute (as resulting from 
the 1905 Convention and from the following reglementsf .58
The recognition that the Public International Unions were international legal persons 
was an acknowledgement o f the importance o f their functions. Immunities or 
privileges, however, were not normally bestowed upon the officials o f the Unions in 
the pre-1914 period, but this changed with the League o f Nations whose Covenant 
granted immunity to its officials (Art. 7, 4).59 The staff o f Public International Unions, 
unlike those o f subsequent organisations, were almost exclusively nationals o f  the
55 G. Fusinato, Avis sur les questions touchants la personality juridique de V Institut International d’ Apiculture 
(1914) at 3.
56 Ibid. at 5.
57 Ibid. at 8.
58 Ibid. at 8.
59 Oppenheim, supra note 42 at 516. Immunity and privileges will become a fundamental legal feature 
of IGOs later. The evolution o f the law on the immunities o f international organisations is examined
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country in which the Union had its headquarters. For example, the Swiss 
G overnm ent reserved m ost o f the positions in the Unions it hosted for its own 
citizens.60 Nevertheless, the principle that ‘the members o f  these international 
Commissions are not called to defend the interests o f their own country, but act - 
with all the freedom o f their conscience - for the benefit o f the union o f  countries 
which they represent’ had already been asserted in relation to the work o f the 
Unions.61 This paved the way for the creation o f  an international professional elite, 
which increased dramatically in size with the establishment o f the League o f Nations.
The establishment o f  the Unions also prom pted a re-definition o f national 
sovereignty. States had caved in to the preponderance o f  economic considerations 
and had accepted limitations on the exercise o f their sovereignty in various matters. 
As observed by Reinsch, the view that ‘everything must be avoided which would 
constitute a derogation o f the complete rights o f  sovereignty’ was abandoned.62
1.4. T h e  Inter-W ar Period: T h e  L eague o f N ations
The League o f Nations was the first international organisation that could claim to be 
‘global’. The League was not ‘global’ in the sense that its membership was universal — 
the US never acceded to the Covenant — or in the sense that it was truly 
representative o f every people in the world — the interests o f colonial peoples were 
no t in any way represented. Both in terms o f  its membership and o f the interests it 
represented, the League remained an essentially European club. However, the League 
was the first ‘global’ international institution in terms o f  the breadth o f  its 
constitutional competence that ranged from the peaceful settlement o f disputes to the 
prom otion o f welfare, free communication and disarmament (Art. 23 o f the 
Covenant). With the establishment o f  the League, there was a momentous 
acceleration in the process o f  international institutionalisation. The debate on 
‘international government’ in those years, often prom oted by national associations, 
went very far and proposals that would be deemed daring even by today’s standards
in Kunz, ‘Privileges and Immunities o f International Organisations’, 41 AJIL  (1947) 828. See also W. 
Jenks International Immunities (1961).
60 Reinsch (1909), supra note 49 at 33.
61 Schucking, supra note 49 at 15.
62 Reinsch (1909), supra note 49 at 10.
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were made and given serious consideration.63 In the end the League represented a 
compromise that fell short o f the suggestions o f the advocates o f a comprehensive 
form  o f international administration, but it still managed to embrace ‘a wide range o f 
interests, somewhat greater in extent than a casual reading o f the Covenant would 
intimate’.64
Usually blamed for its failure to maintain peace and to take resolute action against 
major breaches o f peace (by Italy in Ethiopia, by Japan in China, and by Germany in 
Europe in the 1930s), the League should still be credited with undertaking numerous 
initiatives in other areas, and with achieving some successes. I t established auxiliary 
organs to deal with economic and social questions (slavery and the slave trade, 
intellectual property, refugees, etc.). In the area o f welfare and labour conditions, the 
ILO, which was part o f the League system but enjoyed autonomy, achieved 
im portant results in part owing to the fact that it was no t beleaguered from the start 
by limited membership since the US was a member.65
In the humanitarian field, the League must be credited with establishing the first 
programmes for refugees and appointing Fridtjof Nansen as High Commissioner for 
Russian Refugees in 1921. Although mainly limited to Europe, the League’s 
involvement with refugees and other displaced persons soon expanded beyond 
Russian refugees. Unlike the current refugee regime, which is essentially centred on 
the provision o f  emergency relief, the League’s work for refugees aimed mainly at 
securing their legal status and at finding a durable solution through local integration. 
The only instance in which the League actively pursued the repatriation o f refugees 
was for Russian refugees, although in the end ‘only a fraction o f the total number o f  
refugees returned to their homeland’.66 Otherwise, at the time the preferred durable 
solution was the integration o f refugees in their host countries. The League played a 
pivotal role through the High Commissioner in the settlement o f Asia Minor Greeks 
expelled from Turkey as part o f the Greco-Turkish population exchange, o f ethnic
63 Dubin, ‘Transgovemmental Processes in the League o f Nations’, 37 Int. Org. (1983) 469.
64 Hill, supra note 49 at 79.
65 The US joined the ILO, although they never joined the League o f Nations. Although Italy, 
Germany and Japan withdrew from the ILO in the 1930s, the Soviet Union became a member, as did 
a number o f Latin American countries that had left the League o f Nations.
66 Skran, supra note 1 at 149.
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Bulgarians in Bulgaria, o f Armenian refugees in Syria.67 After 1933 an ad hoc High 
Commissioner was appointed to deal with German refugees. The first High 
Commissioner for Jewish Refugees, James McDonald, resigned after two years 
publicly denouncing the German Reich for its persecution o f  Jews and advocating a 
more proactive role o f the League.68
Such a functional and operative expansion could no t have taken place without the 
formation o f  a large body o f professional international civil servants. In order to 
protect them from pressure from states and to guarantee the independence o f the 
organisation, the Covenant extended diplomatic privileges and immunities to ‘officials 
o f the League when engaged on the business o f the League’ (Art. 7, 4). Before then, 
the grant o f  immunity to officials o f international organisations had been rare.69 The 
Covenant did not grant jurisdictional immunity to the League as a legal person, but it 
did confer some privileges on it such as the inviolability o f ‘buildings and other 
property occupied by the League o f its officials’ (Art. 7, 5). At any rate, in 1926 the 
League reached an agreement with the Swiss Government that essentially guaranteed 
the organisation’s immunity from lawsuits in Switzerland.70 This regulation o f the 
immunity o f  the League was seminal: the UN Charter ended up confirming the 
personal immunities o f UN officials, and added a general provision on the immunity 
o f the organisation (Art. 105, 1) which was fleshed out in two conventions.71 The 
immunity o f  the organisation and o f its officials became a central principle in the 
regulatory framework o f international institutions.72
The existence o f a professionalised civil service, in turn, facilitated the development 
o f an institutional ethos and an organisational identity, which with time became 
im portant factors in shaping institutional practice. The League’s building, with its 
sensational m odem  architecture, became a centrepiece for many career-minded and 
glamour-searching individuals, and for scores o f  dyed-in-the-wool socialites that
67 Exchange of Greek and Turkish "Populations, Advisory Opinion, (1925) PCIJ Series B, No. 10.
68 Skran, supra note 1 at 230 ff.
69 Kunz, supra note 59.
70 In the pre-1914 period, the European Danube Commission stood as an almost unique exception 
among international organisations, since it was endowed with immunity. See Kunz, id. at 857-859.
71 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the United Nations (1946) 1 UNTS 15; 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o f the Specialised Agencies (1947) 33 UNTS 261.
72 According to Brower, the UN Charter, by introducing the functional necessity doctrine, actually 
‘marked an historical shift towards the diminution o f international immunities’ (Brower, ‘International 
Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role o f  Municipal Courts’, 41 Virg. J. Int. L . (2000) 1 at 20).
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rotated around them. This social world o f high-flying League officials in Geneva in 
the 1920s and 1930s is brilliantly portrayed by Albert Cohen in Belle du Seigneur,; a 
riveting novel and a m ordant literary indictment o f  international careerism.73
The increased importance o f personal and organisational factors was not matched by 
the establishment o f mechanisms to ensure staff or organisational accountability, or 
o f  other corrective mechanisms to remedy dysfunctional performance. An im portant 
example o f the unprecedented powers with which the League o f Nations was vested 
and o f  their dysfunctional use is the administration o f  territory. The League was often 
severely criticised for the way it was administering the territories — Saarland and 
Danzig — for which it was responsible under the peace settlement.74 In Saarland, the 
powers o f the League’s administration were extensive, although France retained 
control o f  the mines and maintained a significant public order presence in the 
territory. In Danzig, on the other hand, the League had an essentially supervisory 
role. Throughout its existence, the League’s administration o f the Saarland was 
accused o f  oppressing the German population, and o f being acquiescent to the 
French policy o f  ‘gallicisation’ o f the Saarland.75
Another area in which the work o f  the League was seminal was economic 
restructuring in war-affected countries. For example, a committee was established in 
1921 to propose a scheme for economic reconstruction in Austria. A Commissioner- 
General, appointed by the Council o f the League and residing in Vienna, advised the 
Austrian government on financial matters. His consent was necessary to release 
money that formed part o f the credits granted to Austria. As a result o f  the 
recommendations o f  the committee and o f the work o f  the Commissioner, im portant 
policies were implemented such as the downsizing o f the civil service.76 In other 
instances in the 1920s, the League assumed some measure o f  administrative control in 
relation to economic reconstruction with the consent o f the affected country (e.g. in 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece).77 In the case o f Bulgaria, the work o f  the 
Commissioner o f the League was mainly related to refugees and the Commissioner’s
73 A. Cohen, Belle du Seigneur (Gallimard, 1968).
74 See Chapter IV.2(a).
75 W. H. Dawson, The Saar Territory: Its History, Population, Industry and Government by the Teague of Nations 
(1934) at 18 f£; Hill, supra note 49 at 96-99; R. Jones, S. S. Sherman, The Teague of Nations: From Idea to 
Reality (1927) at 164.
76 Hill, supra note 49 at 84-88.
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approval was necessary for the implementation o f plans for refugees that used 
external resources.78
The ILO deserves a special mention not only because it can be viewed even with 
hindsight as a success story in most respects, but also because it became the main 
welfare organisation within the circle o f  the League.79 The initial mandate o f the ILO 
was quite limited, but, pioneering a trend that would characterise other international 
institutions, the ILO quickly undertook functions that V en t well beyond the modest 
task assigned to it by article 396 in Part X III o f the Versailles Treaty’.80 The ILO’s 
modus operand!, which became typical o f  a certain type o f  welfare multilateralism, 
involved standard-setting, gathering and dissemination o f information, and, to a more 
limited extent, monitoring. The ILO did undertake an operational role on various 
occasions, but its operative functions were quite narrowly conceived and consisted 
mainly o f the provision o f technical co-operation to countries engaged in economic 
or legal reforms affecting the labour market.81 Although such technical co-operation 
is im portant and arguably had a considerable impact on different situations, the ILO 
never extended its operational role beyond this to include the assumption o f 
administrative responsibilities.
International institutional law was consolidated in the inter-war period, but the 
primary concern remained to secure the presence o f international institutions in a 
state-dominated world. The experience o f the League o f Nations, and o f the wide 
array o f  institutions, committees and other organs associated with it, moulded 
archetypical forms o f multilateral action that are still in place today. In some cases, the 
terms o f the debate are similar to current debates. Towards the 1930s the reform o f 
the League was on the agenda, but the predominant concern was related to the 
League’s failures in the maintenance o f peace rather than to its performance in other 
areas. The outbreak o f the war in 1939 cut short this debate.
77 Ibid.
78 See Skran, supra note 1 at 167 ff.
79 In 1929, the ILO budget amounted to one-third o f the total League budget (Hill, supra note 49 at 
113).
80 V. Y. Ghebali, The International Labour Organisation: A  Case-Study on the Evolution of UN Specialised 
Agencies (1988) at 13.
81 A good analysis o f ILO practice in this area is in Ghebali, supra note 80 at 242 ff.
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The Second World War posed enormous dilemmas for humanitarian action. The 
collapse o f the League o f Nations left only the ICRC in charge o f humanitarian 
operations during the war. The ICRC, whose model o f  intervention was premised on 
the principles o f  neutrality and impartiality,82 was confronted with one o f  its most 
difficult choices ever, the decision no t to publicise the evidence it possessed about the 
existence o f  the concentration camps and the extermination o f the Jews.83 In O ctober 
1942, a meeting o f the Committee had been convened to discuss what to do with this 
information. While it would appear that before the meeting the majority o f the 
members o f  the Committee had been in favour o f some public form o f 
condemnation o f the concentration camps, in the final vote all but one were finally 
persuaded that a public appeal would have been useless or even counter-productive. 
The fear o f being perceived as partisan, and o f the consequences that this could have 
had on the work o f  the ICRC in Axis-occupied Europe, were the main reasons for 
their final decision to abstain from any public condemnation o f the concentration 
camps. This episode in the history o f  the ICRC is emblematic o f  the limits o f  neutral 
and impartial humanitarianism. Humanitarian neutrality is yet another example o f  a 
principle that was conceived and consolidated in a different era but that 
anachronistically still govern much o f  today’s institutional practice.84
1.5. F rom  the  L eague to  th e  U N
(a) The steady growth o f multilateralism
Within a few years o f  its establishment, the UN already found itself entangled in the 
Cold War. The admission o f European states that had fallen under the sphere o f 
influence o f one or the other bloc, and the intervention in Korea were key questions 
that the Organisation addressed in the first decade o f  its existence. The Cold War 
however did no t completely stop the growth o f  multilateralism and the progressive 
qualitative and quantitative expansion o f  international institutions.85 Furthermore, as 
decolonisation increased the membership o f  the UN, international institutions had to
82 See Chapter III.3.
83 C. Moorehead, Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the Histoty of the Red Cross (1998) at xxiv-xxxi.
84 The ICRC is a non-governmental entity. However, its model o f humanitarianism, and in particular 
the principles o f neutrality, have pervaded the humanitarian activities o f other entities, including 
international institutions and other non-governmental organisations. On the incompatibility o f  
neutrality with human rights, see Chapter III.3.
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accommodate the claims and interests o f new members, most notably self- 
determination and socio-economic development.
With the exception o f the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), all 
other key institutional actors o f the UN that currently have a significant operational 
dimension were in place by 1951. Some o f the specialised agencies were created in the 
aftermath o f the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944 — the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Others, like the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), were established as new 
organisations in the 1940s, although they had predecessors in the League system. The 
ILO was one organisation that survived the dissolution o f the League, although its 
Constitution was amended and it became a specialised agency o f the UN. A number 
o f  im portant subsidiary agencies, like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle 
East (UNRWA), and UNHCR, had also come to existence by 1950. The World Food 
Programme (WFP) and UNDP were relative late-comers, the former established in 
1961 and the latter in 1965, to accommodate respectively the need to provide 
emergency food assistance in humanitarian crises and the developmentalist agenda o f 
many o f  the UN’s new members.
An im portant distinction for organisations in the UN family is between specialised 
agencies and subsidiary agencies (or specialised programmes). Specialised agencies, 
such as W HO, ILO, and the international financial institutions, are established by 
treaty and are, in all respects, self-standing international legal persons. Specialised 
programmes, on the other hand, like UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, are established by a 
resolution o f the General Assembly and are subsidiary organs o f  the UN. Despite 
their apparent lack o f  autonomy, the specialised programmes, however, play a crucial 
operational role, which is reflected in the expansion o f their budget.86
The UN was involved in field operations since its inception, when it provided relief in 
post-war Europe. The UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) co­
85 With a simile that is perhaps excessively vivid, Philip Allott writes that after the Second World War 
‘intergovernmental organisations multiplied like flies on rotting meat’ (Eunomia (2nd ed., 2001) xiii).
86 See Chapter 11.2(c).
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ordinated activities for the relief and repatriation o f  those who had been displaced by 
the war in Europe, and organised the repatriation o f some seven million persons in a 
few years.87 It was dismantled in June 1947, when the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) was established to deal with some 2 million refugees for w hom  
repatriation was no t possible. The IRO became the second largest operational 
specialised agency, with a staff o f nearly 3,000 persons at the peak o f its activities and 
a fleet o f forty ships.88 The IRO was eventually liquidated in 1951, and the Office o f 
the UNHCR was instituted. With m ost o f the work for European refugees from the 
war completed in the 1950s, UNHCR remained a relatively small organisation for the 
first two decades o f  its existence: in 1971 it still numbered only 350 staff,89 but in the 
late 1970s, following the refugee crisis in South East Asia, its expenditure more than 
tripled. The trend continued in the 1980s and 1990s, although a funding crisis hit the 
organisation in the second half o f the 1990s.90 The other main international 
institution responsible for refugees — UNRWA - was created in 1949. UNRWA began 
to act as an operational agency quite early on, focusing on housing and education.91 In 
some respects, UNRWA resembled the office o f the League’s High Commissioner 
for Refugees more than UNHCR, particularly because o f  the prominent role that 
refugees played in its administration.92 This in turn exposed UNRWA to accusations 
o f becoming ‘politicised’ and o f  espousing the Palestinian national cause rather than 
adhering strictly to the humanitarian terms o f its mandate.93
Although to some extent stifled by the confrontational climate o f the Cold War, on at 
least two occasions in the 1960s the UN succeeded in mounting operations on a large 
scale with a multifarious agenda (peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance and 
development, and administration). The m ost im portant o f these operations was the 
UN Operation in Congo (ONUC), 1960-64. ONUC was primarily a peace-keeping
87 L. Holbom, Refugees: A  Problem of Our Time (1975) Vol. 1 at 26. One major refugee crisis in the post­
war era in which international organisations did not play a crucial role was the population exchange 
between India and Pakistan, following the partition, in which some 14 million people moved across 
the border — still the largest recorded instance o f forced migration.
88 Ibid., at 30-33.
89 Ibid., Vol. II at 1399.
90 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees (2000) at 166-167.
91 See the various articles on UNRWA in the special issue o f the 2 (1) ]. Ref. St. (1989).
92 Ibid. See also L. Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law (1998).
93 For example, Perlmutter, Tatrons in the Babylonian Captivity o f Clients: UNRWA and World 
Politics’ , 25 Int. Org. (1971) 306.
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operation,94 but, in addition to its 20,000 soldiers on the ground, it also employed a 
staff o f some 3,000 for its civilian com ponent and performed im portant 
administrative functions. Various UN agencies operated in the Congo: for instance, 
UNHCR and the ILO ran a joint programme in Kivu province which had been 
affected by the arrival o f thousands o f Rwandan ‘Tutsi’ refugees after 1959, and 
UNESCO administered its largest educational programme up to that point. The other 
prom inent UN operation in this period was the UN Temporary Administration 
(UNTEA) in West Irian (West New Guinea) in 1962-63. Albeit for only a short 
period and smaller in size than ONUC, UNTEA exercised effective control in this 
territory, maintaining security and public order, organising the civil service and the 
judiciary and building some infrastructure.
As mentioned, the Charter strengthened the provisions in the League’s Covenant on 
the immunity o f  the organisation and on the independence o f  international civil 
servants. Indeed, Article 105 confers ‘such privileges and immunities as are necessary 
for the fulfilment o f its purposes’ on the Organisation and on its officials.95 Article 
100 affirms the independence o f civil servants from governments or ‘from any other 
authority external to the Organisation’, while Article 101 provides that ‘the 
paramount consideration in the employment o f  the staff and in the determination o f  
the conditions o f service shall be the necessity o f  securing the highest standard o f  
efficiency, competence, and integrity’. O ne need no t be a committed realist to 
acknowledge that, despite their loftiness, these provisions have often been 
disregarded, except for those conferring privileges and jurisdictional immunities on 
the UN. In the early years o f  the UN’s existence, the Secretary General had already 
accepted the fact that various member states “screened” their nationals before they 
could take up a position with the UN. In the case o f the USSR and other countries in 
the eastern bloc, such “screening” was largely conducted behind the scenes. The US, 
on the other hand, instituted an official body — the International Organizations 
Employees Loyalty Board — entrusted with the “screening” o f US nationals working 
for the UN. Far from contesting the legitimacy o f this step, the Secretary General 
entered into ‘a written secret agreement with the US D epartm ent o f State whereby
94 ONUC’s operational modalities blur the distinction between peace-keeping and enforcement action 
(N. White Keeping the Peace (1997) at 260-261). See also: R. Higgins, United Nations Peace-keeping 1946- 
1967 III: Africa (1980). In recent practice, this blurring has occurred even more distinctly (C. Gray 
International Lan> and the Use of Force (2000) 165 ff.).
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(...) applicants for and incumbents in UN Secretariat positions were “screened”, 
w ithout their knowledge, by US agents’.96 In the early 1950s, a number o f US 
nationals working for the UN even appeared before the US Senate’s Committee on 
Anti-American Activities, and some o f them lost their jobs. Some employees brought 
their cases to the UN Administrative Tribunal and received monetary compensation 
bu t they were not reinstated in their positions.97
There is no doubt that the actions o f the Secretary General at the time were in 
violation o f the Charter. Although the victims were awarded compensation, no other 
remedial steps were taken, and such overt interference with the independence o f  the 
international civil service continued unabated for many years. It was only in 1986, 
when the US courts finally deliberated on this matter, that the work o f the 
International Organizations Employee Loyalty Board was suspended. The District 
Court for the Eastern District o f  Pennsylvania held that Executive Order 10422, with 
which President Eisenhower had established the Board in 1953, was unconstitutional 
in that it violated the First Amendment rights o f  free speech and free association.98 
Although the District Court did not concern itself with the violation o f the Charter, 
its decision indirectly put an end to such violation, after years o f acquiescence and 
complicity on the part o f the very organs o f  the UN entrusted with ensuring the 
respect o f the Charter.
95 The immunity o f the UN and o f UN officials is discussed in Chapter V.
96 Ha2zard, ‘Reflections. Breaking Faith-I’, The New Yorker, 25 September 1989, 63 at 63.
97 The dismissal o f  these employees formed the basis for die damages award that then led to the 
Advisory Opinion o f the International Court o f Justice (ICJ) in Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by 
the U N  Administrative Tribunal ICJ Reports (1954) 47. The Administrative Tribunal had actually ordered 
that four o f the employees be reinstated, but the Secretary General found that it was ‘impossible or 
inadvisable’ to reinstate. Compensation in lieu o f reinstatement was thus awarded. See Cohen, ‘The 
International Secretariat — Some Constitutional and Administrative Developments’, 49 AJIL  (1955) 
295 at 307.
Other employees brought a similar case against the Director-General o f UNESCO who did not renew 
their contracts after they refused to appear before the International Organizations Employees Loyalty 
Board o f the US Civil Service. In informing them o f his decision, the Director-General o f UNESCO 
wrote, ‘I cannot accept your conduct as being consistent with the high standards o f integrity which are 
required o f those employed by the Organization’. Judicial bodies, however, opposed this obvious 
injustice: the Administrative Tribunal o f the ILO found in favour o f the employees, and the ICJ 
recognised the competence o f die Administrative Tribunal to hear their complaints and the validity o f  
its decision (Judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation upon Complaints 
Made against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports (1956) 77).
98 Hinton v. Devine, 633 F. Supp. 1023. See also Roy, ‘US Loyalty Program for Certain UN Employees 
Declared Unconstitutional’, 80 AJIL  (1986) 984.
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To protests against his connivance with practices that infringed the Charter, the 
Secretary General responded with an argument ‘that would henceforth be used by 
UN senior officials to deflect inquiry into malfunction and malpractice at the 
organization: “Everything you say will be used against this organization by the 
enemies o f  the United Nations’”.99 Given the tendency towards bureaucratisation,100 
and owing to the fact that the operational practice o f the UN is also a function o f  its 
institutional culture, these ‘original sins’ played an important and much-neglected role 
in the development o f the fledgling international civil service and in shaping its ethos. 
In the short term,
The number o f international employees who, in a steady draining, left the 
United Nations system during its first decade because o f intimidation, 
indignation or disillusion may be estimated at several hundred. Some were 
encouraged to resign with special payments, sixty others were removed as part 
o f an “efficiency survey”, carried out in 1952, whose records were immediately 
destroyed.101
Despite constraints on the independence o f  their civil service, the UN continued to 
expand and to undertake an ever greater operational role, a process that accelerated in 
the late 1960s and 1970s when the UN provided humanitarian relief in various 
conflicts — in Biafra, Ogaden, Bangladesh, and Indochina. This process continued in 
the 1980s and, as is almost a cliche to say, it gained momentum after the end o f  the 
Cold War, when it became easier to reach the necessary political consensus for 
operations that were not simply humanitarian. Such quantitative and qualitative 
expansion, however, was not always accompanied by a careful analysis o f the legal 
aspects o f these ‘new’ UN operations. International institutions often preferred a 
“define-as-you-go” approach rather than a legal one based on their mandates.
The history o f  UNHCR illustrates this process o f dysfunctional expansion. Until at 
least the mid-1970s UNHCR was small compared with its size today. It had been 
operative on a few occasions, for example in the Congo in 1960, but even then its
99 Hazzard, supra note 96 at 63.
100 Barnett and Finnemore, The Politics, Power and Pathologies o f International Organizations’, 53 
Int. 0^.(1999) 699.
101 Hazzard, supra note 96 at 68.
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operations required less staff and funding, than, for instance, those o f UNRWA. The 
core o f  UNHCR’s mandate as defined in its Statute102 was supposed to be 
implemented through protection activities, i.e. activities that aimed at ensuring that 
refugees could find an adequate replacement for the diplomatic protection denied to 
them  by their countries o f nationality. As a result, within UNHCR the Division o f 
International Protection ‘dominated a rigid hierarchy’.103 Another advantage offered 
by this focus on the legal work o f  the organisation and on its protection activities was 
that the organisation could be shielded from the ‘politically charged atmosphere o f 
the United Nations’.104
With the refugee crisis in Indochina in the 1970s, UNHCR became a predominantly 
operational organisation, in charge o f so-called care and maintenance programmes to 
assist refugees. UNHCR’s mandate, which was centred around the system o f 
international protection o f refugees as a substitute for the lack o f diplomatic 
protection, was progressively eroded; ‘responsibility and accountability to mandate fell 
by the wayside, to the extent that many organisational units today appear 
institutionally incapable o f relating their performance and activities to the mandate o f 
UNHCR as a whole’.105 In addition, UNHCR became more reluctant to challenge 
states since it was by now closely co-operating with them in the management o f 
refugee camps and settlements, and in the provision o f  relief assistance. As has been 
observed,
the pursuit o f protection activities necessarily results in a tension between 
state and individual, and between states and the international agency charged 
with that responsibility. UNHCR cannot expect always to please all sides, but 
the art is to stay close to principles, no t to throw them overboard in an excess 
o f  ‘realistic’ cohabitation.106
The institutional transformation undergone by UNHCR is not unique among UN 
agencies. To mention only a few, other recent examples o f ‘controversial’
102 GA Res. 428 (V), 14 December 1950.
103 Goodwin-Gill, ‘Refugee Identity and Protection’s Fading Prospect’ in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey 
(ed.) 'Refugee Rights and Realities (1999) 220 at 235.
104 Id. at 224.
105 Id. at 235.
106Id. at 223.
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humanitarian/development operations include U NICEF’s ‘complex emergency’ 
intervention in Sudan (Operational Lifeline Sudan),107 U ND P’s provision o f assistance 
to the internally displaced in Kenya,108 and the UNHCR-UNDP joint operation in 
Rwanda to assist the process o f  Imidugugu which involved the forced eviction and 
regroupement o f  rural inhabitants.109 In all these cases, the possible violation o f  the 
institution’s mandate as well as o f other rules o f international law, including human 
rights, has been directly or indirectly raised. One o f the case studies, discussed in 
detail at chapter III, illustrates how the operational practice o f all UN agencies 
involved in Afghanistan under the Taliban was in open contrast no t only with the 
practice o f the political organs o f the Organisation, but also with rules o f international 
law (includingykr cogens rules). The case o f Afghanistan also shows that the practice o f  
international institutions is multi-layered. Rules o f hard law, both those deriving from 
the constituent instrument and those deriving from general international law, are 
progressively eroded as one goes down these layers. Paradoxically, in the case o f 
subsidiary agencies with a strong operational com ponent - UNDP, UNHCR, 
UNICEF, WFP — ensuring their accountability as well as adherence to their 
mandates is often more difficult than in the case o f specialised agencies, which have 
the paraphernalia o f international institutions, including a plenary body, that can 
perform some monitoring.
Another problem is that the operational practice o f international institutions is the 
object o f only sporadic empirical examinations, usually conducted by anthropologists 
and economists, and seldom if ever by lawyers and political scientists.110 With a few 
exceptions, international relations scholars themselves are paradoxically reluctant to 
study reality etnpiricalfy, although many o f them would still define themselves realists. 
Only scant attention has therefore been given to the fundamental fact o f  the growing
107 ‘Sudan’s Child Soldiers Go Hungry in Unicef s Filthy Demob Camps’, The Independent, 23 April 
2001.
108 Human Rights Watch, Failing the Internally Displaced: The UNDP Displaced Persons Program in Kenya
(1997).
109 Hilhorst, van Leeuwen, ‘Emergency and Development the Case o f Imidugudu, Villagization in 
Rwanda’, 13 J. Ref St. (2000) 264.
110 One reason for this reluctance to face the reality o f institutional practice could be the deep-seated 
belief that ‘any increase in international organisation is a triumph o f idealism over realism, that more is 
always better, and that cooperation is ispo facto better than conflict (...) And the unspoken assumption, 
of course, is that international officials are selfless dedicated missionaries with only the best interests 
of the world community at heart’ - S. Strange, The Retreat of the State (1996) 162.
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power o f  international institutions, especially in the south, and to the development of 
an institutional practice that is often dysfunctional and in some cases even ultra vires.in
(b) Categories o f U N  Operations
Categorising the variety o f operations undertaken by the UN and by its agencies is 
n o t an easy task, partly because o f the development, as discussed, o f an operational 
practice that is no t always consistent with the mandate o f the organisations, or that at 
least does no t derive directly from their statutes.
O ne category o f  UN operations which has received significant attention by 
international lawyers is that o f peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions. Such 
missions ought to find their legal basis in either Chapter VI or Chapter VII o f the 
Charter depending on the gravity o f the situation. In practice, however, ‘there is often 
no substantive factual distinction’112 between a dispute that ‘is likely to endanger the 
maintenance o f international peace and security’ (Art. 33), and a threat to the peace, 
breach o f the peace or act o f aggression (Art. 39). These situations, to which different 
powers o f  the Council correspond, ‘are, in effect, often merely ‘labels’ put into the 
resolutions to indicate the political climate in the Council’.
Moreover, peace-keeping missions have evolved beyond the sheer monitoring o f a 
border zone or o f  military activities within a territory with a view o f preventing a 
conflict. Especially since the 1980s, peace-keeping operations have become 
‘multifunctional’, comprising such activities as fact-finding and human rights 
monitoring, the provision o f humanitarian assistance, the exercise o f some 
administrative functions or administrative supervision, post-conflict reconstruction, 
the demobilisation and reintegration o f  former combatants, election monitoring, 
assistance to returnees, and judicial reform.113 As for interventions under Chapter VII, 
the exercise o f  even broader powers, including the assumption o f  full administrative 
responsibilities, has become the norm, as illustrated by the interventions in Somalia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.
111 See Chapter III.
112 White, supra note 94 at 37.
113 See Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the SG on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1995) at paras. 21-22, UN Doc. A /50/60. See also White’s 
analysis o f the practice o f peace-keeping, supra note 94 at Chapter 9.
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This move towards multifunctional peace-keeping has no t been accompanied by 
more pervasive regulation o f these operations on the part o f the Security Council. 
There is a large body o f Security Council resolutions adopted in the 1990s in respect 
o f  the various conflicts in which the UN intervened in a multi-functional manner 
(Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Iraq, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, 
Haiti, East Timor, former Yugoslavia, etc.). Yet these resolutions, even when they are 
relatively detailed like resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo, normally only spell out the 
mandate o f  the mission in rather general terms, indicating the goals o f the mission 
and leaving significant latitude to the agencies on the ground to determine the specific 
course o f  action. For example SC Res. 1244 did no t spell out what the applicable law 
would be, nor did it specify the role o f  different UN agencies or N G O s. In other 
instances, the terms o f  the SC resolution are so vague as to fail to give an indication 
o f the actual scope and nature o f  the UN involvement. Resolution 1181 (1998), which 
established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), regulated the 
peace-keeping com ponent and contained a cursory reference to the role o f the 
civilian staff, but no mention, let alone regulation, o f  the role o f  UNICEF and 
UNHCR - two agencies that ran key programmes in Sierra Leone at the time. When 
in August 1999 UNOMSIL was expanded, the Security Council simply stated that it 
authorised ‘the strengthening o f  the political, civil affairs, information, human rights 
and child protection elements o f UNOMSIL’,114 but the detailed regulation o f these 
activities was left to the staff on the ground. UNOMSIL became the UN Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), when, with the Sierra Leonean crisis worsening, the 
Security Council acted under Chapter V II and further expanded the mandate o f  the 
UN mission.115 This time, some guidelines were given, and subsequent resolutions 
contained a relatively detailed indication o f the main goals o f the peace-keeping 
mission.116 The regulation o f the civilian activities and o f the activities o f  other UN 
agencies on the ground was in comparison scant, and the choice o f means for 
pursuing the objectives was left to the bureaucracy on the ground. It could be argued 
that ‘civilian’ activities were undertaken with the consent o f  the government o f Sierra 
Leone and their regulation did not need to feature in a resolution o f the Security 
Council.
114 SC Res. 1260 (1999) at para. 6.
115 SC Res. 1270 (1999).
116 SC Res. 1289,1299,1313 (2000).
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UN agencies have mounted im portant operations also outside the framework o f 
peace-keeping. In these cases, no legal regulation o f the operations, however generic, 
can be found in Security Council resolutions. One example is the UNICEF-led 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which has organised the provision o f humanitarian 
assistance in south Sudan since the early 1990s. In the 1990s, the Security Council 
condemned Sudan and, acting under Chapter VII, imposed sanctions in the aftermath 
o f the attempted assassination o f President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, for which the 
Sudanese government was blamed.117 The Council however did not regulate OLS, 
although it could have been argued that the protracted conflict in south Sudan 
warranted at least an intervention under Chapter VI. Neither the General Assembly 
nor the Economic and Social Council are normally forthcoming with providing a 
regulatory framework for these operations. When they do intervene, these organs 
usually limit themselves to short statements, commending the work o f  the UN 
agencies on the ground, and at times condemning certain actions o f government or 
insurgents, particularly when they interfere with the delivery o f relief or when they 
endanger the lives o f humanitarian personnel. The paucity o f  regulation coming from 
the political organs o f  the UN has ensured greater autonomy and power for the UN 
bureaucracy.
The Secretary General has adopted a categorisation o f  UN interventions in the peace­
keeping area that is conceptual rather than legal, and casts little light on the regulation 
o f  these various types o f operations. Six main types o f  interventions have been 
identified: preventive diplomacy and peace-making; traditional peace-keeping; post­
conflict peace-building; disarmament; sanctions; and enforcement action. O f these 
actions, the first three would require the consent o f  the affected state(s), while the last 
three can all be undertaken under Chapter VII (disarmament can be undertaken 
either as a consensual operation or as part o f an enforcement action).118 M ost o f these 
operations would form part o f an intervention under Chapter VI or VII, but, as 
acknowledged by the Secretary General, there are situations in which such operations 
are carried out entirely outside the umbrella o f  the Security Council. This can pose 
some problems,
117 SC Res. 1044,1054 (1996) and 1070 (1996), the last two taken under Chapter VII.
118 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 113 at para. 23.
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The more difficult situation is when post-conflict (or preventive) peace­
building activities are seen to be necessary in a country where the United 
Nations does not already have a peacemaking or peace-keeping mandate. 
Who then will identify the need for such measures and propose them to the 
Government? I f  the measures are exclusively in the economic, social and 
humanitarian fields, they are likely to fall within the purview o f the resident 
coordinator. He or she could recommend them to the Government.119
An example o f  a large scale post-conflict peace-building operation in a country where 
no peace-keeping mission was in place is Rwanda after 1996. Although the UN 
Assistant Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had had its mandate extended to include 
activities beyond the scope o f ‘classic’ peace-keeping, with its withdrawal in March 
1996120 an inter-agency UN operation o f post-conflict building remained in place 
albeit devoid o f  a Security Council mandate.
The six categories identified by the Secretary General are therefore no t exhaustive o f 
the operations that the UN in practice puts in place. In other cases, UN agencies 
continue to operate under their mandates and with the consent o f  the affected state. 
In such cases, the Memoranda o f  Understanding (MoU) concluded with the affected 
state should provide a regulatory basis. In practice all MoU tend to be similar, and 
reiterate privileges, immunities and exemptions o f the international organisation, but 
normally have remarkably little to say about the actual conduct and the goals o f  the 
operation.
1.6. C onclusion: A utonom y v. H eteronom y
The traditional realist view is that international institutions, albeit endowed with legal 
personality under international law, do not possess real autonomy. They are 
controlled by the powerful states and are subservient to the interests o f the main 
powers. Unfortunately, as mentioned, there is a paucity o f  empirical studies on 
decision-making in international institutions that can actually substantiate these 
claims.121
119 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 113 at para. 55.
120 SC Res. 1050 (1996).
121 It never fails to surprise me how unempirical most o f the realist literature can be.
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However, some in the international relations literature have critically re-assessed 
realist and statist assumptions, by tackling the two prongs o f the realist attack against 
international law, that is scepticism both about the role o f international institutions 
and o f  non-state actors, and about the ability o f norms to influence the behaviour o f 
states.122 Legal scholars for their part have contributed to this anti-realist offensive not 
only reiterating their deep-seated faith in the power o f  rules,123 but also developing 
innovative — and at times empirical - approaches that attempt to demonstrate that 
norms and institutions do matter in international decision-making.124
O ther im portant contributions to the study o f international organisations have 
highlighted the importance o f  bureaucratic elements and organisational culture. In 
particular, ‘drawing on long-standing Weberian arguments about bureaucracy and 
sociological institutionalist approaches to organizational behavior’, it has been argued 
that ‘the rational-legal authority that international organizations embody gives them 
power independent o f the states that created them and channels that power in 
particular directions’.125 The case studies at chapters IV and V o f this thesis support 
these positions as they analyse situations in which the UN and its specialised 
programmes or agencies acted autonomously, even disregarding the will o f the UN 
political organs.
It would be unwise however to generalise and conclude that the UN and other 
international institutions have developed the unfettered ability to act autonomously 
and that they challenge the interests o f the m ost powerful states in all circumstances. 
In fact, states, especially the main powers, persevere with attempts to use the UN as 
an instrument o f their foreign policy.126 Thus, despite the distinct growth in their
122 See, for example, A. Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (1995), and 
Risse, Ropp, Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (1999), 
especially Risse’s and Sikkink’s Introduction ‘The Socialisation o f International Human Rights Norms 
into Domestic Practices’ 1.
123 Eg.: M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (1999) 15.
124 E.g.: the new international legal process ‘school’ (O’Connell, ‘New International Legal Process’, 93 
AJIL  (1999) 334 at 336-7).
125 Bamett and Finnemore, supra note 100 at 699. The authors correctly observe that, while 
international organisations are certainly constrained by states, ‘the notion that they are passive 
mechanisms with no independent agendas o f their own was not bome out by any detailed empirical 
study o f an international organization that we have found’ (at 705).
126 According to Curtis, one o f the primary foreign policy objectives o f the leading Western states, and 
especially o f the US and Britain was ‘to render the United Nations an instrument o f  their foreign
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power and autonomy the instances in which international organisations succumb to 
the will o f  the m ost powerful states remain numerous. The sanctions against Iraq are 
a case in point. Notwithstanding the vocal opposition o f  the UN bureaucracy, 
particularly the humanitarian side o f it,127 sanctions against Iraq have remained in 
place owing to Anglo-American support, and to the attitude o f other powers, such as 
France, Russia or China, which have at best been capable o f only feeble opposition, 
but for the m ost part have acquiesced to the US-British position. It is still noteworthy 
however that UN officials did actually voice their criticism o f the consequences o f  the 
Anglo-American policy. Various reports, like UNICEF’s 1999 report on child 
mortality, were still issued and depicted a truthful and scathing account o f the 
situation in Iraq.128
This short digression shows that reality is far more complex than the claim that 
international organisations are weaklings to be defended against leviathan states would 
suggest. A ‘power shift’129 from states to international institutions has taken place and 
international organisations have developed over the years the capacity no t only to act 
autonomously, but also to put in place multifunctional operations in which wide 
powers are exercised and in which they can have a direct impact on individuals. 
Reality has in some respects outpaced legal developments: the model for 
humanitarian actions was crystallised at a time when warfare was conducted in a very 
different manner; some o f the founding principles o f international institutional law, 
including the conferral o f  privileges and immunities on the institutions and on its
policies: serviceable as such when required; discarded when n ot’ (M. Curtis, The Great Deception. Anglo- 
American Tower and World Order (1998) at 176). See also White, supra note 94 at 43.
127 ‘Former UN Official Decries Sanctions on Iraq’, The Guardian, 27 Jan. 1999; ‘Second Official Quits 
UN Iraq Team’, The Guardian, 16 Feb. 2000.
128 UNICEF-Ministry o f Health (Iraq), ‘Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Survey 1999’, July 1999. 
The reports o f the human rights bodies o f the UN, on the other hand, were disturbingly cautious. For 
example, in a country where hundreds o f thousand o f children are said to have died as a result o f  
sanctions, the Committee on the Rights o f the Child could only note ‘that the embargo imposed by the 
Security Council has adversely affected the economy and many aspects o f daily life, thereby impeding 
the full enjoyment by the State party's population, particularly children, o f their rights to survival, 
health and education’ (‘Concluding Observations o f the Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Iraq, 
26/10/1998’, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.94). For the rest, some o f the Committee’s extemporaneous 
recommendation to Iraq included the establishment o f an independent mechanism for children to file 
complaints (which, incidentally, even wealthy states in the north still lack), the translation o f  the 
Convention into minority languages, training programmes for professional groups, the revision o f  
welfare policies, the disaggregation o f data collected following the guidelines set by UN specialised 
agencies, greater recognition o f the role o f NGOs like the National Federation o f Iraqi Students and 
Youth, changes in citizenship law, etc.. None o f these praiseworthy recommended steps would have 
had any effect on the single most important violation o f children’s rights in Iraq, i.e. the systematic 
violation o f the right to life as a result o f preventable or curable malnutrition-related deaths.
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personnel, were consolidated at a time when international organisations still needed to 
be protected from the states. O n the other hand, many o f the important 
developments that have characterised institutional practice — the operational role and 
the direct impact on individuals - in the last decennia have not been mirrored by 
developments in the law.
129 Mathews, ‘Power Shift’ , 76 Foreign Affairs (1997) 50.
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CHAPTER II
The Applicability of International Human Rights Law to the UN
11.1. In troduction : A rgum ents for A pplicability
Having outlined the key moments in the historical development o f international 
institutions and o f their engagement in humanitarian operations in the previous 
chapter, I now argue that international human rights law is binding on the United 
Nations (UN). From a legal point o f view, the main obstacle to the applicability o f 
human rights norms to the activities o f  the UN is the fact that the UN is not itself a 
party to human rights treaties — or indeed to humanitarian law ones. However, the 
legal obligations o f the UN are not limited to those contained in the treaties to which 
they are party. This chapter examines other sources o f  legal obligations from which 
the applicability o f  human rights norms to the UN can be derived.
Firstly, international institutions possess international legal personality, which 
encompasses both rights and duties on the international plane. Particular attention is 
devoted to the legal personality o f specialised agencies and specialised programmes o f 
the UN, since they play an important role in the operations that are examined in 
chapters III and IV. Legal personality can form the basis for the application o f human 
rights norms that have acquired customary status and for rules o f ju s cogens. In 
addition, the constituent instrument o f the organisation regulates the terms o f the legal 
personality o f international organisations, no t only conferring powers on them 
expressly as well as impliedly, but also forming the basis for institutional obligations.
Secondly, the fact that member states o f international institutions have become parties 
to human rights treaties is no t devoid o f consequences for their collective action 
through multilateral institutions. In particular, the European Court o f Human Rights 
has argued that, when functions are transferred to international organisations, state 
parties to the European Convention remain obliged to ensure respect for Convention 
rights. A corollary o f this principle is that international institutions should no t commit 
acts that could engage the responsibility o f their member states.
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The third argument, or basis, for the applicability o f international human rights norms 
to  institutional activities is policy considerations, namely the impact on international 
culture o f the view that international organisations could operate unbound by human 
rights law.
Finally, the obligation to observe international norms for the protection o f  individuals 
may feature in the internal law o f the organisations through the adoption o f  codes o f 
conduct, resolutions and other instruments. The mandates o f specific operations may 
also contain provisions on human rights. The way in which international norms are 
internalised is im portant because it gives an indication o f how they will be 
operationalised in the work o f the organisation; internal soft law can often be 
determinative o f  the actual behaviour o f international organisations.1
The applicability o f  the law o f responsibility to international institutions is examined at 
the end o f  this chapter. Owing to the absence o f  systematic codification and to the 
paucity o f  case-law, institutional responsibility is an area o f  uncharted waters in many 
respects.
11.2. In terna tiona l Legal Personality
(a) A.utono??ry and legalpersonality
A legal person is in essence ‘a right-and-duty bearing unit’;2 and legal personality is ‘the 
capacity o f being a subject o f legal duties and legal rights, o f performing legal 
transactions and o f suing and being sued at law’.3
The discussion on the autonomy o f international institutions, which concluded the 
previous chapter, is o f some relevance to the question o f legal personality. The link 
between autonomy and legal personality is important because it shows that 
international organisations ‘deserve’ their legal personality by virtue o f the distinction 
o f their powers and purposes from those o f member states. In fact, Brownlie indicates
1 An example o f a clash between hard norms and their operationalisation is the provision o f UN 
humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan examined in Chapter III.
2 Maitland, quoted in Dewey, The Historic Background o f Corporate Legal Personality’, XXXV Yale L. 
J. (1926) 655 at 656. In this rare incursion in the legal field, the philosopher John Dewey also argued 
that ‘person signifies what the law makes it signify’ (at 655).
3 H. Kelsen The Law of the United Nations (1950) 329.
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as criteria o f  legal personality the ‘distinction, in terms o f legal powers and purposes, 
between the organisation and its member states’ and ‘the existence o f legal powers 
exercisable not solely within the national systems o f one or more states’.4 Brownlie’s 
position is premised on a conception o f  autonomy that would be opposed by realists, 
w ho would argue that an international organisation can satisfy these requirements and 
still enjoy only limited or even no effective autonomy from states. Realists normally 
view ‘organisations simply as fora for attempting to resolve conflict o f  national 
interest, and therefore lacking distinct personality’.5 There are schools o f thought that 
do no t take such a radical view; in particular ‘the functionalist, rationalist and 
conflictive (developing States’) views ... put forward the idea that international 
organisations no t only have a separate personality from the member states, but can 
and do have powers which States by themselves cannot have, although this is relatively 
rare’.6
For essentially practical reasons, the autonomy o f an international organisation is 
normally presumed, and not based on a case-by-case factual assessment. Such 
presumption o f  autonomy characterises the notion o f legal personality in other areas 
o f  the law too. For example, criminal liability, as well as the preclusion o f certain rights 
under private law, can be excluded on grounds o f age, insanity or intoxication, but 
only after proving that particular conditions have obtained.7 On the other hand, 
psychological or environmental factors that can in practice affect the psycho-social 
autonomy o f  an individual do no t usually constitute sufficient grounds for departing 
from the presumption o f  autonomy.
The argument that an international institution should not be considered a legal person 
for any purpose in view o f its complete heteronomy was considered in the Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru case in which the International Court o f Justice (ICJ) held that the 
Administering Authority for Nauru ‘did not have an international legal personality
4 1. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed., 1998) 679-680.
5 N. White, The Law of International Organisations (1996) 27. The implications o f realism for international 
institutional personality are similar to those o f determinism in the sphere o f individual criminal 
responsibility. Realism and determinism maintain that the conduct of, respectively, an international 
institution and a person is determined by factors beyond their volitive control. These positions can lead 
to a significant reduction o f the sphere o f legal personality, and offer grounds for limiting or excluding 
responsibility for wrongful acts. On determinism and criminal responsibility, see H. L. A. Hart, 
Punishment and Responsibility (1968) 28 ff.
6 N. White, supra note 5 at 27.
7 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (3rd ed., 1999) 210 ff.
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distinct from those o f the States’.8 The Administering Authority had been established 
under the Trusteeship over Nauru that the UN granted jointly to Australia, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom in 1947, and that originated from a previous 
mandate o f the League o f Nations. The Court remarked that the Administrator was at 
all times appointed by the Australian Government and was accordingly under the 
instructions o f  that Government’ and his acts Svere subject to confirmation or 
rejection by the Governor-General o f Australia’.9
An institution that is autonomous can still be shown to have lacked autonomy in the 
performance o f  a particular act. In this case, it would be inappropriate to deprive the 
institution o f  its legal personality, but the validity o f  the act in question may be 
affected. For instance, a treaty concluded by an international organisation or a state 
under external coercion is invalid.10 Coercion is an extreme example o f  heteronomy. 
O ther ‘softer’ or better disguised forms o f heteronomy — such as political and 
economic pressure - do not usually have consequences on the validity o f  the act or on 
the personality o f the organisation. From the point o f view o f the law o f  state 
responsibility, coercion per se does not preclude the wrongfulness o f an act and the 
responsibility o f  the coerced state, but it does have the effect o f making the coercing 
state internationally responsible.11 The responsibility o f an international organisation 
for wrongful conduct committed under coercion is an area in which autonomy can 
have important legal consequences. This is in essence the vexed question o f lifting the 
veil’, in which the law o f legal personality and the law o f responsibility become 
intertwined.12 In the hypothetical case o f an international organisation lacking any 
degree o f autonomy, member states could be considered the ‘real’ legal persons 
behind the organisation and bear responsibility for its acts, but the ILC Special 
Rapporteur for State Responsibility has opined that such cases are ‘inconceivable’.13 It
8 Case Concerning Certain 'Phosphate Lands in Naum (Nauru v. Australia), Judgment (Preliminary 
Objections), ICJ Report (1992) 240 at 258.
9 Phosphate Lands in Naum, supra note 8 at 257.
10 Arts. 52-53, Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties between States and International 
Organisations or between International Organisations (1986), 25 ILM 543, not yet in force.
11 Art. 18, Draft Articles on State Responsibility provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee of  
the International Law Commission on Second Reading (2001), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602 [hereinafter 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
u  On the law o f  responsibility see II. 6.
13 For this reason, he has recommended that Article 9 and 13 should be deleted to the extent that they 
referred to responsibility for the conduct o f organs placed at the disposal o f a state by an international 
organisation. International Law Commission, ‘First Report (and Addenda) on State Responsibility by
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does in fact appear that the interactions between member states and international 
organisations tend to be far more complex and that international institutions normally 
do have a minimum degree o f autonomy even if this is limited to their constitutional 
powers shorn o f any effectiveness. As for the argument, raised in the context o f  the 
International Tin Council litigation,14 that the relationship between a state and an 
international organisation can in some circumstances be described as one o f  agency,15 
this argument would no t imply by necessity that the institution is heteronomous. On 
the contrary, even under private law the agent is a legal person in his/her own right.16
(b) International legalpersonality in international decisions
The Permanent Court o f International Justice had discussed the legal personality o f 
international organisations in an advisory opinion on the International Labour 
Organisation.17 However, it was in the advisory opinion on the Reparation case that 
institutional legal personality was examined in a systematic fashion, this time by the 
ICJ and in regard to the UN.18 The General Assembly requested an opinion from the 
ICJ on the capacity o f the UN to bring an international claim for damages caused 
against its employees and against the Organisation itself. In its opinion, the Court 
determined that the UN is endowed with international legal personality, because ‘the 
Organisation was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and 
enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis o f  the 
possession o f a large measure o f international personality and the capacity to operate 
upon an international plane’.19 The UN is thus ‘a subject o f international law and 
capable o f possessing international rights and duties, and ... has capacity to maintain 
its rights by bringing international claims’.20 The Court then considered whether ‘the 
sum o f the international rights o f the Organisation comprises the right to bring the 
kind o f  international claim described in the Request for this Opinion’.21 The Court 
answered this question in the affirmative, having had regard to the ‘purposes and
James Crawford, Special Rapporteur*, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490 at paras. 256-262; and ILC Report
(1998), UN Doc. A /53/10 at paras. 414-15.
14 See below 11.6(d).
15 C. Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (1993) at 114-118.
16 See infra at 125 ff.
17 Competence of the International Labour Organisation to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the 'Employers, 
Advisory Opinion, (1926) PCIJ Reports Series B, No. 13.
18 Preparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1949) 
174.
19 Id. at 179.
20 Ibid
21 Ibid
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functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in 
practice’.22
As pointed out by Bowett, the pronouncement o f the ICJ in the Reparation case can be 
construed as based on a circular notion o f international legal personality: personality is 
inductively inferred from the existence o f specific rights and duties, while at the same 
time the capacity o f the organisation to bear a particular right or duty is deduced from 
its international legal personality.23 In this sense international legal personality would 
be an essentially flawed concept with an exclusively descriptive validity, and it could be 
substituted with a case-by-case enquiry to determine if the organisation has a particular 
right or duty.24
Rama-Montaldo has given a different reading o f the Reparation case endeavouring to 
salvage the concept o f international legal personality. He has argued that the Court 
adopted an objective and material approach to the question o f personality, firstly by 
identifying certain objective structural prerequisites o f  international legal personality, 
and secondly by attaching to such personality ‘precise legal consequences in regard to 
the potential activities o f  the organization’.25 According to Rama-Montaldo, there are 
rights and duties ‘that find their source in personality itself — like (...) : the rights to 
bring a claim, to negotiate, to conclude a special agreement, protest, request for an 
inquiry, etc.’26 In addition to these rights and duties arising directly from legal 
personality, international organisations would be able to bear other rights and duties 
linked with the purposes and functions o f the organisation.
The thesis that any international institutional person has a minimum o f  rights and 
duties that derive directly from its personality undoubtedly has its appeal, but the best 
case that can be made for it is that the ICJ did not entirely rule it out in the Reparation
22 Id. at 180.
23 one might be tempted to deduce, say, a general treaty-making power, from the very fact o f  
personality, even though personality is itself deduced from a specific treaty-making power (D. W. 
Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (4th ed., 1982) at 337).
24 This seems to be the view o f E. Lauterpacht, who, commenting on the distinction between powers 
and personality, asks eif  it is in any event necessary to determine the scope o f powers, what function is 
performed by the concept o f personality?’ (E. Lauterpacht, ‘Development o f Law o f  International 
Organization’, in 152, IV RC  (1976) 381 at 407).
25 Rama-Montaldo, ‘International Legal Personality and Implied Powers o f International Organisations’, 
in XLIV BYBIL (1970) 111 at 116. Rama-Montaldo’s views are shared by C. F. Amerasinghe {Principles 
of the Institutional Law of International Organisations (1996) 69-70 and 100-104).
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case, although there is clearly no indication o f  an endorsement either. Indeed, in a 
decisive passage, the Court inferred the personality o f  the UN from the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities o f the United Nations o f 1946,27 in a sense justifying 
Bowett’s concerns about the circular nature o f the notion o f personality. The practical 
consequences o f  these juxtaposed views o f  international legal personality are not 
significant. Certain basic rights o f international organisations, such as those alluded to 
by the Court in the 'Reparation case, can find a sound enough legal basis in the 
functions and powers vested upon the organisation by its constituent instrument,28 
w ithout need to resort to the hermeneutically more convolute notion o f inherent 
rights. As will be seen, however, different approaches can yield conflicting results in 
respect o f  the extent o f the implied powers and the practice o f the organisation.
The Legality o f Nuclear Weapons (W HO request) case is the m ost recent case in which the 
ICJ discussed the international legal personality o f international organisations.29 The 
Assembly o f the World Health Organisation (WHO) had requested an opinion from 
the Court on the legality o f the use o f nuclear weapons in armed conflict, and based 
this request on its constitutional powers.30 The Court examined the scope o f  the 
Charter-based right o f the W HO, as a specialised agency o f the UN, to request an 
advisory opinion ‘on legal questions arising within the scope o f their activities’ (Art. 
96, II). The Court drew an unpersuasive distinction between the effects on health o f 
the use o f  nuclear weapons, which would come under the competence o f the W HO, 
and the question o f the legality o f the use o f nuclear weapons, which formed the 
subject matter o f  the request and which, in its view, was not covered by the functions 
o f the W HO as enumerated at Article 2 o f its Constitution.31 This reasoning has been
26 Ibid., at 139.
27 Reparation, supra note 18 at 179: ‘It is difficult to see how such a convention could operate except 
upon the international plane and as between parties possessing international personality’.
28 In the course o f debates within the International Law Commission, it was observed that capacity and 
competence are two distinct concepts which should be kept separate (P. Bekker, The Legal Position of 
Intergovernmental Organisations (1994) at 88), whilst the proposed approach seems to conflate them. 
However, although the two terms are not normally inter-exchangeable on the plane o f domestic law, for 
all practical purposes the capacity o f an international organisation is indeed determined by its powers as 
derived from, or implied in die constituent instrument Art 16 o f the Constitution o f the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reflects this conceptual overlap o f capacity and competence: The 
Organization shall have the capacity o f a legal person to perform any legal act appropriate to its 
purpose which is not beyond the powers granted to it by this Constitution’.
29 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (World Health Organization Request),
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996) 66, 110 ILR 1. See L. Boisson de Chazoumes, P. Sands (eds.)
International Law, the International Court of Justice andNuclear Weapons (1999).
30 World Health Assembly Res. 46 (40), 14 May 1993.
31 Nuclear Weapons— WHO Request, supra note 29 at 75-76.
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almost universally criticised, and even described as ‘formalistic, oversimplistic, cynical 
and even logically flawed’.32
The Court also maintained that international institutions ‘are governed by the 
“principle o f speciality”, that is to say, they are invested by the States which create 
them  with powers, the limits o f  which are a function o f the common interests whose 
prom otion those States entrust to them’.33 Furthermore, although the implied powers 
o f an organisation were considered, it was controversially held that the competence o f 
the W H O  to address the legality o f  the use o f nuclear weapons could not be a 
necessary implication o f  its constituent instrument.34 It was found that, as a result o f 
the logic o f  the overall system contemplated by the Charter’, the responsibilities o f  a 
specialised agency like the W HO could no t be construed so widely as to allow them to 
encroach upon the responsibilities o f other parts o f the UN system, in particular the 
exclusive competence o f  the UN on ‘questions concerning the use o f  force, the 
regulation o f armaments and disarmament’.35 In his dissenting opinion, Judge 
Weeramantry was critical o f this approach, which, in his view, denied the obvious 
interrelatedness o f health and peace and the fact that health matters do normally 
overlap with concerns o f  peace and security.36
The Nuclear Weapons (W HO Request) should no t be regarded as representing a 
retrogression in the jurisprudence o f the ICJ on international legal personality that will 
be decisive in future determinations o f  the rights and duties o f  international 
organisations.37 Indeed, this case concerned a particular right o f an international 
organisation, the duty-holder o f which was the Court itself. The existence o f  this right 
was preliminary to the exercise o f the Court’s jurisdiction, and the decision could also
32 Bothe, The WHO Request*, in Boisson de Chazoumes and Sands, supra note 29,103 at 104. See also 
Akande, ‘The Competence o f International Organisations and the Advisory Jurisdiction o f the 
International Court o f Justice', 9 EJIL (1998) 437 at 447-448.
33 Nuclear Weapons — WHO Request, supra note 29 at para. 25. Lauterpacht observes that principle o f  
speciality is ‘an expression directly derived from French law’, which the Court employed without any 
‘introductory or explanatory comment* (Lauterpacht, ‘Judicial Review o f the Acts o f International 
Organisations’, in Boisson de Chazoumes and Sands, supra note 29, 92 at 98-99.
34 Elsewhere the Court used the expression ‘necessary intendment* (Effect of Awards of Compensation Made 
by the UN Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1954) 47 at 56-57).
35 Nuclear Weapons — WHO Request, supra note 29 at para. 26.
36 Id. at 133-134,148 (diss. op. o f Judge Weeramantry). Judge Koroma, also dissenting, emphasised that 
the question that the WHO had posed to the ICJ was not about the illegality of the use o f nuclear 
weapons per se, but on the effects o f such use on the state obligations related to the environment and 
health (Id. at 201, diss. op. o f Judge Koroma).
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be viewed as an example o f judicial self-restraint on the part o f the Court.38 The ICJ 
also knew that it was going to address the issues raised in the W HO request as a result 
o f the similar request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly. More 
importantly, the Court was hamstrung by the adoption o f  a restrictive approach to the 
principle o f speciality and to the interaction between the personality o f  the UN and 
that o f  its specialised agencies. It was assumed that the rights o f the W HO must 
terminate where the rights o f the UN begin, thus leaving no room for co-extensive 
activities in spite o f existing practice. Hence, this opinion o f the Court does not imply 
a narrow approach to international legal personality in general, and is actually 
premised on a generous construction o f  the legal personality o f  the UN at the expense 
o f the personality o f the specialised agencies.39
A cogent indication o f the Court’s stance towards legal personality is to be found in 
the Certain Expenses case. This advisory opinion concerned the scope and meaning o f 
the expression ‘the expenses o f the organisation’ at Article 17, II o f the Charter.40 The 
Court had to determine the scope o f a right o f the UN — the right to have expenses 
covered by member states — to which corresponded a duty o f member states, without 
consequences for the rights o f other international organisations. Different states had 
submitted that they were not under an obligation to cover expenses for those peace­
keeping operations that, in their view, had not been duly authorised. Hence, the Court 
also had to make a preliminary finding on the capacity o f the UN to establish the 
peace-keeping operations in question. In its opinion, the Court recognised a large 
measure o f personality to the UN. It held that the General Assembly had the right to 
establish the peace-keeping operations in question in spite o f the lack o f an express 
provision in the Charter, and that by doing so the Assembly had not ‘usurped or
37 Akande maintains that in this case the Court departed from its own previous jurisprudence {supra 
note 32 at 444).
38 It would be difficult, however, to reconcile this reading o f  the Court’s decision with the antecedent 
judgment in Qatar-Bahrain (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain, Judgment, ICJ Report (1995) 6) in which the Court asserted its jurisdiction notwithstanding 
the manifest lack of consent to it o f at least one party. In addition, as pointed out by the three 
dissenting judges in the Nuclear Weapons case, the precedents o f the Court indicated that the Court 
normally exercises its judicial function, and refrains from delivering an advisory opinion only in extreme 
circumstances, such as, for example, the occurrence o f irregularities. E g. see: Nuclear Weapons — WHO 
Request, supra note, 29 at 193 (diss. op. o f judge Koroma).
39 See below 87 ff.
40 Certain Expenses of the UN, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1962) 151.
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impinged upon the prerogatives conferred by the Charter on the Security Council’.41 It 
was also found that the term ‘expenses’ did not refer only to ‘regular expenses’,42 and 
that internal irregularities in the establishment o f  the operations would not change the 
qualification o f  the expenditure as ‘expenses o f the organisation’.43 In the view o f the 
Court, the ultimate test for determining whether the ‘expenses’ were ‘expenses o f the 
organisation’ was ‘their relationship to the purposes o f the UN’ as set forth in Art 1 o f 
the Charter.44 Since the action in question Svas appropriate for the fulfilment o f one o f 
the stated purposes o f  the United Nations, the presumption is that such an action is 
no t ultra vires the Organisation [sic]’, and that, even ‘if the action was taken by the 
wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter o f that internal structure [of the organisation], 
but this would not necessarily mean that the expense incurred was no t an expense o f 
the Organisation’.45
In spite o f  the ‘backward step’46 represented by the advisory opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons (WHO Request), it does not seem too optimistic to assume that the more 
purposive and generous interpretation o f  the legal personality o f international 
organisations that had characterised the previous case law o f the ICJ will form the 
basis for future decisions. The view that emerges from this case law is that, rather than 
determining in abstract what the content o f  legal personality is, the better approach is 
to ascertain whether an international institution has sufficient personality for 
performing a certain act. The idea o f personality ‘with a variable content’,47 or 
personality for different purposes, may appear outlandish, because we tend to 
conceptualise legal personality having states in mind. However, whereas there is a 
general principle o f equality o f states - the corollary o f which is equal personality for 
all states - no such principle exists for international institutions. In addition, the idea 
o f a flexible legal personality suits the fact that international institutions often take on 
new functions in the course o f their existence.
41 Ibid. at 177. The Court rejected the argument that there had been a violation o f the Charter in the 
implementation o f the resolution o f the Security Council on the operations in the Congo, inasmuch as 
the Secretary General had determined which states were going to participate in the mission although 
such determination should be made only by the Security Council (Ibid. at 175).
42 Ibid. at 161.
43 Ibid. at 168.
44 Ibid. at 167.
45 Ibid. at 167-169.
46 Leary, The WHO Case: Implications for Specialised Agencies’, in Boisson des Cha2oumes and 
Sands, supra note 29,112 at 127.
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(c) Legalpersonality o f tbe Specialised Agencies and the Specialised Programmes
The Charter identifies two fundamental prerequisites for specialised agencies: the 
constituent instrument must be a treaty, and the agencies must have ‘wide 
international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, 
cultural, educational, health and related fields’ (Art. 57, I). The first o f  these 
prerequisites excludes important organisations, such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),48 which, although 
entrusted with significant responsibilities both at the operational and at the policy- 
formulation level, were not established by treaty, but by resolutions o f  an UN organ, 
normally the General Assembly.49 The legal status o f  specialised agencies, such as the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the W orld Bank, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and W HO, ‘is no 
different from that o f other international organisations’.50 Their special characteristic is 
the existence o f a relationship agreement with the UN which spells out the terms o f 
the co-ordinative and recommendatory role o f the UN pursuant to Articles 58 and 63 
o f the Charter. While there is universal agreement on the proposition that specialised 
agencies have international legal personality,51 it is argued by some that the legal 
personality o f  specialised agencies, in contrast with that o f  the UN, is not opposable 
to non- member states.52
47 Bettati, ‘Creation et Personality Juridique des Organisations Internationales’, in R. J. Dupuy, A  
Handbook of International Organisations (2nd ed., 1998) 33 at 53.
48 Bowett’s use o f the term ‘operational agencies’ (Bowett, supra note 23, at 57) to describe these 
programmes seems appropriate, while Conforti’s claim that the UN remains primarily a normative 
rather than an operative entity is out o f line with institutional practice and historical developments (B. 
Conforti, he Na^oni Unite (5th ed., 1994), at 236).
49 UNDP: GA Res. 2029 (XX), 22 November 1965; UNHCR: GA Res. 428 (V), 14 December 1950; 
UNICEF: GA Res. 57 (I), 11 December 1946. An interesting case is that o f the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO) which was initially established as subsidiary organ o f the General 
Assembly and was later transformed into a specialised agency (Bretton, ‘La transformation de 1’ 
ONUDI en institution specialisee’, 25 AFDI (1979) 567). In the humanitarian field, another important 
organisation established as a subsidiary organ by the General Assembly (GA Res. 302 (TV), 8 December 
1949) is the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
50 Meng, ‘Article 57’, in Simma, B. Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations: A  Commentary (1995) 796 
at 800.
51 E. g:. Brownlie, supra note 4, at 680; A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Volkerrecht (3rd ed., 1984) 
180.
52 Meng, supra note 50, at 800-801. The opposability o f the UN’s international personality to non­
member states was addressed by the Court in the 'Reparation case. Judge Kryzov in his dissenting 
opinion opted for an objective approach which echoed the declaratory doctrine o f recognition o f states. 
He argued that an international organisation possessing certain minimum requirement ought to be 
recognised by all other actors, including non-member states (Reparation, supra note 18, at 218-219). 
However, the Court was more cautious and insisted on the fact that ‘fifty states, representing the vast 
majority o f the members o f the international community had the power, in conformity with
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Prerequisites for the lawful establishment o f a subsidiary agency are that an UN 
principal organ has established it in accordance with the Charter, and that the parent 
organ exercises some control over its subsidiary.53 The parent organ has the power to 
revise, and even to revoke, the mandates o f the subsidiary agencies.54 The World Food 
Programme (WFP) is a special case in that it has two parent organs, the UN General 
Assembly and FAO.
The fact that specialised programmes are endowed with legal personality is expressly 
recognised in some constituent instruments, for example in WFP’s General 
Regulations.55 But it is widely accepted that, even where similar provisions do not 
feature, by virtue o f their organisational structure and o f the functions they perform, 
specialised programmes possess a degree o f  international legal personality, albeit 
derivative rather than primary.56 The mandates o f the specialised programmes spell out 
the terms o f their relationship o f subsidiarity with other UN organs, normally the 
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. For example, UNHCR is 
mandated to follow ‘policy directives’ o f the General Assembly and o f  the Economic 
and Social Council, and can engage in other activities, ‘such as repatriation and
international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not 
merely personality recognised by them alone... [emphasis added]’ (Ibid. at 185). The position o f the Court could 
be interpreted as implying that the personality o f other non-universal organisations, such as regional or 
functionally limited international organisations, would not be opposable to non-member states.
53 Sarooshi, ‘The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs’, LXVII BYBIL 
(1996) 413 at 416. Sarooshi adds that the subsidiary organ has to have such a degree o f independence 
from the parent organ as to warrant its ‘separateness’ as an entity from the parent organ. This, however, 
is a logical requirement rather than an additional prerequisite o f lawfulness.
54 For example, UNHCR’s mandate is renewed by the General Assembly every five years (G. S. 
Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (2nd ed., 1996) 214 fh 41). The General Assembly has also 
modified and expanded UNHCR’s mandate in the course o f the years, for example to include some 
responsibilities for providing assistance to internally displaced persons (Ibid., at 264 ff).
55 GA Res. 1714 (XVI), 19 December 1961, and in FAO Conference Res. 1 /61,24 November 1961.
56 For example, the General Regulations o f WFP state that the ‘Programme (...) shall, drawing on the 
legal personality o f the United Nations, have legal capacity... ’ (emphasis added). Some trace the 
ultimate legal source o f their personality in Art. 104 o f the Charter conferring personality on the UN 
(Rudolph, Seidl-Hohenveldem, ‘Article 104’, in Simma, supra note 50, 1125 at 1131). Goodwin-Gill 
states that ‘clearly, by derivation and by intention, UNHCR does enjoy international personality’ 
(Goodwin-Gill, supra note 54 at 216). On the personality o f  UNRWA, see: Dale,. ‘U.N.R.W.A. — A 
Subsidiary Organ o f the United Nations’, 23 ICLf) (1974) 576. In support o f the legal personality of  
subsidiary organs, see Brownlie, supra note 4, at 62 and 680. Recent practice that bespeaks the 
international legal personality is the conclusion o f agreements by the ad Tribunals with states for the 
detention o f individuals sentenced by the Tribunals (See, for example, the agreements o f die 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda with Benin and Mali, Fact Sheet no. 7, at www.ictr.orgl. A 
restrictive view o f  the extent o f the legal personality o f subsidiary organs is held by Hilf, ‘Article 22’, in 
Simma, supra note 50, 380 at 389.
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resettlement, as the General Assembly may determine’.57 UNICEF, on the other hand, 
must act ‘in accordance with such principles as may be laid down the by the Economic 
and Social Council and its Social Commission’.58 Rules o f  treaty interpretation do not 
apply to the interpretation o f these mandates given that they are acts o f an UN organ 
and not treaties ‘having certain special characteristics’.59
The authority and control that parent organs can exercise on their subsidiary agencies 
should not obscure the fact that subsidiary agencies may enjoy a large measure o f 
autonomy. Indeed, in the Effect o f Awards case the ICJ even accepted that in principle 
the decisions o f the UN Administrative Tribunal - a subsidiary organ o f the General 
Assembly — can bind the General Assembly itself, as long as the General Assembly 
had intended to confer these powers on the Tribunal.60 The degree o f autonomy that 
subsidiary agencies concretely possess depends on the terms o f their mandates, but 
also on institutional practice. In particular, the creation o f  a professional civil service 
and the process o f  bureaucratisation have contributed to buttressing the autonomy o f 
the specialised programmes. With time these programmes have developed distinct 
institutional identities and organisational ethoi, while inter-agency competition often 
characterises their interactions.61 The size o f  their staff, their budget, the range and 
importance o f  the operations they lead are by now often larger than those o f  the 
putatively more autonomous specialised agencies.62 The field offices o f UNHCR or 
UNICEF, with their display o f agency’s flags, pictures o f the head o f the institution, 
and various gadgets and posters with the institutional logo, visually illustrate these 
developments. Specialised programmes, like other international organisations, have 
thus grown more powerful as a result o f  the concurrent affirmation o f ‘the legitimacy
57 GA Res. 428 (V) at paras. 3 and 9.
58 GA Res. 57 (I) at paras. 3 (a) and 9.
59 Certain 'Expenses, supra note 40, at 157.
60 Effect of Awards case, supra note 34, at 60-61.
61 Barnett and Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies o f International Organizations’, 53 Int. 
Org. (1999) 699 at 704 ff.
62 A differentation between specialised agencies and specialised programmes in terms o f budget and 
functions is therefore not possible (Dagoiy, ‘Les rapports entre les institutions specialisees et 1’ 
organisation des Nations Unies’, 73 RGDIP (1969) 286 at 291). UNICEF, for example, had 5827 
employees and a budget o f nearly US$ 1 billion in 1998 (http: /  / www.unicef.org/emergl UNHCR had 
5200 staff members and a budget o f US$ 1,27 billion in 1999 
(http:// www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/numbers.htm). FAO, on the other hand, which is a 
specialised agency, had 4,300 members staff and a biennial budget o f US$ 650 million in 1998-1999 
(http://www.fao.org/UNFAO/WHATITIS.HTM). WFP’s budgpt was largpr than that o f  one o f its 
parent bodies, FAO (US$ 1,4 billion in 1999, http://www.wfjp.org/info/Intro/donors/index.html).
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o f the rational-legal authority they embody’ and o f  ‘control over technical expertise 
and information’.63
An important difference between specialised agencies and specialised programmes 
remains that the latter rely principally on voluntary contributions from states to 
finance their operations and are therefore potentially more susceptible to pressure 
from donor countries.64 It would be wrong to conclude, however, that specialised 
programmes are more easily manoeuvrable by states; on the contrary, it may often be 
easier for them to evade the political control o f states.65 Whereas the plenary organs o f 
specialised agencies include representatives o f  member states and are usually entrusted 
with a function o f control and general policy-making, specialised programmes are not 
constitutionally subject to forms o f direct control by member states. Their conduct is 
subject to indirect scrutiny by states through the parent organ, usually the General 
Assembly, or the Economic and Social Council.66
The General Assembly tends to discharge its functions o f control over subsidiary 
agencies in a cursory manner. For example, with respect to UNHCR, Goodwin-Gill 
has observed that its resolutions are ‘rarely consistent in their language, and their 
rationale, too, is often hidden’67 He has underscored the ‘after the event’ nature o f  the 
interventions o f the General Assembly simply to rubber-stamp changes in institutional 
practice and competence that have already occurred. The General Assembly therefore 
seems to have ‘established subsidiary organs that act as specialised agencies without 
having that qualification’.68 As is discussed elsewhere, the erosion and /o r abdication o f 
responsibilities on the part o f  the political organs o f  the UN, and the attendant 
empowerment o f the institutional bureaucracy is a phenomenon o f great practical 
significance.69 Seen in this light, the practice o f  the General Assembly seems 
incongruous: in the area o f standard-setting, it stretches its role to the limit, or even
63 Bamett, Finnemore, supra note 61 at 707.
64 An important difference between specialised agencies and subsidiary agencies is that contributions to 
the latter are on a voluntary rather than treaty-based assessed basis (see D. Williams, The Specialised 
Agencies and the United Nations (1987) at 43).
65 See Chapter V.4.
66 White observes that, while specialised agencies have a reporting obligation to the Economic and 
Social Council, specialised programmes, like UNDP and UNCTAD, have not only grown very 
autonomous but they have often become rivals of the Economic and Social Council (White, supra note 
6 at 146).
67 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 54, at 11, and at 15 £n 61.
68 Dagory, supra note 62 at 291.
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beyond the feasible limit, by adopting a plethora o f resolutions on the most disparate 
subjects and contributing to the development o f a rich body o f  soft law, which 
according to some aids the governance o f globalisation;70 on the other hand, the 
General Assembly fails to exercise its constitutional powers in the area o f institutional 
governance and leaves unencumbered latitude to the programmes it has established, 
although in this case it would have the instruments to play a more significant role.
As has been seen, the restrictive approach to the position o f  specialised agencies vis-a- 
vis the UN that was adopted in the Nuclear Weapons (WHO Request) hinged upon the 
notion that there can be no functional overlap between the UN and its specialised 
agencies. This reasoning, which would apply a fortiori to specialised programmes, is at 
variance with much institutional practice, especially in the humanitarian field, where 
functional overlap is no t only accepted but recurrent. The Court gave little regard to 
the consequences o f  its reasoning; if the W HO is not even permitted simply to request 
an advisory opinion from the Court because this could encroach upon the UN’s 
prerogatives, does it no t follow that - to give only one example - statements o f 
UNICEF, UNDP or UNHCR officials that denounce violations o f humanitarian law 
and that have not been sanctioned by the UN are ultra vires? This position would be 
unsustainable and would paralyse the work o f UN agencies and programmes 
particularly in situations o f conflict. Furthermore, it has been correctly pointed out 
that such a rigid attitude to the division o f  functions and responsibilities among 
various international organisations could undermine co-operation among agencies.71
It is not the sheer functional overlap that should be o f concern but the functional 
overlap accompanied by contradictory practice, as is the case when a specialised 
agency or programme acts in a manner that contradicts antecedent acts or practice o f 
other bodies o f the UN. For example, a number o f operational agencies o f  the UN 
have entered into agreements not only with insurgents in effective control o f  territory 
- such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) in Somalia and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) in south Sudan — but also with non-recognised entities
69 See, for example, Barnett and Finnemore, supra note 61. See also Chapter 1.6.
70 O’ Connell, ‘The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order*, in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance 
(2000) 100 at 102.
71 Akande, supra note 37 at 450-451. Critical is also Leary, supra note 46 at 119-120.
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claiming statehood, like Somaliland.72 Although there is no Security Council resolution 
imposing a duty o f  non-recognition o f  Somaliland — as is the case for northern Cyprus 
— no member state o f the UN has thus far recognised Somaliland. It could thus be 
argued that the UN should have refrained from acts implying recognition o f  
Somaliland. On the other hand, to justify this practice it could be submitted that these 
agreements are meant to ensure the provision o f essential humanitarian assistance and 
do not imply recognition.
(d) Identifying the duties o f international organisations
The existence o f a legal duty to observe human rights or humanitarian law cannot be 
derived tout-court from the sheer conferral o f international legal personality on the UN. 
Such an inference would be a non sequitur.; since international legal personality simply 
involves the capacity to bear rights and duties, but does no t imply per se the existence 
o f specific legal duties.73 Even if one shares Rama-Montaldo’s views on the existence 
o f  rights and duties inherent to international legal personality, the logical nexus 
between the conferral o f legal personality and specific duties would still need to be 
established. In other words, the fact that subject A has sufficient capacity to bear duty 
X does not mean that A is automatically bound by X; or, to give an example from 
private law, whereas there is no doubt that corporate personality could in principle 
encompass an obligation to invest part o f the profits o f the company in a particular 
manner, whether this obligation actually exists or not is a different matter.
Existing case law does not offer clear-cut guidance on how to go about the 
determination o f the specific duties o f  the UN. Although the ICJ observed that 
‘attendant duties and responsibilities’ flowed from the ‘entrusting o f certain functions’ 
to the UN,74 in practice its decisions have dealt with specific rights o f  the ILO, the
72 E.g.: the tripartite Agreement on the Implementation o f Principles Governing the Protection an 
Provision o f Humanitarian Assistance to War Affected Civilian Populations, between the Government 
o f Sudan, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the UN-Operation Lifeline Sudan 
(OLS), signed in Geneva, 15 December 1999, available at www.reliefweb.int). This is part o f a series o f  
tripartite and bilateral agreements concluded by OLS in the context o f the conflict in Sudan. While 
these agreements do not normally contain a clause that explicitly states that they are binding agreements 
regulated by international law, they do contain numerous references to international law but none to the 
domestic law o f Sudan. As a result not only o f  these textual elements, but also o f the intention o f the 
parties, the alternative — that these agreements are contracts regulated by Sudanese contract law, or by 
administrative law given the involvement of the government — does not seem at all plausible.
73 On this, see, for example, H. G. Schermers, N. M. Blokker, International InstitutionalEarv (3rd ed., 1999) 
at 981.
74 Reparation, supra note 18 at 179.
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UN, and the W H O .75 The dearth o f  judicial decisions on the duties o f the UN is not 
so surprising, as UN organs and specialised agencies are likely to make use o f  the 
advisory jurisdiction o f the Court to invoke their rights rather than to request 
clarifications on their duties.76
It is still worth surveying the handful o f indirect references to duties o f international 
organisations that can be found in the sparse case law o f the ICJ. In the Effect of 
Awards opinion, the Court justified the establishment o f the UN Administrative 
Tribunal by the General Assembly notwithstanding the absence o f an express 
provision in the Charter in the following terms,
It was inevitable that there would be disputes between the Organization and 
staff members as to their rights and duties (...) The Charter contains no 
provision which authorizes any o f the principal organs o f the United Nations 
to adjudicate these disputes, and Article 105 secures for the United Nations 
jurisdictional immunities in national courts. It would, in the opinion o f  the 
Court, hardly be consistent with the expressed aim o f the Charter to promote 
freedom and justice for individuals and with the constant preoccupation o f the 
United Nations Organization to promote this aim that it should afford no 
judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the settlement o f any disputes 
which may arise between and them.77
The question that had been put to the Court was whether the General Assembly had 
the power to establish the UN Administrative Tribunal. In response, the Court 
reasoned that, since the General Assembly had to provide some remedy, it was 
empowered to provide the particular remedy in the form o f the UN Administrative 
Tribunal. The Court did not overtly state that the UN was under an ‘implied duty’ to 
provide a remedy to its own staff for the settlement o f disputes, but it did assert that
75 The judgment in the Reparation case does not deal with specific institutional duties. One incidental 
reference, however, is to the duty of the Organisation to remind member states o f certain obligations 
(Reparation, supra note 18, at 179).
76 In addition, the paucity of litigation, as well as scholarly analysis, on institutional duties can be 
explained in the context o f the challenges historically faced by international organisations in a state- 
dominated world. Perpetuating this attitude today, however, would mean to deny that international 
society has entered into a new phase in which once marginal actors, like international organisations and 
non-governmental organisations, play a central role and have significant powers (J. Mathews, Tower 
Shift’, 76 Foreign Affairs (1997) 50).
77 Effect of Awards, supra note 34 at 57.
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failure to provide such remedy would be incompatible with the Charter, and thus 
constitute a violation thereof
In another decision the ICJ made an explicit, albeit curt, reference to the obligations 
o f international organisations. In the Interpretation of Agreement case, it found that 
‘international organizations are subjects o f international law, and, as such, are bound by 
any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their 
constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties’ (emphasis 
added).78 The expression ‘general rules o f international law’ includes at least custom 
and jus cogens?9 The applicability o f customary rules to international organisations is 
also recognised, albeit implicitly, in Article 38 o f the Vienna Convention on Treaties 
between States and International Organisations, and between International 
Organisations themselves,80 while Article 53 expressly confirms the subjection o f 
international organisations to jus cogens. There are, however, two grounds that could 
justify the non-applicability o f  specific rules o f general international law to 
international organisations. Firstly, the organisation may not concretely exercise such 
functions as to warrant the existence o f  certain obligations. Secondly, the constituent 
instrument, or any other international agreement, may expressly exempt the 
organisations from particular obligations.81 Similar arguments apply to the obligation 
o f specialised agencies and specialised programmes to comply with international 
customary law and jus cogens. Specialised programmes, in particular, cannot be 
endowed with more rights — i.e. the right to act free from obligations in the human 
rights and humanitarian sphere - than their parent organs possess on account o f the 
general principle, nemo plus iuris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet.
As for obligations that cannot be based on ‘general rules o f  international law’, the 
starting point must be the statement in the Reparation case that ‘rights and duties [of 
the organisation] will depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied
78 Interpretation of the Agreement of March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
(1980) 73 at 90. See also Judge El-Erian’s independent opinion at 168.
79 See also Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 at 824.
80 Art. 38, Vienna Convention, supra note 10, reads: ‘Nothing in Arts. 34-37 predudes a rule set forth in 
a treaty from becoming binding upon third states and third organizations as a customary rule of 
international law, recognised as such’.
81 The constituent instrument, like any other treaty, could contain provisions that are different from 
existing customary rules, but, in case o f conflict between a rule o f jus cogens and a treaty provision, the 
former prevails (Art 53, Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties (1969), 1155 UNTS 331).
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in its constituent documents and functions in practice’.82 Leaving aside the fact that 
many rules o f  human rights and humanitarian law are customary in nature, there are 
two other ways o f proving that the UN is bound by the whole body o f human rights 
and humanitarian law. It must be demonstrated that either human rights and 
humanitarian law obligations expressly feature in the Charter,83 or that such 
obligations are in a sense ‘implied duties’ o f the organisation, which are necessary for 
the fulfilment o f its purposes and the discharge o f its functions.
The Charter contains a number o f  direct references to human rights that provide a 
legal basis for the applicability o f human rights law to the activities o f the UN. O f 
particular importance is the fact that one o f the purposes o f  the UN, as enumerated at 
Article 1, is to promote and encourage ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms’. It would be impossible for the UN effectively to promote and encourage 
respect for obligations by which it does not consider itself bound and which it sets out 
to violate. Furthermore, the Charter explicitly obliges the Security Council, in 
discharging its duties, ‘to act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles o f the 
United Nations’ (Art. 24, 2). Human rights do not feature in Article 2 o f the Charter, 
which lists the principles regulating the action o f the organisation and o f  its members, 
but this omission is not material. Indeed, in spite o f  its opening sentence,84 Article 2 is 
directed at member states rather than at the Organisation itself. O f the seven 
principles therein listed, only the duty to ensure that non-member states act in 
accordance with the principles and the principle o f non-intervention in matters within 
the domestic jurisdiction o f states apply also to international organisations, while all 
the others pertain typically to states. Furthermore, Article 2 does not provide an 
exhaustive set o f rules for the organisation, and some o f the legal obligations that 
derive from these principles are fleshed out in other provisions o f the Charter.85
Article 55 o f the Charter specifies the purposes enumerated at Article 1. I t asserts that 
the UN shall ‘promote’ inter alia ‘universal respect for, and observance o f  (respect effect!)), 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all w ithout distinction as to race, sex,
82 'Reparation, supra note 18 at 180.
83 An international organisation cannot obviously be a party to its own constituent instrument, but this 
can nonetheless create binding obligations on the organisation. This argument is developed in detail by 
Chinkin, supra note 15 at 94-96.
84 The Organisation and its Members, in pursuit o f the purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in 
accordance with the following principles..
95
language or religion’. O n the one hand, the use o f the word ‘promote’ — rather than 
‘ensure’ or ‘secure’ - bespeaks the inevitably programmatic nature86 o f this obligation 
since the UN was no t going to be empowered to enforce human rights the world 
over; on the other hand, ‘universal respect’ and ‘observance’ are robust terms — and 
the locution respect effectif used in the French text even more so. Again, the duty to 
respect and observe human rights in its activities is an implied and indispensable 
premise for the successful promotion by the UN o f effective compliance with human 
rights in the practice o f its member states. Paraphrasing the aforementioned passage in 
the Effect of Awards,87 it could be observed that, since disputes on the fundamental 
rights o f individuals are bound to arise in the course o f UN operations, it would 
hardly be consistent with the expressed aim o f the Charter to promote freedom and 
justice and with the constant preoccupation o f the UN to do the same if the UN were 
allowed to act without regard to human rights and humanitarian law.
In dealing with the now defunct Trusteeship system, Chapter XII o f the Charter gives 
prominence to ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms’ (Art. 76). 
Although trust territories no longer exist, it is evident from these provisions that 
under the Charter the exceptional exercise o f  governmental authority by an entity 
other than the member state to which the territory belongs is to be accompanied by 
certain duties, which, incidentally, also include the obligation ‘to promote the political, 
economic, social and educational advancement o f the inhabitants’ o f the territory 
(Ibid). It is reasonable to assume the applicability o f similar standards to the UN in all 
situations in which it exercises administrative functions.
Identifying obligations that are ‘implied’ in the constituent instrument and in the 
practice o f the organisation requires an even more demanding interpretative effort. 
This is especially so because, as mentioned, the method for fleshing out the legal 
personality o f  international organisations has been developed having the ‘rights’ o f the 
organisations in mind rather than their ‘duties’. One can only attempt to apply this 
method mutatis mutandis to institutional duties, but little help is found in scholarly
85 Randelzhofer, ‘Introduction to Article 2’, in Simma, supra note 50, 72 at 73.
86 Partsch, ‘Article 55 (c)’, in B. Simma, supra note 50, 776 at 780.
87 Supra note 77.
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writings because, with a few exceptions,88 m ost authors have also concentrated on the 
rights o f international organisations.
Another difficulty is that the scope o f ‘implied powers’ is also quite controversial. The 
Permanent Court o f International Justice considered the extent o f the implied powers 
o f the ILO in an advisory opinion. It recognised the implied power o f  the ILO to 
provide an incidental regulation o f the work o f employers, regardless o f the lack o f an 
express reference to employers in the constituent instrument o f the ILO.89 The 
Permanent Court explained that this power was consistent with the institutional goal 
o f assuring humane conditions o f labour and the protection o f  workers, and that ‘a 
limitation o f the powers o f the International Labour Organization, clearly inconsistent 
with the aim o f the scope o f Part X III [of the Treaty establishing the organisation] 
(...) would have been expressed in the Treaty itself.90 It could be inferred from this 
passage that powers necessary to the fulfilment o f the institutional purposes can 
always be implied, unless they are expressly excluded from the constituent instrument. 
But in the 'Reparation case the ICJ fine-tuned this position by making reference to 
‘those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred 
upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance o f its duties’ 
(fonctions in French). A number o f judges dissented from the majority on the question 
o f implied powers, most notably Judge Hackworth, who uttered a series o f cautionary 
remarks on the use o f implied powers.91
Writers’ views on the acceptable extent o f  implied powers have also differed. 
Seyersted has argued in favour o f a large measure o f implied powers. He maintains 
that international organisations have inherent rights and that the fact that they exercise 
territorial and personal jurisdiction to a more limited extent than states is due to a 
difference o f fact between international organisations and states, and no t to 
differences in their inherent legal capacity. He thus concludes that an international 
organisation can perform any act as long as it is no t expressly forbidden by its
88 C. Eagleton, ‘International Organisation and the Law o f Responsibility^, 76 RC  (1950) 323 at 385 ff. 
Some have simply acknowledged that these areas are ‘uncharted seas’ (Morgenstem, Legality in 
International Organizations’, XLVIIIBYBIL (1976-77) 241 at 253).
89 Competence of the ILO, supra note 17.
90 Competence of the ILO, supra note 17, at 18.
91 Effect of Awards, supra note 34 at 80 (diss. op. Judge Hackworth). He also dissented on similar grounds 
in Reparation, supra note 18 at 198.
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constituent instrument.92 It is not necessary — in his view — ‘to look for specific 
provisions in the constitution, or to resort to strained interpretations o f  texts and 
intentions, or to look for precedents or other constructions to justify legally the 
performance by an intergovernmental organisation o f  a sovereign or international act 
no t specifically authorised in its constitution’ 93
Perhaps the m ost helpful approach to the theory o f ‘implied powers’ is to view it as 
‘nothing but an interpretative directive o f the constituent instruments o f international 
organisations’.94 Such interpretative directives would apply equally for the 
identification o f rights or powers o f  international institutions, and o f their duties. In 
fact, although the question o f institutional duties has not been tackled systematically, 
there would almost certainly be general agreement on the proposition that institutional 
duties are no t simply limited to those based on the constituent instrument. For 
example, legal writers unanimously acknowledge that - to give a paradigmatic example 
o f  international legal obligations - the law o f responsibility applies, mutatis mutandis, to 
the UN in spite o f  no express mention o f  this in the Charter.95 Another example o f 
‘implied duties’ o f the UN is the obligation to respect humanitarian law. Chapter VII 
o f  the Charter gives the UN the power to use force, and the exercise o f  these 
functions is to be accompanied by the obligation to respect the laws o f warfare, as, in 
the words o f the ICJ quoted above, functions were entrusted to the UN with the 
attendant duties and responsibilities’.
To summarise, as a result o f international legal personality, international organisations 
have the undisputed capacity to carry obligations in the human rights and 
humanitarian sphere. The specific sources o f obligation can be found in the 
constituent instrument, in treaties to which they have become parties, but often result 
from the purposes and functions o f the organisations. With respect to custom, it 
could be remarked that international organisations play a marginal role in the 
formation o f  custom, their exclusion being one o f  the enduring legacies o f a state-
92 Seyersted, ‘International Personality o f Intergovernmental Organizations: Do Their Capacities Really 
Depend upon Their Constitutions?’, 4 Indian J. Int. L. (1964) 1 at 20-25.
93 Ibid., at 22.
94 N. Q. Dinh, P. Daillier, A. Pellet, Droit International Public (6* ed., 1999) at 598. A similar position is in 
Verdross, Simma, supra note 51 at 494-495.
95 See infra p. 113 ff.
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centred international legal order.96 It may appear unfair that international organisations 
have to respect norms to the formation o f which they have not contributed, but the 
same was expected o f  states that became independent in the post-colonial period. It 
would be far less desirable to have a category o f ever more powerful actors in the 
international arena exempted from respect o f custom.
II.3. T h e  Effects o f M em ber States* O bligations on  Institu tiona l D uties
Legal personality alone cannot justify the applicability to international organisations of 
rules that have not acquired customary status, unless they feature, expressly or 
impliedly, in the constituent instrument.97 Given that such organisations ‘hitherto ... 
have been accepted as parties to multi-lateral law-making treaties only exceptionally’,98 
the problem o f the applicability to international organisations o f  treaty standards is not 
only theoretical. The widespread reluctance to include international institutions as 
parties to human rights treaties was confirmed in Opinion 2/94 o f  the European 
Court o f  Justice, which held that the European Community did not have the 
competence to accede to the European Convention o f Human Rights emphasising 
that the ‘institutional implications’ o f accession to the European Convention would 
have ‘constitutional significance’. 99 This decision is anachronistic considering that the 
European Community actively promotes respect for human rights in its external 
relations, including its commercial policies.100 If  the European Community does not 
have the competence to enter into human rights agreements, would its credibility as a 
promoter o f  human rights in its external relations not be affected?
The European Community is a powerful international institution, which its 
constituent instrument endows with a high measure o f  legal personality and o f
96 International organisations can however play an important role in the identification o f custom, most 
notably the International Law Commission as part o f its mandate to contribute to the progressive 
codification o f international law.
97 For example, the European Court o f Justice has held that, since the European Community is not a 
party to the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, it cannot be bound by its terms except for 
those rules in the Convention which have acquired customary status (Case C-162/96, A . Racke GmbH 
and co. v. Haupt^ollamtMain% [1998] 3 CLMR 219 at 227).
98 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73, at 984.
99 Opinion 2/94  [1996] EC R 1-1759, at para. 36. However, the European Court o f Justice has affirmed in 
other cases that ‘the European Community must respect international law in the exercise o f its powers’ 
(Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. ~Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp., [1992] ECR 1-6019 
at para. 9), and that a Community act adopted in manifest violation o f a rule o f customary international 
law can be annulled (Racke, supra note 97 at 245-246).
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autonomy from member states. The interpretation o f its competence in Opinion 2/94 
could a fortiori apply to less powerful international organisations. A t present, there is 
no recognisable international effort to promote the accession o f  international 
organisations to human rights or humanitarian law treaties; it is an effort that neither 
states nor international organisations have an interest to undertake.
The conclusion that the human rights obligations incumbent upon international 
organisations are limited to the ‘minimum common denominator’ o f customary law 
remains, to say the least, disturbing. However, the argument that humanitarian and 
human rights law treaty standards should bind the UN ipso facto appears to clash with 
the consensualist foundations o f contemporary international law: treaties to which an 
international organisation is not a party are res inter alios acta f1 It is certainly no 
coincidence that the ICJ in the Interpretation of Agreement case, when listing the sources 
o f  binding obligations for international organisations, only mentioned the agreements 
to which they are parties.102 While even the most rigid consensualist would accept that 
there is one category o f treaties, i.e. constituent instruments, that bind international 
organisations although they are not parties to them, this still seems to be a logical 
exception rather than a falsification o f  the consensualist principles. As in the case o f  
custom, it would be similarly ironic if the marginalisation o f international 
organisations from the international legal process were to result in an outright 
exemption from certain obligations. Moreover, as Schermers and Blokker 
appropriately observed, ‘Their [international organisations’] general abstention from 
becoming such parties cannot therefore be interpreted as a desire no t to be bound. In 
considering the question whether an international organization is subject to rules o f 
treaty law, one cannot start from the hypothesis that this is not the case unless the 
organization expressly bound itself.103 A ‘proper’ consensualist and statist approach, in 
other words, would also imply that international organisations are bound by certain 
treaty standards, since after all it is the consent o f  states that is the basis o f the whole 
system.
100 On the human rights policy of the European Community, see Brandtner and Rosas, ‘Human Rights 
and the External Relations o f the European Community: An Analysis o f Doctrine and Practice’, 9 EJIL
(1998) 468.
101 Chinkin, supra note 15, at 89.
102 Interpretation of Agreement, supra note 78.
103 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 at 984.
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The arguments developed by the European Court o f Human Rights in the Matthews 
case are useful at this point. The applicant, a resident in Gibraltar, contended that her 
rights under Article 3, Protocol N o.I,104 had been violated because the EC Act on 
D irect Elections o f  1976 limited the franchise for the elections o f the European 
Parliament to the United Kingdom, excluding Gibraltar. In its opinion, the 
Commission, while finding the application admissible, stated that no violation o f 
Article 3, Protocol 1, had taken place. Five dissenting commissioners referred to a 
previous case,105 in which the Commission had opined that the Convention does not 
‘prohibit a Member State from transferring powers to international organisations’, but 
that the State ‘would be answerable for any resulting breach o f its obligations’ under 
the Convention.106 According to another dissenting Commissioner, ‘at the present 
stage o f European and international development, where increasingly governmental 
powers are transferred to European or international organs, I consider it essential to 
underline that the Contracting States remain responsible for infringements o f human 
rights if they do not provide for adequate protection o f these rights by the institutions 
to which powers are transferred’.107
The judgment o f the Court supported the position o f the dissenting commissioners. It 
was held that ‘the Convention does not exclude the transfer o f competences to 
international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be 
“secured”.108 The Court rejected the submission o f the United Kingdom (UK) that ‘to 
engage the responsibility o f any State under the Convention, that State must have a 
power o f effective control over the act complained o f .109 In another decision on the 
same day, although it found that no violation o f Convention rights had been 
committed, the Court confirmed its position in Matthews,
104 'The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion o f the people in the choice 
of the legislature'.
105 M. and Co. v. Germany (No. 13258/87), Report o f the Commission, 9 February 1990.
106 Matthews v. United Kingdom (No. 24833/94), Report o f the Commission, 29 October 1997 (diss. op. o f  
Commissioners Weitzel and others).
107 Ibid. (diss. op. o f Commissioner Schermers).
108 Ibid. at par. 32. This approach was criticised by Judges Sir John Freeland and Jungwiert, who, in their 
dissenting opinions, stated (at par. 9):
... we see a certain incongruity in the branding of the United Kingdom o f as a violator of  
obligations under Article 3 o f Protocol No. 1 when the exclusion from the franchise effected 
multilaterally by the 1976 Decision and Act ... was at that time wholly consistent with those 
obligations...; when at no subsequent time has it been possible for the United Kingdom 
unilaterally to secure the modification o f the position so as to include Gibraltar within the 
franchise; and when such a modification would require the agreement of all member States.
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The Court is o f the opinion that where States establish international 
organisations in order to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fields 
o f activities, and where they attribute to these organisations certain competences 
and accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the protection o f 
fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object o f the 
Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from 
their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field o f activity 
covered by such attribution. It should be recalled that the Convention is 
intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are 
practical and effective.110
The point o f law in Matthews could thus be summarised: when effective control over 
certain acts is voluntarily transferred to an international organisation, the state will retain 
at least some responsibility for violations o f  human rights. The ratio decidendi o f  this case 
is no t applicable to those situations in which the state has lost effective control 
involuntarily, as a result, for example, o f  a resolution o f the Security Council. 
Furthermore, the Court could not make a finding on the question o f the responsibility 
o f the European Community, since the Community is not a party to the Convention. 
Far from logically excluding its responsibility, the approach o f the Court can be 
construed as implicitly supporting the notion o f joint and several liability o f states and 
o f international organisations in certain situations.
Matthews places a significant burden on member states by making them responsible, in 
certain circumstances, for violative acts o f  international organisations. The Court did 
not find that the UK was responsible for a violation o f the Convention rights because 
the act was nominally imputable to the Community but effectively imputable to the 
UK. On the contrary, it was recognised that the act in question was a Community act. 
The responsibility o f  the UK was in a sense at the root, resulting from the violation o f 
the obligation to ‘secure’ that rights are respected by international organisations when 
the UK transfers functions to them. The corollary o f this finding is that international 
organisations — the European Community in this case — have an obligation no t to
109 Matthews v. United Kingdom (No. 24833/94), Judgment (Merits), 18 February 1999 at para. 27.
110 Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (No. 26083/94), Judgment (Merits), 18 February 1999, para. 67.
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commit an act that could engender the responsibility o f the member states. It may be a 
rather tortuous path to reach the desired goal, i.e. the conclusion that international 
organisations have to respect human rights, but one that could have far-reaching 
consequences because it requires states to exercise effective control over international 
organisations.
There are, however, some difficulties with applying Matthews to the UN. First, while 
there is uniformity in the obligations incumbent upon European states under the 
European Convention o f  Human Rights, the human rights obligations o f member 
states o f  the UN can vary significantly. I f  the Matthews approach is extended to the 
UN, there could be situations in which a certain UN act would engage the 
responsibility o f state A but no t o f state B because o f differences in the obligations 
incumbent on these two states. Even worse, the commission o f a certain act by the 
UN could result in the responsibility o f  state A, whereas the omission o f the same act 
would cause a breach o f state B’s obligations.111 However, it could still be argued that 
the UN ought to comply with treaty standards accepted only by some o f its member 
states, whenever such compliance is devoid o f consequences for other member states 
— which would be so in the vast majority o f cases. In practice, the Matthews approach 
can thus still be applied to the UN, and it signifies that, when some member states 
have accepted a certain human rights obligation whilst others have not, the UN 
normally has to consider itself bound by it.
Another difficulty is that in Matthews it was easy to identify the ‘culprit’ state, which 
had failed its obligation to secure respect for Convention rights when it transferred 
certain functions to the European Community. When complex UN operations are 
involved, it is no t so easy to identify one culprit state, or a small group o f them; in 
m ost cases, the culprits would be all the member states o f  the UN. This may be an 
interesting proposition legally, but hardly useful practically, since victims cannot bring 
a lawsuit in every member state o f the UN.
Thirdly, Matthews is premised on the idea that states transfer functions to international 
organisations and that they have the power, and are under an obligation to ‘secure’
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rights at this stage. This is ultimately a statist, Hobbesian approach based on the 
notion that all power originates from states, and from them it may be transferred to 
other entities, which are bom  powerless and whose power is always derivative. It is an 
approach that overlooks the role o f  international organisations as autonomous centres 
o f  power, which often exercise functions without an express, or a clearly identifiable, 
prior attribution from states. The doctrine o f  implied powers, and the institutional 
practice examined in the following Chapters o f this work are evidence o f the 
autonomous power o f  international organisations.
Finally, w ithout relapsing into the endless debate on the role o f  fault in responsibility, 
it is important to define the boundaries o f  this ‘obligation to secure’ rights, which 
according to the European Court o f Human Rights is incumbent upon state parties 
when they give up functions and powers to international institutions. International 
institutions often grow beyond what their founders had envisaged, no t necessarily as a 
result o f subsequent transfers o f  functions from states, but also, and perhaps 
principally, as a result o f their own autonomous expansion. Would it be possible to 
construe the ‘obligation to secure’ rights in such a way as to make states responsible 
for what is in practice a failure ‘to foresee the future’, that is the growth o f power o f 
the UN? Furthermore, the establishment o f many an international organisation 
predates the development o f  human rights law, and in these cases states cannot be 
blamed for no t entrenching human rights in the constituent instruments.
There are cases, however, in which the obligations o f member states can be o f great 
importance in the regulatory framework o f UN operations. In particular, whenever an 
UN operation is carried out through member states, the latter normally remain bound 
by their international obligations. Peace-keeping operations and enforcement actions 
are examples in question.112 Since the UN does not have its own military forces, it 
continues to rely on troops made available by nation states. The fact that national 
troops are acting under the UN banner does not exempt them from their international 
legal obligations.113 Indeed, as is also the case with human rights law, states are not
111 This is however a notional hypothesis. I cannot think o f any example in the human rights field where 
this situation could obtain.
112 On delegation to member states, see: D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective 
Security (1999).
113 Greenwood, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’, 1 YB Int. 
Humanit. L. (1998) 3 at 17. Also: Gasser, T)ie Anwendbarkeit dese humanitaren Volkerrechts auf
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simply to respect but to ‘ensure respect in all circumstances’ for the Geneva 
Conventions and for Additional Protocol I.114
Matthews shows that human rights obligations are not devoid o f  consequences for the 
collective action o f state through multilateral institutions. States have a duty to ‘secure’ 
human rights, when they transfer functions; international organisations, in turn, have a 
duty not to commit acts that constitute breaches o f the human rights obligations o f 
their members. The ‘maximum denominator’ - or ‘m ost progressive member states’ - 
standard is the one that is likely to ensure in m ost circumstances that member states o f 
the UN do not incur responsibility for acts o f the UN in breach o f their obligations, 
and, as such, is the one that should provide the yardstick for UN compliance with 
human rights.
II.4. Policy C onsiderations
The arguments for the applicability o f international human rights law to international 
institutions that have just been discussed are alone sufficient to justify such 
applicability. However, other grounds for applicability can still be found. For example, 
the conclusion that human rights law is applicable could be based on the promotion 
o f  the fundamental values o f international society.
There is disagreement on what values and policies are fundamental in the international 
society. Cassese, for example, argues that peace, human rights and self-determination 
are the three sets o f  values that ‘underpin the overarching system o f inter-state 
relations’, but adds that ‘if a conflict or tension emerges between two or more o f these 
values, peace must always constitute the ultimate and prevailing factor’.115 Policy- 
oriented jurisprudence has developed ‘a classification to inventory human desires or 
wants, i.e. ... “values’” that the system o f international law is meant to promote.116
militarische Operationen der Vereinten Nationen’, 5 Revue Suisse de Droit International et de Droit Europe'en 
(1994) 443 at 462.
114 Greenwood, ‘Scope o f  Application o f Humanitarian Law*, in D. Heck (ed.), The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (1995) 39 at 46. See also L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed 
Conflict (2nd ed., 2000) 338-339. D. W. Bowett expressed doubt about the applicability o f humanitarian 
law to UN forces (UN Forces: A  Legal Study of United Nations Practice (1966) at 484).
115 Cassese, *Ex Iniuria Jus Oritur. Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation o f Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’, 10 EJIL (1999) 23 at 24.
116 Wiessner and Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflict Toward a World Public Order o f Human Dignity*, 93 AJIL (1999) 316 at 318.
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This list o f basic values is significantly broader than Cassese’s ‘three sets o f  values’.117 
Policy-oriented theorists would argue that the exclusive pursuit o f security 
characterised international law o f the Grotian era, and is not appropriate to our era 
which is characterised ‘by a rich pluralism in effective power and by the pursuit, 
beyond security, o f the goals o f an optimum order in the shaping and sharing o f  all 
values’.118 Despite such disagreements, the Preamble o f the UN Charter offers a clear 
indication o f what at least some fundamental values are: security (‘to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge o f war*), human rights (‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights’), rule o f law (‘to establish conditions under which justice and the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources... can be maintained), and quality 
o f life (‘to promote social progress and better standards o f life in larger freedom’).
Echoes o f  the policy-oriented approach can be found in the Advisory Opinion on the 
legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (GA Request).119 The decision was 
controversial also because a conflict between values (humanity vs. security/self- 
defence) lay behind it. The non liquet which the Court reached could be attributed to 
the failure to solve such conflict. Judge Higgins, however, dissented from the majority 
and underscored that ‘the corpus o f  international law is frequently made up o f norms 
that, taken in isolation, appear to pull in different directions’. She added that in these 
cases ‘the judicial lodestar ... must be those values that international law seeks to 
promote and protect’.120 It could similarly be argued that, whenever the question of 
the applicability o f  certain human rights standards to UN activities becomes 
problematic from the point o f view o f positive law, the temptation to succumb to a 
non liquet should be shunned and the values o f  international law ought to be affirmed 
by confirming that international institutions are not exempt from the rule o f  law. This 
position would be a function o f the pursuit o f  at least three o f the fundamental values
117 The eigfit values identified by policy-oriented theorists are power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, 
skill, affection, respect and rectitude (ibid). See also H. D. Lassall, M. S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a 
Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Polity (1992).
118 McDougal and Reisman, ‘International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective’, in R. St. J. Macdonald, 
D. M. Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory 
(1983) 103 at 128.
119 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (GA Request), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996), 110 
ILR 227.
120 Legality of Nuclear Weapons (GA Request), supra note 119, at paras. 40-41 (diss. op. o f  Judge Higgins). 
The ambitions o f the policy-oriented jurisprudence would probably go beyond the essentially 
intepretative function assigned to it by Judge Higgins, and purport to offer a comprehensive way of  
looking at international law. Judge Weeramantry also filed a dissenting opinion observing that the
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identified in the Preamble o f the Charter — human rights, rule o f law and quality o f 
life.
II.5. O th er argum ents for applicability
(a) General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions
Neither Security Council nor General Assembly resolutions have addressed the 
applicability o f human rights or humanitarian law to UN forces and to UN operations. 
However, resolutions o f these organs have dealt with human rights extensively and, to 
a lesser extent, with aspects o f humanitarian law. In particular, many human rights 
treaties were adopted first as resolutions o f the General Assembly,121 while numerous 
resolutions address human rights issues in specific country situations.122 The 
normative production o f the General Assembly in the human rights sphere began with 
the adoption o f  the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, which provides ‘an 
authoritative guide’ to the interpretation o f the provisions o f the Charter that refer to 
human rights and that often lack precision.123
General Assembly resolutions are an important tool for setting standards in the 
human rights field for specialised programmes. As a parent organ, the General 
Assembly has a general regulatory power vis-a-vis its subsidiaries.124 Moreover, under 
Article 60 o f the Charter, ‘responsibility for the discharge o f the functions’ o f the UN 
in the area o f international economic and social co-operation ‘shall be vested in the 
General Assembly and, under the authority o f  the General Assembly, in the Economic 
and Social Council’. Resolutions o f  the General Assembly bind the recipient organs,
‘cardinal unit o f value’ in the global society envisaged by the Charter was the dignity and worth o f the 
human being (at para. 1.3 (diss. op. o f Judge Weeramantry).
121 For example: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide (1948), 78 
UNTS 277; Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948; 
International Covenant on Gvil and Political Rights (1966), 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 993 UNTS 3; Convention on the Elimination o f All 
Forms o f Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1979), 19 ILM 33; Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 39/46, 10 December 
1984; Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 44/25,20 November 1989.
122 Quinn, ‘The General Assembly into the 1990s’, in P. Alston, The United Nations and Human Rights: A  
Critical Appraisal (1992) 55 at 77.
123 Brownlie, supra note 4 at 574-575. The Universal Declaration is GA Res. GA Res. 217A (III), 10 
December 1948.
124 The Effects of Awards case was rather peculiar because the Court concluded that the General 
Assembly was bound by the awards o f the Tribunal, which it had established. But this conclusion does 
not contradict the relationship o f subsidiarity between the Assembly and the Tribunal, since the power
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when these are subsidiary programmes established by the Assembly. Indeed, in Certain 
Exspenses, the ICJ observed that certain resolutions are not ‘merely hortatory’, but do 
have ‘dispositive force and effect’.125 In the words of Amerasinghe, they constitute 
‘institutional or organizational acts’.126
In part owing to the failure o f  the General Assembly to exercise its powers o f  control 
and policy direction over specialised programmes like UNICEF, UNHCR and UNDP 
and over UN operations in general, there are only a few resolutions addressed 
specifically to them, and these tend to be unsubstantial in terms o f content.127 O n the 
other hand, the mandate o f some UN operations, especially peace-keeping and peace­
building ones, is contained in a resolution o f the Security Council. In some cases - for 
example East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia -128 the Security Council resolution enumerates 
the protection and promotion o f human rights among the responsibilities o f  the UN. 
However, as observed, one o f  the problems is that in many other cases such a 
mandate from either the Security Council or the General Assembly does not exist.
Specialised programmes are also bound by the terms o f  resolutions that are not 
specifically addressed to them, for example standard-setting resolutions in the field o f  
human rights. The General Assembly, as a parent organ, can expect its own 
subsidiaries, over which it has greater clout than over states, to comply with the 
standards it sets. With respect to the specialised agencies, the situation is not so 
straight-forward. Art 58 empowers the UN to ‘make recommendations for the co­
ordination o f the policies and activities o f the specialised agencies’. The agreement 
between the UN and the specialised agencies is meant to flesh out the terms o f this 
relationship. However, the practice o f  the IMF, the World Bank and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) suggests that some specialised agencies do not 
consider themselves bound by the resolutions o f  the General Assembly, although the
to bind the General Assembly had been vested with the Tribunal by the Assembly itself. See supra note 
60.
125 Certain Expenses, supra note 40 at 163.
126Amerasinghe, supra note 25 at 192 ff.
127 See supra page 90.
128 Respectively: SC Res. 1272 (1999) at paras. 8 and 15; SC Res. 1244 (1999) at para. 11 0 ;  SC Res. 
1088 (1996) at para. 28.
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Assembly, supported by the Secretariat, traditionally views its powers vis-a-vis the 
specialised agencies more extensively.129
A separate but related issue is that o f  the limits o f  the powers o f the Security Council 
and o f  the scope o f  Article 103. The question whether Security Council has the power 
to adopt binding resolutions that involve a breach o f human rights and humanitarian 
law (or even jus cogens) has been very much debated and has given rise to  divergent 
views.130 It has been argued, for example, that through the imposition o f  sanctions on 
Iraq, which resulted, among other things, in a shocking increase in child mortality,131 
the Council has perpetrated a breach o f  the m ost fundamental human rights. States 
that support the sanctions argue that this dismal situation is causally related to the 
sanctions, but legally imputable to the Iraqi government, which could put an end to it 
by complying with the terms o f the Security Council resolution. W hether this 
argument is persuasive or not, it is important to  note that in the practice o f the 
Security Council this putative power to breach customary law or jus cogens has not been 
invoked. W hether or not the Council has such power in theory, its practice suggests 
that it does not avowedly exercise it.
(b) Other sources o f law regulating U N  operations
UN peace-keeping practice includes the conclusion o f treaties with host countries; 
these treaties are known as Status-of-Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Given the 
consensual nature o f  m ost peace-keeping operations, SOFAs constitute an important 
source o f  regulation.132 Following the adoption o f a model SOFA in 1990 by the 
Secretary General upon a request o f the General Assembly,133 it has been the practice 
o f peace-keeping missions to apply it provisionally pending the negotiation o f a final
129 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 73 at 1073-1075; I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World 
(1991). Vol I, at 99 f£; D. Williams, supra note 64 at 160 f£.
130 Martenczuk argues that the Council’s discretion under Chapter VII ‘is essentially unlimited’ (‘The 
Security Council, the International Court o f Justice and Judicial Review’, 10 EJIL (1999) 517 at 546), 
whilst Gowland-Debbas (‘Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues o f State Responsibility’, 43 
ICLQ (1994) 55) and Watson (‘Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court’, 34 Harv. Int. 
L. J. (1993) 1) have taken the view that at least ju s cogens should bind the Security Council. See Chapter 
V on accountability.
131 UNICEF (with Iraq’s Ministry o f Health), ‘Iraq child and Maternal Mortality Survey*, Preliminary 
Report, July 1999, available on the internet at www.unicef.org/reseval/pdfs/irqrptsc2.pdf.
132 Like SOFAs, Memoranda of Understanding are also treaties concluded between UN agencies and 
the host state to regulate a particular operation. Memoranda o f Understanding, however, normally 
involve a slightly less formalised procedure. In addition, no central blueprint for such Memoranda 
approved by the General Assembly exists.
133 UN Doc. A/45/594.
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SOFA with the host state.134 The model should constitute only a starting point for 
negotiations, although in practice the final agreement is unlikely to depart substantially 
from its provisions.
SOFAs normally impose an obligation on the UN to refrain from activities that are 
incompatible with the impartial nature o f its operations, and to respect the laws o f the 
host country. These obligations, which also feature in the 1994 Convention on the 
Safety o f UN and Associated Personnel,135 may provide an adequate legal basis for 
binding the UN to respect norms o f humanitarian law and human rights at least to the 
extent these norms form part o f the laws o f the host country. SOFAs impose a wide 
range o f legal obligations on the UN, including the grant o f privileges and immunities 
to its personnel. Although the 1990 model SOFA did not contain any reference to the 
applicability o f international humanitarian law, recent peace-keeping and ‘peace­
building’ practice has often included applicability clauses.136 In addition, the mandates 
o f ‘peace-building’ operations often include the obligation to promote and protect 
human rights.137
In 1999, the Secretary General adopted guidelines for UN Forces about compliance 
with international humanitarian law.138 The guidelines, which apply ‘in enforcement 
actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use o f force is permitted in self- 
defence’ (Sec. 1), specify that the ‘obligation to respect (...) is applicable to the United 
Nations forces even in the absence o f a status-of-forces agreement’ (Sec. 3). Together 
with the entry into force in 1999 o f the Convention on the Safety o f UN Personnel, 
the Bulletin o f the Secretary General ought to finally put an end to the antinomian
134 GA Res. 52/12 B, at para. 7. Security Council resolutions have normally contained a clause to this 
effect, see for example SC Res. 1159 (1998), on the peace-keeping mission to the Central African 
Republic; SC Res. 1198 (1998), on western Sahara; SC Res. 1270 (1999) on Sierra Leone.
135 GA Res. 49/59, 9 December 1994. In spite o f a savings clause on ‘the applicability of international 
humanitarian law and universally recognised standards o f human rights’ (Art. 20), Costa Rica decided to 
enter a reservation stating that ‘in the event o f conflicts with the application o f the Convention, 
Costa Rica will, where necessary, give precedence to humanitarian law’.
136 Carlevaris, ‘Recenti sviluppi nella prassi degli Status-of-Forces Agreements per le operazioni di 
peace-keeping delle Nazioni Unite’, 53 Com. Int. (1998) 667 at 677; Shraga, U N  Peacekeeping 
Operations: Applicability o f International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related 
Damages’, 94 AJIL (2000) 406 at 407.
137 See Chapter IV.2 and IV.3 on human rights in Security Council resolutions establishing international 
administrations.
138 UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (6 August 1999), reprinted in 836 Int. Rev. R. C. (1999) 812-817. The 
SG’s Bulletin is considered ‘binding on members o f UN forces in the same way as are all other 
instructions issued by the Secretary General in his capacity as “commander in chief’ o f UN operations’ 
(Shraga, supra note 136 at 409.
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practice o f the past within the UN that denied the applicability o f  international 
humanitarian law to UN forces.139 O n the other hand, however, it must be noted that 
the better option would have been to accept explicitly that UN forces are bound by 
the whole o f body humanitarian law rather than attempt to encapsulate ‘the 
fundamental principles and rules’ o f international humanitarian law in a document that 
inevitably turned out to be ‘short, succinct, and simplified’.140 Some non-customary 
rules and principles were included, but others excluded, inevitably creating the 
appearances o f  arbitrariness in the process o f deciding which rules and principles are 
truly ‘fundamental’.
A nother important development has been the commissioning o f the Brahimi report to 
review peace-keeping practice. Among the final recommendations o f the report was 
the inclusion o f human rights and humanitarian law in peace-keeping missions,141 and 
it is likely that this will lead to the incorporation o f  clauses on compliance with human 
rights and humanitarian law in an ever growing number o f  SOFAs.
In addition to SOFAs, rules o f engagement are another important source o f  regulation 
o f the activities o f UN forces; soldiers and officers on the ground would probably be 
more familiar with these rules than with the Security Council mandate for their 
mission or with the SOFAs. The Brahimi report called for the adoption o f  ‘robust 
rules o f  engagement’ to deal with those parties to a conflict that renege on previous
139 The Office o f Legal Affairs traditionally maintained that the UN was not bound by the Geneva 
Conventions, emphasising in the early 1990s that one problem with applicability is that ‘some o f the 
troops put at the disposal o f the United Nations are provided by countries which are not yet parties to 
some o f  die humanitarian law conventions’ (UN Office of Legal Affairs, ‘Letter to the President o f the 
ICRC on the Question o f the Application o f the 1949 Geneva Conventions’, 17 September 1992, UN  
Jur. YB (1992) 431). See also Gutman, ‘United Nations and die Geneva Conventions’, available at 
www.crimesofwar.org/essays.html. and M. Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organisations Toward 
Third Parties: Some Basic Principles (1995) at 32-35. There were occasions, however, when the position o f  
the Legal Office on a related matter implied the applicability o f  the Geneva Conventions to the UN. 
For example, it was argued that the UN could not unconditionally surrender the mercenaries (for the 
most part European citi2ens) in its detention to the Congolese authorities because o f its ‘duty’ under 
Common article 3 ‘to satisfy itself ... that [the Congolese Government] is able and willing to treat such 
personnel humanely and, in particular, to afford it, in accordance with sub-paragraph (d) [of Common 
Article 3] “all the judicial guarantees which are recogni2ed as indispensable by civilized people’” (UN 
Office o f Legal Affairs, Note to the Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs and the Under­
secretary for General Assembly Affairs on the Legal Policy concerning the detention by the UN o f  
mercenaries, UN Jur. YB (1962) at 244).
140 Shraga, supra note 136 at 408.
141 Report o f the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (hereinafter ‘Brahimi report*], 21 August 
2000, UN Doc. A /55/305, S/2000/809, at 54-58.
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commitments.142 Rules o f engagement are drafted by the Secretariat, who, while 
retaining some discretion, has to tailor them to the mandate o f the mission as 
established by the Security Council. It is interesting that the rules o f engagement o f 
the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) implicitly recognised that not only 
were UN forces obliged to respect humanitarian law, but that they also had an 
obligation to ensure its respect and to intervene to stop violations o f humanitarian 
law. In fact, paragraph 17 asserted that the commission o f crimes against humanity 
would ‘legally and morally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them’.143 
As is well known, this rule was tragically flouted during the genocide.
Last but not least, one should not omit the rich body o f institutional soft law (reports, 
guidelines, etc.) that is normally quite important in bureaucratic decision-making 
processes. In some operations, a more formalised law-making procedure may even be 
in place. For example, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) issues regulations that 
cover a wide range o f aspects o f  its administration in Kosovo.
(c) Human rights as entitlements
A nother route for arriving at the conclusion that human rights and humanitarian law 
are applicable to international institutions is by focusing on the entitlements that this 
body o f law vests in individuals, rather than on the obligations that it imposes on 
states. I t is axiomatic that such entitlements are inalienable and appertain to the 
individual, whichever is the authority that exercises effective control.
Human rights treaties have traditionally referred almost exclusively to states, but there 
are some important, and ever more frequent exceptions. The Universal Declaration o f 
Human Rights already stated that ‘every individual and organ o f  society ... shall strive 
by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by 
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance’.144 O f particular relevance to the activities o f the UN is 
Article 28 o f the Declaration, which provides that ‘everyone is entitled to a social and
142 Brahimi report, supra note 141 at 10 (para. 55).
143 Commission o f Inquiry on Rwanda (1999) ‘Report o f the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of  
the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’.
144 GA Res. 217 A (III).
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international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be 
fully realised’ (emphasis added).
The Convention on the Rights o f the Child is an example o f a human rights treaty that 
goes beyond traditional approaches by explicitly imposing obligations on ‘private 
welfare institutions’, in addition to the institutions o f the state (A rt 2). In the field o f 
humanitarian law, Protocol II logically applies to the conduct o f hostilities by non­
state actors as well as the state, and the standards it lies down apply indistinctly to the 
former and the latter.145 The Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) follows a more oblique way for ‘ensuring’ 
a woman’s right to be free from discrimination: it imposes direct obligations only on 
states, but some o f  these obligations are to ‘take all appropriate measures’ to end 
discrimination in areas such as education and work, where the regulation o f the 
activities o f non-state actors is necessary. In other words, CEDAW  obliges states to 
impose obligations on third parties.146 Future human rights law-making should 
continue the tendency initiated by the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child and refer 
to obligations o f actors other than the states as a way o f  fleshing out the content o f 
the obligation to ensure rights. This would also reflect the inalienable nature o f  human 
rights as well as the diverse faces that power and authority can assume.
II.6. T h e  Law  o f R esponsibility
The ILC’s work on the law o f responsibility has so far concentrated on state 
responsibility, leaving out the responsibility o f other subjects o f  international law.147 
Owing to the lack o f codification, some uncertainty on the rules that regulate 
international institutional responsibility remains. Despite this, at least two basic 
principles are widely accepted. First, the UN bears responsibility on the international 
plane for the international wrongful acts that it commits.148 Secondly, the rules o f the
145 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (1977) 1125 UNTS 609.
146 Eg Art 2 (e) o f CEDAW, supra note 121, which obliges states ‘to take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise’.
147 The responsibility o f international organisations is part o f the long term programme o f  work o f the 
Commission (ILC Report (2000) at 290 f£).
148 This is also implicidy recognised in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility {supra note 11). Art. 57 
states that ‘these articles are without prejudice to any question o f  responsibility under international law 
o f an international organization, or o f any State for the conduct o f an international organization’. This 
provision did not feature in the 1996 Draft Articles provisionally adopted by the International Law 
Commission on First Reading, ILC Report (1996), UN Doc. A /51/10  (hereinafter 1996 Draft Articles
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law on state responsibility, which have customary status,149 apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
international organisations.150 The paucity o f case-law on international institutional 
responsibility is a function o f the lack o f fora for bringing claims against international 
institutions. Consequently, the process o f  adapting the rules on state responsibility to 
international organisations is left entirely to the interpreter. The main elements o f 
institutional responsibility - the commission o f  an internationally wrongful act, the 
attribution o f this act to the international institutions, circumstances excluding 
wrongfulness, and responsibility o f member states — are examined here with examples 
taken from the specific type o f UN operations and the case studies analysed in 
chapters III and IV.
(a) Wrongful act
A wrongful act is defined as an action or omission which constitutes a breach o f an 
international obligation.151 W hether a breach has really occurred is the question that is 
likely to arouse controversy when the author o f  the wrongful act is a state. When an 
international organisation commits a wrongful act, on the other hand, the very 
existence o f an obligation binding the organisation is likely to be disputed, given that 
the identification o f  international institutional obligations can raise more problems 
than in the case o f  state obligations.
In the sphere o f  human rights, it is im portant to emphasise that states’ obligations are 
no t limited to the obligation to respect, but encompass the obligation to ensure 
human rights.152 As a result, states in whose territories UN operations are carried out
on State Responsibility]. I will rely mainly on the 2001 draft, and refer to the provision in the old draft 
whenever appropriate. The main differences between the old draft and the proposals on which the 2001 
draft is based are explained by Crawford, ‘Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’, 10 EJIL
(1999) 435.
149 Scobbie, ‘International Organizations and International Relations’, in R. J. Dupuy, A  Handbook of 
International Organisations (2nd ed., 1998) 831 at 887.
150 See: Amerasinghe, supra note 25 at 240; Arsanjani ‘Claims against International Organizations: Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodei (1981) 7 Yale Journal of World Public Order 131; Eagleton, supra note 88 at 323; 
Hirsch, supra note 139 at 7-10; Scobbie, supra note 150 at 887; and N. Quoc Dinh, P. Daillier, and A. 
Pellet, supra note 94 at 756, who underscore that afortiori customary rules on responsibility should apply 
to international organisations. See also International Law Commission, ‘First Report on State 
Responsibility by the Special Rapporteur, Mr F. V. Garcia-Amador’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/96, and in 
(1956, II) YBILC 173 at pp.189-190.
151 Art. 2, Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
152 See for example Art. 2 (1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), 999 
UNTS 171. As has been mentioned above (see note 114), the obligation to ensure also applies to 
humanitarian law obligations. See Art. 1 in each o f the four Geneva Conventions and in Protocol I: 
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration o f  the Condition o f the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forced in the Field, Geneva (1949), 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention (II) for die Amelioration o f the
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are, in principle, under an obligation to ensure that the UN, like any other authority in 
the country, complies with the full spectrum o f human rights obligations undertaken 
by them. In practice, however, it is quite often the case that the weaker the territorial 
state, the stronger the UN, i.e. the range o f powers that UN agencies assume on the 
ground tend to be inversely correlated to the strength o f national institutions. In fact, 
situations o f  internal strife and conflict, and m ost notably in the case o f the failed 
states, are those in which there is a need for a multifunctional UN presence. These are 
also the situations in which obligations, including the obligation to ensure respect for 
human rights, are to a significant extent “transferred” to the UN agencies that have 
assumed such a large measure o f  control.
In order to determine whether a wrongful act has been committed by the UN in the 
course o f its operations, it is necessary at first to determine the content o f the specific 
obligation at stake, which might involve adapting an obligation that has been 
formulated for states to the particular activities o f  the international organisation.153 
Being itself obliged to ensure human rights, the UN could incur responsibility in some 
circumstances for failing to act. For example, when the UN is a provider o f 
humanitarian assistance that is material to the enjoyment o f fundamental human 
rights, and is forced to operate in a social context in which women are discriminated 
against, it is obliged to strive ‘to modify the social and cultural patterns o f conduct o f 
men and women’154 that result in discrimination against women. In the light o f this 
obligation, even conceding that there might be disagreement on the choice o f the
Condition o f the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members o f the Armed Forces at Sea (1949), 75 
UNTS 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War (1949), 75 UNTS 
135; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Gvilians in Time o f War, Geneva (1949), 75 
UNTS 287; Protocol I Additional to die Geneva Conventions o f 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
o f Victims of International Armed Conflict (1977), 1125 UNTS 3.
153 In some cases, a negative conduct, i.e. refraining from doing something, is all that is required; in 
others, a positive obligation exists. Most rights involve some type o f positive obligation, including 
“traditional” civil and political rights. For example, in order to ensure the right to life states not only 
have to refrain from arbitrarily depriving individuals o f their life, but might also have ‘to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts o f another 
individual’ (Osman v. UK (No. 23452/94), Judgment (Merits), 28 Oct. 1998, 29 EHRR 245 at 246). The 
content o f the obligation is to be determined giving due regard to existing treaty provisions, case-law 
and practice o f international judicial, and semi- or quasi-judicial bodies, including the general comments 
of the two Committees established under the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and state practice. See Chapter 
IV.3 and IV.4.C. for a broader discussion of the implications o f the obligation to ensure human rights 
in international administrations and in refugee camps.
154 Art 5 (a) CEDAW, supra note 121. States cannot thus use the socio-cultural status quo as an excuse 
for discrimination; on the contrary, they can bear responsibility on the international plane for 
maintaining it ‘despite evidence of pervasive inequality’ (Cook, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of  
Women’s Human Rights’, 7 Harv. HR J. (1994) 125 at 137).
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m ost effective means for bring about the necessary changes in society, it would be 
hard to deny that the UN practice in Afghanistan to acquiesce to the sexual apartheid 
created by the Taliban regime constitutes a wrongful act.155
The rule that states can incur responsibility for having been accomplices in the 
commission o f  an internationally wrongful act by another state also applies to 
international organisations. Article 16 o f the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
provides that ca State which aids or assists another State in the commission o f an 
internationally wrongful act’ bears responsibility if it had knowledge o f the 
circumstances o f the wrongful act, and if the act would have constituted an 
international wrong if committed by that state.156 W hat ‘aiding and abetting’ concretely 
means depends on the wrongful act in question. For example, in his Separate Opinion 
in the Order o f the ICJ in the Bosnia Genocide case, Judge Lauterpacht took the view 
that compliance with the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia could make members o f 
the UN ‘accessories to genocide’.157 The rule on aiding and abetting is o f great 
importance for the UN, since in various situations it can in practice aid or abet in the 
commission o f  a wrongful act by a state. For example, it could be argued that, through 
the provision o f humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan under the Taliban, or to 
Ethiopia in the days o f  the Menghistu regime, the UN became an accessory to the 
systematic human rights violations perpetrated by the rulers in those two countries.158 
Another example, also examined below, o f complicity with the wrongful act o f a state 
is the rigid application o f neutrality in humanitarian action in conflict.159
In other instances, the international organisation can be the primary author o f a 
wrongful act, while a state is an accessory. With the exception o f UN operations in 
failed states and o f UN de jure administration o f territory, the UN relies on some form 
o f co-operation with the territorial state, even if is only the acceptance o f its presence. 
The violations o f the refugees’ human rights in camps are primarily committed by
155 See Chapter III.4.
156 Art. 27 in the 1996 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
157 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order o f 8 April 1993, ICJ Reports (1993) 325 at 441 (sep. op. o f Judge 
Lauterpacht).
158 As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the responsibility o f the humanitarian agencies there is also 
primary to the extent that they directly provide certain services like education and health in a gender 
discriminatory manner.
159 See Chapter III.3.
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UNHCR, but the state is an accomplice, for example by enforcing the policy o f
encampment and by imposing heavy sanctions on refugees who run away from the 
160camps.
(b) Imputability
The attribution to the UN o f alleged breaches o f human rights committed in the 
exercise o f de jure or de facto control o f territory, or in humanitarian operations, can 
pose some problems: should the wrongful act be imputed to the nominal sovereign — 
the host state in refugee camps, and the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY) in 
Kosovo — or to the organisation that exercises effective control? Or, when UNHCR 
assumes responsibility for refugee status determination, is the state still responsible for 
violations o f the rights o f  asylum-seekers resulting from the application o f  a legal 
procedure which the state should normally put in place, but which it has decided to 
relinquish to an international organisation?
The attribution o f  the act is also one o f  the elements o f responsibility in which the 
adaptation o f the existing rules on state responsibility to international organisations 
can turn out to be problematic. The general rule on state responsibility is that the 
conduct o f an organ o f the state is imputable to the state, whether it ‘exercises 
legislative, executive, judicial or any other function, whatever position it holds in the 
organization o f  the State’ (Art. 4, Draft Articles on State Responsibility).161 The 
adaptation o f  a similarly broad rule on the attribution o f the acts o f  organs to 
international institutions would presumably result in the imputability o f the acts o f  any 
o f organ or office, including field offices, to the organisation. Furthermore, by analogy 
with state responsibility (Art. 7, Draft Articles on State Responsibility),162 the acts of 
organs that have acted ultra vires or o f officials acting in excess o f authority are 
imputable to the organisation. It would therefore be no justification to argue, for 
example, that the imposition o f collective punishment on the entire population o f a 
refugee camp163 is carried out by “rogue” UNHCR officials acting in excess o f 
authority, and that it does not engage the responsibility o f the organisation.
160 Chapter IV.4.
161 Arts. 5-6,1996 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
162 Art 10, 1996 Draft Articles on State Responsibility. See also, for example, the Rainbow Warrior cast, 
26 ILM 1346.
163 Chapter IV.4.C.
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Acts committed by UNHCR, or by UNDP and WFP - which are, as we have seen, 
subsidiary agencies o f the General Assembly — are subject to dual attribution: to the 
UN as a whole, and to the specific operational agency as an international legal person 
in its own right. Dual attribution can raise some problems. While the general 
principles on the law o f responsibility, including the obligation to make reparation for 
illegal wrongs,164 apply to specialised agencies and specialised programmes alike, for 
the latter a problematic aspect is the determination o f the responsibility o f the parent 
organ. The statutes o f  some specialised programmes make express provision in this 
respect, normally excluding the liability o f the UN for claims arising in the context o f 
the operations o f the subsidiary organs.165 The legality o f  these provisions could be 
contested since they could obliterate the obligation to make reparation if the 
operational agency is financially “starved” as a result o f lack o f voluntary 
contributions. The UN could shun its obligation to make reparation each time it so 
wishes by transferring the discharge o f  its functions to subsidiary agencies in financial 
troubles.
Another paradigmatic example o f dual attribution is that o f  wrongful acts committed 
in the course o f peacekeeping operations. In these cases, the wrongful act is normally 
imputable both to the UN and to the state(s) to whose armed forces the individual(s) 
responsible for the act belongs. The Secretary General has maintained that, in such 
cases, the UN is entitled to ‘seek recovery from the State o f nationality’,166 and this 
position has been endorsed by the General Assembly.167
A separate issue, and one o f great importance in the context o f humanitarian 
operations, is the attributions o f wrongful acts o f  non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) or private companies sub-contracted for the provision o f certain services.168 
The rules on state responsibility for wrongful acts committed in the private sphere are 
influenced by the public/private dualism.169 States can bear responsibility only for the
164 Lauterpacht, ‘The Legal Effect o f Illegal Acts o f International Organisations’, in R. Y. Jennings (ed.), 
Essays in Honour of Lord M cNair (1965) 88 at 89.
165 Statute o f UNHCR, supra note 49, at sec. 20; UNICEF’s mandate, supra note 49, at sec. 5; General 
Regulations of WFP, supra note 49, at sec. 9, b.
166 Report o f the Secretary General on Administrative and Budgetary Aspects o f the Financing o f  
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 20 Sept. 1996, UN Doc. A /51/389 (reproduced in 37 ILM 700) 
at para. 42.
167 GA Res. 52/247,17 July 1998.
168 On the privatisation and sub-contracting of humanitarian aid, see Chapter III.l.
169 Chinkin, ‘A Critique o f the Public/Private Dimension’, 10 EJIL (1999) 387.
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conduct o f an insurrectional movement provided that it becomes the new government 
(Art. 10, D raft Articles on State Responsibility), and for the conduct o f persons or 
entities exercising elements o f governmental control if empowered to do so by the law 
o f the state (Art. 5, ibid.) or ‘in the absence or default o f the official authorities and in 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise o f those elements o f authority’ (Art. 9, 
ibid) } 10 In spite o f this rather narrow approach, state obligations in the human rights 
sphere have been interpreted in such a way as to make states responsible in various 
circumstances for the acts o f private actors.171 In particular, in Costello-Roberts v. UK172 
and in the Osman case,173 the European Court o f Human Rights found that the 
positive nature o f the states’ obligations vis-a-vis Convention rights can result in state 
responsibility for acts o f private actors, like a private school or an individual. In Van 
der Mussele v. Belgium,114 the Court held that ‘Contracting parties cannot relieve 
themselves o f  their responsibilities under the Convention by imposing them by law on 
private bodies’ - the Belgian Bar Association in this case.
The same arguments could be used in respect o f international organisations when they 
delegate functions to private actors. A  fortiori these arguments apply to international 
organisations that exercise governmental authority: by delegating powers to private 
entities and individuals - including, for example, the community leaders who in 
refugee camps are given significant judicial powers —175 they cannot elude 
responsibility. A wrongful act committed by an N G O  in these circumstances is again 
susceptible o f dual attribution, to the international institution and to the N G O ; but as 
far as responsibility on the international plane is concerned, only the attribution to the 
international institution can be consequential.
The attribution o f acts in the context o f administration o f territory raises particular 
problems, in part related to the interaction between sovereignty and the exercise o f 
effective control, especially when there is a disassociation between these two. Under 
the rules on state responsibility, acts o f persons or entities exercising elements o f 
governmental authority are attributed to the state if the person or entity was
170 In the previous version o f the Draft Articles, these rules were formulated in a different manner and 
were at Arts. 7, 8,11,14 (1996 Draft Articles on State Responsibility).
171 See Chinkin,, supra note 169 at 393-394, and Cook, supra note 154.
172 Costello-Roberts v. UK (No. 13134/87), Judgment (Merits), 25 Mar. 1993,19 EHRR112.
173 Osman, supra note 153.
174 Van der Mussele v. Belgium (No. 8919/80), Judgment (Merits), 23 Nov. 1983, 6 EHRR 163 at 163.
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empowered by the law o f the state to exercise such authority (Art. 5, Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility).176 But what if the entity exercising elements o f governmental 
authority is another international legal person? The distinction between nominal 
sovereignty and effective control is germane to the question o f attribution in these 
circumstances.
In Lighthouses in Crete and Samos? 11 the Permanent Court took the view that nominal 
sovereignty is what ultimately matters. The Court held that, ‘although the Sultan had 
been obliged to accept important restrictions on the exercise o f his rights o f 
sovereignty in Crete, that sovereignty had not ceased to belong to  him’.178 The dispute 
hinged upon the power o f the Ottoman Empire to grant concessions in Crete, where 
the ‘Ottoman Government exercised no governmental powers (...) although the 
Sultan’s flag was ceremoniously flown until February, 1913’.179 Judge Hudson, 
dissenting, argued that
‘if it can be said that a theoretical sovereignty remained in the Sultan after 
1899, it was a sovereignty shorn of the last vestige ofpower. He could neither terminate 
nor modify the autonomy with which Crete had been endowed against his will 
and with the sanction o f  the four European States. A juristic conception must 
not be stretched to the breaking-point, and a ghost o f hollow sovereignty 
cannot be permitted to obscure the realities o f this situation’ (emphasis 
added).180
In Legal Consequences fo r States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, the ICJ 
dealt with the reverse situation: South Africa had continued to exercise effective 
control in Namibia in spite o f  the termination o f its mandate, that is o f  its title to 
administer Namibia. Regardless o f the lack o f  any title to territory South Africa thus 
continued to exercise rights connected to sovereignty.181 The Court then considered
175 Chapter IV.4.B.
176 Art. 7,1996 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
177 Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (France v. Greece), (1937) PCIJ Series A/B, No. 71.
178 Ibid.
179 Id. at 127 (diss. op. o f Judge Hudson).
180 Ibid
181 Whether in a mandate sovereignty lies with the mandatory state or with other entities (the 
population living in the mandated territory, the League of Nations or the UN, etc.) is a moot point (R. 
Jennings, A. Watts , Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., 1992) at 296 n 6.
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the legal consequences o f the unlawfulness o f South Africa’s presence in Namibia on 
other states.
In neither case did the Court explicitly examine the effect o f the dissociation o f 
sovereignty from administrative and legislative powers on the attribution o f acts 
respectively to the nominal sovereign and to the entity in effective control. The 
doctrine o f  ffectivite (‘effectiveness’), developed mainly in the context o f  territorial 
disputes, can offer some guidance in questions o f attribution. Under this doctrine the 
effective exercise o f  administrative power can be determinative o f the final destination 
o f the territory, if sole consideration o f the legal titles would result in a non liquet™2 
Applied to imputability, effectivite would imply a recognition o f the essential role o f 
effective control for imputing acts and allocating the attendant responsibility between 
the nominal sovereign and the administering entity.
An application o f the principle o f effectivite for the attribution o f violations o f human 
rights can be found in the decision o f the European Court o f  Human Rights in the 
Loi^idou case, where it held that ‘the responsibility o f a Contracting Party could also 
arise when as a consequence o f  military action—whether lawful or unlawful—it 
exercises effective control o f an area outside its national territory’ (emphasis added).183 
Given this earlier decision, the judgment o f the Court in the Matthews case184 might 
appear odd, or even in contradiction with Loi^dou. In its submissions to the Court, the 
UK Government had argued that ‘to engage the responsibility o f any State under the 
Convention, that State must have a power o f effective control over the act complained 
0p 185 argument Gf  the UK Government essentially relied on the doctrine o f 
effectivite without mentioning it: responsibility should ensue, according to this approach, 
only if, and to the extent that the state has effective control over the act. Lack o f
182 In Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986) 554 at 586-587, the Court 
explained that where the act corresponds exactly to law, where effective administration is additional to 
the utipossidetis juris, the only role o f effectivite is to confirm the exercise o f the right derived from a legal 
title. Where the act does not correspond to the law, where the territory which is the subject o f  the 
dispute is, in effect, administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference 
should be given to the holder o f the title. In the event that the effectivite does not co-exist with any legal 
title, it must invariably be taken into consideration. Finally, there are cases where the legal title is not 
capable o f showing exactly the territorial expanse to which it related. The effectivite can then play an 
essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice’.
183 Loi^dou v. Turkey (No. 15318/89), Judgment (Merits), 18 Dec. 1996,23 EHRR 513 at 530.
184 For the facts o f this case and the decisions, see supra II.3. See also supra note 106 (Report o f the 
Commission) and 109 (Judgment o f the Court).
185 Matthews (Judgment), supra note 109 at para. 27.
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effective control would thus prejudice the imputability o f  the act in question to the 
state. The Court rejected this argument and held that ‘the Convention does not 
exclude the transfer o f competences to international organisations provided that 
Convention rights continue to be “secured”’. Clearly, in Matthews the European Court 
o f Human Rights found itself in a difficult position since it did not have jurisdiction 
rationepersonae to adjudicate on the responsibility o f  the Community, but its finding is 
nonetheless important. Furthermore, it could be argued that this decision does not 
really contradict Loi^zdou: in Lozqzdou the Court held that effective control means 
responsibility, but in Matthews it specified that lack thereof does not necessarily mean 
lack o f  responsibility. Effective control is not therefore a necessary condition o f 
responsibility, but it is a sufficient one.
A key element in Matthews was that the UK had transferred competences to the EC 
voluntarily. Applied to the responsibility o f the UN and the territorial state, this means 
that, when power is not transferred voluntarily, the responsibility o f  the nominal 
sovereign is excluded. This would apply to international administrations o f  territory, 
such as the one over Saarland, created by a peace treaty. It would, after all, be ironic if 
Germany, which had reluctantly lost all control over the Saarland, should have 
retained some measure o f responsibility for the acts committed by the international 
administration led by the League o f  Nations. The same considerations could apply to 
the international administration in Kosovo and to the responsibility o f the FRY.186
In de facto administrations o f  territory, states normally transfer powers to the 
international organisations voluntarily, or have acquiesced to their presence. In these 
cases, states are responsible for the acts committed as part o f  the operation o f an 
international organisation in their territory, although this does not exclude the 
responsibility o f  the international institutions. For example, both UNHCR and the 
territorial state can incur responsibility for wrongful acts committed by UNHCR as 
part o f the exercise o f its wide administrative powers in refugee camps. A similar 
answer would be given to the attribution o f an internationally wrongful act committed
186 The international administration in the Saarland and in Kosovo are discussed in Chapter IV 
respectively at IV.2.A and IV.2.B. But the involuntary character o f a transfer o f authority to an 
international institution is not always manifest. Distinguishing between formal consent and real consent 
is particularly important in the relations between international financial institutions and developing 
countries. In fact, while developing countries formally consent to economic re-structuring programmes
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as part o f  the refugee status determination process when this is conducted by 
UNHCR.187 In these situations, given that the act, or the series o f acts, is imputable 
simultaneously to the state and the international organisation, the problem becomes 
mainly the apportionment o f  responsibility, which can only be carried out on the basis 
o f  a rigorous determination o f the facts and context o f  each operation. In all phases it 
is imperative to heed the advice o f Judge Hudson and overcome the predilection for 
juristic conceptions and formalities often regardless o f  the realities o f  a given 
situation.188 In order to determine the attribution o f acts and allocate responsibility for 
them in such complex situations, it is necessary to lift the veil o f some o f these juristic 
conceptions and formalities, and to unmask the reality o f effective power relations.
(c) Circumstances precluding mongfulness
The rules on defences (Arts. 20-27) are for the most part not susceptible o f 
application to international organisations, o r are not at least easily adaptable. What 
does self-defence mean for an international organisation? And how can the notion o f 
‘grave and imminent peril’, which underlies necessity as a circumstance excluding 
wrongfulness, apply to an international organisation?
Distress (Art. 24)189 is a defence that can be adapted to international organisations. In 
fact, UN official(s) might be forced to commit a wrongful act because there is ‘no 
other reasonable way’ to save h is/her life or the lives o f other persons ‘entrusted to 
the author’s care’ {ibid). It is difficult, however, to imagine situations in which the 
breach o f a human rights obligation could not have been avoided because o f distress. 
Distress cannot be invoked to justify violations o f peremptory norms o f international 
law (jus cogens). It could not thus exclude the wrongfulness o f the provision o f 
humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan in a gender discriminatory manner.190 In 
contrast, there are situations in which distress can be invoked to justify breaches o f 
other international obligations in the interest o f human rights.191 For example, UN 
peacekeepers or officials who are forced to violate the terms o f their presence in a 
country and thereby the territorial states’ sovereignty, can invoke distress if their
proposed by the international financial institutions, in practice they have no choice but to do so, 
although it would be difficult legally to characterise such political and economic pressure as coercion.
187 Chapter IV.4.
188 Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (diss. op. o f Judge Hudson), supra note 179.
189 Art. 32,1996 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
190 Chapter III.4.
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actions are needed to save human lives. Hence, during the genocide in Rwanda, the 
Belgian peacekeepers stationed at the Ecole Technique Officielle (ETO) could have 
refused to comply with the order to withdraw, thus exposing themselves to the 
accusation o f committing a wrongful act, 192because leaving the school would have 
meant, as it did, abandoning hundreds o f human lives to sure death. This is the exact 
opposite o f  what happened.193
For its peacekeeping operations the UN has developed the concept o f ‘operational 
necessity’ as a circumstance excluding the liability o f the organisation ‘for property 
loss and damage’.194 Operational necessity is considered distinct from military necessity 
and applies where damage results from necessary actions taken by a peacekeeping 
force in the course o f  carrying out its operations in pursuance o f  its mandates’.195 The 
concept o f operational necessity as defined in reports o f the Secretary General is an 
attempt at adapting necessity as a general circumstance precluding wrongfulness to the 
specifics o f  a UN peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, it is extraordinary that this 
concept, which amounts to a circumstance precluding wrongfulness tailored to UN 
peacekeeping, has been surreptitiously introduced by the Secretary General. This is 
even more surprising if one compares the “smoothness” o f this operation with the 
laborious work that the ILC has had to put into defining each aspect o f state 
responsibility.
191 Saving human life is after all a human rights imperative (right to life!).
192 The interim government in Rwanda, which was carrying out the genocide, would have presumably 
argued that, lacking a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII, the peacekeepers could not 
engage in combat with the Rwandan army. However, this argument was weak not only because of its 
provenance (a government which was committing genocide) but also because the rules o f engagement 
o f the UN Mission in Rwanda would have allowed peacekeepers to intervene to stop the commission 
of violations of humanitarian law {supra 11.5(b)).
193 Hundreds of Rwandans had sought refuge at the school believing that the presence o f the UN  
peacekeepers would guarantee their safety. As soon as the peacekeepers left and abandoned them to 
their destiny, those inside were slaughtered mercilessly. In June 1997 in Nairobi, I interviewed a 
Rwandan refugee who lived with a excruciating sense o f guilt for having told his wife and his little 
daughter to go to ETO, where he thought they would be safe. A lot o f people were trying to get into 
the premises o f ETO, and he believed that they stood a better chance o f being allowed inside if he and 
his brothers did not accompany them. In fact, they were allowed in, but were among the victims o f the 
massacre. He miraculously survived hiding throughout the genocide. For a full account o f what 
happened at the school, see Human Rights Watch/Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 1* 
Homme heave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999); African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despaire, 
Defiance (1995) at 1113 ff..
194 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 166 at para. 13 and GA Res. 52/247 at para. 6.
195 Id.{Report).
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Any definition o f operational necessity cannot encroach upon the customary content 
o f necessity. Thus, the rule that necessity cannot be invoked when ‘the state has 
contributed to the situation o f  necessity’ (Art. 25, 2) should apply to international 
organisations, too, and to peacekeeping operations. In addition, operational necessity, 
like any other defence, cannot be invoked when the wrongful act constitutes a breach 
o f a jus cogens rule. Finally, resort to operational necessity should be limited to 
peacekeeping operations and not extended to other operations, such as humanitarian 
operations and administration o f territory. In the context o f these operations 
justificatory arguments are still developed by the UN and other humanitarian agencies 
but they are usually clothed in morality.196
(d) Concurrent or secondary responsibility of states
The application o f existing rules on state responsibility to international institutional 
responsibility shows its greatest limit in the field o f concurrent responsibility. There 
are three grounds on which states could bear responsibility for acts o f international 
organisations. Firstly, they can be responsible as accomplices for ‘aiding and abetting’ 
the commission o f a wrongful act by an international organisation.
Secondly, it could be argued that the states in whose territory a UN operation is 
conducted normally bear some measure o f responsibility for the wrongful acts 
committed by the Organisation. The 1996 Draff Articles on State Responsibility 
specified that the fact that an act has been committed by the organ o f  an international 
organisation in the territory o f the state is not in itself sufficient to consider it an act o f 
that state.197 However, concurrent responsibility is no t necessarily premised on the full 
attribution to the state o f all acts committed by international organisations in their 
territory, but it is rather premised on the notion that the territorial state, as a result o f 
acquiescence, negligence or collaboration, bears some responsibility, even if only 
marginal, for acts committed in its territory. An exception to this is the case o f  the 
failed state whose institutions have ceased to operate in an effective manner, and do 
no t possess the capacity to express an autonomous political will, let alone to interfere 
with the conduct o f the operation by the international organisation. Another
196 Chapter III.5. and IV.4.D.
197 Art. 13,1996 Draft Articles on State Responsibility; see supra note 13.
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exception is a UN intervention under Chapter VII, since the territorial state is under 
an obligation to comply with the resolution o f  the Security Council.198
The third and m ost controversial hypothesis o f concurrent or secondary responsibility 
is that o f the member states o f the international organisation. There are serious 
reasons for avoiding a regime o f unlimited responsibility o f member states, most 
importantly the fact that this would represent a serious disincentive against 
multilateralism since states would be reluctant to accept liability for acts over which 
they have no direct control.
The argument that member states should carry concurrent liability for human rights 
violations committed by international organisations has no t yet been tested in court. 
However, there is a rich litigation on the liability o f member states for the debts o f 
insolvent international organisations. In general, courts have rejected the idea that 
member states are liable for the debts incurred by international organisations. In J. H. 
Rayner (Mincing Lane) L td  v. Department of Trade and Industry and Others,199 the creditors o f 
the International Tin Council (ITC) brought an action against the UK government to 
recover their losses. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia,, that member states o f  the ITC 
carried secondary liability for the debts o f the organisation, and that the organisation 
had acted as the members’ agent.200 The High Court’s decision to dismiss the claim 
was affirmed by the Court o f Appeal and the House o f Lords. The English courts 
struggled to avoid two possible results: a) the direct recognition o f the international 
legal personality o f the ITC without incorporation, on the one hand; and b) the 
concurrent responsibility o f member states on the other. Since a) would have led to 
the sole responsibility o f member states - a highly undesirable outcome in their eyes — 
the courts resorted to the convoluted fiction o f  the ‘body corporate’ to recognise that 
the ITC was a legal person and thus bore responsibility for its debts.
198 Whether the Security Council can violate norms o f jus cogens is however a moot point See supra note 
130.
199 J.H. Rayner L td v. Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418 for the House of Lords’ decision. 
The decisions o f the High Court and o f the Court o f Appeal are reported respectively at 77 ILR 56 and 
80 ILR 49. See also Case 241/87, Maclaine Watson and Co. L tdv. Council of the E C  and Commission of the 
EC, 96 ILR 201.
200 While liability based on agency ‘may theoretically be a proper basis for the direct liability o f members 
o f an international organization, it must be recognised that proof o f such agency is not easy’ 
(Amerasinghe, supra note. 25 at 262.
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It is important to bear in mind that the conclusion in the ITC cases that there is no 
‘plausible evidence’ o f the existence o f a rule o f  joint and several liability o f the 
member states under international law201 was reached in the context o f financial claims 
and in respect o f a sectorial international institution. The near universal membership 
o f  the UN would make the application o f a regime o f secondary or concurrent 
responsibility o f member states even less viable and appropriate. O n the other hand, 
the gravity o f the violations in question and the fact that one o f the reasons why such 
violations can occur is the member states’ abdication o f their supervisory function202 
are factors that militate in favour o f some form o f member states’ responsibility.
The apportionment o f responsibility between international organisations and states 
cannot be presumptive, and needs to be based on a stringent analysis o f  the facts and 
o f all relevant sources o f law, including the constituent instrument o f the organisation, 
the mandate o f the operation, and any agreement between the territorial state and the 
organisation. Furthermore, the regime o f concurrent or secondary responsibility for 
states is only relevant to one form o f reparation, i.e. monetary compensation. O ther 
remedies to violations o f human rights not only exist, but are even more appropriate 
in some circumstances.203 O ther forms o f reparation, which only the primary author 
can normally offer, include apology, restitution, modification o f future conduct, and 
disciplinary proceedings against the officials responsible for a certain violation.
II.7. C onclusion
That international human rights obligations are binding upon international 
organisations has been argued on various grounds. There can be little doubt that 
customary standards are binding, but uncertainty can persist for treaty standards. The 
lodestar, however, should be the application o f the highest standard available, firstly 
because the UN has to promote the rule o f law and respect for human rights; and 
secondly because it ought to avoid causing embarrassment to, or even engaging the 
responsibility o f those member states who have agreed to higher standards o f human 
rights protection.
201 Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry, 29 ILM 670 at 675 (per Lord Templemann).
202 See Chapter V.4.
203 See D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (1999).
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International institutions can incur responsibility for breaches o f an applicable 
obligation in the human rights sphere. However, owing to the lack o f codification and 
the paucity o f case law, international institutional responsibility is still characterised by 
some grey areas, in particular the regulation and the effects o f the dual attribution o f  a 
wrongful act to an international organisation and a state, and aspects o f causation and 
attribution. The codification work o f the ILC is urgently needed in this area as in few 
others.
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CHAPTER III
Human Rights and Multilateral Humanitarian Assistance
I I I .l .  In troduction
This chapter examines the provision o f  humanitarian assistance by the United Nations 
(UN). It is argued that human rights, which - as has been shown in chapter II - are 
applicable to the activities o f the UN, are at times violated in UN humanitarian 
operations.
The provision o f humanitarian assistance now constitutes one o f the main activities 
o f multilateral institutions, both non-governmental and inter-govemmental. The 
beneficiaries o f humanitarian assistance are for the main part the victims o f conflict or 
natural disasters and the displaced. Large sections o f  the population in general in 
developing countries are also affected directly or indirectly by multilateral 
development programmes. Emergency humanitarian assistance in conflict situations is 
principally provided by the main UN operational agencies — the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and, to a lesser extent, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - while international financial institutions, 
m ost notably the World Bank, play the leading role in the provision o f  development 
assistance. Although development projects also raise human rights issues, this chapter 
focuses on humanitarian assistance provided by the UN humanitarian agencies since 
international financial institutions do not come under the scope o f this thesis.
Humanitarian assistance is provided by UN agencies in various ways, usually through 
the medium o f partner non-governmental organisations (NGOs), more seldom 
through local institutions and /o r local government The provision o f  such assistance 
is at times accompanied by forms o f governance and administration o f territory, as is 
the case in refugee camps, which are examined in chapter IV. In other cases, however, 
the lack o f effective control and administration does not mean that humanitarian 
agencies do not possess the capacity to violate the human rights o f  individuals in the
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affected population; it is the dynamics o f the violation, as the case study o f 
Afghanistan at the end o f  this chapter illustrates, that is quite different.
Neutrality and impartiality are cardinal principles in the practice o f humanitarian 
assistance, but it is argued that violations o f human rights are at times the result o f  too 
strict an adherence to these principles. Again the case o f humanitarian assistance to 
Afghanistan, and the systematic violation o f the principle o f  non-discrimination, 
serves to illustrate some o f  these points. UN practice is examined distinguishing 
between the political practice o f  the organisation (as expressed in the resolutions o f 
the Security Council and o f  the General Assembly), the institutional/bureaucratic 
practice, and the operational practice - that is the real conduct - o f the UN on the 
ground. It is submitted that the practice o f the institutional bureaucracy o f  the UN 
was determinative o f  its actual behaviour. This is a phenomenon o f the utm ost 
importance to international law, because it highlights a loss o f institutional regulatory 
efficacy, and, at worst, a process o f  substantial dis-empowerment o f the political 
organs o f the UN. It also reveals that the ‘softer than soft law’ body o f institutional 
practice can end up being more ‘effective’ - that is more capable o f determining 
behaviour - than ‘hard law’ (including rules o f  jus cogens, as is arguably the case with the 
principle o f non-discrimination),1 in spite o f the hierarchical superiority and the 
avowed greater normative strength o f  the latter. The case study o f  Afghanistan also 
illustrates how the relationship between human rights standards, on the one hand, and 
humanitarianism, as currently practised and conceptualised by the UN, can become 
strained.
III.2 . In terna tional Law  on  H um an itarian  A ssistance
(a) Definitions
The legal aspects o f humanitarian operations have often been discussed alongside the 
question o f humanitarian interventions. Both humanitarian assistance and 
humanitarian interventions have been analysed against the background o f those 
principles o f international law that are affected by them, in particular the principle o f  
non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction o f states and the
1 On the question whether jus cogens is really hard law, see Riphagen, ‘From Soft Law to Jus Cogens and 
Back’ Victoria University of Wellington Law Review (1987) 81.
130
prohibition on the use o f  force.2 In the Francophone legal literature, the key 
distinction is between intervention humanitaire and intervention d’humanite. The former is 
the provision o f humanitarian assistance accompanied by the eventual deployment of 
some security forces solely for the purpose o f  protecting the safety o f humanitarian 
personnel and guaranteeing access to the victims. An ‘intervention d’humanite’ is, on 
the other hand, characterised by a use o f force on a significantly larger scale in favour 
o f one party in the conflict, or o f the civilian victims.3
In this chapter, the terms ‘humanitarian operation’ and ‘humanitarian assistance’ refer 
to the non-forcible provision o f humanitarian aid by states, international 
organisations, and N G O s. According to its commonest meaning in the Anglophone 
legal literature, the term humanitarian intervention refers to ‘cases in which a 
substantial part o f the population o f a state is threatened with death or suffering on a 
grand scale, either because o f the actions o f the government o f  that state, or because 
o f the state’s slide into anarchy...’ and intervention is, thus, ‘taken to mean action 
involving the use or threat o f force’.4 Whereas in principle humanitarian operations do 
not involve the use o f force in breach o f international law, the distinction between 
humanitarian operations and humanitarian interventions has often become ‘blurred’ in 
practice.
Militarisation and privatisation o f aid are two important developments. Militarisation 
can transform the humanitarian operation into a forcible intervention with important
2 Art. 2(4), UN Charter and GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles o f  
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States in accordance with the Charter o f the 
United Nations.
3 Spiry, ‘Interventions Humanitaiies et Interventions d’Humanite: La Pratique Francaise face au Droit 
International’, 102 RGDIP (1998) 407. Bettati, TJn Droit d’ Ingerence?’, 95 RGDIP (1991) 639.
4 Greenwood, ‘Is There a Right o f Humanitarian Intervention?’ 49(2) World Today (February 1993) 34. 
Pogany identities three fundamental characteristics o f humanitarian intervention: the occurrence of  
gross violations o f human rights in a certain country, the use o f armed force by a third party, the lack of  
consent or acquiescence on the part o f the state on whose territory the intervention takes place 
(Pogany, 'Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French Intervention in Syria Re- 
Examined', 35 ICLQ (1986) 182, at 186). The legality o f  humanitarian intervention has recently become 
topical following NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. On the legality o f that intervention, see Bronwlie, 
Chinkin, Greenwood and Lowe ‘International Legal Issues Arising in the Kosovo Crisis’, 49 ICLQ 
(2000) 934.
On humanitarian interventions see also: Franck and Rodley, 'After Bangladesh: Humanitarian 
Intervention by Military Force', 67 AJIL  (1973) 275; R. B. Lillich (ed.), Humanitarian intervention and the 
United Nations (1973); P. Malanczuk, Humanitarian intervention and the kgtimaiy of the use of force (1993); S. D. 
Murphy, Humanitarian Interventions: The U N  in an Evolving World Order (1996); Roberts, 'Intervention and 
Human Rights', 69 Int. Ajf.(1993) 429; F. R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention : A n Inquiry into Law and 
Morality (1988).
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consequences for its legality.5 Privatisation consists o f  sub-contracting some o f the 
services provided by the UN to NGOs. I t poses a series o f problems for the 
application and enforcement o f  international law, because some principles o f 
international law only apply to states.6 However, even when aid is sub-contracted, the 
sub-contracting entity, be it a state or an international organisation, cannot completely 
relinquish its obligations and responsibilities.7
At present there is no international legal definition o f humanitarian assistance.8 Even 
the proposed Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery o f Emergency Relief is 
purposefully vague on this aspect, stating in a rather circular manner that ‘emergency 
assistance’ means ‘the relief consignments and services o f  an exclusively humanitarian 
and non-political character provided to meet the needs o f  those affected by disasters’.9 
The practice o f humanitarian organisations frequently refers to the distinction between 
aid for development and humanitarian assistance, the former being related essentially 
to the longer term objective o f achieving economic and social development, whilst 
humanitarian assistance is normally connected to emergencies o f a natural or 
social/political character (famine, armed conflict, natural disasters, refugee influxes, 
etc.). While not containing a general definition, international humanitarian law 
instruments are, on the other hand, replete with examples o f assistance considered 
‘humanitarian’ under those treaties, including not only food relief and medical services, 
but also educational services and the facilitation o f religious worship.10 In defining
5 The trend towards militarisation o f  aid, especially o f relief in conflict situations, appears to be 
endorsed by large sectors o f the UN humanitarian bureaucracy, and the practice o f the organisation is 
beginning to reflect this. See, for instance, SC Res. 1208 (1998) on the situation in refugee camps in 
Africa, in which the Council expressed it support ‘for the inclusion in the United Nations Stand-by 
Arrangements of military and police units and personnel trained for humanitarian operations, as well as 
related equipment* (at para. 11). In favour o f this trend is Donini, ‘Asserting Humanitarianism in Peace- 
Main tenance’, 4 Global Governance (1998) 81.
6 Schindler gives the example o f the principle o f non-intervention, ‘Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian Interference and International Law* in R. J. Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang 
Tieya (1994) 689, at 701. Domes tici-Met, ‘Aspects Juridiques Recents de 1* Assistance Humanitaire’, 35 
AFD I (1989) 117; Bothe, ‘Relief Actions: The Position o f the Recipient State’ in F. Kadshoven (ed.) 
Assisting the Victims of Armed Conflict and Other Disasters (1989) 91 at 95-96; Macalister-Smith, ‘Rights and 
Duties o f the Agencies Involved in Providing Humanitarian Assistance and their Personnel in Armed 
Conflict’ in Karlshoven 99.
7 Chapter II.6.
8 See N. Q. Dinh, P. Daillier, A  Pellet, Droit International Public (6th ed., 1999) 1020.
9 Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery o f Emeigency Relief (1984), drafted by the UN Disaster 
Relief Co-ordinator, in Annex H in F. Kalshoven, supra note 6 at 248.
10 For example: Art 24, Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration o f the Condition o f the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forced in the Field (1949), 75 UNTS 31; Arts. 25-28, Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners o f War (1949), 75 UNTS 135; Arts. 23, 55, 108, Geneva 
Convention (TV) Relative to the Protection o f Gvilians in Time of War (1949), 75 UNTS 287
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humanitarian assistance, due regard must be given to human rights - both civil and 
political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights - as the normative and 
universal way o f categorising individuals’ basic entitlements and needs.11
(b) The applicable law
Despite its importance in current international affairs, uncertainty on the international 
law governing humanitarian assistance persists. One reason for this uncertainty is that 
the law, in its various forms, has for the most part ensued from the context-specific 
and fluid practice o f states and o f international organisations, governmental and non­
governmental alike. Another feature, which contributes to the obfuscation o f the legal 
dimension o f humanitarian assistance, is that different legal regimes can apply to 
humanitarian operations. International humanitarian, human rights, refugee and UN 
law — and to a lesser extent environmental law - are all part o f this normative 
framework. International humanitarian law instruments contain various provisions on 
the delivery o f humanitarian assistance in the context o f  an armed conflict. Human 
rights law is especially important as it accords protection to such rights as non­
discrimination, the right to life and economic and social rights, all o f which can 
contribute to determining the legal nature o f  the entitlement to humanitarian 
assistance.12 While at present the delivery o f  humanitarian assistance does not often 
take sufficient notice o f human rights law, there can be no doubt that legally this 
should be the case and that a rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance must 
be promoted.
International refugee law constitutes an important framework for the provision o f 
humanitarian assistance to persons that come under one o f the refugee definitions.13
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I, III or IV]; Art 69 (1), Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions o f 1949, and Relating to the Protection o f Victims o f International Armed Conflict (1977), 
1125 UNTS 3; Art 18 (2), Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection o f Victims o f Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (1977), 1125 UNTS 609 
[hereinafter Protocol I or II to the Geneva Conventions].
11 In A  Theory of Human Need (1991), L. Doyal and I. Gough argue that needs to which economic and 
social rigfits (for example physical and mental health) correspond are essential to a person’s well-being.
12 On the right to receive humanitarian assistance, see infra 137 ft  (and references at note 36).
13 Convention relating to the Status o f Refugees (1951), 189 UNTS 137, and the Protocol to the 
Convention relating to the Status o f  Refugees (1967), 606 UNTS 267 [the 1951 Convention as modified 
by the Protocol will be hereinafter referred to as ‘1951 Refugee Convention’]; Organisation o f African 
Unity: 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects o f Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), 1000 UNTS 46 
[hereinafter the OAU Refugee Convention].
133
Furthermore, a process o f  fertilisation from the refugee area into the broader area o f 
humanitarian relief has taken place, because refugees have traditionally been one o f 
the main recipient groups o f humanitarian assistance,14 and owing to UNHCR’s 
operational and institutional expansion over the last decades. Another important 
category o f  displaced persons who can also be beneficiaries o f humanitarian assistance 
are internally displaced persons (IDPs). While the experience o f displacement is 
common both to refugees and to IDPs, they are legally distinct groups. In particular, 
there is no specific treaty regime for IDPs as there is for refugees. The status o f IDPs 
is regulated by general international law, including m ost importantly human rights law, 
but increasingly also by a rich body o f soft law.15
The law and practice o f international organisation constitutes another source o f legal 
regulation o f humanitarian operations. The powers and functions o f international 
organisations are primarily regulated by their constituent instrument, but progressive 
amendments o f these instruments - and o f the original mandates o f the organisations - 
,1<s internal law-making, and ‘implied’ functions and powers have often reduced the 
actual importance o f the constituent instrument in the case o f  most UN agencies. The 
practice o f the organisations is another regulatory source o f great importance, not least 
because the implied powers o f an organisation have to be sought both in the 
Constitution and in the practice o f the Organisation’.17
The specific agreement between the international organisation and the state 
concerning the implementation o f a programme o f humanitarian assistance in 
principle constitutes a source o f legal regulation. I t must be observed, however, that in 
practice there are examples o f humanitarian operations carried out in the absence o f 
any specific agreement with the government concerned, or with agreements that are 
ostensibly nebulous. Indeed, in some situations there is no government in effective 
control with which an agreement can be concluded (for instance, in most phases o f
14 C. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe (1995); B. Harrell-Bond, Imposing A id  (1986) and, by the same 
author, *The Experience o f Refugees as Recipients o f  Aid*, in A. Ager (ed.), Refugees: Perspectives on the 
Experience of Forced Migration (1998) 136.
15 G. S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (2nd ed., 1996) 264-268 . Quite interestingly, the 
provision o f material assistance to IDPs is often carried out by the same institutions responsible for 
assisting refugees. UNHCR has, in fact, an IDP programme in some countries.
16 For instance on the evolution o f the UNHCR mandate see Goodwin-Gill, supra note 15, at 8-18. See 
also Chapter 1.5.
17 Nuclear Weapons - WHO case, at 172-224 (diss. op. o f Judge Koroma) and at 199. On implied powers, 
see Chapter II.2.
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the civil war in Liberia and in Somalia). In addition, maintaining a state o f regulatory 
uncertainty can be advantageous for international organisations that will, thus, have a 
‘free hand’ in the conduct o f  the humanitarian operation.18 Finally, an agreement may 
at times be deemed detrimental to the implementation o f  assistance programmes in 
those parts o f the country that are under the effective control o f insurgents.19
As a result o f  a conflation o f  legal regimes, uncertainty is a feature o f  the current law 
on the provision o f humanitarian assistance. There are only a few examples o f 
humanitarian assistance — such as that provided to prisoners o f war —20 which are 
regulated by the clear-cut resort to one o f the legal regimes and to its specific 
provisions and rules. The vast majority o f humanitarian emergencies are, on the other 
hand, characterised by elements that could warrant at least the partial recourse to one 
or more o f  these regimes. In addition, there is also a degree o f conceptual fluidity with 
notions, categories and principles moving across these legal regimes, often 
accompanied by a process o f partial re-definition and contextual adaptation. For 
instance, the role o f private actors, the problem o f accountability o f humanitarian 
agencies, the question o f  enforcement, some o f  the most important legal standards, 
are all questions that cut across the fictitious conceptual boundaries o f  these legal 
regimes.
The provision o f humanitarian assistance to persons fleeing an armed conflict in their 
country o f origin illustrates how these different legal regimes and categories interplay. 
In fact, while everyone is entitled to respect for h is/her human rights, refugees are 
entitled to  the higher standard o f protection that ensues from refugee status. In 
addition, if the host country is neutral, humanitarian assistance delivered to 
combatants who are still active may be regulated by Geneva Convention (III)21 and by
18 Human Rights Watch, Tailing the Internally Displaced. The UNDP Displaced Persons Program in 
Kenya’ (1997) at 89-90. In its correspondence with Human Rights Watch, UNDP explained its failure 
to reach a ‘formal agreement’ with the Government o f Kenya in part ‘because o f the difficulty in 
reaching agreement with the Government’ but also because o f ‘the uncertainty over funding that made 
it impossible for UNDP to enter into specific commitments that would have allowed it to call for 
reciprocal formal commitments from the Government’ (Ibid. at 89 and 149).
19 In this respect, the practice developed by UNICEF’s Operation Lifeline Sudan for the delivery o f  
assistance to the civil war-ridden southern parts o f the country is noteworthy. Central to such practice 
are tripartite agreements between the Government, UNICEF, and representatives o f die insurgents - 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Exporting this model to other situations may not be so easy due 
to the likely reluctance o f governments to enter into agreements with insurgents in their territory.
20 Geneva Convention III.
21 Art. 4, B (2), Geneva Convention (III).
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the Hague Convention (V), which oblige neutral states to intern active combatants and 
to provide humanitarian assistance to them as if they were prisoners o f war.22
Human rights law is the legal regime o f more general and universal application, in that 
the state in which the humanitarian crisis has arisen is almost certainly bound by it, 
either because it has become party to human rights treaties or as a result o f  customary 
law. Refugee law appears to have at least in principle a well-defined ambit o f 
application. However, the reality o f  mass exodus often makes the applicability o f 
refugee law problematic due to the uncertainty o f  personal status.23 International 
humanitarian law applies primarily to international armed conflicts, with the exception 
o f  a limited number o f  provisions on internal armed conflict (Art. 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions and Protocol II).24
In order to determine the law that is applicable to  the provision o f humanitarian 
assistance in a given situation, a thorough analysis o f  the factual context is necessary. 
Some elements are o f particular importance. Firstly, there is the cause o f the 
humanitarian crisis - be it an international armed conflict, an internal armed conflict, a 
natural disaster or, more generally, government policies that constitute gross violation 
o f  human rights obligation (such as, for instance, a deliberately discriminatory 
economic policy aimed at driving members o f a particular group to destitution). The 
place o f delivery o f the assistance must be considered, depending on whether 
assistance is distributed directly in the country where the humanitarian emergency
22 Art. 11, Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties o f Neutral Powers and Persons in 
Case o f War on Land (1907), 1 Bevans 654 (hereinafter ‘Hague Convention V5]. Art. 12 obliges the state 
’to supply the interned with the food, clothing, and relief required by humanity’. It must be observed 
that this Convention, like most international humanitarian law, applies to international armed conflict 
Indeed, the very concept o f state neutrality is one that is based on the factual premise o f the occurrence 
o f an international armed conflict. The type o f obligation that a state has vis-a-vis belligerents from an 
internal armed conflict received in its territory does not encompass an obligation to intern. However, 
the receiving state still has a duty to ‘refrain from organising or encouraging the organisation of 
irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory o f another State’ 
(GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter o f the United 
Nations).
23 The OAU Refugee Convention (supra note 13) has tried to resolve some o f the problems on the 
determination o f refugee status by providing for the recognition en masse o f  groups o f persons ‘who, 
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part or the whole o f his country o f origin or nationality’ are compelled to seek refuge 
abroad (Art. 1,2).
24 In the Nicaragua case the ICJ held that Common Art. 3 reflects customary law (Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Judgment (Merits), ICJ Reports (1986) 14, at 113- 
114).
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originates or whether it is delivered to persons who have crossed an international 
border. In addition, the consent, or lack thereof, o f the government to the 
humanitarian operation is a material element for determining the question o f  the 
legality o f the operation. Finally, the legal status o f the beneficiaries has to be 
determined because, while everyone is entitled to respect for h is/her human rights, 
some categories o f persons (for example refugees and prisoners o f war) are entitled to 
the specific protection granted to them under special instruments and provisions.
(c)The Nicaragua case and the question of assistance without the consent of the affected State
Nicaragua is so far the only case in which the World Court has considered some legal 
aspects o f humanitarian assistance in conflict. The m ost important finding o f the 
Court in this case was that the United States (US) violated the customary law 
prohibition o f the threat or use o f force, and the principle o f non-intervention in the 
affairs o f another state.25 In particular, the Court found that the ‘support given by the 
United States, up to the end o f September 1984, to the military and paramilitary 
activities o f  the contras in Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply o f  weapons, 
intelligence and logistic support526 was in breach o f the principle o f  non-intervention. 
As regards US support to the contras after October 1984, the Court took into account 
the decision o f the Congress on that date to allocate funds to the contras only for 
‘humanitarian assistance5.27 Under US legislation, ‘humanitarian assistance5 was defined 
as:
the provision o f  food, clothing, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance, 
and it does not include the provision o f weapons, weapons systems, 
ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to 
inflict serious bodily harm or death.28
25 Id at 146-150.
26 Id at 124.
27 It had been argued by Nicaragua that the US actually continued to help the contras even after this date 
in particular by providing intelligence information to help their operations, but the Court did not have 
any conclusive evidence in this respect and could not find against the US on the facts. However, the 
Court used this to make a statement on the law in this respect and, more specifically, on what assistance 
can be deemed truly humanitarian.
28 Nicaragua, supra note 24 at 57.
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The Court observed that ‘there can be no doubt that the provision o f strictly 
humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political 
affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any 
other way contrary to international law’.29 The Court then specified that,
if the provision o f humanitarian assistance is to escape condemnation as an 
intervention in the internal affairs, no t only must it be limited to the purposes 
hallowed in the practice o f the International Committee o f the Red Cross 
(ICRC), namely “to prevent and alleviate human suffering” and “to protect life 
and health and to ensure respect for the human being”, it must also, and above 
all, be given w ithout discrimination to all in need.30
This wilfully general categorisation o f the purposes o f humanitarian assistance is not 
helpful for distinguishing humanitarian assistance from other forms o f  assistance. An 
essential feature o f truly humanitarian assistance as identified by the Court is the fact 
that it ought to be delivered ‘without discrimination between the parties to the 
conflict’. One reason for referring to the practice o f the ICRC is naturally that the 
Court was dealing with the provision o f humanitarian assistance within an armed 
conflict. Reference to ICRC practice is not always appropriate in different 
circumstances.
Basing it on Nicaragua, Oppenkeim’s International haw  summarises the current legal 
position on humanitarian operations as follows,
... the objection [based on the principles o f non-intervention and on the 
prohibition on the used o f  force] to humanitarian intervention does not apply 
to humanitarian assistance to those in need in another state; even in a situation 
o f conflict within a state, humanitarian assistance will not constitute
29 Id. at 124.
30 Nicaragua case, at 125. The characteristics o f humanitarian assistance are more specifically defined as 
those ‘indicated in the first and second o f the fundamental principles declared by the Twentieth 
International Conference o f the Red Cross, that is: the prevention and alleviation o f  human suffering 
wherever it may be found; die protection o f life and health; the ensurance of respect for the human 
being; and the promotion o f mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting peace amongst 
all peoples* (at 124-125). These purposes appear vague at a closer examination. The last principle in 
particular seems to broaden the spectrum of activities designated as humanitarian* beyond the proper 
meaning of this term.
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intervention, so long as it is given (or perhaps is at least available) without 
discrimination between the parties to the conflict.31
Compared with the Nicaragua decision, perhaps not unsurprisingly the position 
emerging from the body o f UN law on this matter — and more specifically the 
resolutions o f  the General Assembly on humanitarian questions - appears more 
conservative and essentially state-oriented. The General Assembly has asserted that, in 
delivering humanitarian assistance, ‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
unity o f states must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter o f the United 
Nations’ and that, as a consequence, ‘humanitarian assistance should be provided with 
the consent o f the affected country and in principle on the basis o f  an appeal by the 
affected country’.32 Hence, the possibility o f delivering humanitarian assistance 
w ithout the consent o f the interested state has been ruled out by the Assembly, at least 
as long as this assistance comes from states or governmental organisations. This 
position as stated by the General Assembly is in plain contrast with the Court’s 
decision in Nicaragua that had recognised the legality o f  the provision o f  humanitarian 
assistance without the consent o f the state.
Which o f these two positions is the correct one under international law? Was the 
Court right in saying that humanitarian assistance provided without the consent o f the 
state cannot be regarded as contrary to international law? O r does the insistence o f  the 
General Assembly on the consent o f  the affected state express the lowest common 
denominator that states have agreed to? At first, the normative strength o f the 
General Assembly resolutions may appear quite strong, particularly in light o f  the fact 
that these resolutions were passed with near unanimity33 The pronouncement o f the
31 R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (9* ed., 1992) at 444.
32 GA Res. 46/182, 19 December 1991; GA Res. 43/131, 8 December 1988; GA Res. 45/100, 29 
January 1991; GA Res. 51/194, 10 February 1997. See also the Agreed Conclusion 1998/1 in the 
Report o f the Economic and Social Council for the Year 1998, Chapter VII ‘Humanitarian Affairs 
Segment5 (UN DOC. A /53/3). In addition, one o f the most cited documents o f international law o f the 
‘new world order* era, a report submitted by the Secretary General to the General Assembly in 1992 
(GA, Report o f the SG on the Work o f the Organisation, A n Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peace­
making and Peace-keeping, UN Doc. A /47 /277/S /24111,17 June 1992) affirms that ‘... the UN will need 
to respect the sovereignty o f the State... and humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance 
with the principles o f  humanity, neutrality, and impartiality’ (p. 12-13).
33 The Court’s decision on the question o f the normative status o f General Assembly resolutions has a 
more cautious nuance in Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons (GA Request), Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports (1996) 226, at para. 70 fif. [hereinafter ‘Nuclear Weaponf\ than in Nicaragua (at 99-100). In 
the Nuclear Weapons case, in particular, the Court concluded that the resolutions on nuclear weapons had
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Court, on the other hand, appears weaker not only because o f the lack o f  a doctrine o f 
stare decisis in international law, but also because the Court did not really explain the 
reasons for its conclusion. Instead, it resorted to a well-established rhetorical device 
for eluding very controversial issues, that is pretending that no controversy exists. The 
Court thus asserted that ‘there was no doubt’ on the view it was taking.
The conclusion o f the Court on the legality o f humanitarian assistance w ithout the 
consent o f the affected state can still be justified with arguments based on human 
rights and humanitarian law, as well as general international law. First, in the Corfu 
Channel case, the Court referred to the existence o f ‘elementary considerations o f 
humanity’,34 which, together with other principles, were found to be the source o f a 
legal obligation incumbent upon Albania.35 Second, although the explicit legal 
recognition o f the right to receive humanitarian assistance is only a little beyond the 
proposal stage,36 it can be argued that the legality o f the provision o f  this assistance 
derives from the protection afforded to such fundamental rights as the right to life,37 
the right to an adequate standards o f living, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, the right to be free from hunger, the right to the enjoyment o f  the highest 
attainable standard o f physical and mental health.38 In this respect, it is also important 
to mention that in its General Comment to Article 6 o f the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee included a social 
dimension involving positive obligations for states as part o f the right to life.39
often been adopted ‘with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions’ and that they fell short 
o f ‘establishing the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality o f the use o f such weapons’ (at para. 71).
34 Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), Judgment (Merits), ICJ Reports (1949) 4, at 22. The so-called 
Martens Clause also contains a similar reference to ‘principles o f humanity and dictates o f public 
conscience’ (Art. 1 (2), Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions).
35 It was held that Albania had been under an obligation to notify other states o f  the existence o f a 
minefield in its territorial sea. In addition to ‘elementary considerations o f humanity’, other relevant 
principles considered by the Court were the principle o f the freedom o f maritime navigation, and every 
state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights o f other 
states.
36 Domestici-Met, ‘Propos sur le droit a 1’ assistance’, in M. Bettati et al., Law in Humanitarian Crises Vol. 
II: Access to Victims: Right to Intervene or Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance1 (1995) 125; Domestici-Met, 
supra note 6, at 122-123; Dupuy, ‘L’assistance humanitaire comme droit de l’homme contre la 
souverainete de l’Etat’ in Kalshoven, supra note 6,27.
37 Art. 6, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter 
‘ICCPR’]. However, even the Convention on the Rights o f the Child, GA Res. 44/25, 20 November 
1989, has opted for a soft formulation regarding the entitlement o f the refugee child to humanitarian 
assistance (Art. 12).
38 Arts. 11-12, International Covenant and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 999 UNTS 3 
[hereinafter ICESCR].
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States therefore - this argument would run - not only have a duty to provide 
humanitarian assistance to their own population, but they also have a duty to allow 
external actors to provide this assistance, if they are not capable o f  fulfilling their 
obligation.40 Article 11 o f the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) lends some support to this view by affirming that in order 
to implement the fundamental right to be free from hunger state parties will act 
individually and through international co-operation.41 It could be argued that an 
international humanitarian operation aimed at the alleviation o f  hunger comes under 
the scope o f  this provision. A solid legal basis for the position o f the Court can be 
found in international humanitarian law.42 For instance, Article 59 o f  Geneva 
Convention IV obliges an occupying Power to agree to relief schemes on behalf o f  the 
occupied population, ‘if the whole or part o f  the population o f an occupied territory is 
inadequately supplied’.43 Such relief schemes may be undertaken either by states or by 
‘impartial humanitarian organisations’. In internal armed conflict, however, Protocol II 
to the Geneva Convention does not oblige state parties to accept external 
humanitarian assistance.44
This question o f the consent o f  the affected state must also be approached from the 
angle o f  the responsibility o f  the international organisation. As discussed,45 the 
International Law Commission has left out o f its work the responsibility o f 
international organisations, but there is general agreement that the rules o f  state
39 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 14 (Art 6).
40 In particular, this argument is developed by Domestici-Met, supra note 6, at 122. See also: Draft 
Principles o f International Relief in Natural Disaster Situations in Hardcastle and Chua, ‘Humanitarian 
Assistance: towards a Right o f Access to Victims o f Natural Disasters’, 325 Int. Rev. R.C. (1998) 589.
41 Art. 11, 2 ICECSR. See also Art. 2 (1) o f the ICESCR and General Comment 12 (XX Session, 1999) 
adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN DOC. E/C.12/1999/5).
42 Schindler, supra note 6, at 689-701. Bothe, supra note 6 at 91.
43 Geneva Convention (TV). These relief consignments shall consist o f ‘foodstuffs, medical supplies and 
clothing’. Other provisions in international humanitarian law instruments that oblige states to accept 
external relief in certain circumstances are referred to by Schindler, supra note 6,at 696-697).
44 Art. 3 (2) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions stresses that ‘nothing in this Protocol shall be 
invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed 
conflict or in the internal or external affairs’ o f the state. Art. 18 (2) asserts that ‘if  the civilian 
population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack o f the supplies essential for its survival, such as 
food-stuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for die civilian population which are o f an exclusively 
humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be 
undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned [emphasis added].
45 Chapter II.6.
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responsibility apply, mutatis mutandis, to international organisations.46 Could it be 
argued that, although the international organisations mounted a humanitarian 
operation without the consent o f the state, there were circumstances, such as 
necessity, that precluded the wrongfulness o f  its intervention? Two conditions must 
be met in order to invoke necessity as a ground for precluding wrongfulness. First, an 
essential interest o f the state against a ‘grave and imminent peril’ must be at stake, the 
only way o f safeguarding such interest being the commission o f  the wrongful act. 
Second, no essential interest o f the aggrieved state must be ‘seriously impaired’. 
Furthermore, if the act in question is in violation o f  a ju s cogens obligation, then the 
state o f  necessity cannot be invoked.47 Clearly, this definition o f  state o f necessity is 
entirely state-centred, and adapting it to international organisations involves a Pindaric 
flight.
This rather confusing picture can be summarised as follows:
1. In the context o f an international armed conflict, the provision o f  humanitarian 
assistance without the consent o f  the affected state is not in breach o f 
international law — and, in particular, o f the principle o f non-intervention — so 
long as it is ‘truly’ humanitarian in nature (i.e. having regard to the nature, purpose 
and modalities o f the assistance that is provided). This view is supported by a 
number o f provisions contained in humanitarian law instruments and by the 
decision in Nicaragua, the former with reference to N G O s - the ICRC and other 
‘impartial humanitarian organisations’ — and the latter in regard to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance by a foreign state. Despite their apparent clarity, the 
concrete application o f these points o f law is bound to give rise to difficulties. 
Suffice it to consider the complexity o f  an intervention/operation like that in 
Kosovo and the near impossibility o f  identifying the ‘truly’ humanitarian aspects 
o f  the operation/intervention.
2. In the context o f an internal armed conflict, while the consent o f the affected state 
to the provision o f  external humanitarian assistance is clearly required by Protocol
46 Dinh, Daillier, Pellet, supra note 8 at 756, who underscore that a fortiori customary rules on 
responsibility should apply to international organisations too; M. Shaw International haw (4th ed., 1997) at 
919-920.
142
II to the Geneva Conventions, the International Court o f  Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua 
took a different view.
3. There is a vast range o f  situations in which a humanitarian crisis obtains outside an 
armed conflict.48 Such situations include no t only natural disasters, but also 
emergencies resulting from human intervention. In particular, it has been argued 
that there is a nexus between the widespread commission o f human rights 
violations, including civil and political rights, and the occurrence o f such 
humanitarian emergencies as famines.49 Perhaps not unsurprisingly, existing soft 
law on humanitarian assistance focuses on natural disasters and chooses to ignore 
the role played by states, and by other authorities, in creating humanitarian 
disasters. In humanitarian crises that do no t occur in the context o f  an 
international or internal armed conflict, the consent o f the affected State to the 
provision o f external humanitarian assistance is at present an indispensable legal 
requirement. However, developments in the area o f humanitarian intervention are 
to be watched closely. Indeed, if it is true, as some authors argue, that international 
law is evolving towards the recognition o f  a right o f humanitarian intervention,50 
this should lead a fortiori to the recognition o f  the right to adopt non-forcible 
measures to remedy a humanitarian crisis, such as the provision o f  humanitarian 
assistance without the consent o f the affected state. It would also follow that this 
right could be exercised by state unilaterally or collectively through international 
institutions.
4. Excluding the wrongfulness o f the act(s) part o f  the provision o f humanitarian 
assistance to a state without its consent, invoking state o f necessity, would be very 
problematic.
47 Art. 25, Draft Articles on State Responsibility provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee of  
the International Law Commission on Second Reading (2001), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602.
48 The definition of internal armed conflict is at Art 1, Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
49 A  Sen, Poverty and Famines (1981). See also: A. de Waal, Famine Crimes (1997).
50 See Greenwood, supra note 4, and Cassese’, ‘E x Iniuria lus Oritur. Are we Moving towards the 
International Legitimation o f Forcible Humanitarian Counter-measures in the World Community?’, 10 
EJIL (1999) 23.
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5. An intervention o f  the Security Council under Chapter VII could be determinative 
o f the legality o f the provision o f humanitarian assistance regardless o f  these 
considerations.51
(d) The development o f the law on humanitarian assistance through the U Npolitical organs 
The General Assembly has not limited itself to resolutions o f a general nature on 
humanitarian assistance. It has also developed a rich practice on specific situations. 
The analysis o f this practice o f  the General Assembly, and also, in the fewer cases in 
which it intervened, o f  the Security Council, can cast some light on the international 
law on humanitarian assistance as has been concretely applied to particular crises. 
However, these situation-specific resolutions do not offer a cohesive picture. While 
the vast majority o f them lay great emphasis on the importance o f the consent o f 
states, in some instances they have mentioned the duty o f the state to allow external 
humanitarian assistance. For example, the General Assembly has emphasised the need 
to secure ‘humanitarian access’ to the civilian population in Kosovo.52 Resolutions on 
the crisis in Sudan, on the other hand, stressed the importance o f  ‘the full involvement 
o f  the Government o f Sudan’ in the conduct o f  the UN’s main humanitarian 
operation, Operation Lifeline Sudan, reiterating that humanitarian activities ‘should 
operate within the principle o f national sovereignty.53
In its resolutions, the Security Council has often called for parties to the conflict to 
ensure the ‘safe and unhindered access for humanitarian organisation to those in 
need’.54 In a few cases, the Security Council has included these clauses in resolutions 
taken under Chapter VII. For instance, it demanded that Iraq ‘allow immediate access 
by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need o f  assistance in all 
parts o f Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for their operations’.55
51 See infra p. 144 ff.
52 GA Res. 53/164,25 February 1999, at paras. 10 and 17.
53 GA Res. 53/1 0 , 11 January 1999. Operation Lifeline Sudan is supervised by the General Assembly, 
which has not specified the terms o f reference o f this operation.
54 For the practice until 1990, see Ramcharan, ‘The Security Council and Humanitarian Emeigencies’ 9 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Bights (1991) 19. Examples from more recent practice are: SC Res. 1231 
(1999) on Sierra Leone; SC Res. 1233 (1999) on Guinea-Bissau; SC Res. 1234 and 1258 (1999) on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; and SC Res. 1265 (1999), which did not deal with a specific situation 
but was adopted in a response to reports o f the SG on the causes o f conflict in Africa and on 
humanitarian assistance (respectively UN Doc. S/1998/318 and UN Doc. S/1998/883).
55 SC Res. 688 (1991).
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O n occasion, the Council has included a clause in its resolution obliging a state to co­
operate with humanitarian agencies, including NGO s. For instance, resolution 687 o f 
1991 bound Iraq, ‘in furtherance o f its commitment to facilitate the repatriation o f all 
Kuwaiti and third country nationals’, to ‘extend all necessary co-operation to the 
ICRC, providing lists o f  such persons, facilitating the access o f the ICRC to all such 
persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the ICRC for those 
Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for’.56 In resolution 1244 on 
Kosovo, acting under Chapter VII the Security Council emphasised that the Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia had to allow ‘unimpeded access to  Kosovo by humanitarian 
aid organisations and to co-operate with such organisations so as to ensure the fast 
and effective delivery o f international aid’.57 With these resolutions the Council has 
strengthened the already important role assigned by international humanitarian law to 
N G O s (the ICRC and other ‘impartial humanitarian organisations’).
A widely recognised milestone in the practice o f  the Security Council in the field o f 
humanitarian assistance was resolution 794 o f  1992 on Somalia, which established 
Operation Restore Hope. The Council determined that the ‘the magnitude o f  the 
human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles 
being created to the distribution o f humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security’.58 The use o f force by its Members for avowedly 
humanitarian purposes was allowed by the Council.59 Somalia offers an example o f  the 
escalation from a humanitarian operation to a forcible intervention on humanitarian 
grounds.
III.3 . N eutra lity  and  im partiality
The resolutions o f the General Assembly and o f the Security Council, and the decision 
o f  the ICJ in Nicaragua have one element in common: they view neutrality and
56 SC Res. 1199 (1998) concerning the situation in Kosovo contains a similar clause but formulated in 
more general terms: the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia is asked to ‘facilitate, in agreement with the 
UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the safe return o f refugees and displaced 
persons to their homes’.
57 SC Res. 1244 (1999). Earlier the Security Council had inter aha demanded that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia ‘allow free and unimpeded access to humanitarian organisations and supplies’ -  SC Res. 
1199 (1998).
58 See also para. 10 o f that resolution in which the Council authorised ‘the Secretary-General and
Member States ... to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’ (para. 10).
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impartiality as essential principles o f  humanitarian assistance.60 Neutrality and 
impartiality can be traced to the practice and o f  the Statutes o f the ICRC, and have 
been subsequently absorbed in international humanitarian law instruments.61 The 
original ‘ethical’ rationale for neutrality and impartiality has been at least in part 
superseded by a more ‘pragmatic’ rationale. These principles are now seen as an 
indispensable pre-condition for humanitarian organisations to be allowed access to 
those who need assistance in a conflict and, perhaps more importantly, for them to 
ensure the safety o f their own staff.62
W hen applied to humanitarian action, neutrality and impartiality are complementary 
terms: ‘neutrality’ requires an obligation not to take sides in a conflict (a duty ‘not to 
do’), whereas ‘impartiality’ requires that, ‘when it comes to action’, humanitarian 
organisation intervene without giving any preference to any party to the conflict.63 
Humanitarian organisations are obliged not to take sides in the conflict, which entails 
a duty not to declare allegiance or support to, o r to make public statements in favour 
o f  one party. Moreover, they are obliged to act without discriminating against any o f 
the parties to the conflict. Neutrality and impartiality also encompass an obligation to 
determine the beneficiaries o f the humanitarian assistance on no grounds other than
59 Pontecorvo, ‘Somalia e Nazioni Unite* in P. Picone (ed.), IntervenU delk Na%oni Unite e Diritto 
Internationale (1995) 201. Sorel, ‘La Somalie et les Nations Unies*, 38 AFDI (1992) 61, at 74.
60 For instance, GA Res. 46/182, 19 December 1991, which contains an annex on the Guiding 
Principles o f Humanitarian Assistance, asserts that such assistance must be provided in accordance with 
the principles o f ‘humanity, impartiality and neutrality*. In Nicaragua, the Court had affirmed that the 
characteristics of humanitarian aid ‘were indicated in the first and second o f the fundamental principles 
declared by the Twentieth International Conference o f  the Red Cross*, which included the giving o f  aid 
‘without discrimination to all in need in Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their dependents’ 
(Nicaragua case, at 124-125).
61 See Chapter 1.2(d) and 1.4.
62 The security o f humanitarian personnel has become a real concern given the exponential rise in the 
numbers o f UN and NGO officials killed in situations o f  conflict; 198 UN aid workers were killed 
between 1992 and 2000, and this figure would be much larger if NGO workers were included (The 
Dangers o f Trying to Help*, The Economist, 10 March 2001). Such concerns have been partly addressed 
with the adoption o f the Convention on the Safety o f  United Nations and Associated Personnel, GA 
Res. 49/59, 9 December 1994. Under the Statute o f the International Criminal Court (Art 8 ,2 , b), it is 
a war crime intentionally to direct ‘attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles 
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter o f  the 
United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under 
the international law o f  armed conflict*.
63 This is the analysis o f the two terms that is offered by Denise Plattner (‘ICRC Neutrality and 
Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance’, 311 Int. Rev. R.C. (1996) 161, at 165). Etymologically, ‘neutrality* 
is the quality o f an entity that is neither ‘male’ nor ‘feminine* and, by extension, that is ‘neither one thing 
nor the other*. ‘Impartiality* is literally the attribute o f an entity or person who is ‘not party* to a 
particular question, dispute or contract The two terms are synonymous. See, also, Weller, The 
Relativity of Humanitarian Neutrality and Impartiality*, American Society o f International Law - 
Proceedings of the 91st Annual Conference.
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their need, and the attendant obligation to assist individuals in proportion to such 
need.64 This approach is also consistent with the meanings given by the ICRC to the 
terms ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’.65
Since the 1980s, the practice o f humanitarian neutrality and impartiality has come 
under severe criticism from some NGOs. For example, Medicins sans Frontiers 
(MSF) has argued that ‘impartial humanitarian aid distributed w ithout discrimination 
openly and publicly to both parties is not appropriate if one o f  the parties does not 
simply aim at defeating the other, but at exterminating’ a population.66 Numerous 
experiences in so-called complex humanitarian emergencies confirm these concerns.67 
In Rwanda not only did the UN decide to disengage in the first few weeks o f  the 
genocide, it also repeatedly called for a cease-fire in order to allow negotiations 
between the parties and to facilitate the delivery o f  humanitarian assistance.68 As has 
been correctly remarked, ‘calling for a cease-fire is a political act’ especially if it occurs 
in the midst o f  a genocide.69 In addition, the Secretary General stressed the fact that 
the UN had to respect neutrality and support the lawful authorities in the country, 
although a number o f international N G O s had established in early April 1994 that acts 
o f genocide were being perpetrated in Rwanda.70 Finally, ‘keeping the appearances’ o f  
neutrality was achieved through a process o f  obfuscation o f  the events unwinding in 
Rwanda, aptly mis-represented as ‘calamitous circumstances’, ‘convulsions’, and as the
64 Pictet, ‘Les principes fondamentaux de la Croix-Rouge et la Paix*, 746 Int. Rev. K  C. (1984) 79.
65 At the 25* International Conference o f the Red Cross in October 1986, it was concluded that 
humanitarian action ought to make ‘no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or 
political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering o f  individuals, being guided solely by their 
needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases o f distress’. On neutrality, on the other hand, it was 
stated that ‘In order to continue to enjoy the confidence o f  all, the Movement may not take sides in 
hostilities or engage at any time in controversies o f a political, racial, religious or ideological nature’.
See also: the ICRC Statutes o f 24 June 1998 (m 324 Int. Rev. K C . 1998) and Plattner, supra note 63,168.
66 Domestici-Met, supra note 6, at 127.
67 African Rights, ‘Humanitarianism Unbound?*, Discussion Paper No. 5 (November 1994).
68 On this, see David, ‘Aspects juridiques de la responsabilitedes differents acteurs dans les evenements 
du Rwanda (avril-juillet 1994)’, Commission d’enquete parlementaire du Senat concemant les 
evenements du Rwanda, in Belgian Parliamentary Documents (Doc. Pari.), Senat, 1997-98, 1-611/13, 6 
dec. 1997, Annexe 6,6-24.
69 African Rights, supra note 67, at 32.
70 SG Report to the SC o f  20 April 1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/470). On the Rwandan genocide, see: 
African Rights Death, Despair and Defiance (1994); Human Rights Watch/Federation Internationale des 
Ligues des Droits de 1’ Homme (FIDH), Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999), at 625- 
628. On Rwanda, see the Report o f  the Report o f  the Independent Commission o f  Inquiry appointed 
by the UN (1999).
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result o f  a ‘frenzy o f massacres’ and o f ‘unruly elements responsible for the 
massacres’.71
Weller has observed that, in order to analyse humanitarian neutrality and impartiality, 
it is necessary to take into account the differing legal character o f these principles, and 
the relativity o f their content as a result o f the operational context and o f  specific 
regulatory aspects concerning the operation or the organisation itself.72 Bearing these 
considerations in mind, some consequences o f  humanitarian neutrality and 
impartiality, highlighted by African Rights and by Alex de Waal, cannot be 
overlooked.73 Firstly, material assistance can end up in the hands o f one o f  the warring 
factions or o f the authorities o f  a state responsible for systematic violations o f human 
rights or humanitarian law. But it is not simply the diversion o f  aid to combatants and 
warring factions that is problematic, the distribution o f  aid through the authorities 
exercising control - a requirement frequently imposed by governments and insurgents 
to allow access to the victims - can also give rise to dilemmas, particularly if the 
authorities in charge decide to distribute aid in a discriminatory manner or to give 
access to humanitarian organisations selectively.
Relief to Ethiopia in the wake o f  the 1984-85 famine is an illustration o f these 
processes. The neediest areas and groups were only marginally affected by the aid 
operation as a result o f  continued manipulation by the Ethiopian Government, which 
was treated as a partner by humanitarian organisations throughout the crisis. Closing 
an eye to the crimes committed by the Ethiopian forces in the course o f that conflict 
and not reporting them was an implicit term in the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between 
the Ethiopian authorities and the humanitarian organisations.74 Humanitarian 
operations can result in an improvement in ‘the legitimacy o f  the controlling 
authority’, be it an insurgent rebel group or the government o f  the country, regardless 
o f  even widespread violations o f  human rights and humanitarian law that it may be 
committing.75 Finally, another consequence o f  humanitarian neutrality and impartiality
71 Human Rights Watch/FIDH, supra note 70. See, for example, the report o f the Secretary General 
presented to the Security Council on 13 May 1994, more than one month after the beginning o f  the 
genocide (UN Doc. S/1994/565).
72 Weller, supra note 63.
73 African Rights, supra note. 67. De Waal, supra note 49.
74 De Waal, supra note 49, at 106-132.
75 Ibid., at 5. David Keen and Ken Wilson have noted that ‘relief organisations have tended to 
conceptualise famines in terms o f food shortages and needs, and accordingly to construct relief
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is the indirect provision o f strategic and logistical support to parties to the conflict, if 
‘the military or political objectives o f the controlling authority or combatant force 
coincide with the logistical requirements o f  the humanitarian operation’.76 In 
particular, this support consists o f  keeping lines o f communication and transport 
facilities open.
There can thus be little doubt in the light o f  recent practice that the unswerving 
application o f neutrality and impartiality can actually be an obstacle to the promotion 
o f  humanitarian ideals, and facilitate the commission o f violations o f human rights. 
Albeit normally unintended, these consequences o f  humanitarian operations cannot be 
ignored by humanitarian organisations, including the UN.77 In some circumstances, it 
may be appropriate to re-visit the modus operandi based on neutrality and impartiality 
and face difficult dilemmas: can humanitarian organisations continue to be neutral and 
impartial in all situations, regardless o f which state or groups they are dealing with? 
Given that humanitarian action can result in some kind o f  help for the authorities that 
are in control o f the territory, should humanitarian organisations not renounce their 
neutrality and impartiality and treat states/authorities differently, depending also on 
their compliance with human rights and humanitarian law? One way o f resolving the 
tension between extreme humanitarian impartiality and neutrality on the one hand, 
and respect for human rights on the other, is by assessing the relative strength o f the 
obligations involved. The ICRC, for example, has to abide by its own constitutional 
requirement to be neutral and impartial. UN agencies and programmes are subject to 
different constitutional obligations, and for them extreme neutrality and impartiality 
may not be an option if these principles cannot be reconciled with their other legal 
obligations. An UN operational agency cannot choose to remain neutral and impartial 
in the course o f  a collective action under Chapter VII o f  the UN Charter, unless 
expressly authorised by the Security Council.78 Moreover, because o f  the applicability 
o f human rights and humanitarian law to its activities, an UN operation cannot 
purport to remain neutral and impartial when the authorities o f the host state or
operations as logistical exercises. However, effective relief in conflict related famines depend on 
understanding the relationship between aid and the dynamics o f  conflict* (Keen and Wilson, ‘Engaging 
with Violence: A Re-assessment of Relief in Wartime*, in J. Macrae, A. Zwi (eds.), War and Hunger: 
Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (1994) 209).
76 African Rights, supra note 67, at 4.
77 See the discussion on complicity in Chapter 11.6(a).
78 For example, SC Res. 1333 (2000) expressly exempts humanitarian organisations from the ban on 
flights into and from Afghanistan as part o f the sanctions against the Taliban (at para. 11-12).
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insurgent groups are committing gross violations o f humanitarian law an d /o r human 
rights.79
An original solution to this clash o f values and normative systems is to re-define the 
principles o f neutrality and impartiality in accordance with the evolution o f 
international law. As suggested by Weller, it is hardly conceivable that insistence on 
compliance with basic rules o f  international human rights and humanitarian law 
should still be regarded ‘as an un-neutral or partial act’.80 International law has eroded 
the space o f neutrality and imposes choices on states and on other actors, including 
international organisations and NGOs. Given that traditional conceptions o f  neutrality 
and impartiality are so deep-seated in the attitudes and ethos o f humanitarian workers, 
it is necessary to propagate this re-definition o f  neutrality and impartiality at the field 
level.
III.4 . A C ase-study: N on-d iscrim ination  in  the  Provision o f
H um an ita rian  A ssistance to A fghanistan  an d  to A fghani R efugees 
in  Pakistan
(a) The history o f relief to Afghanistan
The fact that gender issues ostensibly entered the centre o f  the arena in the Afghani 
conflict did not come as a complete surprise, given that, while ‘it would be an 
exaggeration to say that the war in Afghanistan was fought over the status o f women’, 
this would not be wholly untrue’.81 There are three situations in respect o f  which the 
provision o f humanitarian assistance by the UN and by other agencies operating in 
Afghanistan and in the Afghani refugee camps in Pakistan can be considered to have 
violated the principle o f  non-discrimination.
79 See above Chapter II.6.A. on responsibility for complicity with the commission o f an internationally 
wrongful act.
80 Weller, supra note 63, at 9. My own interviews with senior officials o f  UNICEF’s flagship programme 
o f  humanitarian assistance, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), confirmed that according to the guidelines, 
OLS field staff has to report human rights and humanitarian law abuses to their superior, but that no 
action is normally taken either at field level or at the senior level because it is believed that this could 
endanger the fixture o f  the operation (Interviews conducted in Nairobi in April 1998).
81 Cammack, ‘Gender Relief and Politics During the Afghan War*, in D. Indra (ed.), 'Engendering Forced 
Migration (1999) 94, at 95. On the Taliban regime, see also: P. Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the 
New Order in Afghanistan (1998) and W. Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism Re-bom? Afghanistan and the Taliban 
(1998), particularly Nancy Dupree’s chapter ‘Afghan Women under the Taliban’ 145.
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One o f  these situations regards the employment o f  local staff by the UN in 
Afghanistan. Following pressure and even intimidation from the Taliban authorities, 
Afghani women hired as local staff members by the UN were dismissed shortly after 
the establishment o f the new regime. An element o f discrimination continues to 
characterise the UN’s employment practices related to local staff in Afghanistan. In 
whichever way responsibility for these practices is allocated between the UN and the 
Afghani authorities, it cannot be overlooked that UN agencies have at the very least 
passively accepted the incorporation o f discrimination into their own policies and 
practices.
The principle o f  non-discrimination was also breached in the provision o f 
humanitarian assistance to Afghani refugees in the camps in Pakistan during the 
1980s. In particular, assistance in the form o f  education and o f employment 
opportunities offered by the UN often completely neglected women and girls. This 
can be explained with concerns about the opposition to such programmes by the 
mujahedeen leadership in the camps. At the operational level, in spite o f some protest, 
U NICEF and UNHCR substantially caved in to the mujahedeen, who could rely on 
decisive political support from western countries throughout the 1980s. This failure to 
uphold the rights o f  Aighani refugee women in the camps in Pakistan is best 
illustrated by the comparative data on the education o f refugee girls and boys in the 
camps. In the camps, the level o f  literacy was at 60% among the refugee boys, but it 
was as low as 6% among girls aged six to eleven and 3% in the group o f girls aged 
eleven to seventeen.82 ‘Culture’ is used as a justification for explaining the UN’s failure 
to uphold the rights o f women in the provision o f humanitarian assistance to 
Afghanistan. This argument is no t only untenable legally and morally, but is also 
empirically flawed since literacy rates in Afghanistan in 1978, before the Communist 
take-over, while revealing an overall dismal picture, were also characterised by less 
gender imbalance than in the camps later (95% o f  women were illiterate, as opposed 
to 92% o f men).83
82 Total enrolment in 1988 was over 100,000 boys and less than 8,000 girls (figures cited in H. 
Chadesworth and C. Chinkin, The 'Boundaries of International Taw. A  Feminist Analysis (2000) at 266, fii 
113).
83 Cammack, supra note 81, at 104.
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The final example in the Afghani context o f  humanitarian assistance in breach o f 
human rights is the provision o f such assistance by UN in Afghanistan after the 
Taliban came to power in 1996. The relationship between the Taliban government and 
aid agencies has been distraught since the onset, one o f the main areas o f  friction 
being the status and rights o f women. The UN is heavily involved in Afghanistan 
having allocated some $ 100 million o f  humanitarian assistance to this country in 
1998, about half o f  the total humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, while the rest is 
provided by N G O s.84 To an even larger extent than in the camps, the delivery o f 
various forms o f  humanitarian assistance to women by the UN has been systematically 
impaired, and even altogether halted.
While primary responsibility for die systematic gender discrimination practised in 
Afghanistan remains with the Afghani State both legally and politically, the practice o f 
the UN has no t been in accordance with international law. And it is surely disquieting 
from the point o f view o f international law that the UN not only failed to prevent, or 
to become an effective opponent o f  the gender policies o f  the Taliban regime, but that 
it actually incorporated discrimination against women in its humanitarian assistance, 
and in the recruitment o f its local staff.
In analysing the UN reaction to the policies o f  the Taliban, it is important to 
distinguish three different levels in the response and practice o f  the organisation. 
Firstly, there is the practice o f  the political organs o f  the UN (the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, and the Secretary General), which remains the natural object o f 
interest o f legal scholars. Secondly, there is the practice o f  the institutional bureaucracy 
o f the various departments and agencies o f  the UN, distinct from the practice o f  the 
political organs, and expressed in reports, positions and statements o f policy bodies, 
o f senior civil servants, and o f country or regional representatives. This level o f 
organisational practice will be here referred to as ‘institutional practice’.85 While this 
type o f practice, which has grown over time and has come to acquire great 
importance, is no t explicitly regulated by the Charter, some basis for it can be found in 
Chapter IX and Chapter XV o f the Charter. Finally, the operational level, the way in
84 Wodd Food Programme, Strategic Framework for the UN in Afghanistan o f  12 Sept 1998, available 
at < http://www.wfp.org/OP/Countries/afganistan/strat_£ramework.html>, visited March 27,2001.
85 The term ‘internal practice’ was not opted for, because it would conceal the external effects o f this 
practice.
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which the UN concretely behaves on the ground, is highly significant. By analogy with 
state practice, which encompasses both what a state says it does and what it really 
does, the operational reality must be considered part and parcel o f the overall practice 
o f the organisation.86
From the point o f  view o f international law, it is the practice o f the political organs o f 
the UN that normally receives the greatest attention. In fact, it is also, and perhaps 
primarily, through the acts o f  such organs that international organisations, and the UN 
in particular, have historically contributed to the development o f international law.87 In 
particular, it is well-established that evidence o f the practice and opinio juris o f states 
can be sought ‘by reflection’ also in the acts o f the organs o f the international 
organisations, and o f  the UN in particular.88 O n the other hand, w hat has been here 
referred to as the institutional practice o f the organisation is an expression o f  the more 
autonomous will o f  the organisation. This practice is no t endowed with immediate 
legal consequences on the plane o f international law.89 For instance, this vast body o f 
institutional practice is not normally seen as reflecting the will o f  states and is 
therefore not used as evidence o f state practice, although one could argue that, 
through the supervisory role over operational programmes attributed to the General 
Assembly by the Charter,90 states are actually not only aware o f the institutional 
practice, but may also contribute to its development and consolidation.
Leaving aside the question o f the legal relevance o f institutional practice, a singular 
aspect is that this institutional practice can at times matter more than the practice o f 
the political organs and can be determinative o f  the operational behaviour o f  the 
organisation, even when it is in contrast with an act or a series o f acts o f  a political
86 In a well-known passage o f his dissenting opinion on the Anglo-Norwegan Fisheries case, Judge Read 
adopted the even more radical view that action can be ‘the only convincing evidence o f State practice* 
in Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1951) 116, at 191 (diss. op. o f  Judge Read).
87 R. Higgins, The Development of International Laiv through the Political organs ofthe United Nations (1963).
88 Qtinkin, The Challenge o f Soft Law: Development and Giange in International Law’, 38 ICLQ 
(1989) 850.
89 It is acquiring growing significance. See, for example, the recent arbitration between Eritrea and 
Yemen, in which Yemen claimed that a hydrocarbon study o f the Red Sea region carried out by the 
World Bank and the UNDP ‘constituted recognition o f  Yemeni title by these international agencies, as 
well as expert evidence to the same effect*, and ‘evidence o f  Ethiopian acquiescence’ to the Yemeni tide 
(The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Arbitration, 114 ILR (1999) 1, at 
para 59-60).
90 Except for those operational programmes, including humanitarian programmes, that have been 
established by a resolution o f the Security Council. On the supervisory powers o f the General Assembly 
over operational programmes, see, in particular, Art 60 of the Charter.
153
organ and with human rights law.91 This is a phenomenon o f the utm ost importance 
to international law, because it highlights a loss o f institutional regulatory efficacy, and, 
at worst, a process o f  substantial dis-empowerment o f the political organs o f  the UN. 
It also reveals that the ‘softer than soft law’ body o f institutional practice can end up 
being more ‘effective’ - that is more capable o f determining behaviour - than ‘hard 
law’ (including rules o f  ju s cogens, as is arguably the case with the principle o f non­
discrimination), in spite o f the hierarchical superiority and the avowed greater 
normative strength o f the latter.
(b) The practice o f the political organs o f the U N
In October 1996, a few weeks after the Taliban militias had conquered Kabul, the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1076. Having expressed concern over ‘the 
continuation and recent intensification o f the military confrontation in Afghanistan 
which have caused civilian casualties and an increase in refugees and displaced 
persons, and which seriously endanger the stability and peaceful development o f  the 
region’, the Council, then, called upon
‘all Afghan parties immediately to cease all armed hostilities, to renounce the 
use o f  force, to put aside their differences and to engage in a political dialogue 
aimed at achieving national reconciliation and a lasting political settlement o f  
the conflict and establishing a fully representative and broad-based transitional 
government o f national unity’.92
The cautious wording o f the preamble appears to resemble more closely the wording 
o f  Article 33 rather than Article 39, but authors like Conforti view the request for an 
immediate cease-fire as a typical provisional measure under Article 40 o f the Charter 
(Chapter VII).93 But other authors, reflecting on the more recent practice o f  the 
Council, stress the current tendency to refer explicitly to Chapter VII.94 Subsequent
91 Johan Kaufinann has recognised the importance o f the institutional practice and o f  the acts o f senior 
civil servants for the operational programmes o f  the United Nations (J. Kaufinann, United Nations 
Decision-Making (1980) 78-79).
92 SC Res. 1076 (1996).
93 B. Conforti, he Natjoni Unite (5th ed., 1994) 185.
94 N.D. White, Keeping the Peace (1997) 36-42. Unlike Conforti, White considers a SC resolution on 
Armenia’s invasion o f  Azerbaijan in which the Council had requested a cease-fire as taken under 
Chapter VI and as having only recommendatory value (at 72). In the past, the Council did act under
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resolutions o f the Council have adopted a stronger wording and referred to the 
‘Afghan conflict... (as) causing a serious and growing threat to regional and 
international peace and security’.95 Finally, in 1999-2000 the Security Council explicitly 
referred to Chapter VII in two resolutions.96
Resolution 1076 mentioned the violations o f women’s rights, but limited itself to 
simply ‘denouncing’ them.97 The Council noted that these violations could have 
‘repercussions’ on international relief, but then immediately — and rather 
contradictorily - proceeded to ‘call upon all States and international organisations to 
extend all possible humanitarian assistance to the civilian population o f Afghanistan’ 
[emphasis added], and attached no condition on the provision o f such assistance. In 
its following resolutions on Afghanistan, however, the Security Council added that 
humanitarian assistance must be provided to ‘all in need’ in Afghanistan. M ost 
importantly, the Council strengthened its call to respect the rights o f Afghani women, 
at first ‘urging an end to all discrimination against girls and women and other 
violations o f  human rights,98 and finally demanding an end to such discrimination.99 It 
is im portant to emphasise that these resolutions o f  the Security Council were adopted 
unanimously, with Islamic countries like Pakistan, Iran and Bahrain voting in favour 
o f  them. When the Security Council finally decided to use its Chapter VII powers, it 
did ‘reiterate’ its ‘deep concern’ over the continuing discrimination against women and 
girls, but the real reason for its intervention was the alleged support o f  the Taliban to 
terrorist activities and their refusal to surrender Usama Bin Laden to the US. Again, 
the Council omitted to state clearly that humanitarian assistance would have to be 
provided without discriminating on grounds o f gender.
Chapter VII without explicitly stating so, most notably in the case o f Rhodesia (Alston, The Security 
Council and Human Rights: Lessons To Be Learned from the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis and its Aftermath’, 13 
Austral. YBIL (1992) 107 at 146).
95 SC Res. 1193 (1998) and SC Res. 1214 (1998), both o f  which were adopted unanimously.
96 SC Res. 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).
97 See SC Res. 1076 (1996) at para. 11, where the Council ‘denounces_the discrimination against girls 
and women and other violations o f human rights and international humanitarian law in Afghanistan, 
and notes with deep concern possible repercussions on international relief and reconstruction 
programmes in Afghanistan’.
98 SC Res. 1193 (1998).
99 SC Res. 1214 (1998).
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The General Assembly has passed a number o f  resolutions on the situation in 
Afghanistan after the Taliban conquest.100 The m ost detailed o f these resolutions was 
resolution 52/145,101 which contained very specific requests to Afghanistan. In the 
part on gender discrimination, the General Assembly spelled out a series o f measures 
that ‘all Afghan parties’ had to take in order ‘bring an end without delay to 
discrimination on the basis o f  gender and the deprivation o f  human rights o f women’. 
According to the General Assembly, such measures had to ensure
(a) The effective participation o f  women in civil, cultural, economic, political 
and social life throughout the country;
(b) Respect for the right o f  women to work, and their reintegration in 
employment;
(c) The right o f women and girls to education without discrimination, the 
reopening o f schools and the admission o f women and girls to all levels o f 
education;
(d) Respect for the right o f women to security o f person, and to ensure that 
those responsible for physical attacks on women are brought to justice;
(e) Respect for freedom o f movement o f women and their effective access to 
the facilities necessary to protect their right to the highest attainable 
standard o f physical and mental health;
(f) Equal access o f  women to health facilities.. .102
This is an im portant resolution, not because it adds anything to already existing 
standards, but because it applies these standards to a particular situation. The call to 
bring an end to discrimination ‘without delay’, thus, reiterates the absolute and non­
derogable nature o f the principle o f  non-discrimination.103 Furthermore, the measures 
indicated by the General Assembly echo the language o f  the Convention on the
100 See GA Res. 51/108,12 December 1996; 51/195,17 December 1996; 52/145, 12 December 1997; 
52/211,19 December 1997; 53/165,9 December 1998; 55/174, 28 February 2001.
101 GA Res. 52/145.
102 GA Res. 52/145 at para. 6. This resolution also urged all Afghani parties to ensure that UN 
programmes ‘are carried out without discrimination against women as participants or as beneficiaries’.
103 The non-derogable nature o f this principle in time o f  public emergency has been recognised by state 
parties to the ICCPR. Art 4 o f the Covenant forbids the adoption o f emeigency measures consisting 
that ‘involve discrimination solely on the ground o f race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin’. 
On the question o f the more general non-derogability of the standard o f non-discrimination in treaty 
relations between states, i.e. on whether this principle is part o f  jus cogens, see Chariesworth, Chinkin, 
The Gender o f Jus Cogens’, 15 Hum. Rls.Q. (1993) 63, at 67-70.
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Elimination o f  All Forms o f Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which at 
various points obliges states ‘to take all appropriate measures’ to eliminate different 
forms o f discrimination.104 Finally, the General Assembly’s focus on those particular 
rights — right to work, to education, to health, to freedom o f movement and to 
security o f the person — that were — and still are - being violated in Afghanistan 
without distinction between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic 
and social rights, on the other, is consistent with the nature o f  the principle o f  non­
discrimination as the fundamental principle underpinning all human rights.
Another difference between the practice o f  the Security Council and that o f  the 
General Assembly is that the General Assembly included an appeal to member states 
and to the international community in general to provide adequate humanitarian 
assistance ‘on a non-discriminatory basis’, whereas the Security Council had limited 
itself to a request that humanitarian assistance be provided to ‘all in need’. I t may 
appear to be only a nuance, but reference to the principle o f non-discrimination as 
being legally part o f  the provision o f  humanitarian assistance is significant. Overall, it 
could be said that the General Assembly went a step further than the Security Council 
in its pronouncements.
The Security Council could be criticised not only for excessively cautious language, but 
also for having failed to adopt more serious measures to deal with discrimination 
against women in Afghanistan, such as ‘measures no t involving the use o f  armed 
force’ under Article 41 or provisional measures under Article 40. In order to assess 
this criticism, it is important to consider the past practice o f the Security Council in 
the area o f human rights.105 Before the more recent practice o f this decade, the 
Security Council had dealt with situations that involved widespread human rights 
violations, and, in particular, racial discrimination, in the cases o f South Africa and 
Rhodesia. Although in these instances the Council did reach a determination under 
Chapter VII that these situations constituted ‘a threat to peace’, it is im portant to note 
that human rights played only a minor role in this conclusion. In the case o f  Rhodesia 
the right o f self-determination and the consequences o f the unilateral declaration o f
104 E.g. Art. 3, Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Discrimination against Women (1979), 
19 ILM 33, [hereinafter CEDAW].
105 Alston, supra note 94. Bailey, The Security Council’, in P. Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human 
Rights (1992) 304. Ramcharan, supra note 54.
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independence constituted the most important issue, while the Council made clear that 
the arms embargo on South Africa was not only the result o f apartheid, but also o f 
South Africa’s ‘persistent acts o f aggression against its neighbouring States’.106 The 
early practice o f the Council, thus, indicates that widespread discrimination has not in 
itself been considered a threat to the peace or a breach o f the peace leading to the 
adoption o f  Chapter VII measures. However, Franck maintains that on Rhodesia and 
South Africa the Council might have acted also as a result o f  its perception that there 
was a ‘historically demonstrable connection between the proscribed behaviour and a 
propensity to war’.107 As predicted by Alston, the intervention o f  the Security Council 
in the Iraqi situation in 1990-91 — and, in particular, resolution 688 -108 did in fact 
constitute a watershed in the practice o f  the Council on matters related to human 
rights.109 An important trend has developed since then, signalling a greater 
involvement o f the Council in human rights and humanitarian matters, often 
characterised by interventions under Chapter VII. White has also underscored ‘the 
expansion o f  the concept o f ‘threat to the peace’ in the 1990s into situations o f 
starvation (Somalia), genocide and serious humanitarian crises (Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Zaire), and civil wars (Liberia and Angola), as well as its most controversial action to 
restore democracy (Haiti)’.110
It is also in the very recent practice developed in particular in regard to Albania in 
1997111 and Kosovo in 1998-99112 that some arguments for a more robust intervention 
o f the Council on the systematic discrimination against women in Afghanistan could 
be found. Following a letter o f  the Italian representative to the Secretary General, in
106 SC Res. 418(1977).
107 T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Imw and Institutions (1995) 231. The fact that there is a historical 
connection between racial discrimination and war cannot alone explain the practice o f the Security 
Council. Religions, and religious persecutions, have been at least as much a generator o f  wars, and, as 
has been seen in die case o f  Afghanistan, the status and rights o f women has been a real battleground 
even in that conflict, catalysing factions representing completely opposite views o f society.
108 SC Res. 688 (1991).
109 Alston, supra note 94, at 116.
110 White, supra note 94 at 59.
111 At die beginning o f  1997 a financial crisis triggered o ff serious disorder in Albania. The central 
government had lost control o f parts o f the country and various armed groups emerged. As a result o f  
this crisis and o f the influx o f thousands o f Albanian asylum-seekers in n e ig h b o u r in g  countries, 
especially Italy, the establishment o f a multi-national force for Albania was proposed.
112 Internal disorder and systematic repression has characterised the situation in Kosovo since the end 
o f the 1980s. But later, as a result o f the establishment o f  the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its 
military consolidation, the situation in Kosovo developed into an internal armed conflict, which is 
defined at Art 1 o f Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. The Security Council mentioned the 
occurrence o f  violations o f  international humanitarian law in respect o f Kosovo only in September 
1998 -  see SC Res. 1199 (1998).
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which the establishment o f a ‘multinational protection force’ for Albania to secure the 
delivery o f humanitarian assistance had been proposed,113 the Security Council 
approved a resolution under Chapter VII authorising the member states participating 
in the force to conduct the operation in order ‘to facilitate the safe and prom pt 
delivery o f  humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the 
missions o f  international organisations in Albania’.114 In the case o f  Kosovo, on the 
other hand, the Council decided to adopt ‘measures no t involving the use o f  armed 
force’, consisting o f an arms embargo binding all states ‘for the purposes o f fostering 
peace and stability in Kosovo’.115
In the cases o f  Albania and Kosovo, the Council explicitly acted under Chapter VII 
without elaborating on the grounds that led to the determination that these situations 
constituted a threat to the peace or a breach o f  the peace. The case o f Albania 
represents, in some respects, a real novelty in the practice o f  the Council, given that, in 
spite o f the unrest in this country as a result o f  a financial crisis, the situation could 
no t be said to amount to an internal armed conflict.116 Furthermore, and rather 
unusually for an action under Chapter VII, the Albanian Government expressed its 
full support to the intervention and communicated that it was ‘looking forward to the 
arrival o f such force’.117 As far as Kosovo was concerned, the existence o f a 
widespread policy o f  persecution against ethnic Albanians has been a salient feature o f  
the situation there for the last decade. This persecution, then, began to be exacerbated 
through ethnic cleansing and was accompanied by the occurrence o f violent internal 
disturbances, almost certainly amounting to an internal armed conflict, at least in some 
phases and particularly after the establishment Kosovo Liberation Army as a force on 
the ground.
113 UN Doc. S/1997/258, reproduced in: 52 Com. Int. (1997) 6 at 8.
114 SC Res. 1101 (1997).
115 SC Res. 1160 (1998) recalled also in SC Res. 1199 (1998), and SC Res. 1203 (1998). This is before SC 
Res. 1244 (1999) o f 10 June 1999, which followed the NATO intervention.
116 For the definition o f internal armed conflict see note 48. In the case o f Somalia, the Council’s 
determination that an internal armed conflict was taking place is revealed by the mention o f ‘widespread 
violations o f international humanitarian law* in the preamble (SC Res. 814 (1993)).
117 UN Doc. S /1997/259, reproduced in Com. Int., supra note 113 at 9. It is worthy mentioning that 
China was the only country to abstain in the vote on the resolution on Albania explaining that China 
has ‘never been in favour o f the Security Council frequently invoking Chapter VII o f the Charter in 
authorising such actions’ (Ibid., at 8).
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The situation in Afghanistan differs in some important ways from that in Kosovo and 
Albania and from other situations considered by the Council in its practice, and these 
factual differences can perhaps partially explain the Security Council’s failure to take 
more robust action. However, the explicit determination under Article 39 that the 
systematic discrimination and persecution o f women in Afghanistan constitutes a 
threat to the peace could have been made by the Council. The Council did rather 
belatedly recognise that the Afghani situation was ‘causing a serious and growing 
threat to regional and international peace and security’118, but, as the preamble o f 
Resolution 1214 clearly shows, it was on the armed conflict in Afghanistan, and not 
on the discrimination against women, that this determination was based. Later, when 
Chapter VII measures were adopted,119 the Council again did no t use this opportunity 
to include a more pervasive condemnation o f  gender discriminatory practices in its 
resolutions and concurrently to adopt measures specifically targeted at improving the 
situation o f women. It is quite likely that, were a conflict between different factions 
no t occurring and were the Taliban no t accused o f  offering sanctuary to Usama bin 
Laden, the Security Council would have altogether abstained from intervening in 
Afghanistan, since the persecution o f women is arguably not perceived as likely to 
endanger peace, let alone to constitute a threat o f  the peace or breach o f the peace.
While this may make some sense from the perspective o f the existing legal framework 
regulating the interventions o f the Security Council and o f its established practice, 
from the point o f  view o f the human rights o f  women, it leads simply to a no win 
situation: so long as discrimination against women is not perceived by the 
international community as affecting vital interests and values, states will no t be 
prepared to react forcefully; so long as states do not react forcefully, no ‘threat to the 
peace’ or ‘breach o f  the peace’ can be said to ensue from even such widespread and 
systematic violations o f women’s rights as those occurring in Afghanistan. The 
response o f the Security Council will, thus, be one without ‘real teeth’ and the system 
o f collective security established by the Charter, which has been increasingly used to 
deal with gross violations o f humanitarian law and o f  some human rights, appears to be 
basically unavailable to women living under regimes practising sexual apartheid.120
118 SC Res. 1214(1998).
119 See supra note 96.
120 Sexual apartheid can be defined as
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The Security Council in a sense does no more than reflect existing value systems o f 
the international community, and it is exactly this intrinsic flaw that makes the 
intervention o f  the Council in questions related to the discrimination o f  women 
inevitably less vigorous than in other cases.121 It is also important to note that the 
existence o f  a relatively high threshold o f  acceptability o f  discrimination against 
women, as opposed to  other types o f  discrimination, on the part o f  the international 
community is evidenced by other factors.122 I t could be argued that the practice o f  the 
Council on other types o f discrimination, such as for instance discrimination based on 
religion (for instance, in China or Iran) o r language (for instance, in Turkey), has also 
been weaker than its action in the case o f racial discrimination, and that even racial 
discrimination has been predominantly interpreted in a restrictive manner generally 
limited to the context o f  colonialism and post-colonialism, and to southern Africa. But 
it must be emphasised that the persecution against women in Afghanistan does not 
represent an ‘ordinary’ case o f  discrimination.123 The type o f  discrimination that is
‘the oppression o f  individuals, and their exclusion from equal enjoyment o f human rights, on 
die ground that they are women. Sexual apartheid can be more subde than racial apartheid 
because the forms o f oppression are woven into the fabric o f  society. The agents o f  modem 
sexual apartheid consider the subordinate and domestically oriented role and status o f  women 
part o f the natural order, and assume women’s servitude as a condition o f  society itself Sexual 
apartheid is invisible to them, since they have no vision o f  how a society could function in 
which women exercised full political, economic, spiritual and related leadership in the same as 
men’ (R. Cook, The Elimination o f Sexual Apartheid: Prospects for the Fourth Worid 
Conference on Women’, Issue Paper on Wodd Conferences No. 5, American Society o f  
International Law (1995), at 3).
Paraphrasing the definition o f racial apartheid contained in Art 7 (2) (h) o f  the Statute o f  the 
International Criminal Court (signed on 17 July 1998, not in force), 37 ILM 999, sexual apartheid could 
also be defined as ‘a regime o f systematic oppression and domination’ over women.
121 On this, see Charlesworth, Chinkin, supra note 103. The factual determination based on Art 39 that 
undedies the use o f Chapter VII powers is traditionally considered not to be susceptible to judicial 
review by the ICJ. On this point there was almost unanimous agreement in the Lockerbie case, die 
exception being Judge El-Kosheri. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bedjaoui, while recognising the non­
justiciability o f the Security Council’s determination under Art 39, commented that ‘no small number 
o f people may find it disconcerting that the horrific Lockerbie bombing should be seen today as an 
urgent threat to international peace when it took place over three years ago’; see Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom% Order o f  14 April 1992, ICJ Reports (1992) 3 at para. 21 (diss. op. o f Judge 
Bedjaoui). On the judicial review o f the acts o f the Security Council, see below at Chapter V.5(a).
122 See Charlesworth, Chinkin, Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, 85 AJLL (1991) 
613, at 634, who juxtapose the paucity o f  substantive reservations made to the Convention on the 
Elimination o f  All Forms o f Racial Discrimination to the plethora o f reservations entered by states to 
CEDAW, as further evidence o f this approach. See also Chadesworth, Chinkin, supra note 103, at 68, 
commenting on the list o f  human rights norms considered part o f  jus cogens in the Rcstament (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. On the bias o f jus cogens in the human rights sphere, see also: 
Alston, Simma, The Sources o f Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles’, 12 
Austral. YBIL (1992) 82.
123 Human rights law treats die different types o f discrimination ‘equally’, but it is in the area o f  
international criminal law that the gender bias o f  international law has become more manifest The
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practised, its systematic character, the fact that it results in loss o f  life ensuing, for 
instance, from the lack o f  access to health facilities, the central role that the 
oppression o f  women has in the ideological discourse o f  the Taliban government all 
suggest that the situation in Afghanistan is more comparable to that o f  apartheid in 
South Africa than to other examples o f  discrimination and persecution. In the case o f  
South Africa, the development o f  the concept o f apartheid and the progressive 
crystallisation o f  its prohibition and criminalisation under international law constituted 
a very powerful legal and political tool in the struggle against this form racial 
discrimination and oppression, but the case o f  sexual apartheid in Afghanistan has not 
thus far been followed by a similar movement within international law aiming at 
actualising ‘those values that international law seeks to promote and protect*.124
The Secretary General submitted various reports to the Security Council on the 
situation in Afghanistan, the first one on March 1997, five months after the Taliban 
forces had taken over Kabul.125 The reports o f  the Secretary General find their legal 
basis in his power to ‘bring to the attention o f the Council any matter* which may 
threaten international peace and stability (A rt 99 o f  the Charter), or they can be 
prom pted by a specific request contained in a resolution o f  the Security Council, or o f  
the General Assembly.126 It is important to point out that, although the Secretary 
General is one o f  the organs o f  the UN, its reports are in many respects a product o f  
institutional practice, in that it is the staff o f  the Secretariat and the UN missions in 
the relevant countries that provide much o f  the substantive work behind them,
Charter o f  the Nuremberg Tribunal (Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment o f the Major War 
Criminals o f the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 UNTS 280) only mentioned ‘political, racial and 
religious’ grounds o f persecution as underlying crimes against humanity, but this was also due to the 
specific situation that the Charter was addressing (i.e. the particular type o f racism and genocide 
practised by the Nazi regime). The Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court recognises 
apartheid as a self-standing crime against humanity - Art 7 (1) 0 .  But persecution on various grounds, 
including gender, can amount to a crime against humanity only in connection with other acts, such as 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment or other severe deprivation o f physical 
liberty, torture, and different forms o f  sexual violence — Art 7 (1) (h). Hence, institutionalised forms o f  
systematic gender persecution, not consisting o f  those acts, such as sexual apartheid in Afghanistan, 
may not constitute a crime against humanity under the definition o f  the Statute. On the other hand, 
with respect to sexual violence, both in the context o f war crimes and crimes against humanity, the 
Statute has made some important steps forward as pointed out by Erb, ‘Gender-based Crimes Under 
the Draft Statute for die Permanent International Criminal Court*, 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
(1998) 401.
124 This expression is by Judge Higgins (Nuclear weapons, supra note 33, at 592 (diss. op. o f  Judge 
Higgins).
125 In 1997: UN Doc. S/1997/482, UN Doc. S/1997/719, UN Doc. S/1997/894. In 1998: UN Doc. 
S/1998/222, UN Doc. S/1998/532, UN Doc. S/1998/913. In 1999: UN Doc. S/1999/362. In 2000: 
UN Doc. S/2000/1106, UN Doc. S/2000/875, UN Doc. S/2000/581.
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including the recommendations. In addition to reporting to  these organs, the Secretary 
General also convened meetings o f ‘concerned countries’, at which, however, issues 
related to women’s rights appear to have received limited attention.127
The Secretary General’s reports throughout 1997, while paying token attention to the 
violations o f  w om en’s rights,128 did no t link the provision o f humanitarian assistance 
to a particular stand on these issues, and did no t propose that the provision o f 
humanitarian assistance be made conditional upon respect for the basic rights o f 
women. This would no t have been a case o f  aid conditionality. In fact, the condition 
that is at stake here is that, for humanitarian assistance to  be provided, discrimination 
against women ought no t to extend to it. ‘Traditional’ conditionality, on the other 
hand, is a way o f  exerting pressure on states that violate human rights, making aid 
dependent upon improvements in their human rights record. In this case, instead, it is 
the Afghani Government that is making the continuance o f  the provision o f  
humanitarian assistance by the UN conditional upon the incorporation o f  
discrimination against women in such assistance. The suspension o f  humanitarian 
assistance in all those situations in which the principle o f non-discrimination could not 
be upheld in the provision o f  such assistance would have been a reasonable measure, 
but was never put forward. On the other hand, the UN did not hesitate to  suspend 
humanitarian assistance when the security o f UN staff was perceived to be at stake.129
To conclude on the practice o f  the political organs, it must be noted that the 
Economic and Social Council also intervened in the situation in Afghanistan. O ne o f  
its resolutions is particularly important since the Economic and Social Council called 
on the UN, N G O s and donors operating in Afghanistan to formulate and co-ordinate 
their programmes ‘in such a way as to promote and ensure the participation o f  women
126 On these reports as an instrument o f accountability, see Chapter V.4.
127 See, for instance, the letter o f the Secretary General to the President o f the Security Council o f 1 
May 1997 (UN Doc. S/1997/347), in which the Secretary General summarised one of these meetings. 
The question o f  gross violations o f  women’s rights received only one incidental mention in the second 
last paragraph o f  the letter ‘All participants voiced their distress at the continued plight o f  the Afghan 
people, with special attention drawn to women and girls’.
128 In the last two reports o f  1998 (UN Doc. S /1998/532, UN Doc. S/1998/913), the situation o f  
women receives hardly any attention in the reports o f the Secretary General. This may have to do with 
the fact that in May o f 1998, the UN had reached an agreement with the Taliban authorities (see infra). 
Later on, attention began to be given again to the situation o f  women with the last report o f  2000 (UN 
Doc. S/2000/1106) presenting some o f  the ‘issues o f  principle’ that affect the UN humanitarian 
operations in Afghanistan (at para. 52).
129 UN Doc. S/1998/532, para. 39.
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in those programmes, and that women benefit equally with men from such 
programmes’.130 In addition to its competence in the area o f  human rights and, more 
broadly, international economic and social co-operation (Art. 60 and 62 o f  the 
Charter), the Economic and Social Council plays an im portant role also by co­
ordinating the work of, making recommendations to, and obtaining information from 
UN specialised agencies.131
(c)The other two levels o f organisationalpractice: institutionalpractice and real conduct
The response o f the political organs can be criticised for having been belated and 
w ithout real ‘teeth’, and for having at times failed to give adequate attention to 
w om en’s rights in Afghanistan. However, the position taken by the General Assembly 
in its resolutions was ‘principled’, i.e. it was essentially based on the application o f  
current legal standards on non-discrimination. At the level o f  institutional practice and 
real practice, on the other hand, the adoption o f  a ‘principled’ approach towards the 
Taliban authorities was not taken for granted as the normal and legally mandatory 
course o f action. O n the contrary it was called into question, undermined, and 
eventually rejected. One consequence o f  this is that, in spite o f  the ongoing 
outrageous policies o f  the Taliban government, the UN involvement in Afghanistan 
has tried steadily to increase its involvement in Afghanistan.132
Before analysing the practice o f  the humanitarian programmes, it is important to refer 
briefly to the response o f  the UN human rights machinery to the events in 
Afghanistan. Even though Afghanistan is a state party to numerous human rights
130 ECOSOC Res. 1998/9,28 July 1998.
131 Does the ECOSOC Council in principle have the power to stop the provision o f  humanitarian 
assistance by an UN agency? In the case o f the specialised agencies, this question can be solved 
primarily by looking at the specific agreement between the UN and die specialised agency concluded 
under Arts. 57 and 63 o f  the Charter. In the 1960s the attempts o f  the General Assembly to stop World 
Bank and IMF from assisting Portugal and South Africa were not successful, as the Bank claimed that it 
was not bound by the resolutions o f the General Assembly. See D. Wiliams, The Specialised Agencies and 
the UN: The System in Crisis (1987) at 160 ff.; I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Charting World (1991) at 99 
f£. At any rate, these considerations may not be so relevant in the context o f  Afghanistan, where most 
humanitarian assistance is actually provided by UNHCR and by the World Food Programme (WFP), 
which were established by General Assembly resolutions and act under its authority and, subordinately, 
under the authority o f the Economic and Social Council.
132 For 1996, around 124 million USD were requested by the UN, in 1997 this figure stood at 133 
million, and in 1998 at 157 million and for 1999 a record 182 million were requested (available at 
http: / / www.reliefweb.int/fits / fin98a%.html). Inter-agency appeals are launched by the Secretary 
General, and they are normally followed by a resolution o f the General Assembly in which the 
Assembly calls upon all member states to respond to the appeal.
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instrum ents,133 it was no t from the treaty-based human rights organs that the Afghani 
situation received most attention. This is in part due to the intrinsic limits o f  the 
periodic reporting system, and attendant difficulties faced by these treaty-based organs 
in engendering an ‘emergency response’ to a human rights crisis. The Charter-based 
human rights bodies, instead, reacted more swiftly, in particular with the adoption o f  a 
num ber o f  resolutions by the Human Rights Commission134 and the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention o f  Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities. The language o f the 
resolutions o f  the Human Rights Commission resembles that o f General Assembly 
resolution 52/145. The resolutions o f the Sub-Commission are particularly interesting 
because they acknowledge the existence o f  discrimination in the provision o f  
humanitarian assistance,135 appeal no t to ‘extend diplomatic recognition’ to the 
Talibans, and urge commercial enterprises ‘to  refrain from entering into financial 
agreements’ with the Taliban regime until the end o f  the discrimination against 
women.136 The Special Rapporteur on human rights violations in Afghanistan, 
originally appointed in 1984,137 presented reports to the Economic and Social Council 
and, via the Secretary General, to the General Assembly.138
The institutional practice o f  the UN differs from that o f  the human rights bodies 
significantly. In the autumn o f  1996, faced with the introduction o f a policy o f  severe 
discrimination against women, the UN Office for the Co-ordination o f Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA) released a policy document containing guidelines on the work o f
133 Afghanistan is a party to the ICCPR and the ICESCR; to the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) (GA Res. 39/46 ,10  December 1984); 
to die International Convention for the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination (1965), 660 
UNTS 195; to the Convention on the Rights o f the Child, supra note 37, but it has only signed 
CEDAW. Afghanistan’s reports to all the Committees established under these treaties for monitoring 
compliance are all overdue (this information was available on the website o f  UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in June 1999 at http: /  / www.unhchr.ch/tbs / doc.nsf).
134 Human Rights Commission Res. 1998/70, 21 April 1998 (UN Doc. E /C N .4/R es/1998/70) and 
Res. 1999/9,23 April 1999 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Res/1999/9).
135 See, for instance, Sub-commission Res. 1998/17,21 August 1998, in which the Sub-commission inter 
alia took note o f  the ‘numerous reports dealing with the unprecedented and extremely difficult situation 
o f  women in Kabul and die other parts o f Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, in particular widows 
who cannot support themselves because they are not permitted to work or to benefit from 
humanitarian assistance, which is given only to men’.
136 Ibid. On the Sub-Commission’s response to allegations o f human rights violations, see: Eide, The 
Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f  Minorities*, in Alston (ed.), supra 
note 105,211, at 248-252.
137 ECOSOC Res. 1984/37,24 May 1984.
138 The most recent report was submitted by Special Rapporteur Mr Kamal Hossain to the Economic 
and Social Council on 24 March 1999 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/40). The situation in Afghanistan was 
also the object o f some attention in the reports submitted by the thematic Special Rapporteurs, for
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UN agencies in Afghanistan. This early example o f  institutional practice was 
characterised by a strict adherence to the fundamental principles governing the work 
o f  the UN and the provision o f  humanitarian assistance, such as die principle o f  non­
discrimination.139 This response changed radically as a result o f  a mission o f  the 
Department o f  Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to  Afghanistan in die spring o f  1997. 
The Report that resulted from this mission is an important policy document, on which 
the subsequent operational response o f the UN was based. This report is also a good 
illustration o f  how institutional practice operates and how human rights are diluted 
and even dismissed at this level.
The aim o f the D H A  mission was to devise a common approach for UN agencies vis- 
a-vis the Taliban authorities. After stating that ‘beyond its commitment to the various 
issues such as gender, the environment and drug control, the dynamic o f  the UN 
engagement in Afghanistan relies on a continuum linking the objectives o f  the UN 
Charter and internationally recognised human rights, to the practices o f  the agencies 
under the constraints o f  the field’,140 in a telling passage, the authors o f  the report add:
The question remains to determine if the development o f cooperation 
arrangements with the Taliban are worth the efforts. In our view, the UN 
system has no real choice. It has to invest reasonable efforts into promoting a 
substantive dialogue with the Taliban simply to manage the existing gap 
between their vision o f Afghan society, and the international standards to be 
respected. Furthermore, one should acknowledge the Taliban's impact on the 
political landscape o f Afghanistan, restructuring Afghan society on Islamic 
tenets and modelling a new identity for Afghanistan.
The UN system must relate with these phenomena, at a political and social 
level, even if, in some areas, it shall be only to  express its deep concerns. This 
approach should be undertaken in a constructive, rather than confrontational 
mode, to avoid harsh response from the Taliban. Pressures must be
instance by the Special Rapporteur on torture (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/38) and by the Special 
Rapporteur on Extra-judicial and Summary Executions (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68/Add. 1).
139 UN Department o f Humanitarian Affairs, Afghanistan Weekly Update No. 191,6  November 1996.
140 UN Department o f Humanitarian Affairs, Report of the DHA Mission to Afghanistan, 15 June 1997, at 
Introduction.
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maintained on the Taliban to allow, and participate in, constructive 
experiments in education and the role o f  women in society.141
The authors o f  the report examined three possible approaches that in their view 
represented the options available to the UN and humanitarian agencies in their 
dealings with the Taliban authorities. First, there is the ‘principle-centred’ approach, 
which aims at ‘making assistance conditional upon changes o f  policies that are in 
conflict with the UN Charter and internationally recognised norms and principles’. 
The other approaches envisaged in this document are the ‘tip-toe’ approach — 
‘attempting pragmatic experiments on the ground hoping for the development o f  a 
practical arrangement with the Taliban authorities’ — and the ‘community 
empowerment’ approach — ‘developing community capacity to act as counterparts to 
the UN agencies, in the margin o f  the authorities wherever possible’.142 According to 
the D H A  Report, only a combination o f  these approaches can ensure the success o f  
the UN involvement, but, judging from the final recommendations, the ‘principled’ 
approach seems to have been sidelined in the end. Indeed, the report recommends 
that ‘practical and realistic’ objectives for a common position o f  the UN agencies on 
gender be identified, and that a ‘UN team composed o f male and female expatriates 
should ... elaborate a set o f  practical objectives for UN agencies to sensitise the 
authorities on the implications o f their policies’. Would a similar recommendation to 
‘sensitise’ the authors o f a massive human rights violation even ‘sound’ acceptable 
when applied to other human rights violations, for instance to  those responsible for 
the ethnic cleansing in the ex-Yugoslavia?
But the m ost sweepingly dangerous aspect o f the recommendations o f  the report, and 
one that is reflected in the subsequent practice, is the reference to ‘practical and 
realistic* objectives. I t has already been observed by some authors and by human 
rights organisations that humanitarian action often resists talks o f rights and 
entitlements.143 Obligations and legal standards are perceived as ‘academic’,144 or as 
emanating from an ‘abstract, and sometimes dogmatic environment; centred on the
141 DHA Report, supra note 140, at 4.3.
142 DHA Report, supra note 120, at Executive Summary.
143 B. Harrell-Bond, Imposing A id  (1986) and, by the same author, ‘Hvunanitahanism in a Strait-Jacket’, 
84 (334) African Affairs (1985) 3. See also: African Rights, supra note 67.
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principles’.145 This is also the approach adopted in the D H A  mission report, which 
formulates recommendations virtually regardless o f  international legal standards. 
Subsequent UN policy documents confirmed the adoption o f  this approach in the 
Afghani context.146
The existence o f  different responses in the institutional practice o f  the UN and o f  
N G O s to  the sexual apartheid imposed by the Taliban authorities are revealed in the 
same D H A  report, but, regrettably, such principled practice remained isolated. In the 
early m onths o f  the Taliban rule over parts o f  Afghanistan, both U NICEF and WFP 
had decided to suspend the delivery o f  assistance, respectively education and food, 
when they realised that such assistance could no t be provided on a non-discriminatory 
basis.147 In the case o f WFP, its efforts were undermined ‘by the increased food 
assistance o f  other organisations, such as the ICRC, that took over some o f  its 
programmes’.148 Certainly, the failure to adopt a concerted approach based on 
principles strengthened the contractual position o f  the Afghani authorities who could 
then rely on some degree o f  ‘divide and rule’ o f  the different humanitarian agencies to 
ensure that their oppressive policies against women could continue.
Another im portant example o f  institutional practice is the report o f  the inter-agency 
mission on gender, which took place in November 1997 and was led by Angela King,
144 Morris, Trotection Dilemmas and UNHCR’s Response: A Personal View from within UNHCR’, 9 
IJRL (1997) 492, at 494. My own criticism to this view in: Veidirame, ‘Human Rights and Refugees: 
The Case o f  Kenya’, 12 J. Ref St. (1999) 54, at 75-76.
145 DHA Report, supra note. 140, at Introduction.
146 For instance, the Strategic Framework for the UN in Afghanistan (supra note 84), which states that 
‘the overarching gtal of the United Nations in Afghanistan is to facilitate the transition from a state o f internal 
conflict to a just and sustainable peace through mutually reinforcing political and assistance initiatives’ 
[emphasis in the text). Having formulated the main goal o f  the UN action in this fashion, and 
consistently therewith, it is then accepted in the same document that compliance with the principle o f  
non-discrimination in the provision o f  humanitarian assistance cannot be practically attained in the 
short term. Cassese has argued that
‘in the current framework o f the international community, three sets o f values underpin the 
overarching system o f  inter-state relations: peace, human rights and self-determination. 
However, any time that conflict or tension arises between two or more o f  these values, peace 
must always constitute the ultimate and prevailing factor’, (supra note 50).
It is important to stress, however, that Cassese’s observation is made in the context o f  inter-state 
relations. On the other hand, the argument that the UN involvement in Afghanistan has to be based on 
die pursuit o f  an agreement to end an internal armed conflict at all costs, including the sacrifice o f  
fundamental values protected under the Charter and under human rights law, would not find support in 
the values o f international community as understood by Cassese.
147 See also: Marsden, supra note 81 at 110-111 and 115. Among NGOs, Save the Children the Fund 
(UK) and MSF took similar stances.
148 DHA Report  ^supra note 140, at 3.4.1.
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UN Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement o f  Women.149 This report 
was very critical o f  the lack o f gender awareness and sensitivity in the UN system and, 
in particular, o f  the fact that "despite the attention paid to discrimination against 
women, and lip service to their importance in rehabilitation and development 
assistance, m ost programmes and projects ignore women at all stages o f their design 
and implementation’.150 While re-affirming the need for a principled approach to the 
question o f  humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, the gender mission recommended 
the adoption o f the field-oriented application as "the m ost fruitful way to implement 
the principle-centred approach’.151 The field oriented application was defined as a 
method o f  applying principles "within the context o f a practical, people-centred 
approach to assistance’, in which equality is seen as a "process’ to be interpreted also 
on the basis o f ‘circumstances and the creative implementation o f assistance 
programmes’.152 The gender mission, thus, rejected the strict application o f the 
principle-centred approach - characterised by the suspension o f  any assistance 
programme for which equal participation and benefit between men and women is 
prevented by the intervention o f  the local authorities - on two grounds. Firstly, it was 
arguably concluded that such strict application would be in contravention with the 
resolutions o f the Security Council and o f the General Assembly on Afghanistan, 
which had not explicitly allowed conditionality o f  assistance. Secondly, it was argued 
that the suspension o f  programmes, as a result o f  strict conditionality, would not 
benefit the Afghani population and, especially, the m ost ‘vulnerable’ groups, including 
many women.
In spite o f  some differences, both the inter-agency gender mission and the D H A  
essentially opted for the continuation o f  humanitarian operations in Afghanistan. To 
the extent that it allowed the suspension o f humanitarian assistance in certain 
circumstances, the report o f the gender mission adopted a more principle-centred 
approach than the D H A  report However, it still deemed a pure application o f  
principle both unfeasible and counter-productive. The interpretation given by the 
gender mission to the resolutions o f the political organs as preventing conditionality is 
questionable, particularly because, as observed, this is no t a real case o f conditionality.
149 Report o f  the Inter-Agency Gender Mission to Afghanistan, 12-24 November 1997, posted online 
by the Division for the Advancement o f Women.
150 Ibid., para. 50.
151 Ibid., para. 19.
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In addition, the argument based on the counter-productivity o f  the strict application 
o f principles only considers the short term consequences o f the suspension o f 
assistance, and overlooks long term consequences such as: the legitimation o f Afghani 
authorities by continued collaboration; the facilitation o f  their gender policies by 
allowing discrimination against women to be incorporated in the provision o f UN 
humanitarian assistance; the inevitable loss o f  credibility o f the UN as a prom oter and 
advocate for respect for women’s rights with severe consequences for future
• • • 153activities.
The real conduct o f  the UN vis-a-vis the gender policies o f the Afghani authorities 
was based on these reports. The most significant example o f  UN operational practice 
is the framework agreement between the UN and the Afghani Government, signed in 
May 1998. Under the nomenclature Memorandum o f Understanding between the 
Islamic Emirate o f  Afghanistan and the United Nations, this agreement contains 23 
provisions that deal both with the privileges, immunities and obligations o f the UN 
staff, and with aspects o f  the humanitarian operations o f  the UN.154 After giving 
token endorsement to the principle-centred approach by asserting that both 
Afghanistan and the UN ‘jointly commit that men and women shall have the right to 
education and health care and necessary development activities, based on international 
standards and in accordance with Islamic rules and Afghan culture’ (A rt 12), the 
Memorandum blatantly contradicts itself and reneges on these undertakings. Indeed, 
Article 13 states:
152 Ibid., para. 18.
153 An illustration o f  how these compromises on basic standards can have negative repercussions in the 
longer term is offered by research on refugee rights that I conducted in Kenya. There, the UNHCR has 
been in charge o f  an anomalous refugee status determination procedure following the Kenyan 
Government*s decision to suspend status determination. UNHCR’s procedure for determining refugee 
status fails to respect international standards, for instance by rejecting applications for refugee status 
without giving any reasons (Verdirame, supra note 144, at 58-59 and 75-76). At present the Kenyan 
Government is planning to resume its own status determination. Attempts by UNHCR to ensure that 
this government procedure is consistent with procedural standards are now dismissed by the Kenyan 
Government, which reminds UNHCR o f  its own dismal record o f compliance with these standards.
154 In his first report to the Security Council after the conclusion o f this agreement, the Secretary 
General summarised the contents o f the Memorandum as follows:
The agreement lays out codes o f  conduct for both the United Nations and local authorities, 
sets up a mechanism for joint collaboration and resolution o f  problems and deals in a 
preliminary way with gender issues. As a result o f the agreement, the United Nations decided, 
on 28 May, to lift the suspension o f its programme in southern and south-western 
Afghanistan. The United Nations and other humanitarian organizations look forward to 
improved understanding by the Taliban o f  their responsibilities towards humanitarian 
personnel to enable needed assistance to reach their own people (UN DOG S /1998/532, at 
para. 40; this report was presented to the Council on 19 June 1998).
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The Authorities and the UN will make efforts to increase the participation o f 
men and women in health, education — especially health education — and food 
security. Both parties acknowledge the economic difficulties and the specific 
cultural traditions that make this goal challenging. As a result, women’s access 
to and participation in health and education will need to be gradual [emphasis 
added].
This provision is a curious syllogism, or, rather, a paralogism. After the initial 
statement o f principle, which is in itself abridged by the significant omission o f words 
like ‘equality5 and ‘equal’, Article 13 affirms the existence o f  two obstacles (‘economic 
difficulties and specific cultural traditions’) towards the realisation o f  this principle. It, 
then, goes on to conclude that women’s access and participation will need to be 
gradual. However, ‘economic difficulties’ is a smokescreen, as available economic 
resources can in principle be distributed equally among men and women. The use o f  
‘cultural traditions’, on the other hand, serves an important legitimising function both 
for the Afghani authorities in justifying their sexual apartheid, and for the UN in 
justifying its role in Afghanistan. Underlying ‘specific cultural traditions’ there is a mis­
representation o f  culture as an ‘essentialist and homogenous body’.155 This 
representation o f  culture as an immutable monolith conceals the frequent co-existence 
o f different, even conflicting, interpretations o f fundamental norms within a culture, 
as well as the fact that the prevalence o f  one interpretation over the other is 
contingent upon changeable internal and external factors.
Even in regard to the treatment o f  UN women employees, this agreement allows for 
discrimination. The Afghani authorities were not prepared to treat ‘female Muslim 
staff o f the UN like other UN staff, in particular on the question o f their freedom o f  
movement. According to the Taliban’s interpretation o f the Sharia, Muslim women 
have to be accompanied by mabram (a male member o f  the family, usually the 
husband, father or brother). Under Article 11 o f  the Memorandum, the possibility to 
treat Muslim women employees o f the UN differently was implicitly recognised. 
Indeed, under this provision Afghanistan’s obligation is simply ‘to be ready to discuss 
with religious scholars from Islamic countries the movement o f  international female
155 N. Yuval-Davis Gender and Nation (1997) at 38.
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Muslim staff o f  the UN who are not accompanied by Mahram in order to reach a 
solution in accordance with Sharia’.
Various humanitarian N G O s working in Afghanistan were critical o f  this agreement, 
and o f the way it dealt with women.156 Probably due to the absence o f international 
lawyers on the field working for these N G O s, who can help them articulate this 
criticism in legal terms, these critiques were essentially formulated in the soft language 
o f policy rather than in more imperative legal terms.
W hat is the legal nature and what are the effects o f the Memorandum o f 
Understanding between the UN and the Afghan government singed in May 1998? 
Treaties between international organisations and states are governed, mutatis mutandis, 
by the law that applies to treaties between states.157 No specific form is requested for 
the valid conclusion o f  a treaty,158 and, thus, in order to determine if the Memorandum 
constitutes a treaty, or is o f  a legally non-binding nature, primary regard must be given 
to the real intention o f  the parties. In doing so, it is important to take into account the 
recent decision o f the ICJ in the Q atar v. Bahrain case, in which the Court held that the 
minutes o f  a meeting were a treaty in spite o f  the clear lack o f intent to enter into a 
treaty by at least one o f the parties.159 The legally binding nature o f  the Memorandum
156 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999 (1999) at 164. Physicians for Human Rights, Report on 
Afghanistan, released on 5 August 1998. MSF was expelled from Afghanistan in July 1998, partly as a 
result o f its tougher stance on non-discrimination. In a press release on the day o f  its expulsion, MSF 
once again voiced its criticism o f the agreement between die UN and the Taliban: This accord left such 
principles as non-discrimination wide open to interpretation. The failure o f the UN to take a stronger 
position is disappointing. The memorandum considerably weakened the position o f NGOs, which 
found themselves on the front line o f  having to defend humanitarian principles abandoned by the UN* 
(MSF, Press release o f 21 July 1998, available on http://www.msf.org/pressrel/kabull.htm. June 1998).
157 Jennings and Watts, supra note 31 at 1220. The Vienna Convention on the Treaties between States 
and International Organisations or between International Organisations (1986), 25 ILM 543, not yet in 
force [hereinafter the Vienna Convention on Treaties between States and International Organisations’], 
was based on the Draft Articles prepared by the International Law Commission, but has not yet entered 
into force. See also: Gaja, *A ‘New’ Vienna Convention on Treaties between States and International 
Organisations and between International Organisations: A Critical Commentary’, 58 BYBIL (1987) 235; 
Morgenstem, The Convention on the Law o f Treaties between States and International Organisations 
or between International Organisations’, in Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Lam at a Time of Perplexity 
(1989) 435.
158 From the notorious 'Ihlen Declaration’ - Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 
(1924) PCIJ Reports Series A /B , No. 53 — to the joint communique at the end o f  a meeting between 
two Prime Ministers — Aegean Sea Continental Shelf fGreece v. Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1978) 3 - to 
the so-called Doha Minutes -  the object o f the Qatar v. Bahrain case, infra note 159, international law 
knows o f numerous examples o f  agreements that were concluded very informally and that still 
constituted treaties.
159 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment 
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports (1995) 6. On this case and on the broader question o f  non­
binding agreements, see: Chinkin, ‘A Mirage in the Sand? Distinguishing between Binding and Non-
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o f Understanding between the UN and the Afghan Government seems to be 
unquestionable and results from the wording o f  the Memorandum, its object, and, 
most importantly, from the clear intention o f  the parties. As far as the UN is 
concerned, its intention to enter into a legally biding agreement governed by 
international law is also manifest in the above-mentioned report o f  the Secretary 
General to the Security Council that treats this Memorandum as a treaty.160
The power o f  the UN to enter into a treaty o f  the kind in question appears 
uncontroversial. The treaty-making powers o f an international organisation derive 
from the type and scope o f  its legal personality. Indeed, according to Article 6 o f the 
Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties between States and International 
Organisations and between International Organisations, ‘the capacity o f an 
international organisation to conclude treaties is governed by the rules o f that 
organisation’, defined, under this Convention, so as to include ‘the constituent 
instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with them, and 
established practice o f the organisation’ (Art. 2). In UN practice, framework 
agreements for the provision o f humanitarian assistance are normally concluded with 
the host state both by the UN as a whole and by its agencies and programmes 
separately. There can be little doubt that the power to conclude such agreements is 
part o f  the functional legal personality o f  the organisation, resulting from the Charter, 
from resolutions o f  its political organs, and, last but no t least, from its established 
practice.161
As far as its validity is concerned, the Memorandum o f Agreement between the UN 
and Afghanistan constitutes a rara avis for international lawyers: to the extent that it 
allows discrimination against women to be incorporated in the provision o f 
humanitarian assistance, the Memorandum is simply void for conflicting with a
Binding Relations between States’, 10 Leiden J. Int. L. (1997) 223; Aust, The Theory and Practice o f  
Informal International Instruments’, 35 ICLf) (1986) 787.
160 In the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 
the Court considered various agreements concluded by Egypt and the WHO between 1949 and 1951, 
including one that carried the nomenclature o f Memorandum. While these documents could be 
‘regarded as distinct agreements or as separate parts o f  one transaction’, there was no doubt that they 
established a ‘contractual legal regime’ between the parties (ICJ Reports (1980) 73, at 92).
161 Another example o f treaties between the UN and host state in the framework o f  an intervention o f a 
different nature are the Status o f  Force Agreements, providing the legal framework for a peace-keeping 
operation. On the Status o f Force Agreements, see: Carievaris, * Recenti Sviluppi nella Prassi degli
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peremptory norm o f international law (jus cogens).162 The ju s cogens nature o f the 
principle o f  non-discrimination has been asserted by different authors, and can be 
based on various arguments, including the non-derogable nature accorded to non­
discrimination in human rights instruments, analogy with racial discrimination and the 
fundamental nature o f the standard o f non-discrimination as a principle underpinning 
human rights.163 In particular, if it is agreed that ju s cogens entails at least some human 
rights, it is difficult to imagine how gender discrimination — and, indeed, any type o f 
discrimination - could not be part o f it. In addition to non-discrimination, the 
imposition o f  gender barriers on access to health can cause loss o f  life. To the extent 
that such practices are endorsed by the Memorandum, this treaty is also in violation o f 
the human right to life, again viewed by many authors as part o f  jus cogens.164 One can 
add that, in signing the Memorandum the UN disregarded the resolutions o f the 
General Assembly and o f  the Security Council, which, as we have seen, were 
demanding an end ‘without delay* to discrimination against women in Afghanistan, 
but the consequences o f  the failure to comply with these resolutions are far from clear 
both internally and in relation to third parties.165
More than one year since the conclusion o f the Memorandum o f Understanding and 
in spite o f  the protest o f some N G O s, humanitarian assistance continued to be 
provided within the framework laid in the Memorandum.166 The Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights echoed the pragmatic approach, commenting that there is a need
Status o f  Force Agreements per le Operazioni di Peace-Keeping delle Nazioni Unite’, 53 Com. Int.
(1998) 667.
162 See supra note 103. The provision on jus cogens o f the two Vienna Conventions on treaty law is 
identical and, in both Conventions, is located at Art. 53.
163 See Charlesworth, Chinkin, supra note 103, who also refer to other authors who accept than non­
discrimination is part o f  jus cogens, and Alston, Simma, supra note 122. Even an extreme statist and 
consensualist approach to the question o f the status o f  the principle o f  non-discrimination in 
contemporary international law would find it hard to deny that at the very least this principle is part o f  
customary law.
164 Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimension o f  the Right to Life*, in B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), The Right 
to Ufe in International Taw (1985) 1, at 14-15.
165 Art 46, Vienna Convention on Treaties between States and International Organisations, states that 
‘an international organisation may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation o f the rules o f the organisation regarding competence to conclude treaties as 
invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule o f  fundamental 
importance*.
166 As an example o f more recent institutional practice confirming this approach, see the Strategic 
Framework, supra note 84.
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for the UN to adopt a ‘practical and workable policy’ on discrimination against 
women and girls.167
III.5 . C onclusion: Justificatory  A rgum ents
The case o f Afghanistan exemplifies other dilemmas that can accompany the delivery 
o f humanitarian assistance. Should the provision o f  humanitarian assistance have been 
suspended, given that continuing it required a compromise on such a fundamental 
standard as the principle o f  non-discrimination? Operationalising human rigjhts in the 
provision o f humanitarian assistance in extreme situations is bound to be an arduous 
process. However, allowing discrimination against women to be incorporated in the 
humanitarian assistance that is provided defies the very purposes o f such assistance, as 
well as one o f  the goals o f the UN. Principles and standards may be viewed as ‘almost 
academic in deciding action’ in extreme cases,168 ‘abstract and ideal’,169 but if 
internationally agreed legal principles and standards are not to be invoked in ‘extreme 
cases’ to offer guidance, what is their use?
In addition to their presumed ineffectuality, two more arguments are used to justify 
the UN’s failure to comply with these fundamental standards during humanitarian 
operations. Firstly, it is argued that the humanitarian imperative to save lives at times 
imposes the sacrifice o f other important principles. From a legal point o f  view, 
distress cannot be invoked as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness for violations o f 
rules of ju s cogens.17° As an ethical arguments it purports to derive the justness o f the 
humanitarian action from an ideal o f  commutative justice, that is from the exchange 
between one set o f rights and the other. Myron Weiner developed this position in the 
framework o f neo-Aristotelian ethics,171 which views the ethical process not merely as 
a deductive one, condemns the ‘tyranny o f  principles’,172 opts for an approach to
167 Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, supra note 138. In this report, the Rapporteur believed to 
have also ‘observed some relaxation o f the restrictions imposed on the rights o f women, as a few 
women doctors and nurses were seen at work in a hospital attending to female patients (at para. 21)’.
168 See supra note 144.
169 Cain, ‘The Rape o f Dinah: Human Rights, Civil War in Liberia and Evil Triumphant, 21 Hum. Rts.Q.
(1999) 265, at 297.
170 See Chapter II.6 (c).
171 Aristotelian ethics was based on the concept o f ‘practical wisdom’ (pbronesis), which, unlike ‘scientific 
knowledge* (episteme), does not involve universals. See A  C. Macintyre, Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? 
(1988) 92. On die ‘re-discovery* o f Aristotelianism in the ethical sphere, which in part results from 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics — H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (1989), see eg:. A. R. Jonsen, S. Toulmin, 
The Abuse of Casuistry (1988); C. A  Viano, Teorie etiche contemporanee (1990).
172 Jonsen & Toulmin, supra note 171 at 5.
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ethical issues that is flexible and circumstantial including both deductive and inductive 
elements, and is based on adaptable maxims rather than immutable axioms.173 But, as 
has already been mentioned, this ‘utilitarianism o f  rights’174 disguises the longer term 
consequences o f  the assistance so provided, and is based on an oversimplification o f 
the process o f humanitarian assistance, conveniently de-contextualised and portrayed 
as the quick act o f saving lives in the immediacy o f danger. This is evident in 
Afghanistan, where the policy o f  engagement has blatantly failed and the victims o f 
the Taliban state by now include not only women but also members o f  religious and 
ethnic minorities. Furthermore, both domestic laws and international law contain 
compromise solutions aimed at striking a balance between conflicting interests and 
principles. As far as non-discrimination is concerned, however, under current 
international law this standard, along with few others, is deemed so fundamental that 
no circumstances are envisaged in which its abridgement could be justifiable: it is, in 
other words, an absolutely non-derogable standard.175
The other justificatory argument, which is also echoed in the Memorandum between 
the UN and Afghanistan, is that o f  respect for local culture. This argument rests on 
the fictitious juxtaposition between the heterenomy o f human rights norms and the 
autonomy o f local traditions and cultures. Supporting the ‘autonomy’ o f cultures is 
presented as an intrinsically valuable and as the right moral choice.176 This purposeful 
oversimplification o f complex cultural meaning and multiplicity o f voices obliterates 
the socialfact that the women who were studying and teaching at Kabul University - 
where they constituted the majority o f students and staff - were as much part o f
173 Weiner, ‘The Clash o f  Norms: Dilemmas in Refugee Policies*, Paper presented at the Conference on 
the Growth o f Forced Migration, hosted by the Refugee Studies Programme at Wadham College, 
University o f Oxford, 25-27 March 1998.
174 See Robert No2ick’s definition o f  a ‘utilitarian o f rights’ as one whose ‘goal is... to minimise the 
weighted amount o f the violation o f rights in the society... even through means that themselves violate 
people’s rights’ in: R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) 30.
175 See supra note 103. Moreover, as already observed, the jus cogens nature o f  the standard on non­
discrimination also has consequences on the plane o f responsibility. In relation to state responsibility, 
Art 33 o f  the Draft Articles on State Responsibility excludes the use o f state o f necessity by a state as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness ‘if  the international obligation with which the act o f  the state is 
not in conformity arises out o f a peremptory norm of international law’.
176 Susan Sontag summarises Lem Riefenstahl’s work on the Nubas as a lament for vanishing 
primitives’ (in her essay ‘Fascinating Fascism’, collected in S. Sontag Under the Sign of Saturn (1991) 86). 
Sontag argues that the rehabilitation o f Riefenstahl since the 1960s as a result o f her wodr on the Nuba 
is in part due to the continuing appeal exercised *by the primitivist ideal’; hers is ‘a portrait o f a people 
subsisting in a pure harmony with their environment, untouched by ‘‘civilisation’” (ibid). Such laments 
for vanishing primitives’ indeed undedie the liberal’ defence at all costs o f cultural identities, 
simplistically construed, against the perceived aggression o f  external forces, including the human rights 
discourse.
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Afghani culture as those who at the same time were advocating different values. Far 
from being ‘culturally neutral’ intruders respectful o f  different traditions, international 
institutions in Afghanistan have, wilfully or not, intervened in the local culture and 
have lent their support to one interpretation against the other. And it need also be 
reiterated that, were this a case o f racial discrimination and were ‘culture’ (mis)used to 
justify the practice o f  racism in a given society, there would hardly be even an 
audience for this argument.
International lawyers are likely to be disconcerted by the failure o f a hierarchically 
superior body o f  international law to assert itself within the UN and to shape the 
operational practice o f the organisation. In addition, the effective dis-empowerment o f 
the key political organs o f the UN is another essential factor that can account for this 
rather baffling state o f affairs. In the case o f  Afghanistan, the resolutions o f the 
General Assembly went unheeded, and the terms o f  the Memorandum are in open 
contrast with them. How is it possible that the UN can develop a practice that runs 
contrary not only to international legal standards, but also to the position expressed by 
two o f  its political organs, at least formally, the two m ost powerful ones? A thorough 
answer to this question would warrant an institutional study into the functioning o f 
the UN, focusing on decision-making processes. In the case o f Afghanistan, a certain 
institutional practice o f the organisation, consisting o f mission reports and policy 
statements, played a central role in determining the final terms on which the UN 
continued its engagement in Afghanistan. In this case, there has been an effective 
regulatory failure o f the Security Council and o f the General Assembly for various 
reasons. First, there is no clear independent monitoring machinery to ensure respect 
with principles, as well as decisions and policies laid down by these two organs. 
Second, even if the General Assembly decided to take a more proactive role and to 
monitor the operational practice o f  the organisation on the ground independently, it 
would still find it difficult within the current structure to enforce its findings 
efficaciously and swiftly. Third, both the General Assembly and the Security Council 
rely on the Secretary General to keep them updated with developments on the 
ground. Such arrangement is infelicitous because the Secretariat is obviously at the 
heart o f the institutional/bureaucratic structure o f  the organisation.177 Fourth, and 
crucially, the reaction o f  the political organs o f  the UN, and their efficacy, depends on
177 See Chapter V.4.
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what they perceive to be at stake: in the case o f  Afghanistan, the resilience o f  a gender 
bias, as part o f  a male-dominated institutional environment and culture, played an 
undeniably material role. In order to understand the importance o f this aspect, suffice 
it to imagine the same situation as that o f  Afghanistan changing the type o f  
discrimination, from sexual to racial, the latter form o f  discrimination, even in the 
narrow interpretation given to it in the post-colonial context, being characterised by a 
higher level o f stigmatisation than gender discrimination.178
Finally, the development o f an institutional culture within the UN that, in the name o f 
an ill-conceived pragmatism, looks down on human rights cannot be ignored, and, in a 
sense, comes as no surprise.179 In fact, the essence o f human rights is to put 
constraints on the exercise o f power, still mainly identified as statist power. Those on 
whom constraints are placed are likely to express uneasiness, often in the hope to be 
able to act “boundlessly” . The development o f such an institutional culture has, thus, 
predictably accompanied the organisational growth o f  the UN with its undertaking o f 
operational missions on an ever larger scale. How a cosmopolitan and apparently 
liberal bureaucracy can end up being in practice less progressive on such a crucial issue 
as that o f gender discrimination than bodies composed o f  representatives o f states is a 
question that deserves an answer.
178 In die first phase during the Soviet invasion, there were also political reasons, i.e. the support o f  
Western countries for the mujahedeen, that can explain the decision to compromise at the operational 
level on what remains legally an absolute and non-derogable standard. At this point, however, the 
support o f the western countries for the Taliban is certainly no longer there.
Another interesting hypothesis on the basis o f the experience o f the performance o f UN agencies in 
Afghanistan and on the question o f  gender has to do again with institutional culture. Not only are there 
many women working for the UN, but, most remarkably, two o f the agencies in question (UNICEF 
and UNHCR) were headed by women during the events in Afghanistan, and yet a decision to 
compromise on gender discrimination in the Afghani context must have been supported by them. 
Institutional culture seems to enjoy a high degree o f resilience, and one that the physical presence o f  
women -  or members of other groups for that matter -  cannot alone undermine.
179 See, for instance, Sadako Ogata’s comments on forced labour in the context o f  UNHCR’s much 
criticised repatriation o f the Rohingyas to Burma: ‘Forced labour is an old tradition, it is something like 
a taxation, the poorer you are, the more often you are called in. I am not saying it is good or bad.... ’. 
Asked if forced labour does not constitute a human rights violation, she replied: ‘It depends on how 
you define forced labour and how you define human rights violation. I think it has to be understood 
practically in the context o f your community and their tradition, and then the limited choice these 
people have’ (Transcript by Burma Centrum Nededands o f the Press Conference o f  Sadako Ogata, UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, The Hague, 1 September 1998).
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CHAPTER IV
Violations of Human Rights in the Exercise of Effective 
Control over Territory by the United Nations
IV .l. In tro d u ctio n
It is axiomatic that human rights can be violated by the authorities that are in 
effective control o f  a territory and a population. I t has been recognised that non-state 
actors, such as de facto authorities and multinational corporations, can develop the 
functional capacity to interfere with the fundamental rights o f  individuals.1 In this 
chapter, it is submitted that, when the United Nations (UN) exercises territorial 
control, it can be responsible for violations o f  human rights. Firstly, this can happen 
in international administrations led by the UN. Although there are only a few such 
examples, it appears that the phenom enon o f  UN governance in post-conflict 
situations2 may become more frequent. Secondly, there are situations in which the 
UN assumes administrative powers in the absence o f  an act formally conferring such 
powers on the Organisation. An example is the exercise o f  ancillary administrative 
functions by the UN as part o f the provision o f humanitarian assistance in complex 
emergencies and o f  peace-keeping. Another im portant and problematic example, on 
which the second part o f  this chapter focuses, is the exercise o f  de facto administrative 
powers in refugee camps.
The first instance in which an international organisation ruled over a territory was 
Saarland, which was placed under a mandate o f  the League o f Nations at the end o f  
the First World War.3 The League’s administration o f  the Saarland was heavily
1 See, for example, Kadic v. Karadjic, 70 F.3d 232, in which the US Court o f Appeal for the Second 
Circuit found that the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb Republic was responsible for acts that might have 
been in violation o f  the laws o f nation, specifically acts o f genocide and war crimes. In Doe v. Unocal, a 
US district court held that multi-national corporation could be responsible for human rights violations 
in Burma (963 F. Supp. 880 at 892).
2 Matheson ‘United Nations Governance o f Postconflict Societies’ 95 AJIL  (2001) 76.
3 The League o f Nations had an administrative role in the City o f  Danzig on the basis o f the Versailles 
Treaty. However, its administrative functions in Danzig were far more limited than in Saarland. The 
resident High Commissioner o f  the League in Danzig acted as court o f  first instance in disputes 
between Poland and Danzig, while appeals were considered by the Council o f  the League, which 
could in turn request an advisory opinion from the Permanent Court o f  International Justice (as it did 
in Polish Postal Services in Danzig (1925) PCIJ Series B, No. 11).
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criticised4 especially because o f its support for the French attempts to ‘gallicise’ the 
overwhelmingly German population before the referendum on the final status.
The first UN administration o f  territory was established in West New Guinea (West 
Irian) in 1962-63 and stemmed from an agreement between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands.5 O ther examples in more recent practice are: the UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), based on the Cambodia Settlement Agreements 
and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 668 (1990);6 the UN Mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), envisaged by the Dayton Peace Agreements 
and then regulated by Security Council resolutions 1031 and 1035 (1995); the UN 
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium 
(UNTAES) established in 1996 (SC Res. 1037), which completed its operations in 
January 1998; the international civil administration in Kosovo since 1999 — UN 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) - under the terms o f  Security Council resolution 1244; 
and the UN Temporary Administration in East Tim or (UNTAET) under Security 
Council Resolution 1272 (1999).7 The provisional international administrations in 
Saarland and West New Guinea were entrusted with the organisation o f  a referendum 
on the final status o f  those territories, although in West New Guinea this referendum 
took place only after the end o f  the international administration and the transfer o f 
full administrative responsibility to Indonesia.8 UNTAC’s chief objective was also the 
organisation o f free and fair democratic elections. UNM IK differs from its 
predecessors in that its main objective is no t the organisation o f  a referendum or o f 
elections. UNTAET, established some four m onths after UNMIK, represents 
another novelty in institutional practice in that it was set up after a referendum on 
independence had taken place with a view o f implementing its results.
4 See Chapter I, note 85.
5 Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) (Indonesia-Netherlands) (1962), reproduced in 
57 s4JIL (1963) 493 [hereinafter ‘Agreement on West New Guinea7].
6 With Res. 718 (1991), the Security Council then decided to establish an Advance Mission in 
Cambodia under its authority.
7 See also SC Res. 1264 (1999) and Report o f the Secretary General on the Situation in East Timor, 4 
October 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/1024.
8 Arts. 14-19, Agreement on West New Guinea. While purportedly concluded to uphold West New 
Guineans’ right to self-determination, the terms o f  this treaty clearly reveal that it was no more than a 
face-saving instrument for the Netherlands, which had by then accepted Indonesian rule over West 
New Guinea. Indeed, the people o f  West New Guinea were given the opportunity to exercise their 
‘freedom o f choice’ after the Indonesia authorities had taken over the administration from the UN and
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International administrations are often based on a bicephalous constituent 
instrument: an international agreement between states (or an agreement between 
different factions within a state) on the one hand, and a resolution, or a series o f  
resolutions, o f  the Security Council on the other. Since the terms o f  these resolutions 
are often vague, resort to the international agreement for answering questions on the 
mandate and the powers o f the administration may be necessary.
The lack o f a formal act transferring governmental functions in refugee camps to the 
offices o f  the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at least in part 
accounts for the scant attention that the international legal implications o f the 
establishment o f  camps have so far received. The de facto nature o f  UNHCR 
administration in camps warrants a socio-legal approach to its study. The type and 
extent o f  administrative powers exercised by UNHCR car^ vary from one refugee 
camp to the other. In some cases, governments administer camps in conjunction with 
UNHCR, but in m ost situations governments play a marginal role or no role at all in 
the administration o f  the camps. In addition, administrative powers in camps may be 
exercised by UNHCR alongside humanitarian non-governmental organisations, which 
are often sub-contracted by UNHCR to deliver particular services.9
An important difference between refugee camps and international administrations is 
that the former are in a sense "beyond the rule o f  law’. They are established and 
administered in the absence o f a clear legal framework with little o r no involvement 
on the part o f  the administrative and judicial structure o f  the host country, and 
UNHCR and other agencies in charge make rules as they go along. A nother 
difference is that international administrations have normally been established 
following territorial disputes between states or in the context o f  competing claims to 
independence from, o r autonomy within, a given state. For example, in Kosovo, 
although the sovereignty o f  the Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia (FRY) over this 
province has no t been explicitly called into question,10 the status o f the province 
within the FRY and the extent o f its autonomy are still disputed. In refugee camps, 
on the other hand, with the im portant exception o f the camps for Palestinian
were thus in a position to influence, and even manipulate, the results o f  the plebiscite directly (Van der 
Veur ‘The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique’, 18 Int. Org. (1964) 53).
9 On NGOs in emergency relief, see: B. E. Harrell-Bond, Imposing A id  (1986) at 64 ff.
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refugees in the occupied territories, there is normally no dispute over the territory on 
which they are established and the nominal sovereignty o f  the host country is not 
subject to legal challenge.
IV.2. D e Jure .Exercise o f Effective C ontrol over a T erritory  by th e  U N : 
In terna tiona l A dm inistrations
(a) The precedents
In the practice o f  the League o f Nations and o f  the UN, international administrations 
have been established either by a treaty, subsequently endorsed and implemented by 
the Organisation, or by a resolution o f the Security Council. The Versailles Treaty 
regulated the administration o f the League o f  Nations in the Saarland,11 whereas the 
establishment o f  the UN’s Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in W est New 
Guinea (Irian) in 1962 was based on a treaty between the former colonial power, die 
Netherlands, and Indonesia. The UN administration in Cambodia, UNTAC, was 
regulated by the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement in Cambodia o f 
23 O ctober 1991.12 The terms o f  the international administration in Kosovo were laid 
down in resolution 1244, adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII, bu t the 
Statement o f the Ministerial Meeting o f  G-8, which paved the way to the adoption o f 
the resolution, has also been used for interpreting controversial provisions in the 
resolution.13
The UN Charter, like the Covenant o f  the League o f  Nations, contained provisions 
regulating the now virtually defunct trusteeship system (the old mandate system under 
the League). The system for the administration and supervision o f  trust territories 
established under the Charter (Chapters XII-XIII) pivoted on the Trusteeship 
Council, which had extensive powers including the examination o f  petitions from the 
inhabitants o f the territory in consultation with the administering state as well as the 
carrying out o f  visits under similar conditions (Art. 87). The Trusteeship Council
10 See, for instance, the Statement by the Chairman on the Conclusion o f the Meeting o f  the G-8 
Foreign Ministers held at die Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999, annexed to SC Res. 1244 (1999).
11 See Art 49, Versailles Treaty (1919), 225 CTS 188.
12 31 ILM 183 (hereinafter Paris Agreements].
13 The possibility o f  establishing an ‘international presence’ in Kosovo had been discussed before 
resolution 1244, most notably at the talks in Rambouillet (S. D. Murphy, ‘Contemporary Practice o f  
the United States Relating to International Law*, 93 AJIL  (1999) 628 at 629 ff.). See also Statement o f  
the G-8 meeting o f  Ministers, supra note 10.
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could also take ‘other actions in conformity with the terms o f  the trusteeship 
agreement’ (Ibid.).14
The constituent instrument o f  international administrations creates a legal framework 
for the mandate and the functioning o f  the administration. The vested powers entail 
the functional capacity to take decisions and commit actions in breach o f  human 
rights, although the extent o f  this capacity varies from one administration to the 
other. For example, in Saarland the authority o f the Governing Commission 
appointed by the Council o f  the League o f  Nations did not cover the exploitation o f 
/the m ost im portant natural resource in the region, the coal-mines. Under the Treaty 
o f  Versailles, the mines had been ceded to France ‘in full and absolute possession, 
with exclusive rights o f  exploitation, unencumbered and free from all debts and 
charges o f  any kind’ (Art. 45). The French also had troops, which could be used to 
restore public order.15 The Agreement on West New Guinea, on the other hand, did 
no t spell out the functions and powers o f  UNTEA, but included an obligation, to 
guarantee the rights o f the inhabitants, in particular ‘free speech, freedom of 
movement and o f  assembly’ (Art. XXII).16 These two administrations, however, 
operated in different historical contexts: the international administration o f  Saarland 
was one o f  the punitive conditions imposed on Germany for its responsibilities in the 
First World War. West New Guinea, on the other hand, like many territories in the 
late 1950s and 1960s, was going through a process o f  troubled decolonisation. The 
legal context was, in a sense, also different since by the time UNTEA was established 
the principle o f  self-determination had acquired central importance in international 
law. By rubber-stamping the Indonesian takeover, UNTEA could be accused o f 
having aided and abetted the commission o f  a wrongful act, i.e. the suppression o f 
the West Irian inhabitants’ right to self-determination.17
UNTAC’s historical and political context was that o f  the democratisation movement 
in the post-Cold War era. Unlike its predecessors, UNTAC assumed governmental
14 See the South West Africa cases: South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South 
Africa), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports (1962) 319 and Judgment (Merits), ICJ 
Reports (1966) 6; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notmtbstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970% Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 16.
15 Allot, Le Bassin de la Sane. Organisation politique et administrative (1924) 131.
16An international administration was going to be established in the Free Gty o f  Trieste in the 
aftermath o f  the war, but the city was soon returned to Italy.
17 See supra note 8. On international responsibility for complicity, see Chapter 11.6(a).
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powers over the entire territory o f  a member state o f  the UN. The Security Council 
did n o t need to use its Chapter VII powers to establish UNTAC. Indeed, the exercise 
o f  administrative powers was delegated to the UN by the Supreme National Council, 
‘a sui generis entity’ - itself created under the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political 
Setdem ent - which had been given ‘a special status’ by the international community 
‘in bo th  a Security Council resolution and the Comprehensive Political Agreement’.18 
Hence, although the constituent instrument o f  UNTAC is a treaty, the legal basis for 
the assumption o f governmental functions is a delegation from an autochthonous 
body. UNTAC’s primary goal was the organisation o f  free and fair elections. Its role 
in the electoral process was no t simply one o f  supervision or monitoring as UNTAC 
was empowered to legislate on electoral matters.19
Despite what appears to have been the assumption o f the International Court o f 
Justice (ICJ) in the Expenses case,20 some degree o f  territorial administration is 
exercised by the UN in the context o f  other operations, notably peace-keeping and 
Chapter VII enforcement actions. For example, under Security Council resolution 
814 (1993), which established the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), ‘UN 
entities, offices and specialised agencies’ inter alia had ‘to assist in the re-establishment 
o f  Somali police (...) at the local, regional or national level’ and ‘to assist in the 
restoration and maintenance o f peace, stability and law and order’.
The UN mission in Haiti represented another major operation in the area o f post­
conflict peace-building that involved a significant measure o f  administration. In 
particular, under Security Council 940, the UN was entrusted with policing and
18 Ratner, The Cambodia Setdement Agreements’, 87 AJIL  (1993) 1, at 10.
19 TJNTAC’s mandate thus surpasses that o f the United Nations in the four most recent instances o f  
UN control o f  elections: Namibia, Nicaragua, Haiti and Angola’ (Ibid., at 21). The UN’s mandate in 
the East Timor plebiscite under SC Res. 1236 (1999) was akin to that o f UNTAC. Namibia is an 
example o f success by the UN in difficult circumstances. Although the UN Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) ‘was not called upon to provide international administration in the fullest sense’, it 
did play ‘a key role in Namibia’s transition to independence’ and the elections were generally accepted 
as free and fair Q. G. Merills, International Dispute Settlement (1991) 200).
20 The Court said that the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East ‘should have no 
rights other than those necessary for the execution o f its function, in co-operation with local 
authorities. It would be more than an observers’ corps, but in no way a military force temporarily 
controlling the territory in which it is stationed’ (Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports (1962) 151 at 171). These observations may apply correcdy to UNEF, but not to other peace­
keeping missions.
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m onitoring functions.21 Since O ctober 1999, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) has performed administrative tasks, although there is a democratically 
elected government in place.22 An im portant feature o f  the international intervention 
in Sierra Leone is that British forces are not part o f the UN troops, although they are 
working to implement resolutions o f  the Security Council.
(b) The U N  Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (U NM IBH)
The Dayton Peace Agreement23 created an institutional arrangement for Bosnia- 
Herzegovina that is unique from, the point o f  view both o f  constitutional law and o f 
international law. The international community was assigned a special role in the 
implementation o f  the Agreement, especially through the Office o f  the High 
Representative whose task is 'to m onitor the implementation o f  the peace settlement' 
and 'to  maintain close contact with the Parties to prom ote their hill compliance with 
tlife civilian aspects o f  the peace settlement'.24 In addition, a variety o f  international 
Mlsiitutions currently operate in Bosnia, 'many o f  these with overlapping mandates'.25
The implementation powers o f  the High Representative have included legislative 
powers since 1997, when the Peace Implementation Council authorised him to 'issue 
interim laws when the national authorities are unable to reach agreement'.26 This 
expansion o f the powers o f  the main international organ in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
signals a failure in the process o f  building local institutions that are at the same time 
viable, and based on the rule o f law and on respect o f human rights. Indeed, whereas 
it had been originally envisaged that the international community, through its various 
institutions, would phase itself out, and that the administrative functions o f  UNMBIH 
would be progressively transferred to the Bosnian state, the opposite seems to have 
happened. David Chandler has argued that the main reason for this failure is that the 
Dayton Peace Agreement was based on the misjudged ‘assumption that democracy 
can be taught or imposed by international bodies on the basis that some cultures are
21 SC Res. 940 (1994) and Report o f  die Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, 15 
July 1994, UN Doc. S/1994/828.
22 SC Res. 1270 (1999). The mandate o f this Mission was later expanded under SC Res. 1289 (2000).
23 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [hereinafter Dayton Peace 
Agreement^, signed in Paris, 14 December 1995, 35 ILM 75.
24 Art 2, Annex 10, Dayton Agreement
25 Ni Aolain The Fractured Soul o f  the Dayton Peace Agreement A Legal Analysis', 19 Mich. J. Int. L.
(1998) 957 at 993.
26 Cox The Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Study o f Implementation 
Strategies', LXIX BYBIL (1998) 201 at 206.
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no t rational or civil enough to govern themselves’.27 He has submitted that these 
democratisation policies include a ‘regulatory and dis-empowering content’ hidden 
behind the language o f ‘rights protection, multi-ethnic governance, open media and 
civil society building’.28
W hether one accepts or rejects this political analysis, the experience o f  UNMBIH 
constitutes at least a legal oddity. International administrations are postulated on the 
premise that the UN, normally together with other international institutions, exercises 
administrative functions on a temporary basis, and in the process o f  transition to a 
new order in which the rule o f law based on state sovereignty will be restored. 
Therefore, the extent o f UN administrative powers normally declines over time, 
seldom stays the same, but, in principle, ought no t to increase.
The increasingly interventionist role o f  UNMBIH manifests itself in two principal 
ways. Firstly, whenever a key international policy goal is blocked within one o f  the 
institutions, pressure is brought to bear on the offending parties’.29 This kind o f  
intervention can results in a vicious circle: the Dayton Peace Agreement created a 
weak state but set ambitious goals; when these goals are no t met, the “frustrated” 
international community intervenes from above thus weakening the Bosnian state 
further. In addition to this surreptitious exercise o f power, the interventionist role o f 
UNMBIH has been made possible by the expansion o f  the powers expressly 
attributed to  i t  As mentioned, the High Representative can dismiss public officials, 
including elected ones — over 70 such decisions were taken between March 1998 and 
June 2001 -30 and can override legislative or administrative acts which he deems to be 
inconsistent with the Dayton Peace Agreement, including the central human rights 
com ponent o f the Agreem ent Cox has noted that these new powers o f  the High 
Representative can only rest ‘on an extremely broad interpretation o f  the High 
Representative's powers o f  interpretation under Annex 10’ o f  the Agreement.31 An 
interesting development is the possibility o f judicial scrutiny over the acts o f  the High 
Representative. Such possibility has been admitted in principle by the Constitutional
27 D. Chandler Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (1999) at 3.
28 Ibid.
29 Cox, supra note 26 at 214.
30 See www.ohr.int/decisions.htm.
31 Cox, supra note 26 at 214.
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Court o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina, although no act o f the High Representative had 
been declared unconstitutional by June 2001.32
(c) U NM IK and U N T A E T
The international administrations in Kosovo and East Timor are the most important 
to be set up by the UN since the establishment o f  UNTAC and UNMBIH. The 
constituent instrument o f both these administrations is a resolution o f  the Security 
Council adopted under Chapter VII, resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo and 
resolution 1272 (1999) on East Timor. Both administrations were initially established 
for a limited period, but the Security Council has regularly extended their term.
One o f the distinctive features o f  the Kosovo mission is the coexistence o f  a civilian 
component (UNMIK) with a security one - the Kosovo Force (KFOR) led by the 
N orth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). These two components — or 
‘presences’ in the language o f the Security Council - are mandated to ‘operate towards 
the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner’.33 KFOR is responsible mainly 
for the enforcement o f  the cease-fire, border-monitoring, the demilitarisation o f  the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and for securing public order and safety in order to 
facilitate the work o f  the international civil presence and the provision o f  
humanitarian assistance. The ‘international civil’ presence is responsible for 
‘performing basic civilian administrative functions’, including the promotion o f self- 
government and autonomy, the maintenance o f civil law and order through 
international police forces pending the establishment o f  a local police force, the 
protection and promotion o f  human rights, and the assurance o f safe and unimpeded 
return o f  refugees and displaced persons. Security Council 1244 envisaged that some 
o f  the responsibilities o f the ‘international security presence’ would be progressively 
transferred to the ‘international civil presence’.
The hierarchical relation between UNM IK and KFOR is unclear. Resolution 1244 
simply requests ‘the Secretary General to instruct his Special Representative to co­
ordinate closely with the international security presence’. In principle, the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII, could revise the terms o f  the security presence or
32 Request for the evaluation of constitutionality of the la w  on State Border Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case 
U 9/00  (3 November 2000). This decision o f the Constitutional Court is discussed at Chap. V.6.
33 SC Res. 1244 (1999).
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even decide its termination, but in practice there is no intermediate body that can 
actualise the legal authority o f the Council over KFO R in the implementation phase. 
The inter-play between civilian and military components is thus left simply to co­
ordination between actors on the ground, and to the nebulous regulatory framework 
o f  resolution 1244. As a result, the adoption o f  conflicting measures by UNM IK and 
KFOR is possible. An example is the establishment o f  the Kosovo Protection Corps. 
Under UNM IK Regulation 8, they have to include ‘at least ten percent o f  both active 
and reserve members from minority groups’ (Art. 2.1), but the Statement o f  
Principles signed by KFOR and the KLA provided that Kosovo Protection Corps 
would be ‘recruited and based on multi-ethnic non-sectarian principles’ without 
applying any ‘specific religious, ethnic or gender quotas’.34
In East Timor, the terms for the deployment o f  the Australia-led multinational force 
are set out in resolution 1264 (1999), while resolution 1272 deals with the UN 
administration. The responsibilities o f  UNTEA include the establishment o f  an 
effective administration, the development o f  civil and social services, and the 
coordination and delivery o f  humanitarian and development assistance. In East 
Timor, but no t in Kosovo, it is understood that the administration is mainly there to 
prepare the territory for independence, and indeed supporting capacity-building for 
self-government is indicated as another main task o f  UNTEA. A nother difference 
with Kosovo is that, since the withdrawal o f  the Australia-led multinational force in 
February 2000, the military com ponent that has replaced it has been part o f  U N T E A
Both UNM IK and UNTAET are given legislative and executive powers, including the 
administration o f the judiciary.35 In Kosovo, three main offices were soon established 
within the administration, the Police Commissioner, an Office for Civil Affairs and an 
Office for Judicial Affairs.36 Later, the Kosovo Corps were instituted as ‘a civilian 
emergency agency’ responsible for the provision o f  disaster response, humanitarian 
assistance in isolated areas, rebuilding infrastructure and de-mining.37 In East Timor, a
34 Art 3, Statement o f Principles signed by the Commander KFOR and a representative o f  the KLA, 
June 1999.
35 Report o f the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 
12 July 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/779, and UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1. On UNTAET: Report o f  
the Secretary General, supra note 7, and UNTAET Regulation 1999/1.
36 Report o f the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 10 o f Security Council Resolution 1244
(1999), 12June 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/672.
37 Sec. X UNMIK Regulation 1999/8.
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National Consultative Council, later renamed National Council, was instituted ‘to 
provide advice to the Transitional Administrator on all matters related to the exercise 
o f  the  Transitional Administrator’s executive and legislative functions’.38 A 
Transitional Judicial Service Commission was also set up to recommend candidates 
for judicial and prosecutorial offices and to advise on the removal from office o f 
judges.
Resolution 1244 and resolution 1272 did not address the question o f  the applicable 
law in the administered territories. A corollary o f  the recognition o f  the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity o f  the Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia is the obligation to 
continue to apply Yugoslav law in Kosovo. However, UNM IK must disregard local 
law if  it conflicts with human rights standards. In line with this approach, the 
Secretary General indicated that ‘UNM IK will respect the laws o f the Federal 
Republic o f  Yugoslavia and o f  the Republic o f  Serbia insofar as they do no t conflict 
with internationally recognised human rights standards or with regulations issued by 
the Special Representative [of the Secretary General]’.39 Indeed, the first o f these 
regulations provides that ‘the laws applicable in the territory o f  Kosovo prior to  24 
March 1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do no t conflict’ with 
internationally recognised human rights standards,40 with the fulfilment o f  the 
mandate under Security Council resolution 1244, and with UNM IK’s own 
regulations.41 Subsequent regulations have, however, provided that the applicable law 
is the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989, the date when the autonomy o f the
38 Sec. 1, UNTAET Regulation 1999/2; UNMIK Regulation 2000/24.
39 Report o f  the Secretary General, supra note 35, at para. 36.
40 Reference to the European Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Protocols is made in a number o f UNMIK documents, including in the oath to be 
undertaken by the members o f die Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointments (Art 
3, UNMIK Emergency Decree No. 1999/1). The Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia is not a state party 
to the European Convention, while it is a party to the International Covenant on Gvil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (1966), 999 UNTS 171, and to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966), 999 UNTS 3. It was thus appropriate that UNMIK subsequendy 
(UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 and 2000/59) and UNTAET from the beginning included reference to 
a broader range o f human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Convention on the 
Elimination o f all Forms o f Discrimination against Women (1979), 19 ILM 33 and the Convention on 
die Rights o f the Child (1989), 1577 UNTS 3. It is regrettable that, in countries where a great part o f  
the population has experienced exile, die Refugee Convention is not one o f  the instruments 
mentioned in these regulations (Convention Relating to the Status o f Refugees (1951) 189 UNTS 137 
[hereinafter ‘1951 Refugee Convention*]).
41 Sec. 3, UNMIK Regulation 1999/1. Before the appointment o f Dr Bernard Kouchner as Special 
Representative o f die Secretary General in Kosovo and the ‘normalisation* o f  the work o f  the interim 
administration, a number o f emergency decrees were issued by the temporary Special Representative, 
Mr Sergio Vieira de Mello.
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province was repealed; the legislation which entered into force thereafter can be 
applied on condition that the organ required to  implement it has determined that it is 
no t discriminatory o r otherwise contrary to international human rights standards.42
In East Timor, the Special Representative also decided for the continued application 
o f  ‘laws applied in East Timor prior to 25 O ctober 1999... insofar as they do no t 
conflict* with human rights standards, as it would n o t have been advisable to  create a  
legal vacuum by abrogating laws before new ones are enacted. Although the 
protection and prom otion o f  human rights did no t feature as one o f  the 
responsibilities o f  UNTAET under resolution 1272, the need for offering training to 
UNTAET staff in human rights and humanitarian law and the establishment o f  an 
independent East Tim or human rights institution were expressly mentioned.
Building and reforming local institutions is by far the biggest challenge for UNM IK 
or UNTAET, although in East Timor it is clear that this is part o f  a state-building 
process whereas in Kosovo there is still uncertainty as to  the final outcome o f  the 
process. In Kosovo, a Joint Advisory Council on legislative matters was appointed by 
the Special Representative and asked to  review legislation in force. A working group 
on criminal law began to prepare drafts for a new criminal code and for a code o f  
criminal procedure, although the opportunity, and even the legitimacy, o f  engaging in 
such wide-ranging legislating activity can be disputed. While a review o f legislation to 
ensure compliance with human rights standards is in keeping with Security Council 
resolution 1244, a systematic law-making process could go beyond the purview o f  an 
administration that is still in principle provisional. In addition, in spite o f the attem pt 
to include Serbs in the Joint Advisory Council, the Serb lawyers who had been 
appointed to  the Council participated only in the first meeting but, as a result o f 
continued insecurity, some o f  them appear to have sought refuge in the FRY 
thereafter.43
42 UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, and 2000/59. As a result o f the abrogation o f all legislation 
introduced after 1989, the applicable criminal law is currently based on the old Kosovo Criminal Code 
as opposed to the Yugoslav Criminal Code, although the latter makes provision far crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. See Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, ‘A Fragile Peace: Laying the 
Foundations for Justice in Kosovo’ (October 1999) Sec. II, a.
43 Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights ‘Kosovo: Protection and Peace-Building’ (August 1999) at 
note 17.
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The task o f establishing a multi-ethnic judiciary proved difficult in Kosovo.44 An 
Administrative D epartm ent o f Justice ‘responsible for the overall management o f  
matters relating to the judicial system and the correctional service’ was established in 
March 2000.45 Lay judges are appointed by the Special Representatives upon a 
recommendation o f  the Advisory Judicial Commission, which can also hear 
complains on their conduct.46 International judges and prosecutors have been 
appointed since the beginning o f 2000, although the regulation on their appointment 
and removal does not guarantee their tenure conferring on the Special Representative 
the power to remove them  at his discretion.47
I f  in Kosovo the main challenge is to modify existing judicial and administrative 
structures and practices in order to secure respect for human rights, in East Timor 
such structures have for the most part to be built from scratch. During the brutal 
occupation to  which this territory was subjected for over two decades no t only were 
hundreds o f  thousands killed, the iron fist o f the military also made the development 
o f  local institutions impossible. Poverty, the yet unresolved displacement o f 
thousands, and the activities o f the militias are other factors that make the process o f 
institution-building in East Timor one o f  the m ost difficult tasks ever to be 
undertaken by the UN. The Transitional Administrator has adopted regulations on 
the organisation o f  courts,48 on the establishment o f  panels with exclusive jurisdiction 
over serious criminal offences49 and on rules o f criminal procedures50 in order to 
break the cycle o f  impunity and begin to assert the rule o f  law. A difficult balance o f 
conflicting interests and needs has to underlie this intensive law-making activity: on 
the one hand, it might be appropriate to leave law-making to elected East Timorese 
bodies once these are established; on the other hand, there is a pressing need to put 
an end to the anarchy and to create a solid legal and institutional basis for 
independence. The election o f  a Constituent Assembly will solve this dilemma; the
44 For example, two o f  the six Serb judges appointed by UNMIK fled Kosovo before taking office. 
Report o f the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, 16 
September 1999, UN Doc. S /1999/987 at para. 32.
45 Art 1.2, UNMIK Regulation 2000/15.
46 UNMIK Regulation 1999/18.
47 UNMIK Regulation 2000/6.
48 UNTAET 2000/11.
49 UNTAET 2000/15.
50 UNTAET 2000/30.
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Transitional Administrator has now adopted legislation to regulate the electoral 
process and to define the powers o f  the Assembly.51
In Kosovo, pending the adoption o f a constitutional framework expected some time 
in 20t)l, a Joint Interim Administrative Structure has been in place since January 2000. 
I t comprises the Kosovo Transitional Council and the Interim Administrative 
Council both o f  which have an essentially consultative role. A t the local level, 
municipal boards are headed by a UNM IK Municipal Administrator.52 In addition to 
these fledgling local institutions, UNM IK — including other UN agencies, the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European 
Union (EU) -53 KFOR, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) all exercise 
administrative powers in Kosovo, whether on a de facto or on a de jure basis.54 Finally, 
although Security Council resolution 1244 did no t confer an administrative role on 
the KLA, in the early months KLA appointed administrators acted as ‘a de facto 
government’.55 The civilian administration is under the authority o f  the Special 
Representative,56 but in practice different UN agencies and humanitarian N G O s57 and 
offices often operate independently o f  each other. This is not simply due to lack o f 
co-ordination, but also to diverse modi operandi, to the often fierce institutional 
independence o f different international institutions, and, occasionally, to  internal 
rivalries. Humanitarian actors play a de facto administrative role since they provide 
essential services, such as shelter, water and sanitation, food aid, education, and decide 
on the allocation o f scarce resources, functions that are in many ways typically 
‘governmental’. After the initial chaos, N G O s are now the object o f a UNM IK 
regulation.58
51 UNTAET 2001/2.
52 UNMIK Regulation 2000/1.
53 The EU and OSCE are responsible respectively for institution-building and reconstruction.
54 To these one may also add, especially in the initial phase, the administrative and bureaucratic 
structure inherited from the FRY. There have been staff changes in this administration in order to 
address the ethnic imbalance o f the last decade o f  Yugoslav rule.
55 Lawyers Committee, supra note 42.
56 SC Res. 1244 (1999), at para. 6.
57 Humanitarian NGOs ‘flooded’ Kosovo in the aftermath o f the conflict. For example, several NGOs 
would often provide the same services to returnees in one region. UNHCR, which co-ordinated much 
o f  the relief effort, especially towards returnees, saw this as a mixed blessing: on the one hand, the 
availability o f resources and services was a much welcome change from other humanitarian 
emergencies, but, on the other hand, this proliferation o f  humanitarian actors also resulted in wasteful 
use o f  resources, lack o f  a co-ordinated policy and ‘amateurish’ interventions.
58 UNMIK Regulation 1999/22.
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IV.3. H u m an  R igh ts in  U N  A dm inistrations59
It is beyond dispute that the UN Vas intended to possess sufficient personality to 
exercise jurisdiction and control over territory’.60 Indeed, die Charter explicidy 
recognises that the UN may assume administrative powers in trust territories (Art. 
81). In addition, the wide powers o f the Security Council under Chapter VII include 
the exercise o f  governmental functions by the UN in the context o f an enforcement 
action against a threat to  the peace, breach o f the peace or act o f  aggression. The legal 
personality o f the UN to administer territory in administrations constituted by treaty 
(UNTEA and UNTAC) derives from one o f  its purposes — the maintenance o f peace 
and security (A rt 1,1).
As the experience o f  the UN administration in Kosovo shows, the identification o f 
the law applicable in the administered territory can be fraught with difficulties. The 
constituent instrument o f the administration normally contains some indication o f 
the applicable law, but general international law also needs to be used. Human rights 
law is o f particular significance, since human rights are by definition constraints on 
the exercise o f  power, and o f governmental functions. While the constituent 
instruments o f  recent international administrations have included human rights in 
their mandate, their language conceals the fact that the principal duty-holder o f 
human rights obligations in such cases ought to be the UN itself, as the entity 
exercising dejure control over the territory.61
Far from being a point o f purely academic interest, the question o f  the compliance o f 
UN administrations with human rights has been raised in the context o f the activities 
o f every international administration. As has been seen, the League o f Nations was 
already severely criticised for the ways in which it administered the Saarland in the
59 On the applicability o f  human rights law to the UN see Chapter II.
60 Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice o f the UK in the Field o f  International Law: Survey and 
Comment’, 5 JCLQ (1956) 405 at 411. See also Brownlie, I. Principles of Public International haw (1998) 
172-173.
61 Thus for example UNTAC’s responsibilities in the human rights area were ‘to implement a human 
rights education effort, to conduct general human rights oversight and to investigate and act upon 
human rights complaints’ (Ratner, supra note 18, at 25). However, while Art. 1 o f the Agreement, sup>ra 
note 12, guaranteed respect for human rights, it did not expressly mention that the corresponding 
obligations were incumbent on all authorities, including the UN. is accompanied by an obligation, 
incumbent on all authorities, to respect these rights. The human rights component o f  UNTAC had ‘a 
miniscule staff (one officer in each o f Cambodia’s provinces)’, M. W. Doyle, U N  Peace-Keeping in 
Cambodia: U N TAC’s Civil Mandate (1995) at 30.
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inter-war period.62 The experience o f UNTEA in West Irian in 1962-63 was also 
beleaguered by allegations o f  abuses o f human rights, in particular the right to self- 
determination o f  the inhabitants o f  West Irian, and their freedom o f  speech and 
association.63 UNTAC, on the other hand, failed to assert its control over the civil 
administration as foreseen by the Agreement on the Political Settlement.64 Violations 
o f  human rights, which continued throughout the UN mandate in Cambodia, were 
perpetrated primarily by the various factions; they can be attributed to UNTAC only 
to the extent that they resulted from institutional and administrative failures and, as 
such, might constitute a violation o f  the obligation to  ensure human rights.65 There 
have also been reports about actions in breach o f  human rights directly committed by 
UNTAC in the exercise o f its administrative and judicial powers.66
In Kosovo, it was reported early in the course o f  the mission that the human rights o f  
the Serb and Roma minorities were violated.67 The lack o f security was mainly 
attributed to the KLA, which, as mentioned, was assigned a key role by UNM IK and 
KFOR in the first months. The response o f  UNM IK and KFOR to these threats to 
the security o f  Serbs and Roma was often ‘belated and uneven’.68 As a result o f  KLA 
pressure and o f  the ethnic bias o f  the judiciary appointed and salaried by UNMIK, 
the right to fair trial o f Serbs accused has been reportedly violated.69 According to 
Amnesty International, delays in bringing detainees before the judicial authority are 
frequent, especially in the context o f  the unrest in Mitrovica in 2000.70 On at least one 
occasion, Amnesty issued an urgent appeal on the prolonged detention w ithout
62 See supra note 4.
63 Van der Veur, supra note 8, at 69-71.
64 Doyle, supra note 61, at 34.
65 Chapter 11.6(a).
66 For instance, Doyle reports that die first two prisoners to be detained by UNTAC in its prison ‘were 
held without habeas corpus and without trial’ {supra note 61 at 47).
67 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo’ (August 1999) 1.
68 In Osman v. UK (No. 23452/94), 29 EHRR 245, the European Court o f  Human Rights held that 
state parties might be held responsible for the violation o f the right to life resulting from the actions o f  
private individuals when they could and should have prevented their commission.
69 Amnesty International, ‘Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (FRY)/ Kosovo: Risk o f serious miscarriage 
o f justice in trial o f  Serbs’, Press release o f 20 April 2000; Lawyers’ Committee, supra note 42. See also: 
‘Amnesty and UN Staff Accuse Kosovo War Crimes Tribunal o f  Ethnic Bias’, The Guardian, 20 June 
2001 -
70 Amnesty International, ‘Setting the standard? UNMIK and KFOR's response to the violence in 
Mitrovica’ (2000). This power has at times been conferred even upon peace-keeping operations, such 
as the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC). In that case, a problem that emerged was the detention o f  
mercenaries. The position o f the UN was that mercenaries detained by its forces would be 
surrendered to the Congolese authorities only if  it could ‘satisfy itself ... that Government is able and
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charge o f  an Albanian activist.71 The trafficking o f  persons, especially o f women for 
the purposes o f  sexual exploitation, has prom pted the adoption o f  a specific 
regulation by the Special Representative to increase sanctions on human traffickers,72 
but the problem, which the existence o f a “sex market” for the thousands o f  soldiers 
stationed in Kosovo has only made worse, remains serious. At present, courts do not 
have jurisdiction over KFOR and UNMIK, and the only available remedy to potential 
victims is the ombudsperson institution, which, however, not only possesses limited 
powers but has also been given no jurisdiction over KFOR and its sub-contractors.73
In East Timor, the lack o f  security and o f  a fair and efficient criminal justice system is 
one o f the main human rights issues. As in Kosovo, the delegation o f  powers from 
U NTAET to the insurrectional movement - the National Council o f  East Timorese 
Resistance (CNRT), and to the former guerrilla army, Falintil - has at times resulted in 
human rights abuses. In particular, many individuals suspected o f  collaboration with 
the Indonesian authorities during the occupation, especially ‘members o f  the 
country’s Muslim, Protestant, and ethnic Chinese minorities’,74 have been targeted, as 
have some o f  the returnees from West Timor after being “screened” by the CNRT 
and Falantil. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘the U.N. police lacked the capacity 
and often the will to prevent such abuse’.75 Individuals responsible for the heinous 
crimes perpetrated during the Indonesian occupation, and in particular in its final 
weeks, have no t been brought to justice. Investigations were slow, and, with less than 
4 per cent o f  the local police force being made o f  women and only ‘a handful o f  
w om en investigators’, investigations on rape cases were almost ‘non-existent’.76
Patterns o f  human rights violations differ a great deal from one administration to the 
other, depending inter alia on such factors as the extent o f administrative powers 
vested in the UN, the size and effectiveness o f  the security machinery, the size and
willing to treat such personnel humanely’ and in accordance with Common Article 3 o f the Geneva 
Conventions (U N  Jur. YB (1962) 241).
71 Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International Protests the Unlawful Detention o f Afrim Zeqiri’, 
Press release, 12 February 2001.
72 UNMIK Regulation 2001/4.
73 On the UNMIK and KFOR’s immunities from legal process in Kosovo and on the ombudsperson, 
see Chapter V.4(d) and V.6(d).
74 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001 (2001), also available on the web at www.hrw.org. See also: 
Amnesty International, ‘East Timor: UNTAET, justice and refugees one year after the ballot* (August 
2000).
75 Ibid. (Human Rights Watch).
76 Ibid.
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presence o f civilian administrators seconded by member states,77 and the role o f  non­
state actors, including no t only N G O s but also insurgents. Acts o f UN 
administrations in breach o f  human rights can be distinguished based on the type o f 
obligation that has been breached. Hence, the administration can be directly 
responsible for a certain act in breach o f human rights standards, for example by 
arresting and detaining an individual w ithout formulating charges against h im /her 
promptly (obligation to respect). I t can also be responsible in certain circumstances 
for failing to ensure human rights in the territory it controls, for instance by 
conniving at the breaches o f  human rights by non-state actors, o r by no t taking 
prom pt action to  restore security and order or to adopt measures against violence 
against women.78 I f  the administration fails, on the other hand, to take steps that are 
necessary for the future fulfilment o f human rights, such as, for example, institution- 
and capacity-building, it could be responsible for a violation o f the obligation to fulfil.
The UN has an im portant role to play in post-conflict situations, as part o f  its 
broader functions in the maintenance o f  peace and security. In particular, the 
Secretary General has emphasised that the UN must work to prom ote and facilitate 
post-conflict peace-building - which includes ‘demilitarization, the control o f  small 
arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring o f 
human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development’.79 The 
assumption o f  temporary administrative responsibilities in a territory can be one o f 
way o f  fulfilling this role, but this should happen with the awareness that in this new 
role the UN administrations, like any other authority, have an obligation to respect 
human rights and to offer a remedy when a violation has occurred.80
It is important to emphasise that the challenges faced by the UN in these instances 
are enormous, especially since international administrations are normally established 
in territories that have been tom  by conflict and have witnessed gross human rights 
violations. Any administrator, state or international organisation, would face a difficult
77 In Kosovo and East Timor, the number o f  such administrators is considerable. British 
administrators have also been seconded to Sierra Leone as part o f a bilateral agreement between the 
UK and Sierra Leone, although UNAMSIL is primarily a peacekeeping operation.
78 On the different types o f  wrongful acts in the human rights sphere and international institutional 
responsibility, see Chapter II.6.
79 The Secretary General did not expressly mention international administrations in this listing. Report 
o f  the Secretary General on the Work o f  the Organisation: Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. 
A /50/60  - S/1995/1, at para. 47.
196
task in these circumstances. In addition, understaffing and lack o f  adequate financial 
resources have often undermined UN administrations. For example, in Cambodia, 
scarce funds and insufficient staffing accounted for the inability o f the human rights 
com ponent o f  UNTAC to have an impact on the exercise o f  administrative and 
legislative powers by all the different de facto and de jure authorities in control in 
Cambodia, including, to a limited extent, UNTAC itself.
An additional difficulty for the UN is that the agendas o f  states are often divergent 
with the mandate o f  a given UN administration, and the Organisation has to 
withstand constant attempts by states to interfere with its operations. Kosovo 
illustrates this phenomenon vividly. The UN civil administration works closely with 
the NATO-led ‘security presence’; the latter, although legally based on resolution 
1244, is still the expression o f a military alliance with its own agenda and methods. 
Similar considerations apply to relationship between the UN, and the European 
Union (EU) o r the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
The solution to such disputes should be found by applying the terms o f  resolution 
1244, although this is easier said than done. In practice, powerful member States 
often have the capacity to influence the conduct o f  the UN on the ground more than 
the legal mandate o f  an operation. In addition, the terms o f  the mandate, as is the 
case with resolution 1244, can at times be purposefully nebulous and leave a 
regulatory space o f uncertainty that can be easily filled by sheer political power.
Another problem is that the UN often lacks, no t only the resources, also the capacity 
and experience required for territorial administration, which is after all a function 
typical o f  states. Its assumption o f  administrative powers ought to be temporary and 
exceptional. Furthermore, the constituent instruments o f  international 
administrations make only oblique reference to the applicability o f  human rights 
obligations to  the activities o f  UN administrators. The assumption seems to be that 
human rights violations are committed by others and that all the UN can do is to 
train, to m onitor or to educate. The existence o f at least a risk o f  UN administrations 
acting in breach o f human rights should be clearly recognised; the UN administration 
should be explicitly bound by human rights standards; and individuals should be 
granted remedies against administrative, judicial or legislative acts o f  UN authorities in
80 In Chapter V.6. the question o f thd iihmunity o f the UN is discussed.
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breach o f  their fundamental rights. I f  the situation is such as to warrant derogation 
from some o f  the human rights standards, a system for permissible derogations could 
be instituted under the constituent instrument.81
Underlying many o f  the difficulties faced by UN administrations there is ‘the 
assumption that democracy can be taught or imposed by international bodies on the 
basis that some ‘cultures’ are not ‘rational’ o r ‘civil’ enough to govern themselves’.82 
This assumption is often shared by international N G O s and foreign observers. The 
belief that ‘a transitional lack o f  sovereignty and the denial o f  self-government’ is 
necessary in these situations underpins the establishment o f  these UN 
‘protectorates’.83 While it may be too early to draw conclusions on the long-term 
impact o f  the UN interventions in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, it 
does appear that these administrations have too often been characterised by the 
exercise o f  effective control by the UN and by other international actors in a manner 
that is no t sufficiently accountable and respectful o f  the rights o f  individuals.
IV.4. D e Facto  Exercise o f A dm inistrative F unctions: U N H C R  an d  
R efugee C am ps
(a) The administrative structure o f refugee camps: perfect city* representations and 
dystopian realities
In the triptych o f refugee experience according to UNHCR, refugee camps are the 
central panel — flight being the first, and repatriation the last.84 In many, if no t all, 
refugee camps, the local offices o f  UNHCR exercise some administrative functions. 
Administrative, legislative and judicial powers are not formally transferred by host 
governments to  UNHCR either on the basis o f  an international law agreement 
between UNHCR and the state, o r on the basis o f  the domestic law o f the host state. 
In fact, the Memoranda o f  Understanding concluded by UNHCR (or by the UN) 
with host governments do no t normally provide a basis for the transfer o f 
administrative and legislative powers; as a rule they only entrench certain guarantees
81 It should reflect the law on derogations that is found in human rights treaties (Art 4, ICCPR), and, 
in particular, it should entrench the existence o f non-derogable rights.
82 Chandler, supra note 27 at 3.
83 Chandler, supra note 27 at 65.
84 Thus representations o f  refuses in UNHCR’s web site are normally based on this triptych (see, for 
example: http:// w w w .unhrr.ch/im agps/im ages.htm : and the online documentary on refugees in 
Mauritania, infra note 115).
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for the staff o f the UN, such as immunity from the jurisdiction o f  domestic courts.85 
Despite this, wide-ranging administrative and at times even judicial powers are de facto 
exercised by UNHCR in refugee camps.
N o single administrative structure is applied to every refugee camp. As a result o f  the 
protean nature o f  administrative solutions, the exercise o f  governmental functions by 
UNHCR in refugee camps does no t lend itself to  the same generalisations as UN 
administrations o f  territory established under a treaty or under a Security Council 
resolution. Furthermore, in most situations, ‘camp authorities’ also delegate some 
functions to refugee communities, the extent o f this delegation varying from place to 
place. The type o f  administration that is set up in a particular camp depends on 
various factors, including power relations between the humanitarian agencies on the 
one hand, and the host government and local authorities on the other; the location o f 
the camp and its distance from judicial and other authorities o f  the host country; the 
willingness or reluctance o f  local civil society to become involved in refugee matters; 
and the attitude o f the field offices o f the humanitarian agencies, and o f  UNHCR in 
particular. Finally, in a situation characterised by the lack o f a formal legal framework 
for identifying the responsibilities o f  different actors, personalities also end up playing 
an important, if  no t decisive, role.86 O n the other hand, law, both domestic and 
international, plays a surprisingly minor role in the assumption and exercise o f  these 
powers by UNHCR.
Defining ‘refugee camps’ can be problematic. There is probably some difference 
between refugee camps and other types o f  refugee settlements, such as agricultural 
settlements,87 although nomenclature is often misleading. For the purposes o f  this 
chapter, refugee camps are essentially defined, and differentiated from other 
settlements, in terms o f  their ‘separateness’. In fact, camps are instituted and 
administered as spaces separate from the legal and social environment o f  the host
85 A web o f  agreements between UNHCR and other UN agencies also exists. These Memoranda o f  
Understanding (MoU) regulate co-operation among various UN agencies involved in the same 
operation. The activities that are ‘typically addressed in MoU include, joint contingency planning, joint 
needs assessments, development o f standards and guidelines and sharing o f  information. Public 
information aspects and fund-raising issues, which can be o f  a joint or agency-specific nature, are also 
addressed’ (Executive Committee o f  UNHCR, ‘Memoranda o f Understanding’, UN Doc. 
EC/47/SC/CRP.51, at paras. 29-30). See also ECOSOC Res. 1995/56.
86 Verdirame, Human Rights and Refugees: The Case o f Kenya’, 12 J. Ref. .57.(1999) 54 at 54-55.
87 For example setdements for Sudanese refugees in Uganda, see Black, 'Putting Refugees in Camps’, 2 
FAIR (1998) 4.
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state. Although the degree o f  ‘separateness’ varies from one camp to the other, 
parallel systems for settling disputes and separate health and welfare structures are 
normally established in camps.88 In this sense, the lack o f  integration o f  refugees in 
the host country is not merely a consequence o f camps, but the very essence o f these 
institutions.
The following analysis is based for the most part on research conducted in Kenya in 
1997-98.89 The purpose o f  this analysis is no t to offer a full account o f  the findings o f 
that research, but only to highlight the fact that administrative powers are de facto 
exercised by UNHCR in refugee camps, and that, as a result, human rights can be 
violated in a variety o f  ways. The main camps in Kenya are Kakuma and Dadaab, 
which host, according to UNHCR, approximately 200,000 refugees.90 Kakuma, 
located in the Turkana province in north-western Kenya, hosts almost 70,000 
refugees, mainly Sudanese and Somalis, but including also some refugees from the 
Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic o f  Congo), and from 
Ethiopia. Dadaab, in Kenya’s North-Eastern Province, comprises three camps 
(Dagahaley, Ifo, Hagadera). Refugees in Dadaab are for the most part Somalis and 
Ethiopians, but also some Ugandans, including the ‘prophetess* Alice Lakwena, leader 
o f  the Holy Spirit Movement, a rebel movement active in Uganda in the late 1980s.
Refugee camps in Kenya are characterised by such a high degree o f  separateness that 
they are practically, albeit no t in principle, beyond the application o f  Kenyan law. In 
these camps, UNHCR and its partner N G O s exercise a wide range o f  administrative 
and judicial, or quasi-judicial and semi-judicial, powers. UNHCR’s primary roles are
88 When UNHCR and aid agencies are not present, this integration into existing local facilities and 
resources may occur spontaneously and a certain degree o f self-sufficiency may be reached by the 
refugee population in a relatively small amount o f time. Upon their arrival, UNHCR and the aid 
agencies swiftly introduced the ‘registration = food aid logic* accompanied by die establishment o f  
refugee camps (van Damme, 'How Liberian and Sierra Leonean Refugees Setded in the Forest Region 
o f Guinea (1990-1996)', 12 J. Ref. St.{1999) 36). See also van Damme, ‘D o Refugees Belong in Camps? 
Experiences from Goma and Guinea’ 346 The 'Lancet (1995) 360; and Harrell-Bond, supra note 9.
89 Some o f the findings o f  this project have been published in Verdirame, supra note 86, and will 
appear in B. E. Harrell-Bond and G. Verdirame Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism 
(forthcoming). On the Kenyan camps, see also: J. Hyndman, Geographies of Displacement: Gender, Power 
and Culture in UNHCR Refugee Camps (PhD Thesis, University o f British Columbia, 1996), now 
published as Managing Displacement (2000); Wilde, 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Why and How UNHCR 
Governance o f “Development” Camps Should be Subject to International Human Rights Law* 1 Yale 
H. R  Dev. L. 7.(1998) 5.
90 UNHCR's country information on Kenya (availabk on the internet in November 1999 at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/world/a£ri/kenya.htm). Estimates o f the numbers o f refugees living in a camp 
are notoriously unreliable. UNHCR’s own figures are normally based on head-counts, see below (b).
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supervision and standard-setting for its implementing partners, policy co-ordination, 
responsibility for the overall administration, and facilitating or securing international 
protection. Kenyan police are present in the refugee camps in Dadaab and in 
Kakuma, but, although there is no formal allocation o f  responsibilities, the 
involvement o f  the police in maintaining public order in the camp is as a rule 
negotiated with UNHCR or with one o f  the main implementing N G O s sub­
contracted by UNHCR, the Co-operative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 
(CARE) in Dadaab and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in Kakuma.
The presence o f  N G O s in camps — for the m ost part international humanitarian 
agencies — could prima fade be seen as providing checks and balances on the exercise 
o f  power by UNHCR. But N G O s are actually part and parcel o f  the power structure 
o f refugee camps. Normally sub-contracted by UNHCR for the provision o f 
particular services in the camp, N G O s’ dependence on UNHCR funding affects the 
already limited capacity o f  northern N G O s to respond to the claims and interests o f 
beneficiaries in the south.91 The Gramscian view o f  civil society as the ‘private 
hegemonic apparatus o f the State’92 is well-suited to describe the role o f N G O s in the 
administration o f  camps, bearing in mind that power in these institutions is no t for 
the m ost part exercised by the State but by UNHCR.
Kenyan law is no t normally applied either for solving disputes in the refugee camps or 
for punishing certain crimes perpetrated by refugees. Decisions, which can affect 
human rights, are taken “informally” either by the humanitarian agencies or by the 
‘customary courts’, 93 which apply the customs o f  particular communities as 
interpreted by those w ho have assumed power in exile. In the case o f  Sudanese Dinka 
refugees, who constitute the largest group in Kakuma refugee camp, it is the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) that has assumed this power.94 The ‘customary
91 On humanitarian NGOs, see Harrell-Bond, supra note 9, and, by the same author, ‘Humanitarianism 
in a Strait-Jacket*, 84 (334) African Affairs (1985) 3.
92 A. Gramsci, Quademi del Carcere (1977, edited by Valentino Gerratana, Einaudi), Vol. II, at 801. See 
also Chapter V.3.
93 The terms ‘customary court* and ‘customary law* are used with respect to the dispute settlement 
mechanisms and the substantive rules o f  traditional communities in Africa.
94 Thus the Dinka community have been allowed to establish ‘courts’ to solve disputes and to hear 
criminal cases concerning certain offences like theft, but also ‘customary* offences like adultery. 
During my first visit to Kakuma refugee camp in April 1997, a woman with mental problems and two 
children were the residents o f the prison facilities that UNHCR had built for the Dinka community. 
During a later visit to Kakuma in April 1998, Barbara Harrell-Bond found out that plans for a new, 
bigger and ’better’ prison were on the way.
201
courts’ are given some jurisdiction over criminal matters, although under Kenyan law 
state courts have exclusive criminal jurisdiction.95 The extent o f  criminal jurisdiction 
o f  these ‘courts’, or indeed that they should exercise any such jurisdiction at all, is not 
specified in any document. It is thus a de facto exercise o f jurisdiction, not simply 
endorsed, but also actively encouraged and funded by the UNHCR.
One o f  the obstacles to the involvement o f  Kenyan courts in the administration o f 
justice in the camps is the location o f camps. For example, the closest Kenyan court 
to Kakuma refugee camp is the magistrate court in Lodwar, some 100 kilometers 
away. The local magistrate, like the police, also depends on UNHCR or on N G O s for 
transport. In practice, the magistrate court in Lodwar tends to deal only with the 
cases o f  refugees ‘caught’ outside the camp in Lodwar, while on their way to Nairobi 
or while engaging in some business in Lodwar. These refugees are sometimes charged 
with ‘unlawful presence in the country’. Judicial access to the camps in Dadaab, some 
200 kilometers from Garissa where the closest Magistrate Court is situated, is 
compounded by poor roads and by the activities o f  bandit groups present in the area. 
However, to some extent Dadaab illustrates a different approach aiming at integrating 
refugee matters in the legal system o f  the host country. In fact, after international 
human rights N G O s had documented the widespread occurrence o f  rapes and sexual 
assaults in Dadaab in the early 1990s,96 the Kenya Chapter o f the International 
Federation o f  W omen Lawyers (FIDA) initiated an advocacy project in 1993 and 
prom oted the establishment o f  a ‘mobile court’, funded by UNHCR, which would 
periodically hear cases in the camps, particularly cases o f  rape and sexual violence. 
The ‘mobile court’ began to  operate in 1998 and dealt with a handful cases involving 
both refugees and locals.97 Despite the limited number o f cases it considered, this 
court constitutes an example o f  how humanitarian assistance to refugees can be used 
to develop local institutions rather than to create separate systems that engender
95 ‘Customary courts’, including the Islamic Court, have civil jurisdiction on matters related to divorce, 
dowry and inheritance (R. Kuloba, Courts ofJustice in Kenya (1997) 38 and T. Jackson, The Law of Kenya: 
A n Introduction (2nd ed., 1986) 23).
96 Human Rights Watch, ’Seeking Refugee, Finding Terror - The Widespread Rape o f Somali Women 
Refugees in North Eastern Kenya' (1993); African Rights The Nightmare Continues...Abuses Against 
Somali Refugees in Kenya' (1993).
97 The first case heard by the mobile court concerned a Somali refugee woman... accused o f  
assaulting a policeman who had tried to disrupt her small business in one o f  the camps. This did not 
bid so well for a court that was originally set up to deal with cases o f women victims o f rape and 
assault However, the woman was acquitted and the policeman received a reprimand.
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resentm ent in the local population, weaken local institutions and undermine the 
possibility o f  integrating refugees in the host society.98
Concepts o f  ‘indirect rule’ and ‘decentralised despotism’99 can be useful, mutatis 
mutandis, for representing the power structure and the administration o f  camps. While 
UNHCR relies both  on N G O s and on refugee leaders to administer camps, the 
transfer o f  power from  the administering agencies to the refugee communities, as the 
experience o f  self-management in Dadaab shows, is normally more apparent than 
real. In addition, the power o f the refugee leaders in the camps is negotiated with the 
administering agencies, and fundamental rights o f  refugees are often treated as 
exchangeable commodities in this process o f negotiation.
The negotiability o f  the human rights o f  refugees is a distinctive trait o f  refugee 
camps. In fact, the convenience o f establishing a viable administrative structure, at 
least in part reliant on the co-optation o f  refugee leaders, is deemed a worthy enough 
goal to justify the abridgement o f  the rights o f  refugees. In principle, however, while 
only a few human rights are absolutely non-negotiable,100 the negotiability o f  human 
rights is subject to strict limitations.101 Notwithstanding the existence o f  these 
prescriptions, in Kakuma refugee camp — for example - the leaders o f  the Dinka 
community, m ost o f  w hom  are self-confessed officers in the SPLA, have been given 
large powers that include, as mentioned, the exercise o f  criminal jurisdiction in certain
98 Harrell-Bond, The Experience o f Refugees as Recipients o f  Aid’, in A. Ager, Refugees: Perspectives on 
the Experience of Forced Migration (1998) 136 at 146-149 and 155-157.
99 The decentralised arm o f the colonial state was the Native Authority, comprising a hierarchy o f  
chief (M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism (1996) at 52). 
According to the colonisers, ‘the first step in building a regime o f indirect rule is to endeavour to find 
a man o f influence as chief, and to group under him as many villages and districts as possible, to teach 
him to delegate powers, and to take an interest in his ‘Native Treasury*, to support his authority, and to 
inculcate a sense o f responsibility* (Lord Lugard, cited by Mamdani, at 53).
i°° These are the non-derogable rights, including the principle o f  non-discrimination, the prohibition 
o f  torture, slavery and forced labour, the right to life, freedom o f  thought, conscience and religion, 
and the prohibition o f non-retroactive penal legislation (Art. 4, ICCPR).
101 That some human rights are ‘negotiable’ does not mean that they can be exchanged for any other 
good or value, or that any person can dispose o f them. On the conceptual aspects o f the negotiability 
o f  human rights, see N. Bobbio, L ’ eta dei diritti (1990) 39 f£ (English Translation: The Age of Rights 
(1996)). Human rights can be negotiated with other human rights when there is a conflict between 
opposing prescriptions, or when limitation or derogation clauses are applicable. For example, under 
the ICCPR, freedom o f  expression can be subject to restrictions, only if  these restrictions are provided 
by law and are necessary ‘a) for respect o f the rights or reputation o f  others, b) for the protection o f  
national security or o f  public order, or o f public health or morals’ (Art 19). In addition, ‘in time o f  
public emeigency which threatens the life o f  the nation and the existence o f  which is officially 
proclaimed’ (Art 4), States can adopt measures derogating from their obligations to respect and to 
ensure freedom o f  expression.
203
cases in breach o f  international human rights law as well as o f  Kenyan law. For 
UNHCR the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with the SPLA leaders is expedient as it 
facilitates the administration o f  the camp. In exchange for this, the agencies are 
prepared to tolerate the diversion o f some food aid to SPLA fighters and the forced 
recruitment and military training o f many refugees in the camp, including children.102
O ne o f  the m ost interesting case studies o f  the administration o f  camps is the 
introduction o f  ‘self-management’ in the Dadaab camps since 1995, which was 
observed at its inception by Jennifer Hyndman. Self-management goes hand in hand 
with the idea o f  empowerment, one o f  the m ost popular terms in humanitarian and 
development circles. In Dadaab, CARE International, the principal administering 
agency, devised a system aimed at redistributing ‘decision-making power by increasing 
refugee participation and decreasing the role o f  agencies in determining priorities and 
projects in the camps’.103 As noted by Hyndmann, this approach was conceptually 
flawed as it was based on the misconception that a ‘refugee camp can, or does, 
operate as a village or civil society, and employs community development principles - 
such as self-governance and democratic decision-making’.104 In addition, Hyndmann 
pointed out that the proposed transfer o f  power from administering agencies to 
community leaders would necessarily leave out the management o f  economic 
resources and would marginalise certain groups o f  refugees, especially women. In 
spite o f  these cautionary remarks, self-management was implemented in Dadaab.
Developments after Hyndmann’s departure from Dadaab proved that her criticism 
was correct. According to CARE and UNHCR, refugees had ‘wrongly’ assumed that 
self-management would involve a ‘progressive phasing out o f  the agencies’ and a 
transfer o f  power to refugees and their communities.105 W hen it became clear that 
power was no t actually being transferred, tension between refugees and the agencies 
began to soar. Furthermore, as a result o f  budget cuts in 1997-98, refugees employed 
by UNHCR and by other agencies had to be persuaded to continue working on a
102 The existence o f  these practices is confidentially admitted by NGO officials, but publicly denied by 
UNHCR (Interviews conducted in Kakuma refugee camp, March and July 1997).
103 Hyndman, PhD Thesis supra note 89, at 86.
104 Ibid., at 87.
105 Interview with Mr Hussain, Focal Point for the Implementation o f  Community Self-Management 
for CARE International, Dadaab, 29 April 1998.
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voluntary basis without receiving the so-called ‘incentives’.106 At a time when such 
difficult decisions had to be taken, the agencies re-claimed all the power that had 
apparently been transferred to refugee communities for themselves, and ‘self­
management’ was re-defined in a way that could no longer be threatening for them.
Hyndmann uses the Foucaultian concept o f  govemmentality107 to analyse power in 
refugee camps,108 observing that ‘UNHCR meticulously orders the field through 
exercises o f  counting, calculating, and coding refugees’, and often represents refugees 
‘as statistical and moral deviations’ in its official reports.109
Govemmentality is not the only tool in the array o f  concepts and analyses developed 
by Foucault that can help unravel some o f  the intricate features o f  camps. In 
particular - and in addition to Hyndmann’s observations - useful insight can be drawn 
from Foucault’s genealogical study o f  the prison and from his observations on the 
‘plagued city’. Foucault noted that the camp model is the basis for such apparently 
diverse social spaces as industrial towns, hospitals, hospices, prisons, re-educational 
centres, and that the underlying principle o f  the camp is the ‘spatial concatenation o f  
hierarchical surveillances’.110 In refugee camps, control over refugees is often achieved
106 On incentives, see (c). According to UNHCR and CARE International, there was no alternative to 
dismissing some refugees as a result o f  budget cuts. This downsizing o f  the refugee workforce in the 
camp was portrayed as a healthy process by NGO workers who claimed that ‘refugees would have a 
chance to learn about the realities o f life’ and would be better prepared for repatriation since ‘they will 
go back without a dependency syndrome* (Interview, supra note 105)... as if  dependency on aid and 
‘dependency* on a salary in exchange for work were the same thing.
107 Govemmentality is the capacity o f  power to order ‘across the boundaries o f  family and economy, 
public sector and private sector* (T. L. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (1996), at 133). 
Govemmentality is closely linked to the emergence o f  bio-power, ‘a technology o f power that does 
not exclude surveillance, but incorporates it and integrates it* (M. Foucault, tcBisogna Difendere la Societa” 
(1998, Italian Edition, Feltrinelli) at 208). Bio-politics is principally concerned with population ‘as a 
scientific and political question, as a biological question, and as a question o f power* (Ibid., at 212); at 
the outset, its ‘objects o f  knowledge and its objectives o f  control ... were ... birth, mortality and 
longevity* (Ibid., at 209). Such common practices o f  modem states as social security, individual and 
collective insurance, environmental regulation and the various forms o f  assistance are considered by 
Foucault offspring o f bio-politics.
108 Although Foucault never included refugee camps in his analyses o f  space and power, few 
institutions lend themselves to a Foucaultian analysis as well as refugee camps.
109 Hyndman, supra note 89, at Chapter VII ‘Reporting the Field*. Hyndman refers extensively to the 
UNHCR Country Operation Plan (1995) for Kenya as an example o f a UNHCR report in which 
govemmentality and technologies o f  surveillance transpire. In this report, UNHCR announced that it 
had ‘addressed the intractable problem o f discrepancies between feeding figures, registered numbers, 
and total populations, by camp site as well as by overall caseload and nationality, through physical 
headcounts and registration o f  refugees in the camps. These discrepancies are due to acts o f  refugpe 
sabotage*. Subsequent UNHCR Country Operation Plans — for example in 1997-98 — use similar 
terms.
110 M. Foucault, Sorvegliare e punire (1976, Italian Edition, Einaudi) at 188. For analysing camps, one o f  
Foucault’s most interesting writings is 'Of Other Spaces’, a lecture which he delivered in 1967 but did
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through such archetypical means o f  social control as head-counts.111 The 
controllability o f  refugees, and their powerlessness, is enhanced by their almost 
complete dependence for survival on the food distributed by the administering 
agencies.112 In m ost refugee camp situations, the humanitarian agencies corroborate 
this complete dependency by sanctioning the sale o f  food rations or their exchange 
for other commodities.113 These sanctions are also a way o f  preserving the 
fundamental ‘separateness’ o f refugee camps and their institutionalisation as 
administrative spaces forcibly isolated from the host community.
Representations o f  camps by the administering agencies are im portant — as is the case 
with any ‘self-representation’ o f  power — for comprehending how camps are 
administered. In strident contrast to the painful reality o f  encampment, there is an 
almost joyful representation o f the camp ‘as the utopia o f  the perfectly governed 
city... permeated with hierarchies, surveillances, controls, delegations, and 
immobilised by the functioning o f  a pervasive power which operates differentially on 
individual bodies’.114 Representations o f  the camp as utopia, as the perfectly 
administered city feature in various ways in much o f  the official literature o f  UNHCR 
and other UN agencies: in some cases, life in camps is represented as an idyll;115 and,
not publish until 1984. He distinguished between two main types o f space - utopias and heteropias - 
and spent some time analysing ‘heteropias o f crisis’ and *heteropias o f deviance* (M. Foucault, Archivio 
Foucault: Interventi, colloqui, interviste, Vol. I ll 1978-1985 (1998, Italian Edition, edited by A. Pandolfi, 
Feltrinelli) 307). See also: Diimm, supra note 107, at 34-46. Both utopias and heteropias are useful 
paradigms for analysing refugee camps.
111 ‘Head-counts’ are also expressions o f bio-power (see supra note. 107).
112 Harrell-Bond, supra note 98. In some cases, a higher degree o f self-sufficiency is reached in refugee 
camps, depending on their location and on the availability o f arable land. This is not the case in the 
refugee camps in Kakuma or Dadaab in Kenya situated in semi-desertic regions. In addition, the 
economy o f  these regions does not have industry or services in which refugees could seek paid 
employment The main source o f  income for some refugees comes from working for the agencies.
113 Food rations do not normally include fundamental items like milk. Refugees make 'rational choices' 
by deciding to trade part o f  their ration for other commodities that are not distributed. In his novel La 
Tregua (The Truce) (1971), recounting his experiences after the Red Army liberated Auschwitz, Primo 
Levi recollected that one o f  the first decisions he took after liberation was to sell bread in order to buy 
shoes: since without shoes he would not have been able to walk and look for food, he realised that 
sacrificing the little food he had was necessary for his survival in the longer term. Refugees have to 
make this sort o f  decisions in camps, but sanctions are imposed on them if  they trade or barter food 
rations, in some cases the ration card can be even withdrawn. UNHCR, and other humanitarian 
agencies, argue that they cannot allow the creation o f a trade in goods that are distributed for 
humanitarian reasons.
114 M. Foucault, supra note 110 at 216. Foucault referred these remarks to the plagued city.
115 See, for example, UNHCR’s online documentary Road to Refuge 2: Into the Sahara about a refugee 
camp for Tuaregs in Mauritania (http://www.unhcr.ch/witness4/III Stans/html/toe/toe sethtml): 
and UNICEF, Children of W ar Wandering Alone in Southern Sudan (1994), where it is also claimed that 
since they arrived in Kakuma camp the thousands o f Sudanese unaccompanied minors could ‘resume 
‘normalcy* again (at 21-22).
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in nearly all cases, the life o f refugees and events in camps ‘are reduced to a 
compilation o f  statistics’116 in order to  convey the scientific perfection o f  the 
administration. M ost poignantly, visitors in camps are also regularly treated to these 
utopian representations.117 In fact, as part o f  this induction and briefing upon arrival, 
they are usually driven around the camp in an air-conditioned four-wheel drive 
vehicle, with a UNHCR staff member as guide contentedly pointing to the well- 
ordered com ponents o f  the camp-mosaic and outlining its perfectly tessellated social 
structure.118 Such utopian representations could no t be more distant from the 
perceptions o f refugees — and o f  those visitors, and UNHCR and N G O  workers 
prepared to lift the veil o f  utopia — for w hom  camps are probably closer to 
dystopias.119
The mis-representation o f camps is a powerful lie that serves many purposes; no t least 
it causes any criticism o f camps directed at UNHCR to rebound.120 In fact, UNHCR 
and N G O  personnel will normally be prepared to  acknowledge that there are some 
tesserae in the ‘perfect’ mosaic that still need improvement, emphasising that they are 
striving towards realising the ideal o f the ‘perfect refugee camp’. Bio-political 
techniques o f  control provide UNHCR and N G O  officials with a precise and detailed 
list o f  minimum measurements in health, nutrition, shelter, etc that should be satisfied 
and by which the success o f  their operation will be measured. The camp 
administrators, however, will seldom question the underlying assumption o f  camps
116 N. Farah, Gifts (1999) at 194. Taariq, one o f the characters in this novel, writes an essay on aid to 
Africa in which he employs this expression.
117 Even the visits o f  the High Commissioner are carefully planned and imbued o f  utopian 
representations. They are carefully staged events, which resemble the visits o f  heads o f states: a show 
is organised with refugee dances and music, and she receives little presents by refugees.
1181 was often offered briefing and induction tours o f this kind. Controlling outsiders’ access to camps 
is an essential part o f  UNHCR’s rule. I was often told that I needed ‘authorisation’ from UNHCR to 
visit a camp in Kenya, although my research had been regularly cleared by the Office o f  the President 
and I had been authorised to collect data anywhere in the country. Expressions like ‘authorisation’, 
‘seeking clearance from UNHCR’, ‘detailed programme and purpose o f the visit* were commonly 
used. In Kakuma in July 1997, 1 borrowed a bicycle for transport so that I could be independent o f  
UNHCR or NGO *lifts*. I was told that I had to inform UNHCR about my movements every day and 
give them a programme o f my intended visits and interviews. On another occasion in the same camp, 
in March 1997, together with other researchers, we were denied ‘permission’ to visit the camp at night 
‘for our own security*.
119Camps are, for example, described as ‘an absolutely inhuman place... where people spend their days 
like prisoners sieged by wind and dust*, or ‘as a place o f great suffering where life stops’ (respectively: 
written testimony o f  KM, Congolese refugee in Kakuma, written on 27 April 1998; and interview with 
WG, Nairobi, April 1997, a Burundi refugee who ran away from the camp). See also James Appe’s 
short story ‘A Visit to Kala Settlement* (Flight and Other Stories (1987)) - at the end o f  the visit ‘you will 
breathe a sigh o f relief or pity*.
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(after all, who would no t like to live in the ‘perfect city?), and they will be unlikely to 
accept that there is something irremediably w rong with forcing individuals to live like 
inmates in segregated, isolated and highly regulated spaces, depriving them o f basic 
freedoms.
In this respect, the attempts in humanitarian circles to improve refugee camps by 
devising minimum standards that ought to  be respected in the establishment and 
administration o f  refugee camps — and in general in humanitarian emergencies - 
continue to  elude the main point, i.e. that encampment is a human rights violation in 
itself, and the starting point for systematic violations o f the rights o f  refugees. The 
reason for adopting humanitarian charters and minimum standards, such as the 
Sphere Project, is purportedly ‘to improve both the effectiveness o f  assistance and 
accountability to the stakeholders’.121 One o f  the proposed methods for improving 
camps is site planning and selection. UNHCR has already adopted guidelines on space 
requirement and planning,122 but the guidelines o f  the Sphere Project contain a wide 
array o f  even more precise and always measurable criteria that, according to its 
authors, will make a ‘good camp’ or settlement. These guidelines stress the fact that 
‘the social structure o f  the displaced population should be reflected in the planning o f 
the temporary settlement’ and ‘cluster planning should be used in order to support 
self-policing by the displaced population’.123
Although such proposals are often regarded in humanitarian circles as the way 
towards the establishment o f  a better humanitarian regime, it is argued that they are 
for the m ost part futile and dangerous. Indeed, international law already knows o f 
long and detailed regulations o f  spaces. In particular, the Geneva Convention III on 
prisoners o f  war contains an exhaustive, even obsessive, regulation o f  the 
confinement o f a human group in a restricted space. The Convention makes 
meticulous provision for every aspect o f the life o f prisoners o f war in a camp,
120 It can probably also explain certain attitudes among staff members, in particular the tendency to 
‘de-humanise’ refugees and reduce to statistical entities (See, for example, infra note 134).
121 Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (1998), Chapter I, at 
1. The Sphere Project is probably the most important current example o f a humanitarian charter. It is 
the result o f a collaborative effort o f different NGOs — including Oxfam, CARE, the International 
Committee o f  the Red Cross (ICRQ, Medecins sans Frontiers, LWF, Caritas — and departments for 
international developments o f donor countries.
122 For example UNHCR estimates that each refugee needs 45 squared metres, including ‘a small 
space for kitchen gardening’ (Ibid, Ch. V, at 33).
123 Ibid, at 32 and 35.
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including registration, hygienic standards, provision o f  food, clothing, underwear and 
footwear, frequency o f  health inspections, types and standards o f  shelter, religious, 
intellectual and physical activities, the wearing o f badges, correspondence, etc.124 The 
results o f  the Sphere Project bear a striking similarity to  the legal regulation o f camps 
for prisoners o f  war, and to this extent such endeavours are pointlessly replicative.
These approaches are dangerous because they end up promoting a treatment o f 
refugees - and o f  other beneficiaries o f  humanitarian assistance - that is au par with 
the treatment reserved to prisoners o f  war and that is essentially based on their 
encampment in controllable and accurately disciplined spaces. Since these approaches 
are believed to represent ‘good practice’ and the Vay forward’, the obvious needs to 
be reiterated: refugees, but also other beneficiaries o f  humanitarian assistance such as 
internally displaced persons, are legally entitled to a treatment that has nothing to do 
with that o f  prisoners o f  war. I f  an encampment-based treatment is proposed for 
refugees that is in all respects similar to the international legal regulation o f  camps for 
prisoners o f  war, something has clearly gone wrong, no t in the implementation phase 
o f  humanitarian work but in the thinking behind it.
This regressive soft law o f codes o f  conduct, o f  regulation and control, o f 
measurements and discipline — often originating from N G O s, and (alas) academics - 
constitutes one o f  the m ost serious threats to the refugee regime. D eaf to the 
perceptions o f  refugees and to the overwhelming evidence against camps,125 these 
endeavours aim at putting the finishing touches to the ideal model o f refugee camp, a 
Platonic form o f  eternal perfection for real camps in the perceptible world to 
resemble. They also encapsulate the tendency to reduce human rights to statistical 
figures, measurable — and thus controllable — entities. Glaucon’s polemical outburst in 
Plato’s Rtpublic should be heeded: after hearing Socrates explain which staples would 
be part o f  the diet o f  the dwellers in Plato’s ideal city, Glaucon remarks that the same 
approach and measurements could be used ‘if you were founding a city for pigs’.126
124 Arts. 21-76, Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment o f  Prisoners o f War (1949) 75 
UNTS 135.
125 Some o f  the relevant academic literature is discussed in Harrell-Bond, supra note 98.
126 Plato, Republic II in Plato, Complete Works (1997, edited by J. M. Cooper, Hackett), at 1011.
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(b ) Human rights in refugee camps127
Already on a prima fade basis, refugee camps constitute a violation o f one human right, 
freedom o f  movement. Owing to the dearth o f  socio-legal scholarship on refugee 
camps and o f  analyses o f  the functioning o f  camps as institutions, however, it is often 
wrongly believed that freedom o f  movement is the only human right at stake in these 
situations. Responsibility for such violations lies for the most part with the 
administering agencies, and in particular with the local offices o f  UNHCR.128
Both the 1951 Refugee Convention (A rt 26) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Art. 12) protect freedom o f  movement, defined as 
encompassing the right to choose one’s place o f  residence and the right to move 
freely within the territory o f the state.129 Under human rights law, freedom of 
movement is not a right o f  ‘citizens’, but a right o f ‘every individual’ (A rt 12, African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights) or o f  ‘everyone lawfully within the territory 
o f the Slate’ (Art. 12, ICCPR). A problem with viewing refugee camps as affecting 
exclusively the freedom o f movement o f  refugees is that freedom o f  movement can 
be subject to  limitations and to derogations in times emergency.130 For example, 
under Article 12(3) o f  the ICCPR, restrictions to freedom o f  movement which are 
‘provided by law, necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or 
morals or the rights or freedoms or others’ are allowed, and Article 26 o f  the 1951 
Convention contains a similar limitation clause. The confinement o f refugees in 
camps is often justified with scarcity o f  resources, a ground that cannot be easily 
subsumed under the permissible grounds for limitation under Article 12 (3). 
Furthermore, the establishment o f  camps has been shown to be uneconomical and to 
undermine local health and social welfare structures.131 Although national security is
127 The empirical data on the violations o f human rights in camps discussed in this section refer for the 
most part to refugee camps in East Africa. See supra note 89.
128 See Chapter 11.6(b).
129 See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15 (The Position o f  Aliens under the 
Covenant*) at para. 8; and Art 12, African Charter on Human and Peoples* Rights (1981), 21 ILM 58 
{hereinafter ‘African Charter*]. The ICCPR provisions are normally referred to in this chapter,
although some human rights feature in other human rights treaties, too.
130  .The derogability o f  freedom o f movement can in part explain why human rights organisations have 
not denounced the policy o f encampment. While probably recognising that camps represent an 
infringement o f freedom o f movement, confinement in camps is at the same time justified because o f  
difficult circumstances in host states (mass influx, problems o f public order, scarcity o f  resources). 
This approach ignores other human rights issues in camps. Another reason for the dearth o f  reports by 
human rights organisations on the situation in refugee camps is that an international institution rather 
than the state has primary responsibility for what happens.
131Harrell-Bond, ‘Camps: Literature Review’ 2 FMR (1998) 22.
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sometimes invoked for justifying the confinement o f  refugees in camps,132 the 
threshold set under Article 12 (3) is high, requiring a particularly serious threat to the 
security o f the state.
Although context is often used within a cultural relativist approach in order to 
undermine human rights, it is necessary to contextualise the acts o f UNHCR and o f  
N G O s in order to determine whether they am ount to  a human rights violation or 
n o t  Unless they are aware o f the importance o f  the context, observers can be easily 
misled into believing that particular actions and policies o f the administering agencies 
do no t actually constitute a breach o f human rights. The practice o f  head-counts and 
the case o f  a Sudanese refugee in Kakuma camp illustrate these points.133
Head-counts are periodically conducted by UNHCR no t only to determine the camp 
population, but also as a ‘revalidation exercise* to re-issue ration cards.134 The practice 
o f  head-counts is almost universally perceived as debasing and humiliating by refugees 
and refugees have often protested, at times violently, against i t 135 In order to count 
them, UNHCR places refugees in enclosures surrounded by barbed wire, where they 
are normally left to wait for many hours (this is to ensure that nobody is counted 
twice and receives two ration cards). UNHCR uses special ink to mark a part o f the 
body, normally the arm, to identify those refugees w ho have already been counted. 
The sign is only visible under fluorescent light and is indelible for twenty-four hours.
UNHCR maintains that refugees protest against head-counts, because they are trying 
to ensure that those carrying two or more ration cards will no t be discovered. This is
132 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Tanzania - In the Name o f  Security. Forced Round-ups o f Refugees in 
Tanzania* (July 1999). The same argument to justify encampment was given to me during interviews 
with government officials in Kenya (1997) and Tanzania (August 2000).
133 Harrell-Bond, Voutira and Leopold 'Counting the Refugees: Gifts, Givers, Patrons and Clients1, 5 J. 
Ref St. (1992) 205.
134 Another reason is that ‘maintaining reliable and accurate population figures and demographic data 
is to assure continuation o f  donors’ funding for the Programme’ (Presentation o f  Mr Malik in 
preparation for the head-count, Dadaab, 29 April 1998; Mr Malik is UNHCR’s senior regional 
registration officer, or ‘head o f the head-counts’). It is probably true that there is some donors’ 
pressure on UNHCR in this sense. However, far from challenging these perceptions among donors, 
UNHCR’s entire policy o f  encampment seems to reinforce them.
135 Protests against head-counts took place in both the Kakuma and the Dadaab camps in Kenya, but 
it is far from unknown to other camps: in Uganda, evidence o f  similar protest in Nakivale camp has 
been collected by Mary Byrne in Uganda (E-mail from Mary Byrne to me, 27-11-1999). I was also told 
o f analogous incidents in the refugee camps in Vahun and Kolahun, Liberia, hosting Sierra Leonean 
refugees, when I conducted a fact-finding mission there on behalf o f  the Lawyers’ Committee for 
Human Rights in July —August 1998.
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not a plausible explanation o f  social behaviour. Indeed, it is hardly conceivable that a 
mass protest would take place to protect the privileged few who have managed to 
obtain more than one ration card. O n the contrary, unfairness in rationing is likely to 
engender resentment or even revolt among the unprivileged ones.136 Why would 
refugees be prepared to protest in order to ensure a few extra rations for a few  among 
them, whereas they seldom stage similar protests about the poor quality and the 
insufficient quantity o f  food that is distributed to alB In Kakuma refugee camp in 
1996-97, refugees often complained that rations were grossly inadequate, but no 
organised protest took place, although malnutrition had reached preoccupying 
levels.137 The harsh measures taken by UNHCR on previous occasions to  suppress 
refugee protest may have deterred the organisation o f  a protest or a revolt. But 
another reason may need to be sought in the sociology o f  obedience and revolt. It 
has been argued that in different societal contexts revolts occur when there is a clear 
perception that a certain punishment or treatm ent is essentially inhuman, and that 
‘the punishments that are rejected vary in accord with varying conceptions o f  
humanity’.131
In order to understand why it is expressly against head-counts that refugees decide to 
revolt, it is necessary to  examine the significance o f  this practice in its socio-cultural 
context.139 Firstly, there is a strong cultural resistance among different groups to
136 Even inmates in Nazi concentration camps did not protect individuals who received bigger rations, 
and often reported them to the guards. Such episodes are recounted both by Primo Levi — SeQuesto e’ 
un Uoma (1986) (If This is a Man), and by Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart (1986). On social revolt 
originating frcm concepts o f  distributive justice, see: Barrington Moore Jr., Injustice. The Social Bases of 
Obedience and Vevolt (1978) 37 ff..
137 See Letter mbmitted by Dr Guluma to The Lancet, 4 October 1997, unknown whether published or 
not, on file  with the author.
138 Barrington Moore Jr., supra note 136 at 29. The proposition that conceptions o f humanity are 
historically determined and culturally variable does not entail an acceptance o f  cultural relativist 
positions. On the contrary, the existence o f notions o f ‘cruelty*, ‘inhumanity* and ‘pain* that are to some 
extent variable can contribute to fleshing out human rights norms when applied to different cultural 
contexts. For example, Talal Asad has observed that, in order to apply the prohibition o f  torture to 
different contexts, ‘we need ethnographies o f  pain and cruelty which can provide us with a better 
understanding o f how relevant practices are actually conducted in different traditions* (Asad, ‘On 
Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment*, in R. A. Wilson, Human Bights, Culture and 
Context: AnthrpologicalPerspectives (1997) 111 at 128).
139 But ithis wll not explain another, perhaps more interesting question: why do refugees not normally 
revolt againstbad and insufficient food in camps, or indeed against human rights abuses in camps? In 
order to answir this question, an ad hoc empirical investigation would be necessary. One reason for the 
lack o f revolt could be that claiming rights normally entails a risk for the individual, since it involves a 
challenge to he authorities. On the other hand, the benefits deriving from this challenge are not 
certain and, h any way, would only produce themselves in the future. In places where physical 
survival is imjerative, where there is no network o f judicial and institutional guarantees, and where the 
sheer prospect o f impartial justice appears remote, it can hardly surprise that most refugees decide to
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censuses.140 Secondly, the way in which ‘head-counts’ in refugee camps are conducted 
is particularly debasing: the fact that refugees are forced in enclosures ‘like catde’,141 
often have to wait in the scorching sun for many hours, and that the whole process is 
managed in a cold, impersonal and bureaucratic manner, creates a feeling o f 
humiliation. Thirdly, using markings on the body, albeit not indelible, adds to the 
feeling o f aggravation and debasement. For individuals who have already suffered a 
loss o f  social status and whom aid has made ‘powerless’, an imprinted symbol o f 
humiliation can feel unbearable, as a definite stigma. It is certainly no coincidence that 
the Geneva Convention IV explicitly prohibits ‘identification by tattooing or 
imprinting signs or markings on the body’ (Art. 100).142 Placed in its social and 
cultural context, the practice o f head-counts constitutes ‘a conduct o f  a certain level 
o f severity which lowers the victim in rank, position, reputation or character in his 
own eyes or in the eyes o f  his people’,143 or one in which an individual is ‘treated as an 
object in the power o f  the authorities’.144
The other example that illustrates the importance o f  contextualising the acts o f 
UNHCR is the case o f  Sarah Aruol, a Sudanese refugee woman in Kakuma refugee 
camp.145 To punish her for opposing the forced recruitment o f  her child in the SPLA, 
the local community leaders — who, as has been mentioned, are SPLA officers - 
condemned her to  ‘social ostracisation’: her friends and other Sudanese refugees in 
the camp were not to speak to her, no t to alleviate her daily hardships, and not to 
give her any form o f  social recognition or acceptance.146 There were also times when 
she was pushed to the end o f the queue for food distribution. H er attempts to bring 
her case to the attention o f  the camp authorities did not yield any results, and, after
acquiesce to the abuses and to poor food rather than revolt In addition, as is shown by the example o f  
the Ethiopian refugee who offered human rights education, UNHCR deals with any activity 
considered seditious in an expeditious and summary manner.
140 Such opposition to the idea o f  being counted is particularly strong among pastoralists (E. E. Evans- 
Pritchard, The Nuer (1969) 20), but it is not foreign to western societies. Censuses are also prohibited 
under the Jewish Torah (Exodus, 30,11-13).
141 Refugees interviewed both in Kakuma and in Dadaab used this expression.
142 Geneva Convention (TV) Relative to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons in Time o f War (1949) 75 
UNTS 287.
143 East African Asians v. UK (N o ., 3 EHRR 76, at para. 189.
144 7yrerv. UK, 2 EHRR 1, at para. 33.
145 Interviews with Sarah Aruol (not her red name), Kakuma, July 1997.
146 Ostracising, or threatening to ostracise women who defy gender discrimination is by no means a 
rare practice. Martha Nussbaum refers to an example o f  such ostracisation in Bangladesh (M. C. 
Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (1999) at 82). On the use o f psychological sanctions in traditional 
dispute settlement, see, for example, Kobben, The Cottica Dyuka o f  Surinam', in L. Nader (ed.) Law 
in Culture and Society (1969) 117 at 130.
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camping outside the UNHCR compound, she decided to leave the camp and risk the 
journey to Nairobi. When I discussed this case with the UNHCR field officer in 
Kakuma, I was told that nobody could be forced to help, or to be ‘nice’ to anybody 
else. I t would be difficult to argue that ‘social ostracisation’ amounts to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment in m ost social situations, but in refugee camps 
reliance on social networks and family ties is often indispensable for survival, 
especially for a single m other with three children.
(c) The imposition o f collective punishment and other human rights violations in camps
Perhaps the m ost blatant breach o f  human rights standards in the Kenyan refugee 
camps was perpetrated when the distribution o f food was suspended on two separate 
occasions in Kakuma, and, on one occasion, in Dadaab. In these cases, food 
distribution was suspended after refugees had protested against ‘head-counts’, and, on 
one o f  these occasions, against the introduction o f  a new method for distributing 
food.147 In Kakuma, UNHCR sent a memorandum to the leaders o f  the refugee 
communities, explaining that ‘incentives’148 would also be suspended and that their 
resumption would depend:
‘on the co-operation on the part o f  refugees during the re-construction o f  the 
destroyed facilities, recovering all the looted properties and providing the 
names o f  the culprits responsible for the damages. This will be evaluated by 
my office and our implementing partners shortly after this reconstruction
147 The food rations are made available by WFP and distributed by UNHCR and the other agencies 
operating in the camp. There are various reasons why food distribution often engenders protest by 
refugees. Firstly, it highlights the refugees’ dependency on external help and ‘gifts’ for their survival, 
and thus their ‘powerlessness’. Secondly, it is conducted in a way that is often profoundly debasing and 
humiliating. It almost seems that there is an inverse relationship between order in the camps as 
constructed by the administering agencies and the dignity o f  refugees: indeed, the more ‘orderly* ways 
o f distributing food introduced by the agencies normally involve the use o f  enclosures, strict 
surveillance, meticulous controls over the rations distributed to each refugee, etc. Thirdly, die food 
that is distributed is normally lacking both in quantity, quality and variety.
The 1951 Convention contains a provision on food rationing that shows the extent to which the reality 
o f assistance to refugees has departed from the legal standards. Under Art 20 o f the 1951 Convention, 
‘where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and regulates the general 
distribution o f  products in short supply, refugees shall be accorded the same treatment as nationals’. 
The preoccupation o f the drafters was thus that refugees may be excluded from food distribution in 
situation o f  generalised hardships and this provision was meant to ensure the integration, in the sense 
equal treatment, o f  refugees in any rationing measure.
148 Refugees employed by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies in camps are said to receive 
‘incentives’ rather than salaries, because they are not considered workers but volunteers.
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starts... anyone whose performance proves to be unsatisfactory will be 
dismissed w ithout prior warning’.149
In the same incident, an Ethiopian refugee, who had started a human rights education 
programme in Kakuma, was forcibly relocated to one o f the Dadaab camps. UNHCR 
justified this decision in these terms:150
... UNHCR has taken the decision to transfer you to the Dadaab area. 
UNHCR has noted your unwillingness to be transferred ... but regrets to 
inform you that there are no viable options at the moment. Once in Dadaab, 
you will be expected to  refrain from any conduct likely to  disrupt public order 
in the camp, including the organisation o f  such lectures as you conducted in 
Kakuma Refugee Camp. I t is the view o f U NH CR that the series o f human rights 
lecture was a direct cause fo r the wave o f tension and disruption ofpublic order in the camp 
[emphasis added].151
The culprit was a scapegoat, since his series o f  lectures had only begun a week after 
the ‘disruption o f  public order’ in Kakuma had taken place. In justifying its decision, 
UNHCR referred to ‘Art. I l l  o f  the 1969 OAU Convention and to the Geneva 
Convention’, under which refugees are required ‘to conform with laws and regulations 
as well as with measures taken for the maintenance o f public order’ in the host 
country. The relocation o f the Ethiopian refugee however is a measure that cannot be 
imputed to Kenya, as it was taken and implemented by UNHCR, and was not based 
on Kenyan laws and regulations. His forcible transfer to  another refugee camp, away 
from his network o f  family and friends, was carried out shortly after this letter was 
sent. This decision was in breach o f  this refugee’s freedom o f  expression152 and right 
to a fair trial.
149 UNHCR Sub-Office in Kakuma, Memorandum from the Officer In-Charge to Refugees Working 
for NGOs in Kakuma, 4 April 1996 {on file with the author).
150 Senior Protection Officers are in charge o f  die promotion o f respect for die rights enshrined in the 
1951 Convention and other rights to which refugees are entided under human rights law. In every 
country where UNHCR operates there is normally a Senior Protection Officer who heads the legal 
office.
151 Letter from the Senior Protection Officer, James Lynch, to Assefa Teferi Woldekidan, 19 July 1994 
{onfile with the author, and UNHCR ref. K EN/NRB/PT/94/IC/0794).
152 Violations o f  die refugees’ freedom o f expression in the Tanzanian and Kenyan camps amongst 
others are examined in Article 19, ‘Voices in Exile’ (2001) written by R  Carver and G. Verdirame.
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In places like Kakuma, located in one o f the m ost arid regions in Kenya with virtually 
no arable land, the refugee population is entirely dependent on food distribution for 
its survival. In Dadaab, the situation is slightly better because refugees are at least 
allowed to keep poultry. Both in Dadaab and in Kakuma, there are hardly any 
prospects for local employment.153 As empirical research in Kakuma has shown, the 
‘incentives’ paid to a few hundred refugees working for the UNHCR and the N G O s 
constitute one o f  the principal ways o f integrating the meagre food rations.154 
‘Incentives’ were suspended together with food distribution on these occasions. 
Given that confinement in camps is involuntary, there can be little doubt that 
suspending food distribution in these circumstances amounted to a violation o f  the 
right to life. O ther human rights blatantly violated by this decision are the right to an 
adequate standard o f  living, including adequate food under Article 11 o f the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the right 
to  the enjoyment o f  the highest attainable standard o f  physical health (Art. 12, 
ICESCR), and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (Art. 
7, ICCPR).155 Furthermore, trying to extort the names o f  the 'culprits' under 
conditions o f  unequivocal duress constitutes a violation o f  fair trial guarantees (A rt 
14, ICCPR). It is noteworthy that, under Article 26 o f  the Geneva Convention III, 
‘collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited’ even in camps for 
prisoners o f war.156 Although the Geneva Conventions on the Laws o f War are not 
applicable to refugee camps in Kenya, the fact that collective punishments are 
proscribed under humanitarian law a fortiori shows the illegality o f  these practices in 
refugee camps.
The example o f  collective punishment also illustrates the extent o f the power 
bestowed upon the agencies. Deportations, the extortion o f confessions under threat, 
and the imposition o f  collective punishments are archetypical manifestations o f  
unfettered power. Furthermore, the exercise o f  punitive rights, the reference to the
153 According to UNHCR and to the local authorities, refugees should not take up employment. 
However, a very limited number o f them find occasional work in the informal economy, or jua kali, in 
Kakuma village.
154 See Boudreau, Lawrence, King, ‘Household Food Economy Assessment o f  Kakuma Refugee 
Camp’ (1996).
155 Cassese has argued that the infliction o f particular socio-economic conditions can amount to 
inhuman and degrading treatment (Cassese, ‘Can the Notion o f  Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Be 
Applied to Socio-Economic Conditions?’ 2 EJIL (1991) 141).
156 See also Art 100, Geneva Convention IV, which prohibits the reduction o f  food rations for 
internees.
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maintenance o f  public order, normally a prerogative o f  states, reveal that the 
administering agencies have taken the place o f  the state in many respects.
The system o f  ‘incentives’ denotes the violation o f  another fundamental right, the 
right to work. Under this system, refugees, employed by the agencies as drivers, 
teachers, administrators, doctors, nurses, security guards, et al., receive less 
remuneration than nationals for the same work. This practice is in breach o f  ‘the right 
o f everyone to the enjoyment o f just and favourable conditions o f work, which 
ensure, in particular (...) fair wages and equal remuneration for work o f equal value 
w ithout distinction o f any kind’ (Art. 7, ICESCR). Violations o f  the prohibition on 
forced labour may also occur. For example, in Dadaab in 1997-8 the administering 
agencies decided to  phase out ‘incentives’ and to replace them with a system o f  non­
remunerated work; in Kakuma, they dismissed large numbers o f  individuals who had 
been receiving ‘incentives’ for some time, often for years. In April 1998, UNHCR and 
CARE International, estimating that at least some refugees would refuse to continue to 
work without remuneration, were considering the imposition o f  sanctions, including 
the individualised suspension o f  food distribution.157
Rights o f  refugees in camps can also be violated by acts o f  private security officers 
employed by the agencies in the field. These security officers comprise both locals 
and refugees and, at times, personnel from private security companies. The chief 
security officer normally works under UNHCR supervision, although he is an 
employee o f  the main administering agency sub-contracted by UNHCR (respectively 
LWF and CARE International). Security guards in practice act as an interface between 
refugees, and UNHCR and N G O  staff, filtering the claims o f refugees who, for 
various reasons, try to see a UNHCR or N G O  official. In fact, refugees do no t have 
easy access to the offices o f  UNHCR and o f  N G O s, which are located in a ‘safe’ 
compound, surrounded by barbed wire, with security guards at the entrance gate.158 
Refugees complain that the behaviour o f  these guards and their decisions are 
completely arbitrary. The support o f  a security officer can often make the difference
157 Interviews with UNHCR officials and CARE International Manager, Dadaab, 27 April — 1 May 
1998).
158 In Dadaab there are, as has been mentioned, three different refugee camps, and in each one o f  
them there is a UN and NGO compound. The main compound is located in the village o f Dadaab. In 
Kakuma, all members o f staff reside within the compound, except for the person working for Don 
Bosco, a small Italian NGO.
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between a prom pt response to a refugee complaint, and complete lack o f  action or 
swift dismissal o f  the case. Given that security officers are chosen by UNHCR in 
conjunction with community leaders, they tend to support the claims o f  refugees who 
are close, or at least not inimical to the leaders o f the community, whereas at best 
they neglect others. As a result o f  the role assigned to community leaders and security 
guards as a spring-board for protection cases, many women and minors,159 members 
o f  minority clans and groups, opponents, and in general individuals with feeble social 
networks are often excluded from protection.160
The customary settlement o f disputes in refugee camps, in particular settlement 
through adjudication in customary courts,161 can give rise to violations o f  rights. The 
customary norms that are normally applied by these courts are the result o f a 
complex process o f  transformation, reflecting in part the experience o f exile, and in 
part power relations in camps, including relations between community leaders and the 
de facto authorities, i.e. UNHCR and N G O s. As a result o f  these transformations, 
customary law in exile often loses its ‘subtle, adaptable and situational’ nature.162 In 
Kakuma, the SPLA leaders have assumed control o f  the process o f  dispute 
settlement, and as a result individuals like Sarah Aruol163 whose dispute is against the 
SPLA are basically defenceless. In addition, as has been seen, in the camp Sarah Aruol 
could n o t rely on those kinship and social ties that often act as a shield protecting 
individuals against abuses in the process o f dispute settlement. Had her case arisen in 
her home town in southern Sudan, it is reasonable to hypothesise that her kinship 
and social ties would have played an im portant role and the outcome o f  the case
159 In Kakuma there are some 7,000 Sudanese unaccompanied minors, mainly young men and male 
adolescents. They reached Kakuma in 1991 after fleeing Sudan where many o f  them had become 
orphans or refused to be forcibly recruited in the SPLA. Before arriving in the camp, they had been in 
refugee camps in Ethiopia, where the group had been decimated by Menghistu’s army and by 
starvation. On relationship between these boys and the Dinka community, see (d).
160 *With the current system o f  work by the protection service o f UNHCR, which consists in visiting 
delegates or chairmen o f  each community every Wednesday, and notice that only chairmen o f  
community are called to submit different cases settled in their communities, I AM FALLING in THE 
TOTAL HOPELESS MARGINALISATION BECAUSE MINE WILL NOT GET CHANCE TO 
BE read one day* (Written testimony o f  B D, Burundi refugee in Kakuma, April 1998).
1151 Negotiation is another important way o f  solving disputes (Gulliver, ‘Case-Studies o f  Law in non- 
Westem Societies’ in Nader, supra note 146, 11 at 17), but this section deals predominantly with 
adjudication in the customary courts.
162 O. Harris (ed.), Inside and Outside the Law (1996) 3. On ‘mandatory traditional customs’ in camps, see 
Harrell-Bond, supra 9, at 293 ff. On the adaptability o f  Nuer custom and its historical evolution, see S. 
Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the State (1996) at 217 ff.
163 See supra note 145.
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could have been more favourable to her.164 But the breakdown o f social structures 
and the fact that for m ost refugees these ties are no t so extensive as in their countries 
o f  origin mean that, in this respect too, the application o f  customary law in camps is 
no t subject to the necessary limitations.
The imprisonment o f  individuals found ‘guilty’ by a customary court in cells, which
are built by UNHCR and N G O s,165 constitutes a violation o f  the right to liberty and
security o f  person (Art. 9, ICCPR) and o f the right to a fair trial (Art. 14, ICCPR).
Contrary to widespread belief, subjecting refugees to  the application o f  customary
norms in the manner described — far from being a practice respectful o f  the cultural
rights o f  refugees - is actually in breach o f  cultural rights, primarily defined as the right
o f an individual to ‘freely take part in the cultural life o f  his community’.166 The
jurisdiction o f  the ‘customary courts’ in refugee camps includes criminal matters, and
is significandy broader than is allowed under Kenyan law, and than would be allowed
under the law o f  m ost countries in Africa.167 In addition, non-state courts in Kenya
have an obligation to respect the principle o f  non-discrimination, particularly in the
collection and evaluation o f  evidence, whereas a similar restriction is not imposed on
similar courts dispensing ‘justice’ in refugee camps. Finally, the exercise o f  jurisdiction
by these ‘courts’ in refugee camps cannot be reconciled with the 1951 Refugee
Convention. Indeed, the establishment o f parallel dispute setdement systems in
camps, including the exercise o f  criminal jurisdiction, undermines the access o f
refugees to national courts, although Article 16 o f  the 1951 Convention accords
significant protection to  the refugees’ right to  ‘free access to  the courts o f  law’. This
right occupies a special position in the system o f  the Convention, as, together with
only a handful o f  other provisions, it cannot be the object o f  a reservation by state 
168parties.
164 E.g. see Gulliver, Dispute Settlement Without Courts: The Ndendeuli o f Southern Tanzania', in 
Nader, supra note 146,24 at 59 ff.
165 On these cells, see supra note 94.
166 Art 17, 2, African Charter. See also: Art 27, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights; Art 15, 
ICESCR.
167 See supra note 95. A UNHCR Protection document (‘Implementing Protection’, prepared by the 
Protection Assistant in Kakuma Sub-Office, no date) states that ‘refugees have their own traditional 
courts chaired by an appointed judge with assistance from community leaders who pass judgement on 
offences related to their cultural norm? [emphasis added].
168 In addition to access to courts (art 16), other provisions to which no reservation is permissible 
under Art 42 o f  the 1951 Convention include the refugee definition (Art 1), the principle o f  non­
discrimination in the application o f the Convention (Art. 3), freedom o f religion (Art. 4), the principle 
of non-refoulement (Art 33) and the dispute settlement clause (Art. 38). Under this last provision,
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In both Kakuma and Dadaab the incidence o f  sexual violence was dramatic. In 
Dadaab UNHCR had come under considerable pressure following reports o f  human 
rights organisations on the plight o f Somali women.169 A lawyer from FIDA was hired 
in 1994 for a short period to initiate proceedings against those responsible for the 
violence. The FIDA lawyer also started the mobile court programme, which was 
described above. Unfortunately, once her short-term contract terminated, these 
initiatives foundered. In yet another example o f a grotesque operationalisation o f  an 
originally progressive idea, UNHCR maintained that ‘gender issues’ had been 
‘mainstreamed’ and that there was no need for a separate programme. In 1998, a 
newly appointed Senior Protection Officer revived the mobile court programme and 
insisted that those accused o f committing sexual violence be brought to justice. 
However, there was still little acknowledgement o f the fact that forcing refugee 
women to reside in camps like Kakuma and Dadaab was in itself exposing them to 
the risk o f  becoming victims o f  sexual violence. Various progressive-labelled, donor- 
pleasing and consultant-enriching activities were organised, including gender 
awareness seminars, sensitisation activities and peace education seminars.170 The fact 
remains that the gender imbalance in many “communities”,171 the high proportion o f  
form er combatants, the inactivity o f the entire population, the complete isolation, the 
oppressive and inescapable intimacy, the absence o f law enforcement and the 
presence o f  armed bandits in the region, and, for many women, the absence o f male 
relatives were the main factors that caused sexual violence, and these were no t 
addressed.
Malnutrition, especially am ong children, has been particularly high both in Kakuma 
and in Dadaab.172 The fact that refugees are confined against their will in camps where
disputes ‘relating to the interpretation or application’ o f  the Convention shall be referred to the ICJ. 
However, to date no case under the 1951 Convention has been brought to the ICJ.
169 See supra note 97.
170 The foreign consultant in charge o f the UNHCR peace education programme in Kenya in 1997-98 
hired as one o f her aides a Somali elder in Dadaab who had been accused o f causing his under-age 
wife to neatly bleed to death on fee first night o f marriage. She said fee relatives o f  fee woman and 
this man had settled fee dispute, and she needed him because he was ‘very articulate’ (Interview, 
Dadaab, October 1997).
171 For example, fee Sudanese community includes only a small proportion o f women. In Kakuma, fee 
majority o f  men amongst Sudanese are fee ‘walking boys’, supra note 159.
172 Boudreau et al., supra note 154; Verdirame, supra note 86; Letter o f Dr Guluma, supra note 137. On 
malnutrition in refugee camps outside Kenya, see: Harrell-Bond, supra note 9, at 276 ff.
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they cannot achieve self-reliance means that those responsible for the confinement — 
host states and UNHCR — are obliged to  provide them  with essential necessities, 
including food, shelter and water. Keeping refugees on low rations is thus a breach o f 
Article 11 o f  the ICESCR — the right to an adequate standard o f  living for himself and 
his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement o f  living conditions — and, when loss o f life ensues from malnutrition, 
o f  the right to life (Art. 6, ICCPR).
UNHCR’s defence that sufficient resources are no t available echoes the argument o f  
states that scarcity o f  resources would prevent them  from implementing economic 
and social rights, including the right to food. However, this argument does not reflect 
the nature o f  the obligations o f  state parties to the ICESCR. The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, established under the ICESCR, has 
distinguished three different levels o f  obligations vis-a-vis the right to food: the 
obligations to respect, to protect, and to fu lfil — the latter comprising both an obligation to 
facilitate and an obligation to provide. In refugee camps, UNHCR is responsible for a 
violation o f  the first o f  these obligations — the obligation to respect. Indeed, the 
obligation to  respect imposes a negative duty, requiring states ‘not to  take any 
measures that result in preventing’ access to food.173 Confining refugees to camps, 
depriving them o f  the possibility to seek employment and to secure livelihood 
through their own means are measures that prevent, or at least significantly reduce, 
access to any food other than food aid.174
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has added that:
food aid should, as far as possible, be provided in ways which do no t 
adversely affect local producers and local markets, and should be organized in
The standard set under Art. 26 o f  Geneva Convention III, supra note 124, is often higher than what is 
concretely made available to refugees: The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, 
quality and variety to keep prisoners o f war in good health and to prevent loss o f  weight or the 
development o f  nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken o f  the habitual diet o f the 
prisoners’.
173 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12 on Art 12 (The Right 
to Adequate Food’J, UN Doc. E /C .12/1999/5, para. 14-15.
174 Not all camps are the same: in some, like Dadaab, refugees are allowed to keep poultry; in others, 
they may even be allowed to cultivate some land; in the worst cases, like Kakuma, refugees have 
access to no food other than what is distributed by the agencies fortnightly. But, in general, refugpes’ 
own ability to gain access to food is at least limited as a result o f encampment
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ways that facilitate the return to food self-reliance o f the beneficiaries. Such 
aid should be based on the needs o f  the intended beneficiaries. Products 
included in international food trade or aid programmes must be safe and 
culturally acceptable to the recipient population.175
In substance the Committee views the right to adequate food in terms almost 
antithetic to  the practice o f  UNHCR and o f  the World Food Programme (WFP) in 
the Kenyan camps, and emphasises that this right ‘shall therefore no t be interpreted 
in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with a minimum package o f  calories, 
proteins and other specific nutrients’.176 However, these ‘narrow and restrictive’ 
interpretations o f  the right to food are predominant no t only in the practice o f  
UNHCR and N G O s in camps, but also in the conceptualisation that precedes this 
practice. Methodical and accurate measurements o f  the nutrients that need to be in­
taken to keep the body o f  the refugee healthy are in fact part and parcel o f  the ‘utopia 
o f  the perfectly governed city’, and o f  the reduction o f  refugees and their human 
rights to statistical entities. And, to make matters even worse, even these 
measurements - which would still fall short o f  ‘measuring’ freedom, rights, happiness 
o r welfare - sire in practice seldom respected, pardy because o f  W FP’s policy o f  
reducing food aid automatically after two years, since, according to its model, two years 
is the maximum duration o f  the emergency and continuing food aid would discourage 
self-reliance. Thus, both in Kakuma and in Dadaab, food aid was progressively 
reduced regardless o f  the fact that self-reliance was no t attainable by refugees in those 
circumstances.
In addition, the refugees’ own coping strategies are often undercut by such UNHCR 
policies as the prohibition o f  trade in food rations — another example o f  a violation o f 
the ‘obligation to respect’. As has been observed,177 rations do not include all 
necessary nutrients, and refugees trade them  for other necessities (including milk for 
infants, staples when these are no t distributed, or non-food necessities like clothing 
and footwear). Although UNHCR blames donor pressure for this, in m ost refugee 
camps it still opposes trade in food rations, and at times sanctions this practice with 
the confiscation o f the food.
175 General Comment 12, supra note 173 at para. 39.
176 Ibid., para. 6.
177 See supra note 113.
222
Because o f scarce resources, m ost developing countries are no t able to fulfil their 
obligation to provide such economic and social rights as the right to food, to health and 
to shelter. States, and de facto authorities like UNHCR in refugee camps, have an 
obligation at least no t to hinder — as part o f their obligation to respect - but at best to 
protect and to facilitate the establishment o f  independent networks o f  mutual help by 
refugees. In fact, social solidarity often acts as a private substitute for state action in 
the area o f  food, shelter, education or health, when states are unable or unwilling to 
intervene. In refugee camps, however, there is far less room  for solidarity o f  this kind, 
and therefore even this avenue o f implementing rights is too often denied to the 
refugees. Harrell-Bond has observed that the process o f  re-defining social 
responsibility in exile is often painfully slow, and that the extent to which a refugee in 
a camp can rely on help from others normally continues to depend on the extent o f 
h is/her kinship ties.178 My findings also suggest that, in spite o f  the availability o f  only 
little aid for refugees outside camps, one reason why refugees normally prefer to live 
outside camps is that they can establish more effective social networks.179 This may be 
a consequence o f  the Tiard truth’ that ‘forced intimacy may be an enemy o f  solidarity 
and co-operation’,180 but also o f the fact that, owing to the lack o f prospect o f  
employment o r education, camps are places where no one can really ‘make it’ and 
where offering help seems often pointless.181
(d) The smokescreen: cultural relativism
The arguments that were developed in Chapter III on the regressive and instrumental 
use o f  anything ‘cultural’ - identities, processes and rights — by the UN in Afghanistan 
are germane to refugee camps. These arguments will no t be re-proposed here in their 
entirety, except to highlight how this discourse on culture has actually little to do with 
the existing positive law on cultural rights.
In Chapter III it was argued that one o f  the justificatory arguments used by the UN 
in the context o f  the provision o f humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan hinges on
178 Harrell-Bond, supra note 9, at 283-284 and 293 ff.
179 At least this is what interviews with refugees in Nairobi have elicited.
180 Barrington Moore Jr, supra note 136, at 67.
181 On the other hand, I was amazed at the number o f refugees in Nairobi who managed to find 
sponsorship for short courses from churches, relatives, friends and acquaintances, or other networks. 
In camps, there are some economic disparities, but there is no sizeable group o f  individuals that can 
afford to be generous to others. The scope for solidarity is thus limited.
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the construction o f  culture ’as an essentialist and homogenous body o f  traditions and 
customs’.182 Hence the continued involvement o f  the UN in Afghanistan, and the 
incorporation o f  discrimination against women in UN programmes o f  humanitarian 
assistance are justified inter alia with an apparently cultural relativist argument. This 
argument assumes that the Taliban are the true interpreters o f  Afghani culture, and 
implicitly removes any cultural representational prerogative from other Afghan 
groups and individuals, for example the women who constituted 60% o f the staff o f 
Kabul University and were dismissed by the Taliban. This regressive construction o f 
culture, and the distortion o f  the attendant discourse on cultural rights, prejudices the 
position o f  those within a culture who challenge dominant interpretations.
In refugee camps, the idea o f  culture is sub-served to the exigencies o f UNHCR and 
N G O s. The establishment o f  customary courts, the organisation o f refugees in 
communities,183 and the concession o f  wide and arbitrary powers to community 
leaders are part o f the system o f  indirect rule that is instituted in camps. Far from 
being neutral and respectful o f  cultural identities and processes, UNHCR in this way 
fixates and corroborates one particular interpretation o f a given culture, and 
intervenes in cultural processes siding with one party (normally the strongest one), 
giving it much-needed legitimacy and funds, and helping in the suppression and 
marginalisation o f  other voices and interpretations.
In this respect, the example o f  the Sudanese Dinka refugees in Kakuma is telling. As 
has been discussed, SPLA officers are the self-appointed leaders o f  this ‘community’. 
In the camp, they are tacitly allowed both to forcibly recruit minors and young men 
in the SPLA, and to divert some food aid to the rebels in southern Sudan. They are 
treated as the sole legitimate voice o f  the Dinka community, whereas dissident 
individuals and groups are not given any recognition. Indeed, when tension arises 
between the Sudanese leaders and sectors o f  their community, UNHCR usually 
espouses the cause o f the leaders, at times actively, more often simply by remaining 
inert and omitting to intervene even when an intervention is required under the
182 N. Yuval-Davis Gender and Nation (1997) at 38.
183 As noted by Hyndman, in spite o f so much rhetoric to the contrary, ‘a refugee camp is not a 
community ... (it) is an institution organized as a temporary solution to displacement’, and in which 
refugees ‘are the subjects o f  a tacit and unsatisfactory policy o f containment by which camps are 
enforced 'colonies', not communities defined by voluntary association... In exchange for temporary
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UNHCR’s mandate. For example, a frequent source o f  inter-community tension in 
Kakuma has been the presence o f  thousands o f Sudanese boys184 - for the most part 
Dinkas - who have spent the better part o f their formative years separate from their 
community o f  origin, and who have developed autonomous sets o f  prohibitions and 
permissive rules in exile. For instance, these boys often refuse to undergo military 
training; they reject much Dinka custom on marriage and sexual relations, and 
practise homosexuality.185 UNHCR’s policy on the Sudanese boys in Kakuma (usually 
still referred to as the ‘unaccompanied minors’ although most o f  them are no longer 
minors) has been to deny the acceptability, let alone the legality, o f  the practices that 
did no t conform to Dinka traditional custom as interpreted by the SPLA-controlled 
leadership in Kakuma, and to encourage their forced assimilation into their 
‘community’ o f  origin. The (sub-)culture developed by these boys is thus considered 
unworthy o f  protection, because o f  its differences with recognised Dinka custom. 
The SPLA-dominated group o f Sudanese refugees in Kakuma, like their counterparts 
in Nairobi, has traditionally relatively easy access to  the staff o f UNHCR and o f  other 
UN agencies. A consequence o f  the policy o f  identifying ‘authentic’ representatives o f 
certain communities is that UNHCR can at all time claim to be ‘in contact with the 
Sudanese community’, or to be ‘aware o f  the claims’ o f the Sudanese refugees simply 
by having relations with one group o f  Sudanese refugees while neglecting the claims 
o f others (‘unaccompanied minors’, women, draft-dodgers, mixed couples, political or 
cultural dissidents, etc.).
A misrepresentation o f  cultural rights and the correspondent obligations o f  states 
underlies these UNHCR policies and attitudes. A t the field level, UNHCR officers 
often see themselves as the defenders o f  endangered cultures.186 As part o f  this self- 
righteous mission to save cultures, they support, encourage and fund practices that 
are in breach o f  human rights. In addition, such practices also constitute a violation o f 
the cultural rights they purport to protect as they interfere in a cultural process by
asylum and the provision o f  basic needs, refugees forfeit a number o f  entitlements’ (Hyndman, supra 
note 89, at ‘Simulating Community: Refugee Self-Management7).
184 See supra note 159.
185 Particularly unacceptable to the Dinka leaders is the fact that a number o f Sudanese boys ‘take 
other boys as their wives’ (Interview with Deng Dau, leader o f the Sudanese Dinka community, July 
1997).
186 On the institutional ethos o f  humanitarian workers, see M. Walkup Policy and Behavior in 
Humanitarian Organisations: The Institutional Origins of Operational Dysfunction (PhD Thesis, University o f  
Honda, 1997). See also Susan Sontag’s essay on Leni Riefenstahl and the imagery o f self-appointed 
defenders o f  engendered ‘native’, in Under the Sign of Saturn (1991) 86.
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giving legitimacy, as well as powers and funding to the strongest voices. As has been 
mentioned, human rights law does not recognise the right o f groups to exact 
compliance with cultural practices (or certain interpretations thereof) from 
individuals; instead, it enshrines the right o f  the individual ‘to opt out* o f  h is/her own 
culture, or, as so many people choose to do, to embrace its norms and customs 
selectively. Finally, the use o f mandatory customary practices in refugee camps also 
relies on the ill-conceived and pre-Freudian belief that individuals are always happy to 
adhere to the cultural norms o f their groups.187
The idea o f  cultural rights as represented in refugee camps, on the other hand, 
reinforces existing power relations and enhances the oppressive potential o f  any 
culture over its member individuals. In fact, it is a sociological and historical truism 
that cultures are open to challenges from within and from outside, that they normally 
accommodate a variety o f  often conflicting interpretations and voices, and that they 
constantly undergo processes o f social transformation and adaptation. These 
processes can go as far as to overcome a particular custom. Those who are in power 
naturally perceive this potential for change as a threat. As observed by Pascal, who 
also saw this as a risk rather than a value, any custom may be overcome from within 
once its arbitrary nature is unmasked.188 By promoting the forced membership o f  
individuals in rigidly defined groups and their subjection to the ‘cultural’ norms o f  
these groups, UNHCR thus suppresses this intrinsic potential for change and reform, 
and promulgates the immutable authenticity o f  certain interpretations o f a culture.
(e) Refugee status determination conducted by U NHCR
UNHCR conducts refugee status determination in many Asian and African countries. 
189 This practice constitutes an anomaly since states are normally responsible for legal 
processes within their territory that affect the status and rights o f individuals.
187 In Civilisation and Its Discontents Freud argued that subjection to social and cultural norms is often a 
source o f  discontent (S. Freud, II Disagio della Civiltd in S. Freud Opere (It. ed., Boringhieri, 1978, Vol. 
X) 557).
188 B. Pascal, Pensees (ed. Gamier Freres, 1961) at 152-153 (pensee n. 294): The art o f  opposition, o f  
revolt against States is to undermine established customs, reaching to their foundations in order to 
unveil their lack o f  authority and justice... and they [the people] should not realise the fact o f  
appropriation; the law, introduced once without reason, has become reasonable; it must continue to be 
regarded as authentic, eternal, and its origin must be concealed, unless we want it to come to an end'.
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UNHCR maintains that it embarks upon status determination only in exceptional 
circumstances, but the number o f these ‘exceptions’, for the most part concentrated 
in countries in the south, is significant. In m ost o f these situations, UNHCR has 
determined refugee status for a significant period o f  time — over a decade in Kenya — 
190 and has normally taken over this process from states once large numbers o f 
refugees arrived. Hence, although there are no definitive statistics o f the numbers o f 
asylum-seekers whose applications are considered by UNHCR, it is no t far-fetched to 
hypothesise that the majority o f asylum applications in the south, and probably in the 
whole world, are actually decided by UNHCR rather than states. Most o f the refugees 
recognised by UNHCR are then requested to  reside in refugee camps.
It has been observed that UNHCR’s practice on refugee status determination in 
Asian countries often fails to comply with international human rights standards - in 
particular with requirements o f procedural fairness - and that its procedure in Kenya 
falls short ‘o f  the very guarantees and principles set out in its Handbook on Status 
Determination’.191 It hardly needs emphasising that status determination is so important 
for the lives o f  refugees that it cannot brook sloppy or even unfair procedures. 
Indeed, asylum-seekers whose claim has been wrongly assessed and who have been 
rejected are at risk o f  being returned to a country where they face persecution. Even 
if they manage to remain in the country o f  asylum, they will no t enjoy the ‘privileged’ 
status o f  refugees, and the international protection that in principle ensues thereupon. 
Getting the refugee status determination right is, in other words, the first logical step 
in a truly rights-based refugee regime. I t  is therefore the more disquieting to discover 
that rights o f  asylum-seekers are systematically violated when UNHCR is in charge o f  
this process.
189 Alexander, Refugee Status Determination Conducted by UNHCR’, 11 Int. J. Ref. L . (1999) 251 at 
251. On the basis o f  my own research or experience, in Africa, UNHCR conducts refugee status 
determination in Kenya, die Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Egypt, and Uganda.
190 In some countries, UNHCR has determined status for an even longer period o f time. For example, 
in Egypt it has been in charge o f  the status determination process since 1955.
191 Verdirame, supra note 86 at 58. As has been mentioned, other data pointing to similar findings was 
collected in Uganda by Barbara Harrell-Bond, Zachary Lomo and Pamela Reynell. Fact-finding 
missions conducted by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in west, east and central Africa as 
part o f  a project on the exclusion clauses in the 1951 Convention, often highlighted inconsistencies 
and breaches o f  minimum requirements o f  fairness in status determination procedures by UNHCR  
On the Lawyers’ Committee’s project, see the Special Supplementary Issue, 12 Int. J. Ref. L . (2000).
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An unwonted ally o f  UNHCR could be the view that refugee status determination, as 
well as immigration decisions, do no t constitute a ‘suit at law’ for the purposes o f  the 
right to fair trial.192 Australia has explicitly endorsed this position.193 UNHCR’s failure 
to put in place procedures that comply with minimum standards o f  fairness could 
therefore be justified with the argument that these standards do not apply to refugee 
status determination. I t would be a misjudged apology. Firstly, there is ultimately no 
persuasive reason for excluding refugee status determination from fair trial provisions, 
particularly since, in many ways, refugee status determinations is so unequivocally a 
‘suit at law’ for determining an individual’s rights and obligations (Art. 14, ICCPR). 
Secondly, the protection regime for refugees cannot be effective if  the underlying 
determination is improperly conducted thus increasing the probabilities o f wrong 
decisions. Finally, when the practice on a particular aspect o f  refugee law differs, 
UNHCR ought to prom ote the best practice, which is the practice that is most 
respectful o f  the rights o f  refugees and is consistent with the 1951 Convention.
IV.5. C onclusion
This chapter has analysed the exercise o f  administrative powers by the UN, o r by a 
UN specialised programme. Direct international governance is presumably here to 
stay but there are im portant differences between international administrations — that 
is exercise o f  administrative functions de jure — and refugee camps — where wide 
powers are assumed and exercised on a de facto basis. Perhaps the m ost important 
difference, however, is that international administrations can be improved, refugee 
camps cannot. By making international institutions accountable and by creating a 
clear legal framework for their operation, international administrations can play an 
im portant role in phases o f  post-conflict reconstruction and transition to a new 
autochthonous order. UNHCR's administration o f  refugee camps, on the other hand, 
is no t simply tainted by the lack o f a legal basis for such administration. Its ‘original 
sin’ is the restriction o f  the freedom o f  movement o f  refugees, whence violations o f 
the other human rights flow. A rights-based refugee regime is not compatible with 
the forced encampment o f  refugees.
192 Art 14 (ICCPR).
193 Alexander, supra note 189.
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CHAPTER V
Mechanisms for accountability
V .l. N o tions o f accountability
The idea that ‘power entails accountability, that is the duty to account’1 for its exercise 
is a deeply rooted one in the context o f contemporary liberal democracies. Demands 
for accountability are intertwined with the processes o f bureaucratisation and 
institutionalisation that, as Weber explained, characterise the evolution o f rational-legal 
forms o f  power in modem societies.2 Various mechanisms have been developed by 
modem liberal states to ensure that bureaucracies are subjected to the rule o f  law, and 
act as instruments for its promotion, without turning into incontrollable or even 
oppressive leviathans. With a few exceptions,3 the impact o f the process o f 
bureaucratisation on the functioning o f  international institutions has not formed the 
object o f  systematic analysis. On the plane o f accountability, this process has two main 
consequences. O n the one hand, it renders the international civil service less 
permeable to the influence o f  states. On the other, the establishment o f  complex and 
autonomous bureaucratic structures often allows institutions to act ‘unbound’ by any 
control or guidance.
O n the international stage, the struggle to make international institutions accountable 
for the exercise o f  their power is relatively novel. It was no t until the 1980s that, 
following the exponential expansion o f  international organisations in quantitative and 
qualitative terms, some attention to the question o f  their accountability was, somewhat 
belatedly, given. Before then, the predominant view was that international institutions 
had a role to play in ensuring the accountability o f states by monitoring theif 
compliance with international law and by setting standards for their conduct 
(sometimes referred to as ‘active accountability’),4 but the question o f  the
1 Committee on Accountability o f  International Organisations — International Law Association, ‘Second 
Report presented at the London Conference, July 2000’, at 4.
2 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellscbafi (1922). Italian edition: Economa e Societd (1999, Edizioni di 
Comuni ta), Vol. 1 ,207-220.
3 Barnett and Finnemore, The Politics, Power and Pathologies o f  International Organizations’, 53 Int. 
Org. (1999) 699.
4 International organisations are thus sometimes referred to as having a function o f  control, see 
Valticos, ‘Controle’, in Dupuy, R. J. A  Handbook on International Organisations (1998) 461.
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accountability for the way in which they exercised their powers (‘passive 
accountability’) was overshadowed by the need to  secure their presence in a world that 
was perceived to be completely dominated by states.
Accountability is a semantically broad term. When applied to international 
organisations, a frequent use o f the term confines the scope o f  accountability to 
financial questions. D onor countries often use the term ‘accountability’ in this narrow 
sense. In addition to financial probity, another aspect that is commonly associated 
with accountability is transparency in the decision-making process. Transparency 
involves the full participation o f  all members in the decision-making process, public 
access to information about the position o f  various actors in this process, and rules 
and controls on confidential and informal decision-making.5 Broader notions o f 
accountability encompass reporting on and evaluating institutional performance, as 
well as the monitoring o f  compliance, within clear parameters.6
As far as financial probity and transparency are concerned, there is room within 
existing international institutional law for making progress, and some progress has 
arguably already been made since the 1990s with the establishment o f different and 
more sophisticated mechanisms o f administrative control.7 Such progress is the result 
o f a num ber o f  factors. Firstly, the anachronism o f an ‘unbound’ exercise o f power 
cannot but stride with the ‘rights culture’ that has gained strength after the fall o f 
totalitarian regimes in many countries in the late 1980s, and the affirmation o f  the 
liberal democracy as the unchallenged model o f political organisation. Secondly, 
scrutiny into the work on the ground o f  international organisations has noticeably 
increased, and has led to the publication o f  various exposes by journalists and 
academics.8 Finally, in some o f the major powers, and especially in the United States
5 ILA Committee, supra note 1 at 11; Woods, ‘Good Governance in International Organizations’, 5 
Global Governance (1999) 39 at 44.
6 Ibid., at 14.
7 See below at 243 ff.
8 The list o f  these exposes would be too long. Path-breaking in the academic arena were B £ . Hariell- 
Bond, Imposing A id  (1986) and W. Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modem 
Conscience (1984). Critiques o f humanitatianism have become a bestseller genre with the publication o f  
G. Hancock, Lords of Poverty (1989). In the period 1998-April 2001, the Financial Times reported on 
alleged mismanagement in respect o f at least two international organisations — UNHCR and the UN 
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) - denouncing lack o f accountability for the 
use o f  funds. In the case o f UNHCR, the reports were the result o f  an investigation o f the paper (See 
‘Refugees’ Agency Lost in Wilderness o f  Bungjing and Waste’, Finandal Times, 29 July 1998; TJN Probe 
Raises Concern over Drug Programme’, Financial Times, 26 April 2001).
230
(US), the management o f  the United Nations (UN) has featured in the domestic 
political agenda, although this was often in order to promote a rather populist agenda 
o f disengagement from international institutions.
W hen one extends the notion o f  accountability to include the duty to  account to 
member states and to individuals, international institutional law shows its limits. Any 
effective system o f accountability to individuals must rely on a combination o f 
sanctions and remedies: sanctions on the officials or offices responsible for the 
violative conduct, and remedies to the individual (s) or groups aggrieved by such 
conduct However, as evidenced in many o f the cases and situations discussed in the 
previous chapters, sanctions are not normally imposed and remedies are seldom 
available to victims. As a result, the ability o f  the institution to modify its conduct 
when similar circumstances arise in the future is quite limited. These three interlocked 
criteria (sanctions, remedies, impact on future behaviour) will be frequently referred to 
in this chapter when assessing different mechanisms o f  accountability. I t is also 
im portant to discuss whose accountability (the individual, the office or department, or 
the institution as a whole) can be promoted and through which route. National laws 
offer various avenues for pursuing the individual official responsible for a violative 
conduct, ranging from administrative remedies to to rt law and even criminal sanctions. 
In the case o f  the “rogue” UN official, whose conduct is no t sanctioned by the 
institution, this combination o f  remedies and sanctions is no t available in the same 
measure. Administrative remedies based on the internal law o f  the UN are not 
normally available to third parties, and tort and criminal remedies cannot be used 
because o f  the personal immunity o f the official.9 The accountability o f  the office 
responsible for a certain violative conduct is also difficult to pursue for similar 
reasons. As regards the accountability o f  the institution as a whole, again, remedies 
available to an individual are very limited and controls by states and by the organs o f 
the institutions remain deficient or erratic.
Ensuring the accountability o f  international institutions within the current structure o f 
international law thus presents real challenges and requires, in a sense, a stretch o f  the
9 In some cases o f suspected corruption, however, the UN has encouraged prosecution by national 
authorities (see below on the role o f OIOS).
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imagination in order to find new and innovative ways o f using existing mechanisms 
and rules to  pursue a goal for which they were not originally created.
This chapter examines various routes through which accountability o f  an organisation 
can be pursued, highlighting respective strengths and weaknesses. A t present, there is 
hardly any role for national courts to play, because o f the immunities and privileges o f  
international organisations. This constitutes a severe limit, particularly since the role o f  
courts as guarantors o f respect for the rule o f  law is central in the liberal democratic 
state. The argument that the jurisdictional immunity o f international organisations 
should be reconsidered in the light o f the enlarged functions they have come to 
exercise is considered. The international judicial system is embryonic, and still overall 
ineffective when die rights o f individuals are at stake. Internal, administrative and 
political remedies have some potential, but their impact on the rights o f  third party 
individuals is so far quite limited.
V.2. A ccountability  th rough  M em ber States
Member states o f  an international organisation have a right to ensure that the 
organisation complies with its constituent instrument and with general international 
law. To some extent, they also have an obligation to  do so, given that they can in 
principle bear responsibility for the acts o f  international organisations o f  which they 
are members. Moreover, generalising the Matthews approach, this obligation derives 
from the states’ duty to ensure that their international legal obligations, in particular 
those under human rights treaties, are ‘secured’ when they transfer competences to 
international institutions.10 The function o f  control and monitoring o f  the activities o f  
the international organisation, which member states can exercise chiefly by putting 
into effect their rights under the constituent instrument and their membership o f  key 
organs, should no t be viewed as an optional element in a system o f  accountability, but 
as one o f  its essential components.
The plenary organ o f  the organisation - the General Assembly in the UN and variously 
named organs in the specialised agencies - represents one o f  the main fora where
10 On Matthews v. UK, see Chapter II.3.
232
member states can exercise this function/1 The semi-autonomous agencies — the UN 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP), and die World Food Programme (WFP) - 
established as subsidiary organs, lack a plenary body.12 In principle, their plenary organ 
ought to be the parent organ which established them — the General Assembly, and the 
General Assembly and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Conference in 
the case o f  WFP. Plenary organs are in principle endowed with large powers, but 
whether they exercise them or not depends on the member states. So, for example 
within FAO, states could use the biennial Conference o f  the organisation to  raise 
questions o f  accountability, relying on the powers o f  the Conference to determine the 
policy o f  the organisation and to review the decisions o f  any other organ o f  FAO.13
The executive organs o f  the specialised agencies and semi-autonomous programmes 
exercise significant powers and play an important role in the formulation o f  the policy 
o f  the institution.14 These organs have a more limited membership, and normally meet 
only a few times a year. As is the case with the plenary organs, member states could, if 
they so wished, use the executive organs to m onitor institutional performance and 
promote accountability. Such practice would be entirely consistent with the 
responsibilities o f  these organs, which in some cases have been established with a 
Vatch-dog* and compliance-monitoring function. For example, WFP’s Executive 
Board has a duty o f  ‘intergovernmental supervision and direction o f the management’, 
and an obligation to ensure that ‘the activities and operational strategies are consistent 
with the overall policy guidance set forth by the General Assembly and the 
FAO Conference, as well as the Economic and Social Council and the Council o f 
FAO’.15 A possible, and seemingly unexplored route for enhancing the accountability
11 World Health Assembly (WHO), the General Conference o f  Representatives (ILO), the FAO
Conference.
n  See Chapter. II. 2.
13 Art 4, Constitution o f  FAO.
14 For example: UNHCR has an Executive Committee (established under GA Res. 1166(XII), 26 
November 1957, whose membership has been enlarged to 57 states to be elected by the Economic and 
Social Council (GA Res. 54/143, 16 February 2000); UNICEFs Executive Board (GA Res. 57 (I), 11 
December 1946) has a membership o f 36 states, also elected by the Economic and Social Council. 
WFP’s organ equivalent to UNICEF’s Executive Board and UNHCR’s Executive Committee was 
called Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, it was re-named Executive Board in 1995 
(GA Res. 50/8, 1 November 1995). As for the specialised agencies, these organs are regulated by the 
constituent instrument the ILO has a Governing Body (Art 7, ILO Constitution), FAO has a Council 
with forty-nine member states (Art 5, FAO Constitution), WHO has an Executive Board with thirty- 
two members (Art 24, WHO Constitution).
15 Art 6, General Regulations o f  WFP as revised by GA Res. 50/8 ,1  November 1995.
233
o f  the institutions and for improving operational performance would be to bring a 
complaint to one o f  these executive organs.
In addition to the plenary body and the executive organ, international institutions 
normally have a range o f  committees and commissions with different tasks. These 
committees are for the m ost part established as subsidiary bodies by the plenary o r the 
executive organ, and they tend to comprise international civil servants rather than 
representatives o f states. FAO is an important exception, since the establishment o f  a 
number o f  committees to assist the FAO Council is provided for in the FAO 
Constitution, and state representatives have usually sat as members o f  these 
committees, allowing states to exercise direct control over the organisation even at this 
level.16
States can seek to make an international institution accountable for its conduct by 
exercising diplomatic protection on behalf o f  their citizens who claim to have been 
aggrieved by the act o f an international institution. Although the definition o f  
diplomatic protection is often limited to the intervention on behalf o f  a citizen who 
has been aggrieved by the actions o f  another state, other broader definitions refer to 
actions o f  ‘subjects o f  international law’,17 encompassing both the exercise o f 
functional protection by international organisations on behalf o f  their employees and 
the exercise o f  diplomatic protection by states against an international organisation. 
An important example o f  state practice in this area is the conclusion o f the Settlement 
Agreement between the UN and Belgium for the claims brought by Belgian citizens 
against the UN Operation in the Congo (O N U Q .18 Belgian citizens had brought 
claims in Belgian courts with a view o f making the UN jointly and severally liable with 
the Belgian state for damages to their property resulting from the UN intervention in
16 Art 5 (6) and 6, FAO Constitution.
17 International Law Commission, *First Report on Diplomatic Protection by John Dugard, Special 
Rapporteur*, UN Doc. A /CN.4/506 at paras. 36-38.
18 Exchange o f  Letters Constituting an Agreement Between the United Nations and Belgium Relating 
to the Settlement o f Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian Nationals, 20 
February 1965, U N  Jur. YB (1965) 39. Similar agreements were concluded with other third party states, 
such as Italy (18 January 1967,588 UNTS 197), Greece (20 June 1966,563 UNTS 3) and Switzerland (3 
June 1966, 564 UNTS 193). In 1996, Bosnia Herzegovina submitted a request for compensation for 
damages allegedly caused by the UN during its operations in its territory (Shraga, ‘UN Peacekeeping 
Operations: Applicability o f International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related 
Damage’, 94 AJIL  (2000) 406 at 410, fii 24).
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Congo, but with no success.19 With the settlement agreement Belgian citizens had 
access to  some form o f  compensation. For Congolese citizens, who suffered the brunt 
o f the conflict, no such fund was created, partly because o f  the failure o f  their 
authorities to advocate their case. Furthermore, the exercise o f diplomatic protection 
is no t available to refugees who feel aggrieved by the acts o f  the organisation 
mandated to ‘protect* them, UNHCR.20
In the practice o f  some states, the withdrawal o f  funding has been used avowedly as a 
means to bring an international institution into compliance, or according to a more 
cynical view as a punitive measure against an international institution that did not 
bend over to the requests o f  the contributing state. In the 1980s and 1990s, the US, in 
particular, maintained that its failure to pay contributions to the UN was due to the 
lack o f  accountability and to the poor management o f  the organisation.21 
Congressional leaders made the payment o f  arrears dependent on reform o f  the UN 
system.22 In the end, the compromise reached by the Clinton administration in 
N ovember 1999 did make the continued payment o f the arrears dependent upon die 
UN satisfying certain ‘reform criteria* over a period o f  five years. These criteria 
included parameters o f accountability, although essentially only in connection to 
financial issues, such as opening the programs, offices and activities o f  the UN ‘to 
auditing by the national auditing and inspecting agencies o f its member states’, and 
securing adequate funding for the Office o f Internal Oversight’.23 It is a condition, for 
the US payment o f  its arrears to continue in 2004, that the UN will have ‘approved 
and implemented system-wide structural reform, entailing a significant reduction in 
staff, that would eliminate all outdated activities and program duplication and would 
encompass all relevant United Nations specialized agencies’.24
19 Manderberv. Organisation des Nations Unies and E tat Beige 45 ILR 446.
20 See Chapter IV on the administration of refugee camps.
21 Alvarez, ‘Legal Remedies and the United Nations a la Carte Problem’, 12 Mich. J .Int X . (1991) 229; 
Nelson, ‘International Law and the US Withholding of payments to International Organizations’, 80 
AJIL  (1986) 973.
22 Murphy, ‘Contemporary Practice o f  the United States Relating to International Law’, 94 AJIL  (2000) 
348 at 349.
23 Sec. 2 (2) (A), United Nations Reform Act o f  1999.
24 Sec. 2 (2) (E), United Nations Reform Act o f  1999. It can be surmised that the US Congress, and 
other national parliaments, would be reluctant to make payments to the UN for compensating victims 
o f  violations o f human rights perpetrated by the Organisation.
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Notwithstanding this state practice,25 Article 17 o f  the Charter unequivocally obliges 
states to bear the expenses o f  the Organization ‘as apportioned by the General 
Assembly*. Moreover, Article 19 imposes sanctions on the use o f  this extreme method 
for pursuing accountability: the loss o f voting rights in the General Assembly is to be 
inflicted on states that fail to pay. An exception can be made when ‘failure to pay is 
due to conditions beyond the control o f  the Member*, which seems to apply only to 
cases o f  extreme financial hardships in which a noncompliant state could still be 
allowed to retain its voting rights. Besides these cases, it has been persuasively argued 
that ‘Member States retain the right to resist assessed contributions when they have a 
bona fide claim that the act or the operation to be financed entails a violation o f  the 
Charter or o f  international law*.26 In this case, member states would violate a provision 
o f the Charter — the obligation to the contribute to the expenses o f  the Organisation — 
in order to ensure respect for other Charter provisions or principles o f international 
law and thus avoid becoming accessories in their violation. This is the position, albeit 
developed in the context o f  different obligations, supported by Judge Lauterpacht in 
his separate opinion in the Order in the Bosnia case. He argued that the member 
states o f  the UN had become ‘free to disregard’ Security Council resolution 713 
(1991), which established the arms embargo, because its operation, by penalising the 
Bosnian Muslim population and contributing to its helplessness, ‘began to make 
Members o f  the United Nations accessories to genocide’.27
This approach would considerably limit the range o f situations in which this extreme 
measure can be resorted to, while maximising its potential as an instrument o f  control 
over institutional compliance. Were the practice o f  withholding payments to be 
accepted as a way for member states to pursue a generic agenda o f institutional
25 The US was not the only state in anear with its payment to the UN. One out o f  four member states 
was either unwilling or unable to pay its dues in 2000 (‘Surprising News on UN Dues’, The Forward 
available on the internet at http://www.unwatch.org/pbworks/adsurprising.html). Other examples o f  
defaults in payment o f contributions are referred to in H. G. Schermers, N. M. Blokker, International 
Institutional Law (3rd ed., 1999) at 631-635.
26 Francioni, ‘Multilateralism a la Carte: The limits to Unilateral Withholdings o f Assessed 
Contributions to the UN Budget, 11 EJIL (2000) 43 at 58. Alvarez is also prepared to accept the legality 
o f  die withholding o f contributions in response to utra vires acts but as last resort, to be taken only 
after the complaining member has given the organization the opportunity to correct any error’ (Alvarez, 
‘Financial Responsibility’, in C. C. Joyner (ed.) The United Nations and International Law (1997) 409 at 424).
27 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order o f 8 April 1993, ICJ Reports (1993) 325 at 441 (sep. op. o f  Judge 
Lauterpacht). The fact that member states o f  the UN were becoming accessories to genocide by 
complying with SC Res. 713 (1991) was viewed by Judge Lauterpacht as an “unintended consequence”
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reform, the main contributing states would be in a position effectively to blackmail the 
institution, a power that the Charter does no t accord to any state, and which would 
constitute a derogation from the principle o f  sovereign equality o f states. However, 
Article 19 only applies to the financial contributions that are made to meet ‘the 
expenses o f  die Organisation’ (A rt 17).28 An argument could be made that 
compensation for wrongful acts committed in the course o f an operation are 
‘expenses o f  the Organization’. However, Article 19 would continue not to cover the 
system o f  voluntary contributions on which the semi-autonomous agencies and the 
specialised agencies alike rely for much o f their work.29 Within these institutions, 
donor states can use their contributions to influence operational activities, and to 
promote greater accountability without incurring any sanction.
Recent state practice also includes the use o f  less antagonistic means o f  monitoring 
the performance o f  international institutions. Noteworthy is the growing involvement 
o f  national parliaments in matters relating to the accountability o f  international 
institutions. For example, the Select Committee on International Development o f  the 
House o f  Commons examined the institutional performance o f  UNHCR and o f  the 
UN Office for the Co-ordination o f  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the 
emergencies in Kosovo (1999) and Mozambique (1999-2000), crises in which the UK 
government had a significant stake having committed funds and resources.30 In 
addition, in one o f  its reports, the Select Committee also addressed the questions o f  
democracy and transparency within the World Trade Organisation.31 Quite 
importantly, in the data collection phase, the Committee heard evidence from officials 
working for the UN and the World Bank, including the heads o f  UNICEF, UNDP 
and the World Bank. By the beginning o f  2001, the Select Committee could list
of the resolution. Furthermore, the extreme gravity o f  the situation and the particular importance o f  the 
obligations involved — the obligation to prevent genocide — were material to this conclusion.
28 In Certain Expenses, the ICJ clarified that the locution ‘expenses o f the Organisation’ does not refer 
only to the regular expenses and includes expenses for operations for the maintenance o f  peace decided 
by the General Assembly (Certain Expenses of the UN, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1962) 151).
29 For example, on UNHCR, see: Vayrynen, The Dilemma o f  Voluntary Funding: Political Interests 
and Institutional Reforms’, Paper presented at the International Conference ‘Commemorating UNHCR 
at 50: Past, Present and Future o f Refugee Assistance’, Columbia University, New York, May 16-18, 
2000.
30 International Development Committee (House o f Commons), ‘Kosovo: The Humanitarian Crisis’, 15 
May 1999, Third Report — Session 1998-99 (HC 422); International Development Committee (House 
o f Commons), ‘Mozambique: Report and Proceedings o f the Committee, Minutes o f  Evidence and 
Appendices’, 3 May 2000, Fifth Report — Session 1999-00 (HC 326).
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‘scrutiny into multilateral development agencies’ as part o f  its regular work and state 
that
N o t only is this the first time that a Committee o f  this House has considered 
in such detail the work o f  these multilateral development agencies, it has also 
become clear that these bodies are unused to such scrutiny from national 
parliaments. I t has been gratifying to see their willingness to appear before the 
Committee —  in almost every case there were initial concerns about giving 
evidence since these bodies are not directly accountable to national 
parliaments. These concerns were allayed.. .32
This practice is no t limited to the UK. The Sub-Committee on International 
Operations and Human Rights, under the Committee on International Relations at the 
US Congress, has also heard evidence from heads o f  UN agencies, although not 
always with a view o f  assessing their performance but as part o f  fact-finding on 
regional conflicts.
Scrutiny by national parliaments is likely to intensify in the future both because o f 
public pressure on governments to account for tax-payers’ money spent through 
international institutions and because o f  the emergence o f  a more disenchanted view 
among the public on the work o f  the UN. The idea o f UN officials appearing before 
parliamentary committees and commissions may generate images o f international civil 
servants ‘bullied’ by national politicians eager to score points in front o f  their 
audiences. However, given that powerful states already attempt to influence the work 
o f international institutions behind the scenes, parliamentary control at least offers the 
benefit o f  being public and adversarial in nature. One problem is rather that current 
practice is essentially limited to UN officials appearing before the parliaments o f 
influential states — and im portant donors — like the US and the UK. Again, this avenue 
may prove an effective a way o f  promoting accountability only for the strong 
countries. There is no reason however why this good practice should no t be extended
31 International Development Committee (House o f Commons), ‘After Seattle— The Worid Trade 
Organisation and Developing Countries’, 29 November 2000, Tenth Report — Session 1999-00 (HC 
227).
32 International Development Committee (House o f Commons), ‘First Special Report’, 24 January 2001 
(HC 82).
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to the national parliaments o f  the countries in which the operation takes place, with 
the exception, for various reasons, o f  failed states.
Accountability through member states can be especially effective in peace-keeping 
operations, since the governments o f the countries o f  nationality o f the various 
contingent normally retain a t least some measure o f  control over their forces. In these 
cases, ‘piercing the intergovernmental veil’33 and pursuing accountability in domestic 
fora may be appropriate and expedient, as demonstrated by the investigations in 
Canada, Belgium and Italy in the aftermath o f  the mission in Somalia.34 Despite some 
exceptions, however, the states are still reluctant
V.3. A ccountability  th rough  N G O s
According to Chamovitz, it was before the First World War and during the inter-war 
period that N G O s exercised the m ost significant influence at the international level.35 
He reaches this conclusion measuring the impact o f  N G O s on international life on the 
basis o f  two criteria: their ‘degree o f  penetration’ into intergovernmental meetings or 
international organisation, and the degree o f influence that they exerted on the agenda 
o f  governments. Applying these criteria nowadays can perhaps allay some o f  the 
precipitate enthusiasm that characterises much debate on N G O s. Indeed, although we 
may have entered a cycle in which the influence o f  N G O s is in the ascendant,36 their 
‘degree o f  penetration’ in international organisations remains limited and their powers 
within the organisations are still based on the constitutional arrangements negotiated 
in the 1940s and 1950s.
In theory, N G O s could act as ‘watch-dogs’ o f  multilateral institutions by spearheading 
international public interest litigation; in practice, the rules on locus standi and on the 
submission o f  amicus curiae briefs curb N G O  participation in international judicial 
proceedings.37 Interestingly, the Permanent Court o f Justice had a more liberal
33 The expression is John Cerone’s, ‘Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo*, ASIL  
Insight (October 2000) at www.asil.org/insights /htm.
34 For example, parliamentary enquiries followed the publication o f  allegations on the behaviour o f  UN 
troops in Somalia. See Lupi, ‘Report by the Enquiry Co m m ission on the Behaviour o f  Italian Peace- 
Keeping Troops in Somalia*, 1 YB Int. Ilumanit. L . (1998) 375.
35 Chamovitz, Tw o Centuries o f Participation: NGOs and International Governance’, 18 Mich. J. Int. L. 
(1997) 183.
36 Chamovitz claims that the impact of NGOs on international life is ‘cyclical*.
37 This is mainly true o f the ICJ. NGOs have been involved in cases before the European Court o f  
Justice, the Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights, and, subject to more restrictions, before die
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approach to the submission o f  briefs on the part o f  N G O s than its successor.38 In 
fact, there is only a very small number o f  cases o f  the International Court o f  Justice 
(ICJ) in which non-gpvemmental actors played some role, namely the 1950 South West 
Africa case,39 the two advisory opinions on Nuclear Weapons,40 and Gabcikovo- 
Nagymarosf although much o f  their participation had to remain ‘behind the scenes’. 
Even so, their indirect involvement was not unanimously welcomed. In the Nuclear 
Weapons opinion, Judge Guillaume questioned whether the requests could really be 
regarded as ‘emanating from the Assemblies that had adopted them’ and whether it 
would not have been appropriate for the Court to declare the requests ‘inadmissible’.42
An interesting development is the establishment o f  the World Bank Inspection Panel, 
to which requests for inspection can be presented by ‘an affected party in the territory 
o f  the borrower which is not a single individual (i.e., a community o f  persons such as 
an organisation, association, society or other grouping o f  individuals)’.43 The 
Inspection Panel provides an ‘unusual window for members o f  the public to access 
quasi-legal processes and norms’44 vis-a-vis an international institution, but it is no t a 
judicial organ, and even as a non-judicial body still represents a starting point rather 
than a point o f  arrival.45
N G O  presence in UN organs is overall trifling. The Charter simply concedes that ‘die 
Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements with non- 
gpvemmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence’
European Court o f  Human Rights. Shelton, ‘The Participation o f Non-governmental Organisations in 
International Judicial Proceedings’, 88AJIL  (1994) 611.
38 Chamowitz, supra note 35 at 216-217 (especially footnote 294) and at 279; Shelton, supra note 37 at 
623.
39 International Status of South-West Africa, ICJ Reports (1950) 128.
40 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (WHO Request), Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports (1996) 66 and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (GA Request), Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports (19%) 226.
41 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1997) 7.
42 Nuclear Weapons (GA Request), Sep. Op. o f  Judge Guillaume at para. 2. Judge Oda also appeared to 
frown upon the involvement o f NGOs (Id, diss. Op. o f  Judge Oda at para. 8).
43IBRD Res. 93-10 and IDA Res. 93-6 The World Bank Inspection Panel’ at para. 12. Thus, for 
example, in two cases in 2000, a local Ecuadorian NGO had submitted the request for an investigation 
in Ecuador Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (Report o f  16 May 
2000); the International Campaign for Tibet was behind the request in China: Western Poverty Reduction 
Project Investigation Report (Report o f  28 April 2000). See: I. Shihata The World Rank Inspection Panel (2nd ed., 
1999).
44 Bissell, ‘Recent Practice o f the Inspection Panel o f  the World Bank’, 91AJIL  (1997) 741 at 744.
45 See below at 243 £f.
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(A rt IV).46 B y  March 2 0 0 1  such arrangements had been made with nearly 2 0 0 0  
N G O s. ECOSOC Resolution 1 9 9 6 /3 1 ,  which contains a detailed regulation o f  this 
status, fails even to protect an N G O ’s basic freedom from state interference by 
providing that an organisation which engages ‘in a pattern o f  acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles o f the Charter o f  the United Nations including 
unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against Member States o f  the United 
Nations incompatible with those purposes and principles’ shall have its consultative 
status withdrawn or suspended. States use these provisions to have the status o f 
N G O s hostile to their policies suspended or withdrawn. For example, Cuba 
successfully lobbied for the suspension o f  an N G O  o f  Cuban exiles, and Russia 
secured a majority o f  votes in the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations in 
favour o f  its proposal to suspend the Transnational Radical Party, which had been 
critical o f  Russian policy in Chechenya.47
N o t only is the status o f N G O s within the Economic and Social Couifcif — the UN 
organ in which they are more ‘visible’ — precarious, their rights are also limited. N QO s 
can make written submissions to the members o f  the Economic and Social Council 
via the Secretary General, and can make oral presentations only upon a 
recorppripndation o f the Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations and with 
Council.48 N G O s are virtually absent from UN organs other than;
46 The provisions applying to NGOs contained in the statutes o f specialised UN agencies normally 
replicate Art. 71. See Lagoni, ‘Article 71’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A  
Commentary (1994). UNHCR’s Statute mandates the High Commissioner to keep ‘inclose touch with ... 
inter-governmental organisations concerned, establishing contacts in such manner as he may think best 
with private organisations dealing with refugee questions, facilitating the co-ordination o f the efforts o f  
private organisations concerned with the welfare o f refugees’.
47 ‘Report o f  the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on the first and second parts o f  its 
2000 session’, 13 July 2000 (UN Doc. E /2000/88 (Part II)). The final decision on the suspension is 
taken by the Council, but a recommendation o f the Committee normally anticipates a decision to 
suspend.
48 ECOSOC Res. 1996/31 at paras. 30-32.
49 Chamovitz, supra note 35 at 278.
50 Gramsci is credited with coining the term ‘civil society’ or, at least, with its diffusion. However, the 
Gramscian dismal analysis o f civil society, in particular the emphasis on its hegemonic nature and on
me Economic andui  Social Council. However, practice is cautiously evolving and 
N G O s may be allowed to make submissions to  other organs in some circumstances, 
for example some N G O s ‘made a presentation to the Security Council on the crisis in 
Africa’s G reat Lakes region’.49 Within these constraints, it is no t surprising that, in 
spite o f  the rhetoric about UN-civil society partnership,50 N G O s have not had a real
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opportunity to make what could be one o f  their m ost significant contributions to 
international society, i.e. monitoring the work o f  states and international institutions 
and adding pressure to ensure their accountability for violations o f  human rights and 
humanitarian law.
A theoretical problem with viewing N G O s as promoters o f the accountability o f  
international institutions is that TSIGOs themselves need to be subjected to standards 
o f  accountability and good governance’.51 In many situations, N G O s’ vested interests 
coincide with those o f the very international institutions or states which they ought to 
monitor. In the humanitarian field, for example, N G O s often are ‘implementing 
partners’ o r subcontractors o f  international institutions. I f  competition exists, it is 
normally over funds rather than over standards. The case o f  refugee camps, examined 
in Chapter IV, demonstrates that, far from attempting to make UNHCR accountable 
for the violations o f  human rights it commits, N G O s too often decide at best to 
acquiesce to  them, and for the most part to be zealous executors. In many instances, 
especially when the relationship between UN agencies and international N Q Q s is 
concerned, it seems that the current phase mirrors ‘the fourth moment in the history 
o f the relationship between civil society and the state’ in Africa, which was 
characterised by the ‘collapse o f  an embryonic indigenous civil society, o f  trade unions 
and autonomous civil organisations, and its absorption into political society (...) it is 
the time when civil society — based social movements became demobilised and 
political movements statised’.52 This is, in other words, the phase o f  co-optation.
Although the general picture on the role o f  N G O s as ‘watch-dogs’ o f international 
organisations is no t encouraging, some interesting practice is emerging. First, albeit 
this is no t the rule, there are examples o f  humanitarian N G O s that maintain their 
integrity and have, on some occasions, challenged the actions o f international 
organisations.53 Secondly, in the 1990s human rights N G O s published reports in 
which they criticised the conduct o f various UN organisations and o f peacekeeping
the social interests that civil society represents, seem to have been entirely forgotten. Gramsci can be a 
good anti-body to the current pandemic excitement about the role o f NGOs.
51 Woods, supra note 5 at 45.
52 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (1996) at 21.
53 Medicins Sans Frontier has often been critical o f die way particular humanitarian operations have 
been conducted. On at least four occasions (Ethiopia 1984-86, Eastern Congo 1994-96, Afghanistan 
1996-97, Sudan 1998), it broke ranks with other humanitarian agencies even deciding to suspend its 
operations because it believed that fundamental principles were neglected.
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operations, certainly contributing to pressure for accountability.54 Monitoring by 
human rights N GO s is an example o f  good practice that can yield positive results, 
although one has to hope that human rights N G O s will resist co-optation rather more 
ably than their counterparts in the humanitarian sphere. In the environmental and 
developmental arena, much o f  the pressure for change on international financial 
institutions has been exerted through the concerted action o f  transnational coalitions 
o f NGOs. Such coalitions are based on a partnership between N G O s in the north, 
which have easier access to funds and can lobby and campaign in donor countries,55 
and N G O s in the south, which have a direct knowledge o f  the situation on the field 
and can mobilise local support.56
V.4. A ccountability  th rough  th e  political organs o f the  organisation
and  th rough  adm inistrative control
The existence o f  a wide gap between principles, as laid down both in general 
international law and in the acts o f  the political organs o f  the UN, and the practice o f 
many an operation o f  the UN has been highlighted in Chapter III. It would follow 
from that analysis that a way o f  containing the erosion o f  standards within the UN — 
that grows steadily as one moves from the top (the Security Council, the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General) to the bottom  
(field operations) - could consist o f reinforcing existing mechanisms o f top-to-bottom 
political control, and o f  establishing new ones. O ne problem with this approach is that 
it assumes the willingness on the part o f  the political organs to exercise their 
supervisory role in a rigorous manner. O n the contrary states, which dominate the 
political organs, might no t always have a real interest in promoting the operational 
accountability o f the UN. They limit themselves to adopting resolutions in the 
General Assembly and o f  the Security Council with a purposefully righteous tone in 
order to give legitimacy to  the UN operation and to secure consensus. As a result, in 
some instances the political organs appear more capable o f  taking a progressive and 
principled stance on very controversial issues - such as the continued provision o f
54 On UNHCR, Human Rights Watch, ‘Uncertain Refuge’ (1997); on UNDP, Human Rights Watch, 
‘Failing the Displaced: The UNDP Displaced Persons Program in Kenya* (1998); on peacekeeping 
operations, African Rights, ‘Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces* (July 1993), 
and Amnesty International, *Peacekeeping and Human Rights’ (January 1994).
55 J. A. Fox, L. D. Brown (eds.) The Struve for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots 
Movements (1998).
56 Importing this experience into the area o f  humanitarian assistance may not be so simple, since 
humanitarian NGOs are often part and parcel o f  the humanitarian power structure.
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humanitarian assistance to the Taliban authorities discussed in Chapter III - than the 
bureaucracy o f  international institutions putatively composed o f  a well-educated, 
forward-thinking and open-minded cosmopolitan elite.
A t present, the extent to which the political organs o f  the UN exercise control over 
the organisation tends to  vary significantly from one type o f  operation to the other. 
For example, the operations o f  the specialised programmes, such as UNICEF, 
UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, are not normally subject to pervasive scrutiny on the part o f 
the political organs o f  the UN. The peculiar legal status o f  these programmes — 
subsidiary bodies in principle, but autonomous organisations in practice — has 
undoubtedly been instrumental to their lack o f accountability to the parent organs. 
The parent organs in turn acquiesced to this situation without activating powers that 
they legally possess. As for administrative control over the specialised programmes by 
the Secretariat, their quasi-autonomous status makes them  impermeable to this form 
o f control. The reason for this is political rather than legal: the ‘feudal’ structure57 o f 
the UN with its relatively weak centre and its various principalities and fiefdoms 
reflects a delicate balance o f  power within the Organisation. The Secretary General 
could use some o f  his legal powers more imaginatively to  promote the accountability 
o f  the specialised programmes, but is unlikely to do so within the current inter- 
institutional equilibrium.
The administrative and political control o f  peace-keeping, peace-making and peace­
building operations58 raises different problems, for the m ost part related to the fact 
that the practice o f  the UN has developed in a context that was different from that 
originally envisaged by the Charter; which is not to say that such practice is 
automatically ultra tires. Depending on which organ established the operation, it is 
either the General Assembly or the Security Council to which ultimate responsibility 
appertains.59 A common pattern since the leave it to Dag’ policy that characterised the
57 The comparison with feudal institutions is Paul Szasz’s (The Role o f the UN Secretary General: 
Some Legal Aspects’, 24 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1991) 161).
58 On the different types o f peace operations, see Chapter 1.6(c).
59 The report o f  die Secretary General, A n Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A /47/277, S/24111) introduced 
die distinction between preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peacemaking. Preventive diplomacy 
mainly involves the good offices intervention o f the Secretary General to prevent or contain a conflict. 
Peace-keeping and peacemaking normally involve an operational dimension, frequendy on a multi­
agency scale. The Supplement to A n Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A /50/60, S/1995/1) introduced the 
category o f  post-conflict peace-building. Peace-keeping missions can be established both by the Security 
Council and by the General Assembly, since the competence o f the Council in this area is primary but
244
UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF) and ONUC has been the conferral 
o f  wide powers o f  implementation and interpretation o f the mandate o f  the operation 
on the Secretary General.60 The Secretary General submits periodic reports to the 
Security Council on the implementation o f each mission. Some resolutions expressly 
state the number o f  reports that the Secretary General has to submit every year,61 
while others simply request the Secretary General ‘to  report to the Council at regular 
intervals’ o r ‘to provide periodic reports’62 In the case o f at least one peace-keeping 
mission - the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) - no 
regular reporting to the Council or the Assembly has taken place.63 The reports 
submitted by the Secretary General on the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), on the 
other hand, have been detailed and rich with information, and, for instance in the 
period June 1999-April 2001, have included the text o f the over 100 regulations issued 
by the Special Representative o f  the Secretary General.
(a) The reports o f the Secretary General
The reports o f  the Secretary General constitute the main official channel for keeping 
the Security Council, and less frequently the General Assembly, informed about the 
implementation o f  the mandate. The importance o f  these reports could hardly be 
underestimated. I t has been pointed out that, particularly when a Chapter VII 
operation is concerned, the exercise o f delegated powers by the Secretary General is 
subjected to limitations, including the good faith use o f  discretionary powers and the 
preservation o f  a decision-making process that is independent o f  UN member states.64 
To these limitations, it is necessary to add the duty to keep the delegating organ, the
not exclusive (Certain Expenses, supra note 28 at 162), but non-consensual missions require the use o f  the 
Chapter VII prerogatives o f  the Council. As mentioned, many operations o f  the UN do not have a clear 
mandate o f  one o f the political organs (Chapter 1.6).
60 N. White, Keeping the Peace (1997) 230; D. Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective 
Security (1998) 50 ff.. For the Secretary General these powers have been ‘a sword and ... a shield’ (G. 
Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960-1964 (1978) 194). On at least one occasion - the 
UN Emergency Force (UNEF) — the Secretary General could decide its withdrawal from Egypt in 1967 
without reference to the General Assembly, which had established it in the first place (R. Higgins, 
United Nations Peace-keeping 1946-19671: The Middle East (1969) 273).
61 After the initial report to be submitted within three months o f  the deployment o f  the UN troops, SC 
Res. 1272 (1999) on East Timor requests the Secretary General to submit one report every six months; 
SC Res. 1289 (2000) on Sierra Leone requests a report every 45 days;
62 SC Res. 1244 (1999) on Kosovo and SC Res. 1312 (2000) establishing the UN Mission in Ethiopia 
and Eritrea (UNMEE).
63 R. Higgins, United Nations Peace-keeping 1946-1967II: Asia (1970) 352.
64 Sarooshi, supra note 60, at 55-57. Reviewing a judgment o f the UN Administrative Tribunal, die ICJ 
endorsed the conclusion that the Secretary General’s discretionary powers to extend the period o f  
appointment o f an employee were not ‘unfettered’ and could not be exercised in an ‘arbitrary and
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Security Council, accurately informed about the exercise o f  the delegated powers as 
well as about relevant factual developments. The existence o f  this duty was indirectly 
recognised by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case. Rejecting the Russian argument that 
the Secretary General had acted ultra vires in determining the size and composition o f  
ONUC, the Court emphasised that there existed a ‘record o f reiterated consideration, 
confirmation, approval and ratification by the Security Council ... o f  the actions o f  
the Secretary General’, and that it was clear that, under these circumstances, the 
Secretary General could no t have ‘usurped or impinged upon’ the prerogatives o f the 
Council.65 For the ‘consideration, confirmation, approval and ratification’ o f  the 
Security Council to be informed, the Secretary General has to provide detailed 
information about his activities, and o f his staff on the ground.
The reports o f the Secretary General are normally prepared by the staff at the 
Secretariat on the basis o f  drafts on the various issue areas submitted by the field staff. 
The problem o f their being erratically submitted could be easily fixed if the Security 
Council developed a more consistent practice and requested the Secretary General to 
submit reports at the same interval for each mission, making exceptions only if  the 
situation on the ground warrants more frequent assessments. However, one argument 
against intensifying the submission o f these reports is that they require a considerable 
investment o f staff time and resources at the field level.66
The main advantage o f  entrusting the implementation o f  peace-keeping operations 
with the Secretary General is that their management is no t in the hands o f  states, but 
is in the hands o f an avowedly impartial office. A problem, however, is that states will 
continue to try to influence certain aspects o f  these operations but will do so in the 
backrooms. It is also rather simplistic to assume that the Secretary General is really 
super partes. Another major disadvantage with this role o f  the Secretary General is, as 
the head o f  the institutional bureaucracy, s /h e  is no t always interested in promoting
capricious’ manner (Application for Review of Judgment 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report (1987) 18 at 57-58).
65 Certain Expenses, supra note 28 at 175.
66 During a fact-finding mission in Sierra Leone in July 1998 on behalf o f the Lawyers’ Committee for 
Human Rights, we were told that many o f the senior officials were extremely busy in those days and 
were not gping to be able to meet us, because o f  the imminent deadline for sending their drafts to 
headquarters. The Secretary General was about to present his first report on the UN Observer Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to the Security Council (UN D oc S /1998/750), and another one was due 
after only two months.
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the accountability o f  h is/her staff, particularly an ‘effective’ accountability, which, as 
mentioned, ought to entail a sanction against the responsible individual/office, and a 
remedy to the aggrieved person(s).
In order to make reporting more effective as a means o f  accountability, members o f  
the Security Council could use the submission o f  the report o f  the Secretary General 
as an opportunity to ask questions about the conduct o f the operation. Direct and 
intense questioning is one o f the instruments that is used by national parliaments to 
exercise control over the executive, and there is no reason why it could no t be adapted 
to international institutions. In order to perform this function effectively, it would be 
important for the Security Council to rely on different sources o f  fact-finding, without 
limiting itself to information made available by Secretary General. The submission o f 
reports by N G O s and other interested parties, particularly from the affected area, 
should be encouraged.67 Under existing rules, the Council can allow the direct 
participation o f  N G O s or experts, for example by means o f  oral presentations.68 
Representatives o f weaker countries in the Security Council would especially benefit 
from this opening o f  the sources o f  information, since they cannot normally rely on 
the detailed briefings, including information from intelligence sources, to which more 
powerful states — m ost notably, but not exclusively, the five permanent members - 
have access. The proposed changes would not necessitate any reform o f  the Charter; 
on the contrary, they would probably serve to further compliance with the Charter. 
They would however involve a considerable change in modus apemndi.
(b) Control by the Security Council
Another tool with potential applications in the area o f accountability is the fact-finding 
mission o f  a delegation o f  the Security Council. In 2000 alone, five such missions were 
conducted in different crisis areas.69 In three cases the mission o f  the Security Council 
focused on political aspects (Sierra Leone, Congo, Ethiopia), but in at least two
67 In the practice o f  the Security Council the participation o f  non-member states and o f representatives 
o f  UN subsidiary agencies is well-accepted and has occurred with some frequency (for examples, see 
UN Department o f  Political Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security CoundL Supplement 1981-1984 
(1992) UN Doc. ST/PSCA/l/Add. 9 and Supplement 1985-1988 (2000) UN Doc. ST /D PA /l/A dd. 10). 
The participation o f  individuals or private institutions is almost unknown (see supra p. 241).
68 Rule 39 and Appendix A and B, Provisional Rules o f Procedure o f the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/96/Rev.7, also available at www.im.org/Docs / s c /scrules.htm.
69 They are listed at www.un.org/Docs /sc / missionreports / scmissions.htm. The relative reports are: 
S/2000/1105 (on East Timor); S/2000/992 (on Sierra Leone); S/2000/416 (on Congo); S/2000/413 
(on Ethiopia and Eritrea); S/2000/363 (on Kosovo).
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instances (East Timor, Kosovo) the review o f the implementation o f  the resolutions 
o f  the Council and fact-finding about the conduct o f the UN operation on the ground 
constituted the main focus o f the mission. The East Timor mission, in particular, dealt 
with operational aspects and made a series o f  recommendations on security, refugees 
and justice. Missions o f the Security Council to review the operational implementation 
o f  its resolutions could become an important institutional check on the performance 
o f the UN. In the existing practice the gist o f  these missions has been predominantly 
political as a way o f exerting pressure on various parties to overcome obstacles to the 
implementation o f  a resolution, or o f facilitating an ongoing political process. The 
Security Council ought to include, however, an element o f  accountability and o f  
performance-monitoring in its missions. Human rights should no t simply be paid 
token respect to, but form part o f the fact-finding o f the Council which could rely on 
independent experts to accomplish this. An indication o f  the considerable impact that 
fact-finding missions could have on improving accountability is the lively public 
debate that ensued from the publication o f  a report o f  a UK parliamentary delegation 
which was critical o f the operational performance o f UNHCR in Kosovo.70
In some instances, the Security Council has appointed ad hoc commissions o f  enquiry. 
For example, the Council instructed the Secretary General to  establish an ad hoc panel 
o f experts to investigate the illegal exploitation o f  natural resources and other forms o f 
wealth in the Congo.71 The panel’s report to the Council in April 2001 aroused severe 
criticism from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, which the report accused o f  plundering 
resources in eastern Congo.72 I t was far from predictable that the panel would reach 
this conclusion, given the level o f  international support that these countries, 
particularly Rwanda and Uganda, have enjoyed since the mid-1990s. The use o f 
‘independent’ commissions o f  enquiry to investigate aspects o f  an international 
conflict could constitute an important step forward in making Security Council action 
accountable, in particular by ensuring that the factual determinations underlying the 
action o f the Security Council — e.g. that a certain state is an aggressor, that a threat to
70 See supra V.2.
71 Statement by the President o f  the Security Council, 2 June 2000, UN Doc. S/PRST/2000/20.
72 Report o f  the Panel o f Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic o f the Congo, 12 April 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/357; UN OCHA 
Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN-CEA), Weekly Round­
up 68,20 April 2001.
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peace exists in a given region, or who is to  blame for a crisis — are less coloured by 
political bias.
The Security Council has also set up committees and advisory boards for monitoring 
the implementation o f  resolutions that impose sanctions or embargoes. Although the 
effectiveness o f  ‘sanctions committees’ is disputed,73 with the appropriate 
modifications this could be another useful model for enhancing accountability 
through political bodies. A d  hoc committees could be established to m onitor the 
performance o f  UN agencies and bodies working under a Security Council mandate. 
In order to achieve optimal efficacy, these committees should preserve the leanness 
that characterises sanctions committees.
In earlier practice, ‘advisory committees’ were established to assist the Secretary 
General in the implementation o f  a peace-keeping operation. For example, the 
General Assembly established an Advisory Committee on UNEF I to be chaired by 
the Secretary General.74 An Advisory Committee for ONUC, comprising 
representatives o f  the states that were contributing troops to the mission, was created 
as a result o f the personal initiative o f the Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold. The 
ONU C Advisory Committee met regularly and assisted both Dag Hammarskjold and 
U Thant in handling the Congo crisis and in the strategic management o f  ONUC.75 In 
the 1990s, these advisory committees reappeared albeit under a different 
denomination and in a less structured format: now referred to as “Friends o f the 
Secretary General”, informal groups comprising representatives from contributing 
member states have been ‘created on an ad hoc basis to support the Secretary-General 
in the discharge o f peacemaking and peace-keeping mandates entrusted to him’.76
The executive committee that was established by the Secretary General shortly after 
the inception o f  UNM IK  differs from advisory committees o f  peace-keeping 
missions. The committee was required ‘to assist the Special Representative in fulfilling 
his responsibilities’, and to act as ‘the main instrument through which he will control
73 Boudreau, ‘Creating a United Nations Sanctions Agency*, 4 International Peace-keeping (1997) 115, 
argues that sanctions committees are largely ineffective and that a sanctions agency should be 
established.
74 GA Res. 1001 (ES-I), 7 November 1956.
75 See R  Hig^ns, United Nations Peace-keeping 1946-1967 III: Africa (1980) 64 ff.
76 Supplement to A n Agenda for Peace, supra note 59 at paras. 83-84.
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the implementation o f UNMIK’s objectives’.77 However, membership o f  this 
Committee was essentially ‘bureaucratic’ w ithout any representative o f  Security 
Council members, and including only the special representative, h is/her deputy, and 
the heads o f  the four main components o f the mission — the UN (civil administration), 
UNHCR (humanitarian assistance), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) (institution-building) and the EU (reconstruction).
(c) E xpostfacto measures
As a result o f  the failures o f  the UN in the 1990s, a number o f  expos facto instruments 
o f  accountability were established. These instruments consisted o f  reports o f  
independent commissions o f  enquiry (Rwanda), special reports o f  the Secretary 
General (Srebenica), as well as the establishment o f special evaluations units -  
sometimes known as ‘lessons learned’ units - within UN organisations and 
departments. The Rwanda report was the result o f  an initiative o f the Secretary 
General,78 which was endorsed by the Security Council.79 The three members o f  the 
commission o f  inquiry were appointed by the Secretary General. The final report o f 
this commission80 is severely critical o f  the conduct o f the UN in Rwanda during the 
1994 genocide. However, although it constitutes an important document for 
ascertaining numerous key facts on the conduct o f  the UN in Rwanda, it may not be 
as efficacious as a means o f securing accountability for wrong-doing. Indeed, the 
combination o f  sanctions and remedies that were mentioned above as necessary 
components o f  an effective mechanism o f  accountability is lacking. Although the 
terms o f  the inquiry were essentially limited to  fact-finding and to the formulation o f  
recommendations, and did no t expressly include the indication o f  remedies or 
sanctions, the panel could have decided to include them in its recommendations. 
Instead, the only remedy that was recommended was feeble, i.e.
The United Nations should acknowledge its part o f  the responsibility for not 
having done more to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. The Secretary- 
General should seek actively ways to launch a new beginning in the
77 Report o f the Secretary General on the UN Interim Administration Mission to Kosovo, 12 July 1999, 
UN Doc. S/1999/779.
78 Letter from the Secretary General to the President o f  the Security Council, 18 March 1999, UN Doc. 
S/1999/339.
79 Letter from the President o f the Security Council to the Secretary General, UN Doc. S/1999/340.
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relationship between the United Nations and Rwanda, recognising the failures 
o f  the past but also establishing a commitment to cooperation in the future.81
Within politically accountable domestic institutions the results o f  similar inquiries 
would often result in a political sanction, i.e. the resignation, or even dismissal, o f 
officials whose conduct was found to  be unsatisfactory. However, although senior 
officials o f  the UN were not spared criticism in the final report,82 no consequence 
appears to have flowed from such criticism.
Unlike the Rwanda report, the report on the fall o f  Srebenica was no t prepared by an 
independent panel o f  experts, but by the Secretary General following a request o f  the 
General Assembly.83 Perhaps not surprisingly, this report is more cautious than the 
Rwanda report in identifying responsibilities within the UN both at the level o f 
member states o f  the Security Council and at the field level, although it is hardly 
disputable that in this crisis it was the lack o f  political will on the part o f  the key 
members o f  the Security Council to intervene that caused the fall o f Srebenica.84
Evaluation and lessons learned’ units can play an important role in promoting debate 
and changes within institutional cultures that are often still impervious to scrutiny and 
assessment. Reports evaluating specific projects and policies have been available in the 
public domain since the 1990s.85 While this certainly advances accountability and 
transparency, it is arguable w hether the impact o f  such evaluation activity on the field
80 ‘Report o f  the Independent Inquiry into the Actions o f the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide 
in Rwanda* (15 December 1999), available at <www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm>.
81 Ibid. at recommendation no. 14.
82 For example, Kofi Annan, who was Under-Secretary General for Peace-keeping Operations at the 
time o f  the genocide, was criticised for not briefing the Secretary General about a telegram in which 
General Dallaire, Force Commander o f UNAMIR, alerted the headquarters about information he had 
received on the planning o f the genocide in Rwanda. Arguably, the career o f a politician in a democratic 
country found to be responsible for a failure o f this gravity would not have survived.
83 Report o f  the Secretary General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebenica, 
15 November 1999, UN Doc. A /54/549; and GA Res. 53/35,30 November 1998.
84 The report does recognise that the there was a failure on the part o f the Secretariat ‘to fully 
comprehend the extent o f the Serb war aims’ (Id. at para. 496 and 501). In his account o f  those troubled 
years, former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lays the blame squarely with the US 
administration for the failures o f the international community in Bosnia and for assigning an impossible 
task to the UN (B. Boutros-Ghali Unvanquished: A  U S.- UFJ. Saga (1999)).
85 For example: the reports o f UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit can be found at 
http: /  / www.unhcr.ch/evaluate /main.htm: the reports o f UNICEF’s Division o f Evaluation, Policy and 
Planning are available at http://www.unicef.org/reseval/: the Lessons Learned Unit o f the Division o f  
Peace-keeping Operations are at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>.
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is considerable and w hether lessons are really ‘learned’. O n the contrary, lessons that 
are prematurely and optimistically considered *1631111’ are too often quickly forgotten.
(d) Ombudsman offices
An example o f a lesson learnt but soon forgotten’ is the proposal to establish 
ombudsman offices ‘to consider grievances registered by the local population against 
the United Nations’ for peace-keeping operations. This proposal was contained in the 
report on UNOSOM o f die Lessons Learned Unit at the Division o f  Peace-keeping, 
where it was argued that
Without such a mechanism, the United Nations was perceived by many in 
Somalia to  be "above die law", which undercut its efforts to promote human 
rights. Likewise, UNOSOM ’s attempts to promote an open and free political 
process in the country was partially handicapped by an apparent lack o f 
transparency in its own political operations.86
These proposals for a peace-keeping ombudsman were no t followed up. They were 
no t discussed in the ‘Brahimi’ report - the m ost important review o f  UN peace­
keeping practice in the last years - which also took surprisingly litde notice o f  matters 
o f  accountability and compliance with the mandate in peace-keeping operations.87
In the humanitarian sector, proposals for the creation o f  an ombudsman have been 
receiving increasing attention mainly as a result o f  the Humanitarian Accountability 
Project — an initiative o f  various N G O s which inter-govemmental organisations have 
not joined.88 The proposed humanitarian ombudsman would represent a step forward 
in mechanisms o f accountability because o f  its envisaged direct accessibility to the 
beneficiaries o f a humanitarian programme and because o f  its jurisdiction ratione 
personae which would include at least N G O s. A t present, the only avenue that is 
available to beneficiaries who claim to have been aggrieved by a specific decision or
86 The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM), April 1992 - March 1995’ at para. 57 (date o f release not dear) available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/somalia.htm>.
87 Report o f  the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report”), 21 August 2000, UN 
Doc. A /55/305, S/2000/809.
88 See http://www.onewodd.org/ombudsman/. in particular Beyani, The Legal Framework for an 
International Humanitarian Ombudsman* (October 1999), and Apthorpe, Mayhew, ‘A Possible Modd
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policy o f a humanitarian agency is to resort to local courts. However, national judicial 
remedies are not available vis-a-vis UN agencies because o f  their immunity.89 Even 
vis-a-vis N G O s are these remedies often available only on paper, either because the 
judiciary is not operative or because international N G O s have managed to secure for 
themselves a de facto immunity from administrative and judicial interventions. The 
litmus test for a humanitarian ombudsman is again determined by the type o f  remedies 
and sanctions that it could mete out.90
The UN experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an interesting case study because 
various human rights bodies, including ombudsman offices, featured among the web 
o f  institutions created under or in the wake o f the Dayton Peace Agreement.91 The 
m ost important o f  such bodies is the Commission on Human Rights, which comprises 
two distinct offices, the Office o f the Human Rights Ombudsman — which later 
renamed itself Office o f  the Human Rights Ombudsperson — and the Human Rights 
Cham ber92 While both the Ombudsperson and the Chamber can hear individual 
complaints, their jurisdiction rationepersonae is limited to the parties to Annex 6 o f  the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, i.e. the Republic o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation 
o f Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.93 As a result, they would have 
to reject as inadmissible a complaint against the UN Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (UNMBIH) or the International Stabilisation Force (SFOR), unless the 
complaint was presented against one o f  the parties to Annex 6 for failing to prevent 
UNMBIH or SFOR from violating a certain right. Indeed, while no case against the 
UNMBIH or SFOR appears to have been brought before the Ombudsperson,94 the
for a Humanitarian Ombudsman: Report on Action Research in Kosovo’ (September 1999). The latter 
is based on a thorough field study o f  the feasibility o f  a humanitarian ombudsman in Kosovo.
89 See below V.6.
90 This is so assuming that the ombudsman would have die essential features that normally define this 
office (impartiality and independence, accessibility to individuals, promptness, etc.).
91 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [hereinafter *Dayton Peace 
Agreement^, signed in Paris, 14 December 1995,35 ILM 75.
92 Id. at Annex 6.
93 The Ombudsperson and die Chamber can consider only cases where the violation ‘is alleged or 
appears to have been committed by the Parties, including by any official or organ o f the Parties, 
Cantons, Municipalities, or any individual acting under the authority o f such official or organ* (Id. at 
Art 2, Annex 6). The substantive human rights law that they can apply includes ‘the rights and 
freedoms provided in the European Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Protocols and the other international agreements listed in the Appendix to this 
Annex’ (Id. at Art 1).
94 Inadmissibility decisions are known as ‘decisions not to open an investigation’ under the Human 
Rights Ombudsperson. Although the Office o f the Ombudsperson did not deal with complaints against 
UNMBIH, some reported decisions not to open an investigation were taken in cases brought against 
non party states (Amautovic Fehim v. Germany, Application No. 285/97; De&c Said v. Sweden, Application
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Human Rights Chamber declared an application inadmissible for lack o f  jurisdiction 
ratione personae since the applicant alleged that his right to a fair trial had been violated 
by SFOR.95 The fact that the Dayton Peace Agreement granted such a restrictive 
jurisdiction ratione personae to the Commission on Human Rights signifies an inherent 
contradiction, given that the same agreement created the basis for the exercise o f  
extensive powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina by international authorities, i.e. 
UNMBIH and SFOR. It is also at variance with the need to ensure the protection o f  
the human rights, especially the rights o f  women, in the private sphere. Although there 
is no doubt that the vast majority o f  human rights violations that need to be addressed 
in Bosnia are related to violations committed by the Bosnian federal authorities or by 
one o f  the republics, it is still ironic that the plethora o f  human rights bodies96 that 
have been set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not provide a mechanism for ensuring 
accountability for violations o f  fundamental rights perpetrated by the international 
authorities - those very authorities entrusted with the promotion o f  respect for the 
rule o f law in this war-ridden country.
The experience in Kosovo signals a step forward in this respect The ombudsperson 
institution, established in June 2000, can ‘receive and investigate complaints from any 
person or entity in Kosovo concerning human rights •violations and actions 
constituting an abuse o f authority by the interim civil administration or any emerging 
central or local institution’.97 The ombudsperson, who cannot be a citizen o f  any o f  
the states that made the former Yugoslavia o r o f  Albania (Sec. 6.1), is given wide
No. 246/96; S S . v. Federal 'Republic of Yugoslavia and M r S. K, Application No. 176/96). See also the 
information on how to complain (point 3: ‘about which authorities can a complaint be made?5) in the 
web-site o f  the Office o f  the Ombudsperson (at <http://www.ohro.ba/index.htm>).
95 Drasko Radic v. International Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), Case No. CH /00/4194.
96 In addition to the Commission on Human Rights and its two distinct offices, other human rights 
bodies o f  a governmental or inter-govemmental nature operative in Bosnia and Herzegovina include: 
die Human Rights Office within UNMBIH and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) responsible 
for the implementation o f  UNMBIH’s human rights mandate under SC Res. 1088 (1996) and divided 
into four units (Special Response Team; Human Rights Investigations Desk; Local Police Registry 
Section; and the Housing Action Team); the Federal Ombudsman established under the Constitution o f  
the Federal Republic o f Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Human Rights Ombudsman o f  the Republika 
Srpska, created by legislation passed in the National Assembly o f the Republika; the Commission for 
Real Property Claims o f Refugees and Displaced Persons (under Annex 7 o f  the Dayton Peace 
Agreement); the OSCE human rights department with its 28 field offices (under Article 10, Annex 6 o f  
the Dayton Peace Agreement); the field presence o f  the UNHCHR; and the Human Rights and Rule o f  
Law Department at the Office o f  die High Representative (under Annex 10 o f the Dayton Peace 
Agreement), where the Human Rights Co-ordination Centre — an inter-agency initiative that also 
involves OSCE, UNHCR, UNMBIH, and UNHCHR - is also based. Since April 2000, there has also 
been a Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees.
97 Sec. 3.1, UNMIK Regulation 2000/38.
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powers o f  investigation. She/he has ‘access to and may examine files and documents 
o f  the interim civil administration and o f  any emerging central o r local institution’ 
(Sec. 4.7). Reasons for denying access to such files have to be stated by the Special 
Representative, in which case the ombudsperson ‘may draw such inferences as he or 
she sees fit’ (ibid). The ombudsperson is also granted the right to have access to any 
person deprived o f  h is/her liberty (Sec. 4.8). The ombudsperson’s powers o f  
enforcing his decisions are however comparatively weak. She/he can make 
recommendations to the competent authorities ‘that disciplinary o r criminal 
proceedings be initiated against any person’ (Sec. 4.10). I f  the authorities fail to act, the 
ombudsperson may draw the Special Representative’s attention to the matter or make 
a public statement. Another limit is that he/she cannot investigate complaints on the 
actions o f  the Kosovo Force (KFOR) led by the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO).
The Inspection Panel o f the World Bank is another example o f a semi-judicial body 
which can receive complaints from third parties, individuals and groups, affected by a 
project o f  the Bank. By March 2001 the Panel had received nineteen formal requests 
for an inspection, and had delivered twelve reports on as many complaints. The fact 
that its reports are public represents an important step forward in the direction o f  
much-need greater transparency. However, in addition to the fact that its reports are 
no t binding, another limit o f the Inspection Panel is that its ability to make important 
findings o f  law is constrained no t only by its membership — which does not include 
lawyers and makes it essentially a fact-finding body -  but also by the requirement that 
the Panel seek the advice o f  the Bank’s legal department.98
Ombudspersons and other semi- and quasi-judicial bodies, especially those that have a 
mixed local and international membership and are field-based, can become effective 
mechanisms o f  accountability in UN post-conflict operations. They can be distinctly 
more effective than internal mechanisms o f  inspection. Indeed, unlike inspectors’ 
offices, which are often located within the hierarchical structure o f  the institution,99
98 Bradlow, ‘International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case o f the World Bank 
Inspection Panel’, 34 Virg.J.IntJL. (1994) 553 at 594. See also Shihata, supra note 43.
99 For example, in UNICEF and UNHCR the Inspector General is in the office o f  the Executive 
Director and the High Commissioner respectively.
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ombudsmen are not staff members o f  international institutions,100 and can exercise 
independent and impartial oversight over the activities o f  international authorities. 
Their semi-judicial nature also gives them power to indicate remedies for individuals, 
which internal inspectors normally do not possess, and ensures a rights-based 
approach to accountability questions rather than one restricted to financial 
accountability and accountability to donors.
(e) Interned mechanisms o f oversight
Despite their significant limits, internal mechanisms o f oversight should not 
completely be discounted. As would be the case in any bureaucracy or large company, 
UN agencies and departments normally have different bodies with an oversight or 
performance monitoring function, and some time even a smaller section within the 
organisation may have its own oversight unit.101 Within UNHCR, for example, there is 
an Inspector General’s Office located within the High Commissioner’s Executive 
Office and to whom the Inspector reports. Inspections are an
internal oversight and management tool that provide the High Commissioner 
and her senior managers with a broad review o f  the functioning o f her field 
representation at all levels. N o t less importantly, inspections provide 
UNHCR’s field offices with an independent and objective review o f  their 
performance.. ,102
UNHCR’s Inspector General is also responsible for investigations in case o f 
wrongdoings.103 A separate office is the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit,104 which 
reports to the Assistant High Commissioner, and often relies on external consultants 
to  conduct its evaluations. Within the Office o f  Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) at
100 There are exceptions. For instance, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman o f the International 
Finance Corporation (IFQ is a staff member o f the organisation.
101A comprehensive review o f the oversight mechanisms in the operational agencies was undertaken by 
the Office o f Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and was submitted to the General Assembly (Report 
o f  the Secretary General to the General Assembly on Enhancing the Internal Oversight Mechanisms in 
Operational Funds and Programmes, UN Doc. A/51/801; see also the update report submitted in 
2001, UN Doc. A/55/826).
102 Executive Committee o f the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘UNHCR’s Organization Oversight 
and Performance Review Framework’, 18 September 2000, UNHCR Doc. EC/50/SC/INF.6, at para. 
7.
103 The investigation teams normally consist o f UNHCR staff, or staff o f the OIOS at the UN  
Secretariat.
104 See supra note 85.
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the Secretariat there is a UNHCR unit that provides auditing services. The Oversight 
Committee, chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner, is responsible for the co­
ordination o f  oversight activities. While they all have an oversight function, these 
various offices are responsible for different aspects o f oversight, namely audit, 
evaluation, monitoring, inspection, investigation, and co-ordination.105
The m ost important central mechanism o f  internal oversight in the UN is OIOS 
headed by an Under-Secretary General and established by General Assembly 
Resolution 48/218B in 1994. In this resolution the General Assembly, having 
expressed its concern ‘at the inadequate implementation o f General Assembly 
mandates in some cases and the undertaking o f  non-mandated measures in other 
cases’, decided to establish ‘an additional independent entity... to enhance oversight 
functions, in particular with regard to evaluation, audit, investigation and 
compliance’.106 The Under-Secretary General who heads O IO S is appointed by the 
Secretary General subject to the approval o f  the General Assembly. The General 
Assembly reviewed O IO S’ work in 2000,107 emphasising inter alia that in the course o f 
investigations- the Office ‘shall provide procedures to protect individual rights o f  staff, 
including those o f  staff members making reports to  the Investigations Section, and to 
regulate due process and fairness for all parties concerned’, and that the ‘operational 
independence o f  the Office o f Internal Oversight Services is related to the 
performance o f  its internal oversight functions’.108
The link between O IO S’ independence and its operational effectiveness is evident in 
the case o f  T.H.109 A former employee in UNHCR’s finance section (Division o f the 
Controller for Management Services), Mr T.H. maintains that he was contacted by 
O IO S after it found out that Mr T.H.’s report on accounting practices within the 
organisation had been suppressed and that, as a result o f  it, Mr T.H.’s contract o f 
employment had not been renewed as expected. However, the information Mr T. H. 
provided to OIOS, as well as its source, were disclosed to UNHCR, causing UNHCR 
to  stiffen its attitude and to refuse to review the negative appraisal o f  Mr T.H.’s 
performance. After his contract had not been renewed, Mr T.H. had begun to search
105 See report, supra note 101.
106 GA Res. 48/218B, 23 December 1993 at paras. LA.1 and II.9.
107 GA Res. 54/244,31 January 2000.
108 Id. at para. 16 and 18.
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for another job, but the negative appraisal was making it impossible. I t was therefore a 
pressing concern o f  his to  have this negative appraisal reviewed. The Joint Appeals 
Board, to which a case for unfair dismissal was submitted, found in his favour, but its 
final report is not binding. In addition, O IO S’ alleged breach o f its mandate to protect 
Mr T.H. as an informant could not form part o f  his complaint to die Joint Appeals 
Board — and, later, to  UNAT — since neither o f  them has jurisdiction over OIOS.
Since its inception, OIOS has conducted various investigations on allegations o f 
corruption or mis-handling o f  funds. Although it is difficult to gauge the overall 
effectiveness o f  OIOS and assess the claim that it recuperates far more money that it 
spends for its activities,110 it has had some impact on oversight within the UN leading 
to dismissals and even arrest o f  staff.111 Pardy as a result o f  the public attention that 
some o f  its reports have received, reform has often ensued from OIOS intervention, 
as was the case, for example, with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
severely criticised in one o f  OIOS’ early reports.112 In the audit sector, OIOS has 
achieved im portant results no t only by conducting audits for some UN programmes 
and departments, but also by spearheading the establishment o f resident and field 
audit units in peace operations.113 OIOS, as an accountability mechanism, thus scores 
well on at least two fronts (impact on the future behaviour o f  the organisation and 
sanctions), but it still fails to offer a remedy to aggrieved persons, apart from a likely 
improvement in the future behaviour o f the examined organisation/programme. 
Moreover, its approach to accountability is mainly premised on a notion o f  
accountability that focuses on financial probity and proper management rather than a 
rights-based approach from the point o f  view o f  the beneficiaries. O ther central 
bodies with an oversight function are the Joint Inspection Unit and UN Board o f 
Auditors. Both were established by the General Assembly114 and are responsible
109 Joint Appeals Board decision No. 322.
110 See the introductory page o f  OIOS* web-site at <http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/abtoiosl.htm>.
111 ‘UN Rocked by Flood o f  Fraud Cases’, The Observer,; 3 September 2000. In the period from July 1999 
to June 2000, ‘22 cases were recommended for criminal prosecution by national law enforcement 
authorities’ (Report o f  the Office o f  Internal Oversight Services for the Period from July 1 1999 to June 
30 2000, UN Doc. A /55/436 at para. 156).
112 Report o f  the Office o f Internal Oversight Services on Audit and Investigation o f the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. A /51/789.
113 OIOS Report, supra note 111.
114 GA Res. 74 (I), 7 December 1946. An External Board o f  Auditors was instituted later (GA Res. 1438 
(XTV), 5 Decemberl959). The Joint Inspection Unit was created by GA Res. 31/192, 22 December 
1976.
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respectively for conducting investigations on the management o f  funds and on 
efficiency, and for auditing the accounts o f  the organisation.
Examining the performance o f  political and administrative mechanisms o f 
accountability within the UN, it is difficult to resist the temptation to become sceptical 
and even cynical. With the few exceptions and qualifications considered above, the 
standard modus opemndi o f  such mechanisms appears reflects this sequence: a 
committee or commission o f  enquiry is (at times) established to examine a particular 
problem; a report is published and ceremoniously forwarded to the Security Council 
and the General Assembly, which inexorably ‘welcome’ the findings o f  the report and 
invite the Secretary General to follow up; various committees, groups, and tasks forces 
are created to deal with the follow up and produce endless reports, feeding on each 
other’s information; focal points and units (often endowed with a generous 
consultancy budget) are created at the field level to  promote ‘awareness’ and report to 
the superiors. This system may have produced some positive results in some areas, but 
its overall efficacy is dismal. Suffice it to make once again the example o f  gender 
discrimination.115 Notwithstanding the proliferation o f gender awareness programmes 
within the UN, conferences, gender focal points in the field offices o f  virtually all 
programmes, the incidence o f  rape in the Kenyan refugee camps administered by 
UNHCR remain scandalously high and the policies adopted grotesquely ineffective,116 
and a treaty which endorsed discrimination against women was entered into by the UN 
in Afghanistan.
In order to enhance the effectiveness o f  their action, administrative and political 
organs ought to adopt measures that are no t simply cosmetic. Measures should 
include, when necessary, disciplinary sanctions against staff and redress for victims. 
Moreover, these organs should enlarge their composition to include truly impartial 
experts. Some organs could also take on a proactive role. In particular, the Security 
Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council could use 
parliamentary committees as a model for their work to m onitor the work o f  the 
subsidiary programmes on a regular basis. Another model for political control
115 See Chapter III.
116 Chapter IV.4.
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features, after all, in the Charter itself The Trusteeship Council comprised various 
members, including a representative for each o f the five permanent members o f  the 
Security Council, and had extensive powers in supervising the conduct o f 
administering authorities in trust territories.117 Although the trusteeship system cannot 
apply to ‘territories which have become members o f  the United Nations’ (Art. 78) and 
could not thus be directly activated for the UN administrations that we have examined 
in Chapter IV, it could still provide a model for the role that political organs ought to 
be expected to perform in similar circumstances. They have manifestly fallen short o f 
performing anything close to that role. Finally, other Charter-based bodies that could 
play a great role both in standard-setting for and in monitoring UN operations are the 
human rights bodies, whose silence on these matters is baffling.
V.5. A ccountability  th rough  the  in ternational judiciary
International courts should constitute a natural avenue for ensuring the compliance o f 
international institutions with international law, and for promoting their 
accountability. Yet, the role o f  the international judiciary in this area is marginal, and 
will remain so until the jurisdiction o f  these courts is no t expanded to include claims 
brought against international organisations by states or by individuals.
A t present, the only international judicial body that has been granted the power to 
annul decisions o f the organs o f  an international organisation is the European Court 
o f  Justice.118 The system o f  judicial review o f  European Community acts is far from 
optimal, because o f the restrictive rules on locus standi, and because o f  the limited 
grounds on which an action for annulment can be brought. Such grounds comprise 
lack o f competence, infringement o f a fundamental procedural requirement, 
infringement o f  the Treaty, and misuse o f  powers, but do not include violation o f  a 
fundamental right. The European Court o f  Justice has attempted to remedy this 
situation by making ‘the material provisions o f  the European Convention de facto 
binding on the Community’ despite the silence o f  the European treaties.119
117 Chapter IV.2(a).
118 Arts. 230-233, Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty o f  
Amsterdam (Before the Treaty o f  Amsterdam, these were Arts. 173-176). See A  Albros-Llorens, Private 
Parties in European Community Law: Challenging Community Measures (1996).
119 Alston and Weiler, ‘An Ever-Qoser Union in Need o f a Human Rights Policy7, 9 EJIL (1998) 658 at 
700.
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As for locus standi, Article 230 o f  the European Community Treaty distinguishes 
between various categories o f  applicants. While member states and the executive 
organs o f the Community (the Commission and the Council) can always request the 
annulment o f  a Community act, die European Parliament, the Court o f  Auditors and 
the European Central Bank can bring this action only ‘for the purpose o f  protecting 
their prerogatives’ (Art. 230, 3). The rules on locus standi are even stricter in the case o f 
natural or legal persons. Proceedings can be instituted only ‘against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form o f  a 
resolution or a decision addressed to another person, is o f  direct and individual 
concern to the former’ (A rt 233, 4).120 These rules on locus standi significantiy limit the 
individual’s capacity to protect h is/her fundamental rights against acts o f  the 
Community. This state o f  affairs is particularly problematic if one considers the 
extensive and ever expanding powers o f  the organs o f  the Community. Seen in this 
light, the jurisprudence o f  the German Constitutional Court that affirms its 
prerogative to challenge Community acts if  they violate fundamental human rights has 
some justification.121
I f  the system o f  remedies against breaches o f  human rights by organs o f  the European 
Communities is still in need o f  improvement, no comparable system is in place for 
other international institutions. The ICJ and its predecessor - the Permanent Court o f 
International Justice — have given important contributions to the development o f 
international institutional law but have paid very little attention all to the question o f 
the accountability o f international institutions, and o f  the UN in particular, for 
violations o f human rights, or indeed o f  other rules o f  international law. The paucity 
o f case-law should no t be a surprise given that, under the current system o f  advisory 
jurisdiction, international organisations are likely to seek the advice o f  the court when 
fheir rights, rather than their obligations and eventual responsibility, are at stake.122
120 The jurisprudence o f the European Court o f Justice on locus standi and public interest litigation has 
been conservative and rather inconsistent. See S. Weatherill and P. Beaumont E C  Law (1995,3rd ed)
2 5 3  ff..
121 See below V.6.
122 See Chapter II for a discussion o f the case-law o f the Wodd Court on international institutional law.
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(a) Judicial review o f the acts ofthe Security Council
An area on which there has been great debate is the question o f  judicial review o f  acts 
o f  the Security Council by the ICJ.123 This question is still under the consideration of 
the Court in the Lockerbie case.124 As a general rule, the Court has affirmed that it does 
not have unlimited powers o f  judicial review o f the resolutions o f  the Security 
Council,125 but has also asserted that it is no t hierarchically inferior to the Security 
Council and is no t precluded from adjudicating on matters which form the object o f 
resolutions o f  the Council.126
That the Charter did not intend to  create a Security Council that is completely 
‘unbound’ is clear from Article 24.127 After conferring ‘primary responsibility for the 
maintenance o f  international peace and security’ (Art. 24,1) — thereby making the 
Council the most powerful UN organ - the Charter provides that in the discharge o f 
its duties the Council ‘shall act in accordance with the Principles and Purposes o f  the
123 See, for example, Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’, 90 AJIL  (1996) 1; Franck, The "Powers of  
Appreciation": Who Is the Ultimate Guardian o f UN Legality?' (in Editorial Comment), 86 AJIL  (1992) 
519; Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court o f Justice and the Security 
Council in the Light o f the Lockerbie Case’, 88 AJIL  (1994) 643; Martenczuk, The Security Council, 
the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie', 10 EJIL (1999) 517; 
White, T o  Review or not to Review? The Lockerbie Cases before the Wodd Court’, 12 Leiden J. Int. L
(1999) 401.
124 The Order in response to the Libyan request for provisional measures and the Judgment on 
preliminary objections have touched upon this issue, but the judgment on the merits is not out yet. See: 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Anting from the A erial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Report 
(1998) 9. On Lockerbie, see also the Order o f 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports (1992) 3. A substantially 
identical judgment was delivered in the homonymous case between Libya and the US, ICJ Report 
(1998) 115.
125 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 16 at 45. See 
also Lockerbie Order supra note 124, diss. op. o f  Judge Weearamanthry at 50. Judge El-Kosheri, 
however, dissenting from the majority, found that SC Res. 748 (1992) was ultra tires (Lockerbie Order, 
diss. op. o f Judgp El-Kosheri, supra note 124 at 105 ff.). In his separate opinion in the Bosnia Order, 
supra note 27, Judgp Lauterpacht, unlike Judge El-Kosheri, did not argue that the Security Council 
resolution at stake was ultra tires, but he submitted that its continued operation was causing member 
states to become accessories to the genocide perpetrated by the Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia and the 
Republica Srpska.
126 That the Court is not prevented from adjudicating on matters o f  great political relevance is a 
principle well-established in its jurisprudence. This is so even if  the Security Council is simultaneously 
dealing with the question under Chapter VII. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1980) 3; M ilitary and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports (1984) 
391 esp. at 432; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina c. Yugoslavia), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports (1996) 595. See also 
Prosecutors. Tadic (IT-94-1), Decision on the Defence Motion for Intedocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 
(Appeals Chamber) at paras. 23-25.
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United Nations’ (Art. 24, 2).128 The Charter does no t contain a similar provision on 
the General Assembly, and it is reasonable to  conclude that the specific mention o f  
the duties o f  the Council is not casual, especially since it comes immediately before the 
provision that obliges member states ‘to accept and carry out the decisions o f  the 
Security Council* (A rt 25). The conferral on the Security Council o f  wide powers was 
thus balanced with its express subjection to the principles o f international law. I t is not 
reasonable, however, to infer from this fact alone that the ICJ has unlimited powers o f 
judicial review.129 Indeed, it is difficult to believe that such a “revolutionary” power 
could have been implied. Moreover, had the Charter and the Statute o f  the Court 
intended to  grant this power to the Court, they would have also introduced rules 
allowing states to request the judicial review o f  acts o f the Security Council.
I f  the Charter alone does not solve this question conclusively, a broader evaluation o f 
policy considerations is no t much more helpful. The very argument in favour o f  
judicial review — that it would strengthen the rule o f  law and erode the sphere o f  self- 
interested political decisions — can also be used against it. Indeed, the success o f  the 
Security Council in the most difficult task with which it is entrusted, the maintenance 
o f  peace and security, hinges upon the fact that it reflects the balance o f  power among 
states. A  Security Council whose resolutions were subjected to judicial review by an 
international judicial organ could gain in legitimacy, but judicial review might also act 
as an incentive for states to revert to unilateralism.130 Some states could simply prefer 
to prevent the Council from producing any act on certain matters rather than risk the 
judicial annulment o f  the resolution, thus undermining the effectiveness o f the 
Security Council as the central organ in our system o f collective security.
127 In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber o f  the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia stated that ‘. .. neither the text nor the spirit o f  the Charter conceives the Security Council as 
legbus solutus (unbound by law)’, supra note 126 at 28.
128 On Art. 24 see Judge Lauterpacht’s separate opinion in the Bosnia Order, supra note 27 at para. 101.
129 According to Judge Schwebel, Art. 24 ,2  cannot imply the conferral o f a power o f judicial review on 
the ICJ, and ‘the subjection o f  the acts’ o f  the Security Council to the law ‘relies not upon judicial 
review, but on self-censorship’ {Lockerbie Judgment, supra note 124, diss. op. o f  Judgp Schwebel 64 at 
76).
130 The fear that the inconsistency o f a resolution o f the Security Council with a judgment o f  the ICJ 
might weaken the Council rather than strengthen it was prominent in the Lockerbie case {e.g. Lockerbie 
Order, supra note 124, diss. op. o f Judge Bedjaoui at para. 7, and sep. op. o f Judge Lachs), as was the 
consideration o f  the impact o f the decision on future cases involving UN action (Lockerbie Judgment, 
supra note 124, diss. op. o f  Judge Jennings 99 at 113). See also Aegean Sea Continental Sbelf (Greece v. 
Turkey), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1976) 3 at 33 (sep. op. o f Judge Tarazi): The Court, if  the
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The ICJ can review the legality o f  acts when it is expressly requested to do so by the 
organ from  which the act in question emanated, provided obviously that the organ has 
the capacity to request an advisory opinion. W hen the Assembly o f  the Inter­
governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) requested an opinion from 
the ICJ on the validity o f  the constitution o f  the Maritime Safety Committee, the 
Court held that, by excluding Liberia and Panama from the Maritime Safety 
Committee, the Assembly had violated the provision in the its Statute that prescribed 
that the eight countries with the largest commercial fleet be represented in the 
Committee.131 The Court did not indicate w hat the consequences o f  the invalid 
constitution o f  the Committee ought to  be.132 The IMCO Assembly decided to re­
constitute the Committee without declaring the nullity o f  the acts o f the irregularly 
constituted Committee.
The main difference between Lockerbie and the Maritime Safety Committee is therefore 
that in Lockerbie the Court*s judicial review would be incidental to the resolution o f  an 
inter-state dispute, and the organ whose acts would be reviewed — the Security Council 
— has no t expressed its intention to subject the legality o f  its acts to the jurisdiction o f  
the C ourt The fact that the Security Council has far greater powers and 
responsibilities than the Maritime Safety Committee can only complicate matters 
further. Nonetheless, various authors have argued that the Court has powers o f 
incidental judicial review,133 while suggesting that, as in the decision in Maritime Safety 
Committee, this power could be attenuated by excluding the nullity ab initio o f  the ultra
134vires act.
(b) Other international judicial bodies
Given this complex and problematic debate on judicial review o f  Security Council acts 
by the ICJ, Alvarez is certainly right in observing that ‘it is ironic that the first 
international judicial body actually to do so [to review the legality o f  an act o f  the
circumstances so require, ought to collaborate in the accomplishment o f  this fundamental mission’ o f  
the Security Council in the maintenance o f  world peace and security.
131 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of tbe Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Report (1960) 150.
132 As a general rule courts pronounce on the thema deridendum that has been brought to them by the 
parties (ne eat judex extrapetitapartium).
133 Eg.: Martenczuk, supra note 123 at 525-528; Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 123 at 670-671; 
Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect o f Illegal Acts o f International Organisations’, in R. Y. Jennings (ed.), 
Essays in Honour of Lard Me N air (1965) 88 at 95-96 (and Judge Lauterpacht’s Separate Opinion in the 
Bosnia case, supra note 27).
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Security Council], in a binding context, is an ad hoc war crimes tribunal established by 
the Council itself.135 In the early stages o f  the proceedings o f the Tadic case, die 
defendant challenged, inter alia, the legality o f  the establishment o f  the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by the Security Council. The Trial 
Chamber stated that ‘it is no t for this Chamber to judge the reasonableness o f  the acts 
o f  the Security Council’, but contradicted itself by adding that ‘it is w ithout doubt that, 
with respect to the Former Yugoslavia, the Security Council did no t act arbitrarily’.136 
The Trial Chamber proceeded to examine in some detail the arguments on the 
unlawfulness o f  the Tribunal that the defence had submitted. The decision o f  the 
Appeals Chamber also concluded that the Tribunal had been properly established, and 
contained an even more detailed refutation o f  these arguments. The Appeals Chamber 
argued that ‘a narrow concept may, perhaps, be warranted in a national context but 
no t in international law’, which ‘lacks a centralized structure’ and ‘does not provide for 
an integrated judicial system operating an orderly division o f labour among a number 
o f  tribunals, where certain aspects or components o f jurisdiction as a power could be 
centralized or vested in one o f  them but not the others’; as a result, ‘in international 
law, every tribunal is a self-contained system’.137 Persuasive as these arguments might 
be, the self-validation o f  the Tribunal remains problematic especially given that, once 
it had decided to pronounce on the matter, its conclusion was foregone. I t might have 
been more cogent for the Tribunal to dismiss this part o f  the motion.138
Human rights arguments were used before the European Court o f  Human Rights in a 
series o f  cases concerning employees o f  international institutions. Given that the 
European Court could not exercise jurisdiction directly vis-a-vis international 
institutions, these cases were brought by the applicants against their state o f 
nationality. The Court has maintained that when transferring responsibilities and 
powers to international organisations, state parties have to ensure that the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention continue to be secured, and receive 
‘equivalent protection’.139 As a result, in a series o f  cases in which it was argued that
134 Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 123 at 673.
135 Alvarez, ‘Nuremberg Re-visited: The Tadic Case’, 7 EJIL (1996) 245 at 249.
136 Prosecutor v. Tadic (IT-94-1), Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Trial Chamber) at 
para. 16.
137 Tadic (Appeals Chamber), supra note 126 at para. 11.
138 This was Judge Li’s position. Id., sep. op. o f Judge Li at para. 2-4.
139 See, in particular, Matthews v. United Kingdom (No. 24833/94), Judgment (Merits), 18 February 1999, 
discussed in Chapter II.3. ‘Equivalent protection’ is a locution used by the Court in Lending A G  v.
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the unavailability o f recourse to national courts for employment disputes constituted a 
violation o f  Article 6 (1) o f the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court 
has actually examined the procedure for settling disputes offered by the international 
organisation and assessed it in the light o f  the Convention. However, so far the 
alternative process available to applicants has been deemed to offer equivalent 
protection, and no violation o f Article 6 (1) has been found as a result o f  the 
jurisdictional immunities o f  international organisations.140 One case in which the Court 
did find that a violation o f  a protected right had taken place was Matthews. Although 
this case did not concern the treatment o f  an employee o f  an international 
organisation or its immunity, it was submitted by Denise Matthews, a resident in 
Gibraltar, that her right to participate in free elections (Art. 3, First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights) had been violated by the EC Act that 
limited the franchise for the elections o f  the European Parliament to the United 
Kingdom excluding Gibraltar. The Court found in her favour and awarded her costs 
and expenses.141 Matthews, like the cases brought by former employees, is an example 
o f  “oblique” adjudication o f the conduct o f  an international organisation: it is always 
the state’s responsibility for transferring powers to  international organisations without 
securing corresponding rights that is considered. This approach might be difficult to 
apply to areas other than the right to a fair trial in employment disputes, and is less 
likely to work vis-a-vis an international organisations with a much broader 
membership, such as the UN and its specialised agencies.
O ther international judicial bodies that could in principle become mechanisms for 
accountability include the International Criminal Court (not yet in force),142 and the 
two ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and for the Former Yugoslavia. Although there is no 
precedent to this effect, these courts could in principle put on trial a UN official
Germany (No. 00038817/97), Decision on admissibility, 9 September 1998, and was originally used by 
the Commission in M. and Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany (No. 13258/87), Decision on Admissibility, 
9 February 1990. See Chapter II.3 and II.6.
140 Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (No. 26083/94), Judgment (Merits), 18 February 1999, at paras. 66 fit, 
and Beer and Regan v. Germany (No. 28934/95), Judgment (Merits), 18 February 1999, at paras. 54 ff, 
both noted by Reinisch at 93 AJIL, (1999) 933. See also: Lending, supra note 139; A .L . v. Italy (No. 
41387/97), Decision on Admissibility, 11 May 2000.
141 In Matthews, as in the other cases, the European Court o f Human Rights did not give much 
importance to the question o f  justiciability. In die United Kingdom and the US, courts would have 
most probably considered non-justidable a question such as the one put to the Court by Denise 
Matthews. The view that the European Court o f Human Rights should have proceeded in a similar 
manner is taken by Canor, ‘Primus Inter Fares'. Who is die Ultimate Guardian o f Fundamental Rights in 
Europe’, 25 E LR (2000) 3 at 13.
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accused o f  committing a crime over which they can exercise jurisdiction ratione loci, 
temporis and materiae. However, peacekeeping operations and peace-enforcement 
missions are the only operations in which the realistic possibility o f  the commission o f 
these crimes exists. In humanitarian assistance operations and in de jure or de facto 
administration o f  territory, while human rights violations can occur, the possibility that 
such violations entail international crimes is remote.
The judicial review o f acts o f the Security Council could undoubtedly enhance the rule 
o f  law in respect o f  the UN, and offer safeguards against the ultra vires acts o f  the 
Council.143 However, should the existing rules on locus standi before the World Court 
remain unmodified, these safeguards would o f limited benefit, and available only to 
states. In addition, an entire category o f acts o f  international acts — those ‘o f  a kind 
which could also be committed by states’ including ‘denial o f  justice, misuse o f 
territory’ -144 could no t form the object o f  judicial review. As a mechanism for 
ensuring the accountability o f  the UN for violations o f  human rights, judicial review as 
presently construed and applied is o f  very limited impact.
The role that international courts should play to ensure UN compliance with 
international law is not, however, limited to the judicial review o f  the legality o f  the 
acts o f  political organs. For example, international judicial bodies should play a role in 
UN administration o f  territory. The “silence” o f  the ICJ on international 
administrations is surprising if compared with the experience o f  its predecessor. The 
Perm anent Court o f  International Justice delivered five advisory opinions on various 
legal questions inherent to the administration o f  the Free City o f  Danzig, which was 
subject to a regime o f partial international administration, ranging from the capacity o f 
the City to join the International Labour Organisation (ILO),145 to the constitutionality
142 Statute o f  the International Criminal Court (1998) 3 7 ILM 999.
143 The Court could thus act as a ‘restraining factor in tracing the limits o f Security Council action in 
terms o f  both the Charter and o f international law’, Gowfland-Debbas, supra note 123 at 662.
144 Lauterpacht The Legal Effect1, supra note 133 at 89. The ‘other class o f  unlawful acts... which can 
arise only in the context o f international organisation’, includes, for example, the consistency o f  certain 
acts with the constituent instrument. These acts are more likely to form the object o f a request o f  
judicial review or o f incidental judicial review.
145 Free City of Danzig and International Labour Organisation, Advisory Opinion, (1930) PCIJ Series B, No. 
18.
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o f  legislation in criminal law and criminal procedure,146 to administrative questions 
including appeals against decisions o f  the High Commissioner o f  the League o f 
Nations.147 Although the Permanent Court had been assigned a specific role under the 
Versailles Treaty, the ICJ could still play an active role in international administrations 
within the constraints o f  the Charter and o f  its Statute if, for example, the General 
Assembly empowered, under A rt 96 (2) o f  the Charter, UN organs involved with the 
administration to request advisory opinions.
V.6. A ccountability  th rough  n a tional courts
The main obstacle to the use o f  national courts as a mechanism for the accountability 
o f the UN is the jurisdictional immunity bestowed upon the Organisation and its 
officials. Immunity ‘does not free the organkation from any obligation’, but it ‘may 
frustrate the enforcement o f  the law’.148 Although the provision on immunity in the 
Charter is worded in such a manner as to  lend support to the functional approach to 
the immunity o f the UN and its officials,149 the General Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities o f the UN150 and the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities o f 
the Specialised Agencies151 appear to signal a move towards absolute immunity. State 
practice, including judicial decisions, has for the most part endorsed absolute 
immunity.
The General Convention makes the UN, ‘its property and assets wherever located and 
by whomever held’ immune from ‘every form o f  legal process’ (Art. II, Sec. 2). In 
addition to the Organisation’s immunity, personal immunity is conferred on certain 
categories o f individuals connected with the Organisation: representatives o f  member 
states, UN officials and experts on missions. This immunity is o f particular
146 Consisting of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City, (1935) PCIJ Series 
A /B , No. 65. On the other hand, the Permanent Court itself did not deal with the Saarland where the 
League exercised wider administrative powers than in Danzig.
147 Polish Postal Sendees in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, (1925) PCIJ Series B, No. 11; Jurisdiction of the Courts 
of Danzig Advisory Opinion, (1928) PCIJ Series B, No. 15; Treatment ofPoRsh Nations and Others Persons of 
Polish Origin or Speech in the Darn^g Territog, (1932) PCIJ Series A /B , No. 44.
148 Schermers and Blokker, supra note 25 at 1008.
149 Art 105 (1 and 2) reads:
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory o f  each o f its Members such privileges and immunities as 
are necessary for the fulfilment o f its purposes.
Representatives o f the Members o f the United Nations and officials o f the Organization shall similarly 
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise o f  their functions in 
connexion with the Organization’.
150 (1946) 1 UNTS 15 and corrigendum 90 UNTS 327.
151 (1947) 33 UNTS 261.
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importance in the context o f  accountability since the imposition o f  sanctions on the 
individuals) responsible for the violation is an essential component o f  an effective 
mechanism for accountability. Under the General Convention, UN officials are 
‘immune from legal process in respect o f  words spoken or written and all acts 
performed by them in their official capacity* (Art. V, Sec. 18).
(a) The waiver o f immunity
The UN can waive its immunity, but ‘it is ... understood that no waiver o f immunity 
shall extend to any measure o f  execution’ (A rt II, Sec. 2). The power to waive the 
immunity is vested in the Secretary General, whereas ‘executive directors o f  semi­
independent programmes have no such power’.152 As far as personal privileges and 
immunities, these are granted ‘in the interests o f  the United Nations and not for the 
personal benefit o f  the individuals themselves’. In respect o f  the immunities o f  
officials and experts on missions, the Secretary General has ‘the right and the duty’ to 
waive their immunity ‘in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede 
the course o f  justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests o f  the 
United Nations’ (A rt V, Sec. 20; Art. VI, Sec. 23) .153
According to some, these provisions refute the thesis that the General Convention is 
in contradiction with the Charter, and demonstrates that the Convention subscribes to 
the functional necessity approach.154 However, clear criteria for the waiver o f 
immunity are set out only for the immunity o f  officials but no t for the immunity for 
the Organisation. Moreover, under the Convention, there is no adequate remedial 
mechanisms for all those cases in which the Secretary General wrongly denies the 
waiver o f  immunity. In practice, the Secretary General enjoys almost complete 
discretion in the exercise o f  this power as his decision to refuse to  waive immunity 
cannot be appealed to another organ by an individual or by an affected state. Such 
discretion appears incompatible with the fact that, at least as far as the immunity o f 
officials is concerned, the Secretary General has a duty to waive it in certain 
circumstances. The conduct o f  the Secretary General can be reviewed only if a request
152 U N  Jur. YB (1969) 225.
153 The immunity o f representatives o f members can be waived by the state (Art. IV, Sec. 14).
154 This is Brower’s view. Brower, ‘International Im m u nities: Some Dissident Views on the Role o f  
Municipal Courts’, 41 Vtrg. J. Int. JL. (2000) 1 at 27. Schermers and Blokker support the functionality 
principle {supra note 25 at 358-360), as do A. Reinisch, International Organisations Before National Courts
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is put to the ICJ by a competent organ o f  the UN or o f  a specialised agency under 
Article V III, Secs. 29-30 o f  the General Convention.155 In the two cases arising out o f  
a dispute under the General Convention that the ICJ has so far considered,156 the 
requests were submitted by the Economic and Social Council. Both cases concerned 
the immunity o f  experts on mission, but the question o f  the exercise o f  the Secretary 
General’s duty to grant a waiver o f  immunity in some circumstances has no t yet 
formed the object o f  an advisory opinion o f  the Court.
The example o f  the imposition o f  collective punishment on the entire population o f  a 
refugee camp in Kenya157 can illustrate how ineffective this procedure would be. The 
refugees in Kakuma refugee camp had in principle a clear-cut case for bringing a 
lawsuit against the UNHCR officials who had decided to suspend food distribution.158 
The Secretary General would have been under a duty to waive the immunity o f  the 
officials responsible for the decision in order not to impede the course o f  justice.159 If, 
as is likely, he had denied the waiver, his decision could no t have been reviewed by the 
Kenyan courts. The refugees would have had to persuade the Kenyan government to 
exercise diplomatic protection on their behalf by putting forward a resolution in an 
international organ to request an advisory opinion o f  the Court.160 This situation 
would have also been sadly ironic: refugees, on whose lack o f  diplomatic protection 
from their countries o f  nationality the regime o f  international protection is premised, 
would have had to seek the improbable diplomatic protection o f  their country o f  
asylum against the acts o f  their ‘international protector’. A t any rate, their chances o f
(2000), and P. Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organisations (1994), but they all seem to 
understand functionality differently from Brower.
155 The Convention on die Privileges and Immunities o f die Specialised Agencies contains a more 
detailed regulation o f  the consequences o f  die advisory opinion o f  die ICJ. It allows the affected state 
to withhold the immunity or privilege that has been abused (Art 24). Amerasinghe argues that this 
procedure ‘may be adequate to take care o f abuse o f  all kinds’ although it is likely to be a long drawn- 
out one’ (C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations (1996) 403).
156 Applicability of Article 6, 22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
{hereinafter ‘Mazilu casej, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1989) 177; Difference Relating to Immunity from  
Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the U N  Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter ‘Cumaraswamy 
casej, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1999) 62.
157 Chapter IV.4.
158 Cumaraswamy opinion, supra note 156 at 89, concludes with the rather sibylline dictum o f  die Court 
that UN officials ‘must take care not to exceed the scope o f their functions, and should so comport 
themselves as to avoid claims against the United Nations’.
159 Brower argues persuasively that the waiver o f immunity, when granted, covers not only die officials 
but also the Organisation (Brower, supra note 154 at 31-32).
160 ‘A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect o f an injured person who is stateless and/or a 
refugee when that person is ordinarily a legal resident o f  the claimant State’ (Art. 8, Draft Articles on
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success would have been almost inexistent given the role o f the Kenyan authorities, if 
no t in this specific episode, in introducing and enforcing the policy o f  encampment o f 
refugees.161
As for the likely outcome o f the opinion o f  the Court, it would be difficult to foretell 
since the Court has never been seized with a case that deals with such grave breaches 
by UN officials. In the Cumaraswamy case, one judge did note the Court’s reluctance to 
examine the consistency o f  the conduct o f  the Special Rapporteur with the terms o f  
his mandate.162 That case dealt, at most, with incautious utterances by an expert on 
mission, and not with violations o f human rights, and it can be surmised that such 
reluctance would no t have featured to the same extent in a case involving a human 
rights violation.
Unchecked powers often lead to abuses, and the almost complete lack o f  
accountability for the exercise o f  the Secretary General’s prerogative to waive 
immunity can in part explain the manifesdy unjust practice that has developed in spite 
o f  the requirements o f  the General Convention. A t present, immunity is normally 
waived when an investigation conducted by OIOS gathers evidence o f theft o f  UN 
property committed by an official.163 OIOS also seeks the prosecution o f  individuals 
external to the Organisation who have committed a crime — fraud or theft for the 
m ost part — o f  which the UN has been a victim. In cases o f  corruption and forgery, 
the sanction against UN staff is often only a disciplinary one, or consists simply o f  the 
dismissal o f  the officials in question; prosecution by national authorities is seldom 
sought in such cases.164 In cases brought by individuals, including former staff, against 
the UN, there is still enormous reluctance to  waive immunity. The UN does no t
Diplomatic Protection, in International Law Commission, Tirst Report by John R. DugarcT, supra note 
17>-161 Another example that illustrates the limits in the enforcement o f the Secretary General’s duty to 
grant an immunity waiver is the lawsuit brougjht by two Rwandan survivors against the UN. The UN  
Faces Genocide Suit’, The Age, 10 January 2000; 'Genocide Lawsuit Against the UN’, The Guardian, 11 
January 2000.
162 Cumaraswamy, supra note 156 at 121 (diss. op. o f Judge Koroma).
163 Report o f  the Office o f Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation into Allegations o f Theft o f  
Funds by a Staff Member o f  the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN Doc. 
A /53/811; Report o f  the Office o f Internal Oversight Services for the Period between 1 July 1997 and 
30 June 1998, UN Doc. A /53/428 at paras. 151 f£; Report 1999-2000, supra note 111 at para. 49. 
OIOS* rules do not specify when an investigation would result in criminal prosecution by national 
authorities - Report o f the Secretary General on die Rules and Procedures to be applied for the 
investigation functions performed by the Office o f Internal Oversight Services, 11 October 2000, UN 
Doc. A /55/469 at paras. 21-22.
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generally waive immunity even for traffic violations, although these are usually 
insurable.165
(b) National judicialpractice
Courts have for the m ost part upheld the principle that ‘under the [U.N.] Convention 
the United Nations' immunity is absolute, subject only to the organization’s express 
waiver thereof in particular cases’, and that, as a result, the distinction between acta jure 
gestionis and acta jure imperii does not apply to the immunities o f  international 
organisations.166 There are, however, some exceptions. In particular, the Italian Court 
o f  Cassation has maintained that the application o f  the doctrine o f restrictive 
immunity should be extended to international organisations, and that, as a result, they 
should no t enjoy immunity for acts jure gestionis.167 In the US, even in the cases in 
which the traditional position has prevailed, courts have often been careful not to 
exclude, as a matter o f  principle, the applicability o f  restrictive immunity to 
international organisations.168 There have also been pronouncements contrary to  the 
prevailing trend. In a case, which did not turn out to be precedent-setting, a court in 
New York held that a driver employed by the UN who had exceeded the speed limit 
was not entitled to immunity because
To recognize the existence o f  a general and unrestricted immunity from suit or 
prosecution on the part o f the personnel o f  the United Nations (...) even 
though the individual's function has no relation to the importance or the 
success o f the Organization's deliberations, is carrying the principle o f  
immunity completely out o f  bounds. To establish such a principle would in 
effect create a large preferred class within our borders who would be immune 
to punishment on identical facts for which the average American would be
164 Id. (Report 1997-98) at paras. 75 and 143-144.
165 Schermers and Blokkers, supra note 25 at 361.
166 Boimah v. UN General Assembly, 664 F. Supp. 69 at 71; A shkir et d . v. Uniled Nations, Gv. No. 97-2266 
(TFH).
167 FAO  v. Inpdd (1982) 87 ILR 1, but in FAO  v. Colagrossi, , 101 ILR 386, die Court o f  Cassation 
appears to have departed from its own precedents. On the dispute between FAO and Italy, see 
Reinisch, supra note 154 at 131-134. Morgenstem sees the Italian reservation to the General Convention 
as the starting point o f the dispute (F. Morgenstem, Legd Problems of Intemationd Organisations (1986) 6
168 See A skir v. Boutros Ghati et d , 933 F. Supp. 368, in which the District Court for the Southern 
District o f  New York did not find it necessary to pronounce in favour o f  absolute or restrictive 
immunity because ‘because even if the more limited restrictive immunity doctrine applied, the claims in 
this case do not arise out o f commercial activity by the United Nations’. See also De Luca v. UN, 841 F. 
Supp. 531; Boimah, supra note 166.
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subject to punishment. Any such theory does violence to and is repugnant to 
the American sense o f  fairness and justice and flouts the very basic principle 
o f the United Nations itself, which in its preamble to its Charter affirms that it 
is created to  give substance to the principle that the rights o f  all men and
1 169women are equal.
In another case, originating from a lawsuit brought by a private company against the 
Organisation o f American States, the distinction between actajure gestionis and acta jure 
imperii was applied by a US Court.170
In the US, an argument for the restrictive immunity o f  international organisations 
could be based on statutory provisions. Under the International Organizations 
Immunities Act, international organisations are granted ‘the same immunity from suit 
and every form o f  judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments’;171 it could 
thus be argued that the exceptions under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act172 to 
the general jurisdictional immunity o f  foreign states ought to apply to international 
organisations too. I t might not be too long before a lawsuit against the UN, based on 
a restrictive approach to immunity, is successfully brought in US courts. Such a case 
could rely on these statutory provisions, but also on the language o f  the Charter, and 
in particular the fact that the Charter excludes immunity for acts that are not necessary 
for the fulfilment o f  its purposes, and, afortiori, for acts, such as violations o f  human 
rights, that are contrary to the fulfilment o f  its purposes.
As far as the immunity o f  officials is concerned, the Pinochet case could be used to 
bring a case against a former UN official for acts such as torture, which, according to 
the House o f Lords, could no t be interpreted to fall within the concept o f “official” 
acts for which a former head o f State enjoyed immunity.173 Even if the question o f 
immunity were to  be solved in this manner, another bar to the exercise o f  jurisdiction 
by national courts could be the doctrine o f  non-justiciability since ‘it might be 
protested that were such arguments to succeed, they would involve a municipal court
169 Westchester County on Complaint of Donnelly v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 31 at 34.
170 Dupree Associates Inc. v. Organisation of American States and the General Secretariat of the Organisation, 63 
ILR 92.
171 22 USCS §288a.
172 28 USCS §1605.
173 R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [1999] 2 All ER 97.
273
in determining a question o f  UN law (Le. as to the scope o f  the purposes o f  the 
UN)’.174
Courts have been reluctant to  lift the immunity o f  an international organisation on the 
basis o f  an implied waiver. In Mendaro v. World Bank, the appellant argued that a 
provision in the Articles o f  Agreement o f  the World Bank amounted to an implied 
waiver o f  immunity.175 However, the US Court o f  Appeals for the District o f 
Columbia Circuit, affirming the decision o f  the District Court to reject the claim, held 
that immunity must be ‘narrowly read in light o f  both national and international law 
governing the immunity o f  international organizations’.176
In some cases the plea o f  immunity was rejected, because it plainly fell outside the 
scope o f the General Convention. For example, in Kadic v. Karadic, the defendant’s 
argument that, as an invitee o f the UN, he was entitled to immunity under the 
Headquarters Agreement was dismissed.177 In another case, Mushikiwabo et aL v. 
Barayagwi^ a, the plaintiffs sought damages for the defendant’s involvement in the 
genocide in Rwanda and for the key role he allegedly played in the murder o f some o f 
their relatives.178 The defendant maintained that he enjoyed immunity because he was 
attending a session o f  the UN when he was served with the summons. The 
Government o f  Rwanda sent a note officially to waive immunity, although this was 
no t probably necessary. Neither Kadic nor Mushikiwabo concerned cases brought 
directly against either the UN or UN officials. However, Louise Mushikiwabo later 
attempted to bring a case against the Organisation for its failure to  protect the 
persons, including many o f  her relatives, who had sought refuge in the Ecole 
Technique Officielle in Kigali in the early days o f the genocide.179
174 Wickremasinghe, Verdirame ‘Responsibility and Liability for Violations o f  Human Rights in the 
Course o f  UN Reid Operations’, in G  Scott Torture as Tort (2001) 465 at 478. See also Reinisch, supra 
note 154 at 96 ff. and 118 ff..
175 Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610. A comment on Mendaro is in Singer, ‘Jurisdictional Immunity 
o f  International Oiganizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns’, 36 Virg. JJnt. L . 
(1995) 53. For a discussion o f  sexual harassment cases brought by women employed by international 
institutions, see H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin The Boundaries of International Lam: A  Feminist Analysis
(2000) 187-189.
176 Id. at 611. Waivers o f  immunity are traditionally interpreted narrowly in the context o f state 
immunity too, e.g.: A  Company L tdv. Republic ofX , 87 1LR 412.
177 Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232.
178 Mushikiwabo et aLv. Barayagni^ a, 94 Gv. 3627 (JSM).
179 See supra note 161, and Chapter II note 188.
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Human rights arguments to  limit the scope o f  immunity o f  international organisations 
have been used only sporadically, and, so far, unsuccessfully. In Manderlier v. U N, the 
Belgian Civil Tribunal upheld the immunity o f  the UN, despite the plaintiffs 
argument that his rights under the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, in 
particular his right to an effective remedy under Article 8, had been infringed upon.180 
The Court o f  Appeal in Bruxelles reached the same conclusion but admitted that the 
fact that there was no court to which the appellant could submit his dispute with the 
UN ‘may be deplored’, and ‘does not appear to conform to the principles proclaimed 
in the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights’.181 The Manderlier decisions, which date 
back to the 1960s, arose out o f  a dispute between a Belgian citizen and UN troops in 
Congo during ONUC. Even if  the Belgian courts had accepted Manderlier’s 
arguments, it would have still been impossible to  give execution to their judgment 
because o f  the U N ’s absolute immunity from execution.
(c) Thejurisprudence o f the German Constitutional Court
The principle o f ‘equivalent protection’ - developed, as we have seen, by the European 
Court o f Human Rights - as the yardstick for gauging whether immunity results in a 
violation o f human rights has not affirmed itself in national judicial decisions. 
However, although the European Court did not expressly acknowledge this, the 
German Constitutional Court is to be credited - or blamed, depending on the point o f 
view - with pioneering some o f  those arguments.182 The German Court did not accept 
the position o f the European Court o f  Justice according to which Community 
legislation remains valid even if it infringes fundamental rights protected under 
national constitutions, because, were this not so, the unity and efficacy o f  Community 
law would be harmed.183 The German Constitutional Court maintained instead that its 
role as guarantor o f  the fundamental human rights enshrined in the German 
Constitution does not stop when functions are transferred to international institutions. 
O n this basis, the German Constitutional Court concluded that it could review the 
consistency o f European legislation with the Bill o f  Rights in the German
180 45 ILR 446 and 69 ILR 139 (respectively first instance and appeal decision). The Universal 
Declaration is GA Res. 217A (III).
181 69 ILR 139 at 143.
182 “Solange T \ Federal Constitutional Court, (1974) 37 BverfGE 271, [1974] 2 CMLR 540; “Solange IF \ 
Federal Constitutional Court, (1986) 73 BverfGE 339, [1987J 3 CMLR 225. Weatherill and Beaumont, 
supra note 120 at 443 ff..
183 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesselschaft mBb. v. Einfuhr- and Vorratstelle jiir  Getreide unde Futtermittel, 
[1972] CMLR 255.
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Constitution. In Solange 27, however, the Court added an important qualification stating 
that,
so long ^solangi^ as the European Communities and particularly the case law 
o f the European Court generally ensure an effective protection o f  fundamental 
rights as against the sovereign powers o f  die Community which is to be 
regarded as substantially similar to the protection required unconditionally by 
the German Constitution, and in so far as they generally safeguard the 
essential content o f fundamental rights, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability o f 
secondary Community law.184
With this decision, the Court did not thus renounce its prerogatives, but it simply 
decided to waive them ‘as long as the Community protection can be equated with that 
provided under the Grundgesetz’ (Constitution).185 The German courts’ antagonism 
toward the supremacy o f  EC law re-emerged in the 1990s, at first, with a decision o f  
the Constitutional Court on the Maastricht treaty and, later, with the decisions in the 
banana litigation cases.186 These judgments have been criticised on various grounds: 
that they vilify ‘the idea o f  fundamental rights’ protection’ by transforming it ‘into a 
tool for the protection o f  the property rights o f  special groups’,187 that they are 
inspired by a Schmittian and nationalistic conception o f  law.188 However, even if its 
reasoning has suffered from a lack o f consistency and its tone, particularly in the 
Maastricht decision, was rather infelicitous, the fundamental concern o f  the German 
Constitutional Court remains valid. Far from representing an anachronism, these 
decisions epitomise the dilemmas faced by national judges entrusted with the
184 Solange II, supra note at 227.
185 Crossland, Three Major Decisions Given by the Bunderverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional 
Court)*, 19 E LK  (1994) 202 at 205.
186 Maastricht case, Federal Constitutional Court, 89 BVerfGE 155, [1994] 1 CMLR 57 at 79 and 81. On 
the banana litigation, see Reich ‘Judge-made 'Europe a la carte*: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts 
between European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana Litigation’ 7 EJIL (1996) 
103.
187 See Reich, supra note 186 at 110.
188 Zuleeg, The European Constitution under Constitutional Constraints: The German Scenario’ 22 
E LR  (1997) 19.
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protection o f  fundamental rights when they have to deal with the transfer o f  powers 
to international subjects.189
(d) 'National judicial control over dejure administrations
In de facto or de jure administration, the checks and balances that are at least present 
within the legal order o f  the European Union are no t normally in place.. In these 
circumstances, it is even more difficult for national courts to abstain from exercising 
their judicial function, especially when fundamental rights are at stake. A decision o f  
the Constitutional Court o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina exemplifies these problems. A 
group o f members o f  the Federal Parliament requested a review o f the 
constitutionality o f a law enacted by die High Representative.190 Although the request 
did no t adduce human rights as one o f  the grounds o f  unconstitutionality, the decision 
o f  the Court is important because, on the one hand, it recognised that ‘the powers o f  
the High Representative... as well as his exercise o f  those powers are not subject to 
review by the Constitutional Court’;191 on the other hand, the Court affirmed that in 
this case the High Representative Tiad intervened in the legal order o f Bosnia and 
Herzegovina substituting himself for the national authorities’ thus acting ‘as an 
authority o f Bosnia and Herzegovina*.192 The law which he had enacted had to be 
regarded as a law o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, as such, it could be subject to 
review o f  constitutionality. The Court used the locution ‘functional duality’ to describe 
certain acts o f  the High Representative, which are at the same time acts o f an 
international entity and acts the national authorities.193 The Court then went on to 
examine the substance o f  the request and found that the law in question was no t 
inconsistent with the Constitution.
189 Courts in other member states o f  the EU have occasionally been reluctant to accept the supremacy 
o f  community law over die national constitutional provisions on fundamental rights, but die German 
Constitutional Court is the judicial body that has regularly upheld this position. In Frontini v. Mimstro 
deUe Finance, Corte Costituzionale, [1974] 2 CMLR 372, die Italian Constitutional Court state that 
limitations o f  sovereignty [including the transfer o f powers to the EC] cannot go beyond a certain limit 
and bite into the fundamental rights o f the citizens and the fundamental principles o f the state 
structure1 (at 381).
190 Under Art VI, 3 o f  the Constitution, the Constitutional Court o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina can 
receive requests submitted, inter alia, by one fourth o f  the members o f either chamber o f the 
Parliamentary Assembly. The law-making powers o f the High Representative are regulated under 
Annex 10 o f the Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 91.
191 Requestfor the evaluation of constitutionality of the haw on State Border Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case U 
9/00 (3 November 2000) at para. 5.
192 Ibid.
193 The concept o f  ‘functional duality1 in this decision o f the Constitutional Court o f Bosnia is discussed 
in some detail by Wilde, ‘The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser when International Organizations 
Administer Territory1, American Society o f International Law — Proceedings o f the 95* Meeting (2001).
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As a result o f  this decision, the constitutionality o f  the normative acts o f  the High 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be challenged if such acts are believed 
to be inconsistent with the Bill o f Rights in the Constitution. I t is no t clear, however, 
whether constitutional review could also cover other international bodies, or other 
powers o f  the same High Representative, and, if  so, to  what extent Although it was 
no t perhaps explained in the best possible way, the reasoning o f  the Court appears 
very sound: when an international institution behaves like a national authority, then a 
constitutional court should consider itself entitled to exercise jurisdiction for die 
purposes o f  constitutional control. This position is also consistent with the rules on 
state responsibility on the basis o f  which ‘the conduct o f  an organ o f  a State o r o f  a 
person or entity empowered to exercise elements o f the governmental authority shall 
be considered an act o f  the State under international law’.194
The decision o f  the Constitutional Court o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina would no t have 
been possible in Kosovo, where there is no local supreme court that can derive its 
legitimacy from an international agreement and the regulations o f  the Special 
Representative take precedence over any other law.195 One o f  these regulations 
concerned the ‘Status, Privileges and Immunities o f  KFOR and UNM IK and their 
personnel in Kosovo’.196 Under this regulation, the Special Representative, various 
high-ranking officials and others ‘as may be decided from time to time by the Special 
Representative (...) shall be immune from local jurisdiction in respect o f any civil or 
criminal act performed or committed by them in the territory o f  Kosovo’ (Sec. 3.2). 
The regulation also provides that ‘UNM IK personnel, including locally recruited 
personnel, shall be immune from legal process in respect o f  words spoken and all acts 
performed by them in their official capacity’ (Sec. 3.3). Most controversially, the 
regulation declares that ‘UNM IK and KFOR contractors, their employees and sub­
contractors shall no t be subject to local laws or regulations in matters relating to the 
terms and conditions o f  their contracts’ (Sec. 4.1). Immunity from legal process in 
respect o f  ‘their official activities’ is granted to ‘KFOR contractors, their employees 
and sub-contractors’. Although the regulations reproduces the provision o f  the
194 Art. 5, Draft Articles on State Responsibility provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee o f the 
International Law Commission on Second Reading (2000), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.600. See Chapter II.6.
195 See Chapter IV.2(c).
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General Convention on the ‘right and duty’ o f  the Secretary General to waive 
immunity when it would impede the course o f  justice, its conditions remain overall 
draconian. However, although Kosovo courts are barred from exercising jurisdiction 
over UNMIK, the Ombudsperson, as discussed,197 can receive complaints on abuse o f 
authority by the interim civil administration.
(e) National judicial decisions on peacekeeping operations
National courts have exercised jurisdiction vis-a-vis members o f  the armed forces who 
served as peacekeepers abroad. In these cases, the question o f  immunity has not been 
raised because no one doubts that members o f the armed forces remain subject to the 
jurisdiction o f  their country o f origin while they serve as peacekeepers, although they 
have immunity from the jurisdiction o f the state in which they are sent on mission. 
Canadian courts have heard cases concerning the conduct o f  Canadian members o f 
the armed forces in the course o f  the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti198 and in 
Somalia.199 In Italy and Belgium, the conduct o f  troops in Somalia was the object o f 
mainly administrative enquiries, although some cases also ended up in court. In one 
case concerning two members o f  the Belgian contingent in Somalia who had been 
accused o f  threatening and beating up Somali minors at a checkpoint, the accused 
were acquitted by the Military Court in Brussels (Cour militaire de Bruxelles) on the 
ground that the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols did no t apply to the conflict 
in Somalia.200 Despite patently flawed decisions such as this one, the exercise o f 
jurisdiction by national courts, in particular by military courts, can constitute a 
mechanism for accountability that is no t available in other UN operations. An 
important limitation, however, is that this mechanism has not so far offered remedies 
to the victims, and has mainly acted as a sanction for the perpetrator, as well as, 
presumably, as a deterrent Furthermore, in these cases national courts cannot take 
cognisance o f the level o f institutional responsibility. Command responsibility would
196 UNMIK Regulation 2000/47. See also UNMIK Regulation 2000/44 on the privileges and 
immunities o f the World Bank and its officials.
197 Chapter V.4(d).
198 R. c. Lau^on, 8 Admin. LR. (3d) 33.
199 R. v. Brocklebank, Court Martial Appeal Court (1996) 134 DLR. (4*) 377; R. v. Seward, Court Martial 
Appeal Court (1997) 45 Admin. LR (2d) 148.
200 Cour militaire, Bruxelles, 17 decembre 1997, Journal des Tribunaux (4 avril 1998) 286. On the cases in 
Italy, see Lupi, supra note 34.
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also be unattended, when such responsibility appertains to members o f  the armed 
forces o f another state, or to a UN official.201
(f) What rolefor national courts?
Brower’s argument that the current system already adheres ‘to the functional necessity 
doctrine, but gives international officials the primary authority for making immunity 
determinations’202 is no t satisfactory, since we have seen that the UN has not granted a 
waiver even in cases in which it was plainly under an obligation to do so. Brower also 
submits that ‘the expansion o f municipal court jurisdiction is unlikely to make 
international organizations significantly more accountable because international law 
already requires international organizations to minimize their reliance on immunity 
and to provide claimants with alternatives to municipal court litigation’.203 Again, this 
position seems far removed from the reality o f  the power o f  international institutions. 
There can be little doubt that impartial and accessible adjudication could only be to 
the benefit o f  justice.
O ther arguments against a greater involvement o f  national courts are more difficult to 
brush aside. Cases such as Cumaraswarny and Manila certainly bespeak the importance 
o f  maintaining a regime o f  immunity for the UN.204 The fact that, notwithstanding the 
provisions on immunity, UN personnel are still arrested and attacked is another 
indication that immunity serves an important function.205 International organisations 
also need to be protected from other types o f  governmental interference, as the 
screening o f  US employees in the UN by their government vividly demonstrates.206 In 
this sense, it is difficult to  disagree with the European Court o f  Human Rights when it
201 The International Criminal Court, once in force, could solve many o f these problems.
202 Brower, supra note 154 at 8.
203 Ibid.
204 See supra note 156. The M a^lu case concerned a Romanian member o f the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection o f  Minorities who had been requested to prepare a report 
on human rights and youth. Mr Mazilu later complained that die Romanian Government forced him to 
retire, and prevented him from submitting his report or otherwise participating in the works o f the Sub- 
Commission. The Cumaraswamy case, on the other hand, arose from an interview given to the press by 
the Special Rapporteur on the Independence o f Judges and Lawyers, in which he commented on 
commercial litigation in Malaysian courts. Two Malaysian companies argued that the article was 
defamatory and filed a lawsuit for damages. In both cases the position o f  the UN was supported by the 
ICJ. It is clear, however, that, while the M azilu case had to do with the unacceptable interference o f a 
government with an expert on mission, the Cumaraswamy case dealt with the third parties who 
considered themselves aggrieved by the words o f the Special Rapporteur. The conclusion o f the Court 
was correct in this case, too, since it would have been excessive to qualify his statements as ‘unofficial’ 
simply by virtue o f their being rather incautious or inopportune.
205 Brower, supra note 154 at 38 ff.
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states that ‘the attribution o f  privileges and immunities to international organisations is 
an essential means o f ensuring the proper functioning o f  such organisations free from 
unilateral interference by individual governments’.207
A difficult balance needs to be struck between the needs o f  the Organisation and the 
rights o f individuals who are directly affected by the UN. The shield o f  absolute 
immunity is one that the UN cannot keep for too long, particularly if  it intends to 
maintain and increase its operational role. Courts have generally treaded cautiously and 
have avoided a blanket application o f restrictive immunity. Absolute immunity, 
however, jars stridently with a world in which judicialisation and legalisation grow 
exponentially, and in which even former head o f  states can stand trial. A reformulation 
o f  the law o f immunity o f  international institutions is called for. A t the very least, in 
cases where the immunity is not waived, the individuals who have brought the case 
against the UN should be offered to opportunity to seek a review o f  the decision o f 
the Secretary General by an impartial organ to which they have easy access. The risk 
o f  not intervening promptly is that national courts might decide to take the situation 
in their own hands leading to the development o f  an erratic case-law.
Clear rules governing the immunity in complex operations such as Bosnia are 
particularly needed. The Constitutional Court o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina was right in 
deciding that it can strike a law enacted by the Special Representative as 
unconstitutional. The promotion o f  the rule o f  law through development o f  local 
institutions, including courts, is one o f  the objectives o f the “international 
community” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and indeed in operations o f  post-conflict 
peace-building in general.208 How can the rule o f  law be credibly prom oted if its 
international promoters are no t prepared to subject themselves to it? In the future, the 
mandate o f  these UN operations could spell out which acts o f  the UN would not be 
immune from the jurisdiction o f  the courts, identifying at least cases in which 
immunity would contradict the very purpose o f  the mission.
206 See Chapter 1.6.
207 Beer and Regan, supra note 140 at para. 53.
208 Supplement to A n Agendafor Peace, supra note 59 at paras. 47 ff.
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Y.7. C onclusion
Existing mechanisms for accountability do no t offer a combination o f  adequate 
sanctions and remedies when fundamental rights have been directly violated by an act 
o f the UN. While administrative mechanisms are those that can better protect the 
public interest o f  ensuring that the future conduct o f  international institutions is 
modified, they are not easily accessible to the victims who often live in refugee camps 
o r in countries ridden with civil strife and conflict. Moreover, in current practice 
administrative reports have seldom resulted in either sanctions on the officials 
responsible for the violative conduct, or in an indication o f remedies to the aggrieved 
individuals. The concept o f accountability that still underpins mechanisms o f  internal 
oversight is limited to financial probity and transparency. This concept needs to be 
expanded, and a rights-based approach must be developed for internal mechanisms to 
be able to display their full potential as instruments for the promotion o f  institutional 
accountability. As regards political organs, there is still significant room within the 
boundaries o f  existing international institutional law for expanding their control 
function. The General Assembly could monitor the activities o f the specialised 
programmes (UNHCR, WFP, UNDP), whilst the Economic and Social Council could 
take the lead in monitoring the activities o f  the specialised agencies.
The exercise o f  diplomatic protection by states o f  nationality vis-a-vis the international 
organisation is another mechanism that should be explored further, and the use o f 
which should be encouraged when appropriate. I t must also be noted that in practice, 
however, states are not likely to use the often significant resources needed to mount a 
legal challenge against an international institution on behalf o f  certain categories o f 
individuals, most notably refugees. As for N G O s, they also have a role to play, but it 
is important to deconstruct the civil society rhetoric, and to analyse the power 
relations between N G O s, on the one hand, and international institutions and the state, 
on the other, that obtain in each specific situation. In some cases, mainly in the 
context o f the provision o f  humanitarian assistance, N G O s depend on international 
institutions for funding, and undertake contractual obligations with them. This 
inevitably reduces their ability, and willingness “to stand up to” an international 
organisation that commits wrongful acts. O n the other hand, when N G O s maintain 
their funding and operational independence, one can assume that they will be more
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prepared to advocate in favour o f individuals or groups aggrieved by the acts o f  the 
UN.
The role o f  die adjudication in national and international courts needs to be expanded. 
N o other mechanism can substitute a judicial o r arbitral remedy in terms o f  the 
independence and impartiality o f die process and o f the perception o f  justice that it 
creates, as was implicidy recognised by the ICJ in the Effect o f Awards case.209 Existing 
judicial bodies, the ICJ in particular, can play an important role, but at present 
individuals cannot bring a lawsuit against an international organisation in the Court, 
and individual states cannot seek the advisory opinion o f  the Court on matters o f 
institutional law. At the very least the advisory jurisdiction o f the Court should be 
expanded so that the Court could be seized o f  cases concerning institutional duties 
and compliance.
Accessibility to potential victims is an essential requirement for an international 
judicial body to be effective. A d  hoc field-based judicial and semi-judicial organs could 
be instituted as part o f  multifunctional operations, especially administrations o f  
territory. In this respect, the ombudsperson recently established in Kosovo, despite 
h is/her weak powers o f  enforcement, represents an interesting novelty because 
he/she has power to investigate abuses committed by the interim civil administration. 
When national courts are operative and offer guarantees o f  impartiality and lack o f 
prejudice, they could also become involved. For this to happen in a manner that will 
not damage the independence o f the UN, it would be important that a reformulation 
o f  the immunities and privileges o f the Organisation is proposed by the UN itself 
abandoning its anachronistic claim to absolute immunity.
209 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal^  Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports (1954) 47 at 57.
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Conclusions
The transfer o f power from states to other actors, such as multinational corporations, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations, is an 
'essential aspect o f  globalisation.1 The consolidation o f  a diffuse form o f  power - 
vested in non-state actors and in intergovernmental entities — may conceal the 
emergence o f  a new Leviathan, bigger and perhaps more powerful than the state, and 
also less visible and more mercurial than the state. While it is primarily for sociologists 
and political scientists to  conduct innovative analyses o f  power in this new globalised 
environment, it is for international lawyers to examine the legal implications o f  this 
phenomenon, identifying in particular the international obligations incumbent on non­
state players and ways o f  ensuring their compliance with international law.
By focusing on a specific aspect o f  this ‘power shift* from states to other international 
actors - the legal obligations o f  the United Nations (UN) in the sphere o f  human 
rights and its accountability for breaching them —this thesis has also called into 
question the disassociation o f  the pre-dominant international legal paradigm — which 
views states as the primary, if not the exclusive, duty-holders o f  international human 
rights, refugee and humanitarian law - from an international reality in which the statist 
‘absolutes o f  the Westfalian system are all dissolving*.2 It has been shown that human 
rights can be violated in the course o f  UN operations and it has been argued that 
international rules, albeit applicable in principle to the UN, often cannot be enforced 
in practice.
Although I examined some o f  the worst failures o f the UN, I did not purport either to 
demonise this Organisation, or, worse, to advocate its abolition, or even to give 
ammunition to some o f  its self-interested enemies. While it is probably time to shatter 
the common perception that ‘international institutions, and international culture [are] 
necessarily emancipatory’,3 it cannot be forgotten that international institutions are key 
players in the management o f  the process o f  socio-economic globalisation and can
1 ‘Until recently, international organisations were institutions of, by and for nation-states. Now they are 
building constituencies o f their own and, through NGOs, establishing direct connections to the peoples 
o f  die world* (Mathews, T?ower Shift*, 76 Foreign Affairs (1997) 50).
2 Ibid.
3 Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War*, 38 Harv. 
Int. L .J . (1997) 443 at 444.
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become agents o f  social change and progress: refugees need an international 
organisation that makes up for the lack o f diplomatic protection o f  their state o f 
nationality or origin, and that advocates their rights in a principled and efficient 
manner; and humanitarian assistance can secure the survival o f  millions o f  persons 
affected by armed conflict or natural disaster. International institutions, however, 
cannot escape the rule o f  law, and in particular respect for the basic code o f  humanity 
enshrined in human rights law. Chapter V  has shown that within the existing 
normative and institutional framework room for change is limited and the applicability 
o f  international human rights law to the UN is destined to remain inconsequential. 
Revitalising existing procedures and encouraging the development o f  a progressive 
practice are only short-term answers; in the longer term, the introduction o f  new 
procedures might be inevitable. Furthermore, there are areas o f  substantive law that 
still await clarification, chiefly the law o f  institutional responsibility, on which the 
efforts o f the International Law Commission should soon be directed. The application 
by analogy o f  the rules on state responsibility has limits, and, in some cases, does not 
offer plausible solutions to questions o f  institutional responsibility.
I t has also been suggested in chapter V that it is time to review the UN’s anachronistic 
claim to absolute immunity. National courts should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction 
vis-a-vis the UN at least in de jure administrations. The waiver o f immunity must be re­
examined and an accessible and impartial procedure needs to be put in place to  ensure 
that the duty o f  the Secretary General to waive immunity in certain circumstances can 
actually be enforced.
A challenge for international lawyers is to  embark upon studies o f UN practice that 
are no t confined to the practice o f the political organs, since, as chapter III in 
particular has illustrated, the real practice o f  the Organisation might differ substantially 
from official practice. I f  the rules and the machinery for accountability are to have an 
impact, it is important that international lawyers, on whom the task o f interpreting 
rules and devising new procedures will fall, examine institutional practice closely.
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The struggle for the accountability o f  the UN4 and o f  other international institutions is 
only at its beginning. I t will need a concerted effort o f  academics and practitioners to 
succeed, let alone the political will to bring about far-reaching changes. It would be 
unimaginably damaging for many individuals the world over, as well as for 
multilateralism itself, if international institutions, as they are entrusted with ever more 
powers, were to remain ‘unbound’.
4 The expression is taken from J. A. Fox, and L. D. Brown (eds.) The Strugglefor Accountability: The World 
Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements (1998).
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